JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner was appointed on casual basis on 1.4.1982 and was regularised on 16.6.1983 as a Village Extension Worker. Subsequently petitioner being an Office Bearer of his Union wrote several letters against the respondent No. 3 and in Annexure-9 there is an allegation against the respondent No. 4 only to the extent that the sons of a Contractor were meeting him. Petitioner was not attending the service from 28.8.1987. There were several allegations and charges against the petitioner including misuse of the funds, non-payment of the dues to the milk producers, interference in Court cases, misbehaviour with the officers and employees of the Federation. Letters written by the respondents could not be served upon the petitioner. Respondents tried to serve the petitioner by sending registered letters but in vain. Ultimately, respondents resorted to the mode of substituted service by making publication in the news paper on 14.1.1988 by which the petitioner was asked to file a reply to the charges against him. Petitioner demanded the documents including charge-sheet and the same were served upon him on 10.6.1988. Admittedly petitioner did not file any reply to the charges. Apprehending that respondent No.4 would be biased against him, petitioner asked for change of inquiry officer i.e. respondent No. 4. Respondents proceeded with ex parte enquiry against the petitioner and awarded the punishment of termination of his services vide letter dated 4.10.1988 contained in Annexure 25 to the writ petition. 2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner preferred the instant petition challenging the said order dated 4.10.1988. 3. Heard Shri R.S. Saluja learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri D.K. Parihar learned counsel for the respondents. 4. Shri Parihar, learned counsel for the respondents raises a preliminary issue that there is a statutory remedy provided u/R. 9 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Dairy Federation Employees (Disciplinary action and appeal) Regulations, 1980 and the petitioner preferred the instant petition without exhausting the statutory remedies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G. Virapillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 ; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopinath, 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 312 and in Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 603 has specifically held that where the statutory remedy is provided, the writ petition should not generally be entertained and parties be directed to avail the statutory remedies. (2) SCC 312 and in Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 603 has specifically held that where the statutory remedy is provided, the writ petition should not generally be entertained and parties be directed to avail the statutory remedies. However, this writ petition is pending here for last eight years and in the case of Dr. B.P. Agarwal v. State of U.P., (1995) 1 SCC 614 , it has been held by the Apex Court that the Court should not relegate the parties to the alternative or statutory remedy, if the petition has been pending since long. Therefore, the petition is heard on merit. 5. Admittedly petitioner did not file reply to the charge-sheet. In State of U.P. v. T.P. Lal Srivastava, (1996) 10 SCC 702 , the Apex Court has held that if an employee in spite of an opportunity given to him by the employer, has not come forward with the reply to the charge-sheet, the employer has right to proceed against him ex parte, as the employee has loss the right of defence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "Instead of submitting reply to the charge-sheet, he went on dilly-dellying in submitting the reply ...... Since the respondent had avoided to give the reply, he has forgone his right to submit his reply." 6. In the instant case, as petitioner lost the right to defence, respondents concluded inquiry against petitioner ex parte and passed the impugned termination order. Shri Saluja has vehemently urged that the impugned order is arbitrary and mala fide and has been passed having grudge against petitioner. Once petitioner demanded for the change of inquiry officer for having apprehension of being biased, the impugned inquiry and order vitiate only on that ground alone. The issue of mala fides has been considered by the Apex Court in, the case of Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1977 (2) SCR 198 , and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "It has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well established rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant in regard thereto, we do not think that they could be considered as sufficient to establish "malus animus"." 7. In E.P. Rayappa v. State of Taniil Nadu, 1974 (2) SCR 348 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "Secondly,the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made that proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility ..... therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it maybe noted that top administrators are, often required to act which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may land themselves to mis-constructions and suspicious as to the bona fide of their author when the full facts and surrendering circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration." 8. The Supreme Court in M/s. Sukliwiiider Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 31 has observed as under:- "The Court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The burden of establishing mala fides, lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned order of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias of misuse by the Government of its powers." 9. In the case of Dr. The burden of establishing mala fides, lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned order of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias of misuse by the Government of its powers." 9. In the case of Dr. Mahesli Madhav Gosavi v. Shivajirao Nilangerkar Patil, (1987) 1 SCC 228 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "That it was somewhat unfortunate that allegations of mala fide which could have no foundation in fact were made and several cases which had come up before this Court and other Courts and it had been found that these were made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of which might at least stick. It is therefore the duty of the Courts, warned this Court in the said decision, to scrutinise these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them in case where they have no foundation in fact ....... Therefore, while the Court should be conscious to deal with the allegations of mala fide case aspersions on holders of high office and power, the Court cannot ignore the probabilities arising from proved circumstances." 10. In the case of M. Sliankarnarayana v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 1 SCC 54 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "It may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution surmise on conjecture " 11. Petitioner's counsel could not point out any serious allegations against respondent No. 4 except a bald statement in a complaint contained in Annexure 9 that sons of a Contractor were seen the respondent No. 4, I am of the considered opinion that the said accusation alone falls short to be an issue of mala fides. 12. The issue of apprehension of bias is also no more res-integra. 12. The issue of apprehension of bias is also no more res-integra. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the test of real likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information, would have sought that bias was likely to adversely affect the decision and the test of likelihood of bias is to be determined taking the relevant factor into consideration and what is relevant is "the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the parties" and if the Court having regard to the antecedent events, reaches the conclusion of bias, in that case the Court may declare the proceedings coram non-judice. For reaching that conclusion the Hon'ble Supreme Court had relied upon various judgments particularly, in Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education & Registration, (1894) 1 QB 750 ; Vassiliades v. Vassiliades, AIR 1945 PC 38 & Metropolitan Properties Companies (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 . Thus, the ratio remains that a judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality, is a nullity and the proceedings "coram non-judice". 13. In International Air Port Authority of India v. K.D. Bali & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 1099 , the Supreme Court considered the aspect of bias and relied upon the judgment in King (De Vesei) v. Justices of Queens Country, (1908) 2 IR 285 , wherein it had been as under:- "There must ...... be reasonable evidence to satisfy ....... that there was a real likelihood of bias. I do not think that their vague suspicion of whimsical capricious and unreasonable people should be made a standard to regulate our action here ...... Certainly mere flimsy ground elusively generated and morbid suspicion should not be permitted to form a ground of decision." 14. After relying upon the aforesaid judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that parity of administration requires that the party to the proceedings should not have an apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to decide against the party, but at the same time it is also equally true that it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The Supreme Court has approved and applied the law laid down in Ranjit Thakur (supra) in Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 417 and Jiwan Kumar Lohia & Anr. v. Durgadutt Lohia, AIR 1992 SC 188 . Some view has been taken in Tilak Chand Magat Rani Obhan v. Kamla Prasad Shukla, 1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 21 . In the instant case petitioner has not led any factual foundation for reasons of being biased. Thus the apprehension of petitioner was without any basis whatsoever. 15. In view of the above, there is no force in the writ petition and is accordingly dismissed.Writ dismissed. *******