ORDER: 1. Aggrieved against the order of the first respondent dated 31.10.1995, the petitioner has filed this writ petition to quash the said order on various grounds. 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and involved in the manufacture of telecommunication equipments. The company has 1,658 number of employees on its rolls. As per the decision taken by All India Public Sector Sports Control Board, it was decided that the Sports Board should be constituted in all public sector undertakings. Such a Sports Board had been founded on 1.5.1974 by the petitioner. In view of the said decision, 4th respondent viz., Hindustan Teleprinters Sports and Welfare Board was constituted as a separate entity in the year 1974 by the petitioner-company. In order to widen the scope and activities to include cultural recreational and other social activities like film show, picnics etc., it has been decided to constitute a combined Sports and Welfare Board for the Company, with effect from 1.5.1974. The said Board was called as the “Hindustan Teleprinters Sports and Welfare Board.” The regular employees and members of the family only were eligible to participate in the activities organised by the Board as the Board was a separate entity. The Board of the Sports and Welfare was constituted by various officers of the petitioner- company and workers by equal representation. There were Divisional Committees which were functioning as Advisory Forum to the Board and the Board was responsible for all policy decision, allocation of finance etc., as per the Constitution of the Board. 3. The finance of the 4th respondent comprised of allotment from the petitioner- company income from shows, and tournaments and also donations from other sources which was also clearly stipulated in the Factory Instructions. All the partipating employees, were subject to displinary action of the sports and Welfare Board. All the above factual position clearly show that the 4th respondent was separate entity and was governed by its own Board and members. It was found that in order to facilitate and implement the activities of the Board effectively a need was felt to make use of the service of the “Markers” in addition to the voluntary services offered by the employees of the petitioner company. It was found that in order to facilitate and implement the activities of the Board effectively a need was felt to make use of the service of the “Markers” in addition to the voluntary services offered by the employees of the petitioner company. The second and third respondents had joined the Board in November, 1977 and 1975 respectively and are still working with the Board/ 4th respondent. It is further contended, while such is the position the petitioner- company received a notice from the first respondent dated 6.8.1991 requesting the petitioner- company to enter appearance before the first respondent. It was brought to the attention of the first respondent that the 4th respondent was an autonomous body and the petitioner has nothing to do with the case filed by the respondents 2 and 3. There is no ‘master’ and servant’ relationship between the petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3. It is also brought-to the notice of the first respondent that the 4th respondent has acceded that the second and third respondents were their employees and the 2nd and 3rd respondent could not be the employees of the petitioner. The first respondent, in spite of the valid objection of the petitioner by order dated 31.10.1995 passed the impugned order under Sec.3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status) Act, 1981. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-company has approached this Court as stated above. 4. On behalf of respondents 2 and 3 the 2nd respondent has filed a counter-affidavit. The case of the respondents 2 and 3 are briefly stated hereunder: Both the respondents 2 and 3 are working as “Markers”/ Peons since 1.1.1975 and 1.1.1977 respectively. They are also incharge of sports materials while practice and to collect the same and keep them in proper place. Apart from the responsibility as “Markers” they were also working as Peons/Attenders in the Welfare Department doing the job of Peon-cum- Attender since 1975 and 1977. They are working continuously under the petitioner and 4th respondent. They are paid Rs.750 only which is less than minimum wages prescribed for Attender-cum- Marker and not equivalent to the Class IV employees who are working under the petitioner. They made various representations to absorb them as permanent employees but the petitioner failed to give them permanent status. They are working continuously under the petitioner and 4th respondent. They are paid Rs.750 only which is less than minimum wages prescribed for Attender-cum- Marker and not equivalent to the Class IV employees who are working under the petitioner. They made various representations to absorb them as permanent employees but the petitioner failed to give them permanent status. In such circumstamce, they filed an applica- tion under Sec.3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Estab-lishment (Conferment of Permanent Status) Act (hereinafter called as the ‘Act’). As per Sec.3 it is mandatory on the part of the employees to confer permanent status of any workman who has completed 480 days of continuous service in a period of 24 calendar months. 