Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 22.4.1988 contained in Annexure 8 to the petition by which the services of the petitioner had been terminated. The factual gamut of the case as revealed by the record is that petitioner was appointed as Gram Sewak (V.L.W.) on 18.1.1985 on purely temporary basis for a period of 29 days or till the regularlyselected candidates are made available by the District Establishment Committee (hereinafter called D.E.C.). The services of the petitioner were extended several times for a period of 29 days and it came to an end in July 1986. As the regular selected candidates were not made available by D.E.C. petitioner was given appointment vide order dated 6.10.1986 contained in Annexure 2 to the petitionfor a period of six months purely on temporary basis and there has been no further extension of his services. However, petitioner claims that he continued to work without any extension of his services and he has been removed from service vide impugned order dated 22.4.1988. (2). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner has challenged the impugnedorder dated 22.4.1988 mainly on the ground that there was a Government order dated 20.1.1988 contained in Annex.4 to the petition, to the effect that all temporary V.L.Ws. appointed subsequent to December 31, 1985 be removed and as the petitioner had been appointed prior to the said date, his termination is illegal and contrary to the Government order. (3). Heard Shri A.K. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.L. Jangid, learned counsel for the respondents. (4). It has been contended by the petitioners counsel that the termination order is contrary to Government order dated 20.1.1988 and thus the termination is illegal. There is no force in this contention as the petitioner had not worked conti-nuously from the date prior to 31.12.1985 and there has been a gap in his service. Infact he has worked regularly from 13th December, 1986 as is revealed by order dated 15.4.1988 contained in Annexure 6 to the writ petition. The impugned termination order itself makes it clear that before passing it respondent No.3 had sought a report from respondent No.2 and it was reported therein, that the peti-tioner had not been in continuous service from the date prior to 31st December, 1985. The impugned termination order itself makes it clear that before passing it respondent No.3 had sought a report from respondent No.2 and it was reported therein, that the peti-tioner had not been in continuous service from the date prior to 31st December, 1985. On the contrary, petitioner himself has stated in paragraph 3 of the petition that he worked up to July, 1986 and then was subsequently appointed vide order dated 6.10.1986. There is no evidence or material on record which may justify the claim of the petitioner and thus the submission made is not tenable. Itis next urged that once petitioner has been allowed to work for a long period, he could not have been removed from service. Petitioner was holding a post temporarily, thus he cannot claim that he was having any right to the post, and his termination is contrary to law. In State of U.P. and another vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (1) the Apex Court has categorically held as under : ``Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. (5). In case like the instant the Court has to be satisfied as what is the legally justiciable right of the petitioner which has been infringed and for which the petitioner can resort to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitu-tion of India. The Supreme Court in Purshotam Lal Dingra vs. Union of India (2) has held that ``A person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier and further held that a Government Servant holding a post temporarily does not have any right to hold the said post. In R.K. Mishra vs. U.P. State Handloom Corporation (3)the Apex Court has observed as under : ``Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service Rules and the terms of contract of service. . . . . . . . . . . . . (6). . . . . . . . . . . . . (6). A temporary Government servant has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Government servants. Similarly in Triveni Shankar Saxena vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (4); Commissioner ofFood and Supply vs. Prakash Chandra Saxena (5); Ram Chandra Tripathi vs. U.P. Public Service Tribunal and Others (6); Madhya Pradesh Hasth Shilp Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Devendra Kumar Jain and Another (7) and Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra) the Apex Court has categorically held that incumbent to a post who has been given appointment on temporary basis, terminable without notice has no right tohold the post and he is, not entitled of any opportunity of hearing before his services is dispensed with as his termination does not amount to forfeiture of any legal right. (7). In Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India (8), the Honble Apex Court has placed reliance on the observations made in Malloch vs. Aberddeen Corporation (9) where-in it has been observed as under : ``A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice or an essential administrative fault cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain. (8). Shri A.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out what is the legally justiciable right of the petitioner which has been infringed or for the enforcement of the same the writ petition has been filed. It is well settled law that writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory right or when there is a complaint by a person that there is a breachof statutory duty on the part of the respondent. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction (State of Kerala vs. K.G. Madhavan Pillai (10);State of Kerala vs. Smt. A Laxmikutty (11); Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. vs. State of Haryana (12) and Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (13). Thus I find no substance in this contention also. (9). It has next been contended by Shri A.K. Singh, that there are large number of judgments of this Court wherein, the writ petitions have been allowed only on the ground that the employees have been permitted to work under the interim orders of the Court for a long period and as in the instant case, the petitioner had been granted interim order on 2.5.1988 and petitioner is working till today on the basis of the said interim order, petitioner cannot now be removed from the service. I am afraid the contention raised is preposterous and if accepted, would have very serious repercussions and it is beyond imagination of any person as what would happen if this principle is extended to the criminal cases. