D. K. Jain, J. ( 1 ) THIS order will dispose of two applications filed by the defendant under order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code (IA No. 8627/95) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (IA No. 8628/95) for setting aside the ex-parte decree passed against her on 6 April 1995 and for condonation of delay in filing the first application. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed a suit for possession of flat No. RU-196, Visakha Enclave ,pitampura, Delhi and for mesne profits against the defendant, her daughter in -law, with a further prayer for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to handover the documents of title relating to the property. The defendant resisted the suit, claiming that the said flat was acquired by her out of her Stri-Dhan and other savings. Pleadings in the suit were completed on 10th February 1992: the issues were framed on 20 December 1992 and the dates of trial were fixed on 12 April 1993 for plaintiff s evidence on 18 and 19 January 1995 and for defendant s evidence from 20 to 23 January 1995. The case was thereafter adjourned from time to time for filing list of witnesses and scrutiny before the Deputy Registrar and ultimately came up for trial on 18 January 1995 but was adjourned to 20 January 1995. As no one appeared for the defendant on all these dates, plaintiff s ex-parte evidence was recorded and on 6 April 1995 an ex-parte decree was passed against the defendant. Hence the present applications. ( 3 ) THE applications were filed on 7 September 1995, alleging that: (1) the ex-parte decree has been deceptively obtained by the plaintiff in connivance with her son, the defendant s husband, with whom divorce proceedings were pending, and he had assured her that the plaintiff would withdraw the present suit on her agreeing to divorce him, and (2) counsel had wrongly noted the dates of trial as being 18-19 January 1996 instead of actual dates of trial fixed as from 18 to 23 January 1995; it was an inadvertent error on the part of her counsel on account of which she could not appear in court and should not be made to suffer. It is stated that the defendant learnt about the ex-parte decree only on 22 August 1995, when the records were inspected in order to make a fresh application for the impleadment of DDA, who were pressing her for payment of remaining instalments, and the application has been filed bonafide, within 30 days from the date of knowledge of the decree dated 6 April 1995. ( 4 ) THE applications are resisted by the plaintiff, inter -alia, on the pleas that : (i) the application for setting aside the decree having been filed after the expiry of one month from the date of decree, it is barred by time; (ii) that the suit was not contested bonafide, the defendant/applicant was non-serious and in any case was extremely negligent throughout , in that (a) after fixation of the dates of trial, the case was listed before the Deputy Registrar number of times but no one appeared before him on her behalf (b) even the lists of witnesses were not filed by the defendant, (c) on all the dates of trial, the name of the counsel for the defendant was shown in the cause list, who, on one of the dates in fact appeared in this court in another case but did not appear in the present suit and (d) when the plaintiff s execution petition was listed on 26 July 1995, names of the parties were duly shown in the cause list but still no one appeared for her and (iii) the application is malafide; contains false averments; she and her counsel were aware of the actual dates of trial; the counsel engaged by the defendant, had inspected the case file on 13 October 1993 and 3 August 1994 and was fully aware of the dates of trial fixed from 18 to 23 January 1995. The defendant s plea that her counsel gave her the wrong dates of trial is termed as false and fraudulent for which she is liable to be prosecuted for criminal contempt. Defendant s allegation about the deception and assurance by plaintiff s son to withdraw the suit is also denied. It is stated that the defendant is herself a practising Advocate in this and the Supreme Court and she and Mr. Defendant s allegation about the deception and assurance by plaintiff s son to withdraw the suit is also denied. It is stated that the defendant is herself a practising Advocate in this and the Supreme Court and she and Mr. Upadhyay, the other counsel appearing for her in the case, were working together for quite sometime and thus, defendant s stand of contacting the counsel and his giving her wrong dates of trial is false and frivolous. ( 5 ) IN her rejoinder to the reply filed by the plaintiff, the defendant has attempted to explain away her knowledge of actual dates due to her counsel having inspected the file of the case on 13 October 1993 and 3 August 1994, by merely saying that on the first inspection he wrongly noted the dates and the second inspection was only for a limited purpose to ascertain if the plaintiff did or not appear on 24 March 1995 and the actual dates of trial were then not noted. Since the said explanation has material bearing on the stand of the defendant it would be appropriate to reproduce the same hereunder:- "that in reply to sub-para (V-a) of the preliminary objection that the counsel for the defendant inspected the file in 13. 10. 93 when he noted down the date for evidence on 18. 1. 96 and 19. 1. 96 instead of 18. 1. 95 and 19. 1. 95. As stated by the defendant in her application U/o. 9 R-13 that there were talks of reconciliation taking place between the defendant and the plaintiffs son from 24. 