5. Instead of complying with their request the petitioner herein filed a counter affidavit and contended that they are not a factory as defined under Sec.2(m) of the Factories Act nor an Industrial Establishment as under Sec.2(3)(c) of the Act. The only dispute was whether the 4th respondent in the main writ petition is part and parcel of the petitioner or not. The building of the 4th respondent is situate within the precincts of the petitioner and they are not paying rent for the premises occupied by the 4th respondent. Considering the oral and documentary evidence the first respondent passed the impugned order granting relief in favour of the respondents 2 and 3 herein. Since the above order is based on acceptable evidence absolutely there is no merit in the writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the same. 6. Fourth respondent has filed a separate counter affidavit wherein it is stated that the 4th respondent Board was constituted as a separate entity in the year 1974 by the writ petitioner. The 4th respondent Board alone is responsible for all policy decisions, allocation of finances etc., as per the constitution of the Board. In order to facilitate and implement the activities of the 4th respondent- Board effectively a need was felt to make use of service of ‘Markers’ who were employed on casual basis in the initial stage in the year 1977. They are looking after the work of the Board since then such as the maintenance of sports grounds, distribution of sports items to the members, looking after the equipments etc., the ‘Markers’ are employed by the Board on a casual basis. They are looking after the work of the Board since then such as the maintenance of sports grounds, distribution of sports items to the members, looking after the equipments etc., the ‘Markers’ are employed by the Board on a casual basis. Neither their working hours nor their working conditions are similar to that of the company's employees. Since the Board is run by the employees of the company for their own benefit, it is only natural that the building is within the company. However, the markers are employed by the Board which is not a factory nor an industrial establishment. The Board is free to employ if it deem it necessary. Only considering the situation of the building, the employees of the Board were issued with identity cards, so that only authorised per-for security reason. The ‘Markers’ are paid by the Board out of its own funds which are very meager. In other respects the 4th respondent wants to adopt an affidavit filed by the writ petitioner. 7. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr.Sanjaimohan learned counsel for the writ petitioner, Miss.Geetha for respondents 2 and 3 and Ms.Poornima Maduram for respondent 4. 8. Mr.Sanjaimohan learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) The first respondent has no jurisdiction under Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment and Permanent Status) Act, 1981 to go into the question, namely who is the employer of the second and third respondents, (ii) The first respondent having come to the conclusion that the second and third respondents have been in continuous service with the 4th respondent and eligible for permanent status with 4th respondent cannot seek to burden the petitioner herein with the second and third respondents by trying to bring about an axis between the petitioner and the 4th respondent. (iii) The first respondent ought not to have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is the employer of the second and third respondents. 9. (iii) The first respondent ought not to have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is the employer of the second and third respondents. 9. In support of the above contentions, he also relied on the following decisions: (a) Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen , (1996)3 S.C.C. 267 ; (b) Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Arunkumar Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Arunkumar Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Arunkumar , (1995)2 L.L.J. 15 and (c) All India Railway Institute EmployeesÂ' Association v. Union of India , (1991)2 L.L.J. 265 . 10. On the other hand Ms.Geetha, learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 after taking me through the order of the first respondent submitted. (i) there are enough evidence to show that the 4th respondent Board is part and parcel of the petitioner- company. Hence, the first respondent is competent to decide the issue; (ii) as per the provisions of Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status) Act as well as the provisions of the Factories Act, the conclusion reached by the first respondent cannot be assailed and he is competent to decide the issue relating to the claim made by the respondents 2 and 3; (iii) since the first respondent authority has decided the claim of the respondents 2 and 3 on dicial review by this Court under Art.226 is very limited. 