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of his case in the Court of law. Interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the caseand if the writ petition is dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. Petitioner cannot take any benefit of his wrong of getting interim order and, thereafter, blame the Court. The fact that writ petition is found devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition has been filed. The maxim ``Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the actof the Court shall prejudice no one. It is well settled principle of law to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delay occasioned by the act of the Court. Thus any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delay occasioned by the act of the Court. (Vide Grindlays BankLtd. vs. Income Tax Officer Calcutta & Ors. (14); Ram Krishna Verma vs. State of U.P. (15); Dr. A.K. Sirkar vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (16); Shiv Shankar & Ors. vs. Board of Directors UPSRTC & Anr. (17) and M/s. Kannauria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. Electricity Board (18). (10). In the instant case petitioner has been the beneficiary of interim orderand respondents suffered as they could not fill up the post by regular selection because of the interim order passed in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, judgments to the effect that a petition is liable to be allowed only because petitioner has been allowed to work for a long period, under the interim orders of the Courts, are liable to be ignored, being contradictory to law of the land. Rather it is theduty of the Court to rectify the mistake as in Hotel Bala Ji and Ors. vs. Andhra Pradesh and Others (19), the Supreme Court observed as under : ``To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of the judicial conscience. (11). In the instant case, such judgments are liable to be ignored becauseof the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. While explaining the scope of Article 141, the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore vs. State of Punjab (20) has observed as under: ``Under Article 141, the law declared by it is of a binding character and as commandful as the law made by a legislative body or an authorised delegatee of such body. . . . . . . . Their Lordships decisions declare the existing law but do not enact any fresh law. is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of the law as existing but much beyond that. The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is. (12). is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of the law as existing but much beyond that. The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is. (12). In Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director Punjab Industries (21) the contention, that though her appointment had been in contravention of the Rules of recruitment but as she worked for 16 years under the interim orders of the Courts, her services should be regularised and it would not be justified to removeher from service after continuous working for such a long period, was rejected by the Honble Apex Court holding that once an appointment is illegal it cannot gain legality at a subsequent stage and the Court cannot issue a direction to allow her to continue in service only on such ground. (13). In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the services of the petitioner cannot be regularised merely on the ground that he is continuously working for last several years under the interim orders of this Court. Passing such order cannot be justified for the reason that the respondents could not fill up the post because of the interim order of this Court and eligible candidate who could have been considered for the post have been deprived of their legitimate rights to be considered for the post. Moreover, continuation of petitioner after the lapse of period of six months, after his reappointment vide order dated 6.10.1986, is contrary to the Rules and thus cannot be taken into consideration. The services of Gram Sewaks are governed by the provisions of Rajas-than Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishads Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act) and Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishads Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called the Rules.) Section 31(4) provides that all temporary appointments shall be made by the Panchayat Samiti in the prescribed manner from selected candidates for the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Services cons-tituted under Section 86. Section 86(6) provides that appointment by direct recruitment shall be made by a Panchayat Samiti in accordance with the rules made in this behalf by the State Government from the persons selected for the post in a grade or cadre in the district by sub-section (1) of Sec. 88. Sec. 86(8) further provides that the appointing authority may, so long as regular selectionis not made by D.E.C. and selected condidates are not made available for appointment, make appointments in the prescribed manner on a temporary basis of a period not exceeding six months and the said period may be extended for a period of six months only after consultation with D.E.C. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he was not appointed from the selected candidates for the postin the district by the D.E.C. after following the procedure laid down for direct recruitment under Rules 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1959. His appointment was purely temporary and was made under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1959. Rule 23(1) provides that no temporary appointment shall be made for a period exceeding six months. The nearest employment Exchange shall also be asked tosend a panel of names of persons possessing the requisite qualification. The period of such temporary appointment may, however, be extended beyond six months only with the previous concurrence of the Committee and the temporary appointment made under this Rule shall not be continued for period of exceeding 12 months without the prior concurrence of the Commission. In the instant caseit is clear from the facts narrated aboved that the temporary appointment of the petitioner remained continuous beyon six months without the previous concurrence of the D.E.C. and beyond 12 months without prior concurrence of the Commission. Infact Rule 23(6) automatically extinguishes the services of a temporary employee as it provides that temporary appointee of this nature shall bedeemed to have vacated his office and shall not be entitled to any salary thereafter. Therefore, allowing the petitioner to continue after the period of six months was not only contrary to the Rules but was arbitrary. (14). The rule of law inhibits arbitrariness and any arbitrary action is liable to be invalidated. Every acton of the State or its instrumentalities should be fair,legitimate and above board. The action should be without any affection or oversion, it should not be even suggestive of discrimination. (14). The rule of law inhibits arbitrariness and any arbitrary action is liable to be invalidated. Every acton of the State or its instrumentalities should be fair,legitimate and above board. The action should be without any affection or oversion, it should not be even suggestive of discrimination. The acts of the State instrumentality should not even apparently be given the impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. (Vide Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther vs. Kerala Financial Corporation (22). In Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress(23), the Supreme Court observed as under : ``In a system governed by a rule of law discretion when conferred upon the executive authorities, must be confined within definite limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decision should be made by the application by known- principles and rules and in general, such decisions should be predicatable and the citizen should know whether he is. (15). It is settled law that when the action of the State or its instrumentalities is not as per the rules or regulations or supported by a statute, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction to declare such an act to be a nullity. In Sirsi Municipality vs. Cocelia Kom Francis Tellis (24) the Supreme Court observed that the ratio is that the rules or the regulations are binding on the authorities. Similarly, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sukhdeo Singh and Ors. vs. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Rajvanshi and Others (25) has observed as under : ``The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction to declaration by courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular Conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard. The statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the employees a statutory status and impose restriction on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the conditions. An ordinary individual in a case of master and servat contactual relationship enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies. An ordinary individual in a case of master and servat contactual relationship enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies. In the case of statutory bodies it has been said that the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observations of rules and regulations. Failure to observe requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring dismissal in violation of rules and regulations to be void. (16). Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Ambica Querry Works vs. State of Gujarat (26); Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhan (27) and in Ram Chand and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. (28) and held that the exercise ofthe power should not be made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tend towards arbitrariness. (17). However, before parting with the case, I would like to point out that it is well known Rule of practice and procedure that at inter locutory stage a relief which is asked for and is available at the final disposal of the matter cannot be gran-granted, unless, there is any special reason which is to be indicated in clear terms in inter-locutory order. (Vide U.P. Junior. Doctors Action Committee vs. Sheetalnadwani (29); St. Johans Teachers Training Institutions vs. State of Tamil Nadu (30) and State of Maharashtra vs. V.S. Roundale and Ors. (31). In Guru Nank Deo University vs. Parmindar Kumar Bansal (32), the Honble Supreme Court has obser-ved as under : ``We are afraid that, this kind of administration of interlocutory remedies, more guided by sympathy quite often wholly misplaced, does no service to anyone...... We find that loose, ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing judicial discretion to the criticism of degenerating into private benevolence..... Decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensue from the interim order itself. (18). Thus, in a case like this, to grant an interim injunctio n is not justifiedas it has caused great prejudice to the respondents as well to other eligible candidates, who could have applied for the post and could have been considered. (18). Thus, in a case like this, to grant an interim injunctio n is not justifiedas it has caused great prejudice to the respondents as well to other eligible candidates, who could have applied for the post and could have been considered. (19). Thus, for the reasons recorded above, I am of the considered opinion that the petition is devoid of any merit and hence dismissed. However, as petitioner has worked for about a decade, the respondents may consider his candidature for the same/or similar post, whenever the appointments are made on regular basis, provided he fulfils all other eligibitilies, granting him relaxation of age, if it is so required. No costs.