1. 94 to 7. 4. 94 and the same could not materialise due to the adamant attitude of the plaintiff her husband and her son to sell the premises RU-196, Visakha Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi-34 under question and were forcing the defendant to part with the possession of the premises on its sale, the defendant requested her counsel to inspect for a limited purpose the file in order to know whether the plaintiff had appeared in the matter on 24. 3. 94 or not and the same was confirmed to her by her counsel. however, her counsel in his bonafide inadvertence did not check the future dates fixed for recording of evidence in the said matter. The criminal contempt filed by the plaintiff is highly defamatory. 3. 94 or not and the same was confirmed to her by her counsel. however, her counsel in his bonafide inadvertence did not check the future dates fixed for recording of evidence in the said matter. The criminal contempt filed by the plaintiff is highly defamatory. scandulous, misconceived and is only filed with a view to (-) the defendant and her counsel before this Hon ble Court. (Emphasis added) ( 6 ) IN support of the above plea, the defendant has also filed independently an affidavit of the counsel, Mr. Ashwini Kumar. The relevant portion of the said affidavit is also reproduced below:- "1. That I have inspected the records of the aforesaid suit on 13. 10. 93 and mistakably noted the date of trial as on 18/19. 1. 1996. Accordingly when the defendant contacted me sometime in middle of April ,1994, I informed her of the date of the trial of the suit as 18/19. 1. 1996. 2. That subsequently, the defendant further instructed me to find out regarding the plaintiff s appearance in the matter on 24. 3. 94 in the suit before the High Court and also about the list of witnesses. I accordingly inspected the file again on 3. 8. 94 to find out as to whether the plaintiff had appeared on 24. 3. 95 and whether the list of witness has been filed by the plaintiff or not. Since I was in the bonafide impression about the date of trial having been fixed on 18/19. 1. 1996, I did not recheck the date of trial. (Emphasis added) ( 7 ) I have heard Mr. Y. P. Narula, learned counsel for the plaintiff and Mr. M. N. Krishnamani, learned senior counsel for the defendant/applicant. ( 8 ) MR. Krishnamani, while placing the entire blame for nonappearance of the defendant, on the wrong information about the dates of trial on her counsel Mr. Ashwini kumar, has submitted that the applicant could not be made to suffer for the negligence and lapse of her counsel. He has heavily relied on the aforenoted affidavit filed by the counsel. A passing reference is also made by him to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Anr Vs. Munshilal and Anr, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . ( 9 ) ON the other hand, Mr. He has heavily relied on the aforenoted affidavit filed by the counsel. A passing reference is also made by him to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rafiq and Anr Vs. Munshilal and Anr, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . ( 9 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Narula, while relying on the decisions of Supreme Court in Sri Lal Shah and Ors Vs. Gulabchand Sah (Dead) by LRs and Ors JT (1) 1993 (SC) 90 and Manick Chandra Nandy Vs Debdas Nandy and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 446 has contended that in the present case the period of limitation of 30 days to make the application for setting aside the decree dated 6 April 1995 was to commence from the date of decree and not when the defendant had gained knowledge of the decree and, therefore, her application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code is barred by limitation and the applicant having failed to show any sufficient cause for her non-appearance and also for dely in filing the application for condonation of delay, both the applications deserve to be dismissed. ( 10 ) THERE appears to be considerable force in the argument of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the present case would fall in the first part of Article 123 of the Limitation Act , 1963 and the period of limitation for filing the application under order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code had to be computed from the date of the decree, however, keeping in view the fact that the applicant has also filed an application under Section 5 of the said Act for condonation of delay , I consider it unnecessary to broach upon this issue in greater detail. Thus the only question, which requires consideration is whether there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the defendant from 18 to 23 January 1995 and for condoning the delay in filing application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true that the words "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. (See The State of West Bengal VS. The Administrator , Howrah Municipality and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 749 and Collector, Land Acquisition and Anr Vs. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353 ). (See The State of West Bengal VS. The Administrator , Howrah Municipality and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 749 and Collector, Land Acquisition and Anr Vs. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353 ). It is equally true that generally speaking a litigant may not be held responsible for the negligence of his counsel unless there is any remissness on the part of the litigant himself. ( 12 ) GENERALLY speaking , as held in Rafiq s case (supra), mistake of a Counsel who neglects or fails to appear in the case, when the party had done all that was required of him to ensure that the counsel would represent him on the hearings in court, may constitute a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code but it cannot be accepted as an abstract proposition of law or an inflexible rule and each case has to be decided on its own facts. However mere raising of such plea cannot be accepted as such and has to be tested on facts. ( 13 ) EXAMINING the facts of the present case in the light of the above broad principles. I find that the defendant applicant s stand is neither correct nor bonafide and appears as a patched up version, improved from stage to stage and have no hesitation in coming t the conclusion that the defendant has miserably failed to make out sufficient cause for her/or her counsel s non-appearance in court on the aforenoted dates of trial, for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 6 April 1995. ( 14 ) THE stand of the applicant in the application and in the afore-extracted paragraph of the rejoinder is that when talks for compromise failed and on 7 April 1994 the trial court fixed the divorce case on 6 July 1994 for evidence, she contacted her counsel to find out the progress in the present suit and it was at that stage that the counsel gave her the dates of trial as 18-19 January 1996 instead of actual dates of 18 to 23 January 1995, "as noticed after inspection of the record of the case". It is difficult to be believe , as the defendant would like to believed , that on the first inspection on 13 October 1993 defendant s counsel noted down wrong dates of trial and on the second inspection on 3 August 1994, he did not check them. According to the defendant, her counsel was neither required to nor inspected the dates of trial on the second occasion. ( 15 ) FROM the record I find that dates of trial were fixed on 12 April 1993. Between 12 April 1993 and 3 August 1994, the case was listed only on 26 October 1993 and 24 March 1994, when except for adjourning the case, no other orders of significance were passed. The only effective order available on record is the six line order made on 12 April 1993, when the dates of trial were fixed and it is beyond ones comprehension that when the counsel first inspects the record on 13 October 1993 he notes down wrong dates of trial and when he inspects the file again on 3 August 1994 he does not read the said six line order dated 12 April 1993 and would not notice and detect, if any, wrong noting had been done by him. ( 16 ) IT is also pertinent to note that the factum of applicant s counsel having inspected the case file on two occasions i. e. on 13 October 1993 and 3 August 1994, on which reliance is now placed, was not disclosed in the present applications and it was only when the plaintiff filed her reply to the applications, pointing out this fact, that the applicant came up with the afore -extracted explanation of "inspection for a limited purpose". I am constrained to say that defendant s explanation lacks bonafides and she has not come with clean hands. Interestingly, the same counsel at whose hands the applicant alleges to have suffered, has drafted and filed the present applications on 7 September 1995, without taking any such plea which has been taken in the rejoinder filed on 27 November 1995. Significantly, counsel s affidavit was also not filed along with the rejoinder. It was filed only on 11 March 1996 and that too when certain observations fell from the court while hearing arguments in plaintiff s application seeking vacation of order , staying the operation of warrants for possession issued in execution proceedings. Significantly, counsel s affidavit was also not filed along with the rejoinder. It was filed only on 11 March 1996 and that too when certain observations fell from the court while hearing arguments in plaintiff s application seeking vacation of order , staying the operation of warrants for possession issued in execution proceedings. The applicant is not an illiterate person, ignorant about the courts procedure. She is a practising Advocate in this Court and Supreme Court and is also involved in other personal litigation. Her plea of sufference at the hands of her counsel inspires little confidence. Having regard to these facts, I find it difficult to hold that the applicant is an innocent litigant, who has suffered injustice on account of default of her counsel, deserving relief in equity. ( 17 ) THE ratio of the decision of Supreme Court in Rafiq s case (Supra) that after entrusting the case to a lawyer, a party, who may be a villager, having no knowledge of the Court procedure, remains confident that the lawyer would look after his case well, is not applicable on the facts of the present case and is clearly distinguishable on facts. Here, the grossly negligent defendant is herself a practising advocate, well versed with the Court procedure. ( 18 ) IT appears that the intention of the defendant was to delay the proceedings in this case, in all probability to bargain in the divorce proceedings pending between her and plaintiff s son. ( 19 ) EVEN if the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code were to be condoned, there being no sufficient cause for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 6 April 1995, the decree would survive and as such IA 8628/95 is rendered infructuous. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, both the applications are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.