11. To substantiate the above points she has relied on the following decisions: (a) Employees State Indusrances Corporation v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone and W.Mills Ltd. Employees State Indusrances Corporation v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone and W.Mills Ltd. Employees State Indusrances Corporation v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone and W.Mills Ltd. , (1994)2 L.L.J. 138; (b) Kirlosker Pneumatic Company Ltd. v. V.A. More Kirlosker Pneumatic Company Ltd. v. V.A. More Kirlosker Pneumatic Company Ltd. v. V.A. More , 1993 Lab.I.C. 1802; (c) Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani , 1974 Lab.I.C. 968; and (d) Wire Netting Stores v. Regional Provident Funds Commissioner , 1970 Lab.I.C. 1249. 12. Now, I shall consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. Now, I shall consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sec.3 of the Act deals with conferment of permanent status to the workman. Sec.4 deals with appointment of Inspectors and Sec.5 speaks about power and duties of the Inspectors. After taking me through the relevant sections of the Act as well as the Rules made thereunder, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent is not competent to decide who is the employer of the workmen, here respondents 2 and 3. With the facts available in this case the first respondent authority has to decide whether the Hindustan Teleprinters Sports Welfare Board is a separate entity and the petitioners are controlled by the above Board or the Board is a part and parcel of the main factory viz., Hindustan Teleprinters Limited. 13. In order to ascertain the above fact, the authority scrutinised the oral and documentary evidence as well as the activities of the Sports Welfare Board. When a workmen claim that their principal employer is only Hindustan Teleprinters and the stand of the management was mat both of them were working under the Hindustan Teleprinters Sports and Welfare Board, necessarily the first respondent herein has to take a decision with regard to the employers of the respondents 2 and 3 in the light of the evidence on record. Even though relying on Secs.4 and 5 of the Act as well as the Rules made thereunder, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the issue involved before the first respondent is beyond the competency of the first respondent, I am unable to accept the argument. In the light of the provisions referred to above as well as the evidence let in before him and in the light of the pleadings of both parties, I am of the view that the first respondent is competent to decide the claim of the respondents 2 and 3. Whether the order of the first respondent can be sustained or not on merits is a different thing and I shall consider the merits of his order in the following paragraphs. 14. It is seen that as per the decision taken by All India Public Sector Sports Control Board, it was decided that a Sports Board should be constituted in all Public Sector undertakings. 14. It is seen that as per the decision taken by All India Public Sector Sports Control Board, it was decided that a Sports Board should be constituted in all Public Sector undertakings. In pursuant to the said decision, the 4th respondent viz., Hindustan Teleprinters Sports and Welfare Board was constituted as a separate entity in the year 1974 by the petitioner-company. In order to appreciate the activities of the 4th respondent- Board, it is better to see the preamble of the 4th respondent- Board which is as follows: “The recreational activities of the employees of the Hindustan Teleprinters are now being looked after by the Hindustan Teleprinters Recreation Club formed on 15th August, 1963. In order to widen the scope and activities to include cultural, recreational and other social facilities like film shows, picnics etc., it has been decided to constitute a combined sports and welfare board for the Company with effect from 1.5.1974. This Board will be called the Hindustan Teleprinters Sports and Welfare Board.” 15. All the participating employees of the Company were subject to disciplinary action by the Board, (R4). The learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that one Assistant Personnel Officer-in charge is looking” after the sports activities along with the usual activities of the company as an additional assignment. In order to facilitate and implement the activities, the Board has decided to make use of the ‘Markers’ in addition to the voluntary services offered by the employees of the petitioner- company. Therefore, the second and third respondents were employed on casual basis by the 4th respondent. Both of them have joined the Board in November, 1977 and January, 1975 respectively and are still working with the Board/4th respondent. It is also brought to my notice that the 4th respondent was an autonomous body and had nothing to do with the petitioner. There is no ‘Master’ and ‘Servant’ relationship between the petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3. The 4th respondent has already acceded that the second and third respondents were their employees. The above factual position has been supported and reiterated by the 4th respondent once again. 16. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents 2 and 3 that they were doing the job of peon cum attender since from 1975 and 1977 and they were employed by the petitioner herein. The above factual position has been supported and reiterated by the 4th respondent once again. 16. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents 2 and 3 that they were doing the job of peon cum attender since from 1975 and 1977 and they were employed by the petitioner herein. Only the petitioner- company has conducted the interview. Neither the interview proceedings nor the appointment order were placed before the first respondent herein. Both the ‘Markers’ were given identity cards by the petitioner- company. In the identity cards in the column “Department”, it was mentioned as Welfare Department and the identity cards have been issued by the Security Officer to the petitioner-company. The identity cards were issued only to employees of the petitioner- company by the officer of the petitioner- company. They have also produced gate passes, vouchers, receipts received by the company, in order to prove that they are workmen under petitioner-company. In the payment vouchers only the emblem of the petitioner- company is printed. The Trade Mark and Emblem cannot be used by another independent organisation or institution without the permission of the said company. The 4th respondent Board is fully founded by the petitioner-company and they are not paying any rent for the premises which is situated within the premises of the petitioner- company, there is no independent officer of its own to the 4th respondent herein. All the above factual aspects have been considered by the first respondent and found in favour of the respondents 2 and 3. 17. On the above factual position, it is the case of the petitioner that the respondents 2 and 3 are employees of the 4th respondent- Board. On the other hand it is the definite contention of the ‘Markers’ i.e. respondents 2 and 3 that the 4th respondent- Board is part and parcel of the petitioner- company. Hence, according to them irrespective of the fact that they are working under the 4th respondent- Board, the order passed by the first respondent under Sec.3 of the Act is perfectly in order. 18. Hence, according to them irrespective of the fact that they are working under the 4th respondent- Board, the order passed by the first respondent under Sec.3 of the Act is perfectly in order. 18. After considering the various decisions referred to by both side, let me decide whether the order of the first respondent is justified or note Among all the decisions, the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen , (1996)3 S.C.C. 267 is very relevant for our case. In that case aggrieved against the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, the Reserve Bank of India filed an appeal before me Supreme Court. For carrying on the business the Bank employees various categories of staff such as Officers, Clerks, Stenographers, Typists etc., and Peons, Mazdoors, the Bank has been providing Canteen facilities to its employees in Classes III and IV. There is no obligation either under any statute or otherwise, for the Bank to run the canteens. It is so done only as a welfare measure. The Bank bears by way of subsidy to the extent of 95% of the costs incurred by the canteens for payment of salary, provident fund contribution, gratuity, uniform etc., and also provides premises, fixtures, utensils, furniture, electricity, water etc., free of charge. It is seen that the canteens are run either by “Implementation Committee (Canteen Committee) or” Co-operative Societies “ or ‘Contractors’ In that case the point at issue between the parties was whether the persons working in the various canteens aforesaid are employees of Reserve Bank of Indiae According to the Employees Federation since the R.B.I. under statutory obligation to provide canteen facilities to its employees and the same is being therefore done as such implementation committee(canteen committee) or Co-operative societies or contractors instead of Bank doing it on its own by employing persons directly. The employees, should be directed to be absorbed with retrospective effect and the Bank be directed to pay the difference of wages. The Bank disputed the claim made by the Federation on behalf of the workmen. The employees, should be directed to be absorbed with retrospective effect and the Bank be directed to pay the difference of wages. The Bank disputed the claim made by the Federation on behalf of the workmen. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal following the decision of the Apex Court in M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India , 1990 S.C.C. (Supp.) 191 directed the employees employed in the canteen are employees of the Reserve Bank of India and granted the relief as prayed for. Analysing the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in M.M.R. Khan's case, the Apex Court has observed thus: ”…One aspect is clear. The Reserve Bank of India (the Bank) is under no statutory or other legal obligation to provide canteen facilities to its employees. The tribunal has not found any such statutory or legal obligation in the Bank. That apart, we have to bear in mind the following salient features in the matter of recruitment of staff by the Banks. It is a well-known fact that recruitment of staff (inclusive of Class IV) to the banks is done by a Selection Board, and there are guidelines governing the process of selection…. So also in the case of Reserve Bank of India, the process of selection and recruitment of the staff if by a different Board and appropriate qualifications are prescribed for the particular posts. In the case of persons employed in the canteens, they are not subject to die rigour and discipline of the above rules and methods of selection. This distinguishing feature is relevant in adjudicating the controversy raised herein. In the case of persons employed in the canteens, they are not subject to die rigour and discipline of the above rules and methods of selection. This distinguishing feature is relevant in adjudicating the controversy raised herein. The tribunal has held that (1) Regarding canteens run by the Implementation Committee, the Bank exercises “remote control”, which is as effective as any, (para 26 of the award) ‘ (2) Regarding the canteens run by co-operative societies, the Tribunal has held that they are nonstatutory but recognised canteens and by nominating the representative of the Bank to the Committee, it exercises control (para 28 of the award); (3) Regarding the canteens run by contractors, “non-statutory”, “non-recognised canteens”, in the absence of distinguishing features highlighted in para 38 of the decision M.M.R. Khan case, they could be said to be “recognised canteens” by the Bank and the persons employed by the contractors are also entitled to the benefit similar to the one afforded to persons employed in the canteens run by the Implementation Committee and cooperative societies (para 32 of the award). The question that falls for our consideration is whether the aforesaid view of the tribunal is justified in law, holding that the instant case is covered by the decision of this Court in M.M.R. Khan case. The test to determine as to whether a person is a workman and the relationship of master and servant exists in a particular case has been laid down by this Court in innumerable decisions. The test to determine as to whether a person is a workman and the relationship of master and servant exists in a particular case has been laid down by this Court in innumerable decisions. In one of the earliest oft-quoted cases, Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra , A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 264, delivering the judgment of the four-member Bench, Bhagwati.J. considered in detail the various decisions on the point and laid down the law thus: “The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do but also manner in which he shall do his work, or to borrow the words of Lord Uthwatt at page 23 in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. The proper test is whether or not the hirer had authority to control the manner of execution of the act in question’. The nature or extent of control which is requisite to establish the relationship of employer and employee must necessarily vary from business to business and is by its very incapable of precise definition. The correct method of approach, therefore, would be to consider whether having regard to the nature of the work there was due control and supervision by the employer…” (emphasis supplied) The above decision was followed by a three-member Bench in Chintaman Rao State of M.P. In this decision the court also observed thus: (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1340) “There is, therefore, a clear-cut distinction between a contractor and a workman. The identifying mark of the latter is that he should be under the control and supervision of the employer in respect of the details of the work.” …..In applying the law laid down by this Court, as stated above, we should distinguish those line of cases, where a statutory liability is cast on the employer for maintaining the canteen viz., as per Sec.46 of the Factories Act or due to the extend meaning given to the definition of the word ‘employer’ in the particular statute, any other person like a contractor to whom an owner of the undertaking had entrusted the execution of any work which was ordinarily part of an undertaking or industry was also covered. See in this connection Saraspur Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ramanlal Chimanlal and Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. We should at once state that the principles laid down in those line of cased cannot apply herein, since admittedly (a) no statutory liability is cast on the Bank to run a canteen and Sec.46 of the Factories Act is inappli- cable herein; and (b) the Industrial Disputes Act does not contain an extended definition of the word ‘employer’.” After stating the law on this point as above, Their Lordships have held, “In our opinion, the said reasoning and conclusion of this Court in M.M.R. Khan case rested on its own facts." Their Lordships have also further held, “Even according to the Tribunal, the Bank exercises only a remote control’. We are of the view that in the absence of any obligation, statutory or otherwise,regardjng the running of a canteen by the Bank and the details relating there to similar to Factories Act or the Railway Establishment Manual, and in the absence of any effective or direct control in the Bank to supervise and control the work done by various persons, the workers in the canteen run by the Implementation committee (Canteen committee) cannot come within the ratio laid down by this Court in M.M.R. Khan case.” Finally, their Lordships concluded, “we, therefore, hold that the assumption made by the Tribunal that the instant case clearly falls within the ratio laid down by this Court in M.M.R. Khan case, is totally unjustified and incorrect. On the facts of this case, in the absence of any statutory or other legal obligation and in the absence of any right in the Bank to supervise and control the work or the details thereof in any manner regarding the canteen workers employees in the three types of can-teens, it cannot be said that the relationship of master and servant existed between the Bank and the various persons employed in three types of canteens. 166 persons mentioned in the list attached to the reference are not workmen of the Reserve Bank of India and that they are not comparable employees employed in the Officers’ lounge. Therefore, the demand for regularisation is unsustainable and they are not entitled to any relief. We hold that the award passed by the tribunal is factually and legally unsustainable.” 19. No doubt, the first respondent i.e., the statutory authority as well as the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 very much relied on Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Aruri Kumar Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Aruri Kumar Director General, E.S.I.C. and others v. M.Aruri Kumar , (1995)2 L.L.J. 15 . In that case, their Lordships have held the Sports Board was an inbuilt part of the larger establishment of the ESIC. and nomination to the Board or other authorities within the hierarchy was intended to be filled up by nomination. The conduct of the Sports Board was therefore available to be reviewed by the disciplinary authority of the ESIC. and if there was any delinquency in the Sports Body by the employees of the Corporation, the disciplinary authority has jurisdiction to take notice of the same. The following passage has been very much relied on by the authority as well as the counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, thus: “We have heard learned Attorney General in support of the appellant and respondent's counsel. We are of the view that the tribunal lost sight of the basic feature that the sports body was an inbuilt part of the larger establishment of the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and a nomination to the Board or other sports authorities within the hierarchy was intended to be filled up by the nomination. Therefore, half of the members of the sports body was manned by the representative bodies of the ESI. Corporation on the basis of nomination. Therefore, half of the members of the sports body was manned by the representative bodies of the ESI. Corporation on the basis of nomination. The conduct of the sports body was, therefore, available to be reviewed by the Disciplinary Authority of the Corporation and if mere was any delinquency shown in the sports body by the employees of the Corporation the Disciplinary Authority had jurisdiction to take notice of the same. Even counsel for the respondent is not prepared to support the view of the tribunal on this score. We accordingly, vacate the finding of the tribunal that the Disciplinary Authority had no jurisdiction to maintain the proceeding.” 20. A careful scrutiny of the above judgment shows that in that case the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the Sports Board of the ESI. Corporation has been entrusted to ESI. Corporation. In other words, ESI. Corporation is a disciplinary authority for the persons working in the sports Board nominated by ESI. Corporation. Apart from this the counsel for the other side had not disputed the above factual position in mat case. That was the reason for holding that the disciplinary authority in the ESI. Corporation is competent to take action against the persons working in the Sports Board. That is not the position in our case. I have already extracted the pleadings of the respective parties. The disciplinary action in respect of persons working with the 4th respondent lies with 4th respondent only. Hence, the judgment referred above is distinguishable and I am in entire agreement with the argument make by Mr.Sanjaimohan with regard to the above decision. 21. In All India Railway Institute Employees Association v. Union of India All India Railway Institute Employees Association v. Union of India All India Railway Institute Employees Association v. Union of India , (1991)2 L.L.J. 265 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the employees of the Railway Institute/Clubs are need not necessarily be employees of the Railways. In spite of the provisions in the Railway Establishment Manual with regard to the employees working in the Railway Institutes/ Clubs in the said decision the Supreme Court negatived the plea made by the employees that they may be treated as employees of the railway administration. The said decision supports me case of the petitioner. 22. In spite of the provisions in the Railway Establishment Manual with regard to the employees working in the Railway Institutes/ Clubs in the said decision the Supreme Court negatived the plea made by the employees that they may be treated as employees of the railway administration. The said decision supports me case of the petitioner. 22. The learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 relied on the decision of a Bombay High court reported in ESIC and another v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. and others ESIC and another v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. and others ESIC and another v. G.N. Mathur, Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. and others , (1994)2 L.L.J.138 and also another decision of the same High Court reported in Kirloskar Pneumatic Co.Ltd. v. More and others Kirloskar Pneumatic Co.Ltd. v. More and others Kirloskar Pneumatic Co.Ltd. v. More and others , 1993 Lab.I.C. 1802. After taking me through both the decisions, she contended that the first respondent is competent to decide the issue viz., whether the 4th respondent is part and parcel of the petitioner- company or a separate entity. Since, I have already decided the first issue in favour of the respondents 2 and 3 holding that in the light of the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder first respondent is competent to decide the same. Hence, therefore no need to elaborate the said issue with reference to the above decisions. She also cited the following decision with regard to the jurisdiction of the first respondent. (i) M/s.Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani and others M/s.Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani and others M/s.Martin Burn Ltd. v. T.G. Moorjani and others , 1974 Lab.I.C. 968. The reading of the said two decisions show that, it is open to the authority to conduct a preliminary enquiry with regard to the employer and employee relationship. Here also, since I have already accepted the case of the respondents 2 and 3 and found that the authority is competent to render a finding there is no need to elaborate further. 23. The facts in our case shows that respondents 2 and 3 herein were appointed by the Sports Board (4th respondent). Here also, since I have already accepted the case of the respondents 2 and 3 and found that the authority is competent to render a finding there is no need to elaborate further. 23. The facts in our case shows that respondents 2 and 3 herein were appointed by the Sports Board (4th respondent). In order to show that the respondents 2 and 3 even though function under me 4th respondent form part of the petitioner- company, it is submitted that they were given identity cards by the petitioner- company, the same has been issued by the Security Officer of the petitioner- company. Moreover only the members of the petitioner- company are permitted to participate in the 4th respondent Sports Board. The office of the 4th respondent Sports Board is also located within me premises of the petitioner- company. Apart from this the officers of the Sports Board have been nominated by the petitioner- company. Hence, it is contended that the 4th respondent herein has no independent function and the same is functioning only under the roof of the petitioner herein. In spite of similar facts in the Reserve Bank of India case, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the recent judgment reported in Employees in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employees in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen Employees in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen , (1996)3 S.C.C. 267 , have held that in the absence of any statutory or other legal obligation and in the absence of any right in the Bank to supervise and control the work or details thereof in any manner regarding the canteen workers employed in the three types of canteens, it cannot be said that the relationship of master and servant existed between the Bank and various persons employed in the three types of canteens. The conclusion of the Apex Court in the said decision is directly applicable to our case. Here also there is no statutory or legal obligation on the part of the petitioner- company to run the 4th respondent Sports Board. In such circumstance, the demand of regularisation of respon-dents 2 and 3 in the petitioner- company cannot be sustained. Accordingly, I hold that the order passed by the first respondent is factually and legally unsustainable. 24. Here also there is no statutory or legal obligation on the part of the petitioner- company to run the 4th respondent Sports Board. In such circumstance, the demand of regularisation of respon-dents 2 and 3 in the petitioner- company cannot be sustained. Accordingly, I hold that the order passed by the first respondent is factually and legally unsustainable. 24. Net result, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the first respondent dated 31.10.1995 is quashed. No costs. 25. In view of disposal of the main writ petition, W.M.P. Nos.3433, 8303 of 1996 and 2210 of 1997 are closed as no order necessary. Petition allowed.