JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :---At the outset the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 viz. Smt. Kashibai and Smt. Chandrabhaga had died during pendency of appeal and their names be deleted from array of parties. Order accordingly. 2.The interesting question of considerable importance that arises in the second appeal is: Whether in the erstwhile Kolhapur State a brother could be taken in adoption by his brother or such adoption was prohibited in view of Wat-hukuma of 1920 issued by the then Kolhapur State?" 3.The facts, so far as material, are capable of being stated with utmost brevity. One Dattaji resident of village Shiroli, taluka-Hatkanangle within the then Kolhapur State died in the year 1907 leaving behind his widow Radhabai. The said Radhabai in the year 1920 adopted Pandurang as their son. Pandurang had two wives Smt. Kashibai and Smt. Chandrabhaga. No issue was born to the Pandurang from either of the wives and on 14-12-1944 he adopted his brother Shankar. The adoption was notified in the Kolhapur State Gazette on 13-12-1945. On 26th June, 1949 the partition is alleged to have taken place between Pandurang and his adopted son Shankar. On 1st June, 1967 Pandurang died leaving behind his mother Radhabai, his two wives Smt. Kashibai and Smt. Chandrabhaga, and adopted son Shankar alias Dattatraya. Smt. Radhabai (original plaintiff) filed a suit for partition and separate possession of the properties, details of which were given in the plaint and according to her she had half share in the said property and the remaining half share belonged to Smt. Kashibai and Smt. Chandrabhaga, two wives of Pandurang. The case set-out by the original plaintiff was that Shankar alias Dattatraya has no interest in the property and was not entitled to any share since his adoption was not legal and valid. In the suit, the two wives of Pandurang viz. Smt. Kashibai and Smt. Chandrabhaga were impleaded as defendants No. 1 and 2 respectively, Shankar alias Dattatraya was impleaded as defendant No. 3 and one Rangrao Rajaram Patil who is alleged to have purchased some property from defendant No. 2 was impleaded as defendant No. 4. The plaintiff's case has been resisted by the defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 and according to them the defendant No. 3 was validly adopted by Pandurang. The plaintiff's case has been resisted by the defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 and according to them the defendant No. 3 was validly adopted by Pandurang. A plea of adverse possession was also set-out by defendant No. 3 with regard to R.S. No. 183/2 and 225/7-B. The defendant No. 1 Smt. Kashibai, one of the wives of Pandurang, supported the plaintiff's case. 4.The trial Court, after trial, decreed the plaintiff's suit on 29th April, 1978 by holding that plaintiff was entitled to partition and separate possession of the half share in the suit land described in paragraph-1 of the plaint and defendants No. 1 and 2 may levy the decree in execution for their 1/4th share each on payment of requisite Court fees. The judgment and decree passed by trial Court came to be challenged by defendant No. 3 as well as by defendant No. 1 separately in Civil Appeal No. 161/78 and Civil Appeal No. 158/78 separately before the Assistant Judge, Kolhapur and the Appellate Court heard both the appeals together and by the judgment and decree dated 24th July, 84 dismissed both the appeals and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The concurrent judgment and decree passed by the two courts below is under challenge in the second appeal at the instance of defendant No. 3. 5.Turning back to the question involved in the second appeal it may be observed that in the then Bombay State the rule of Hindu Law relating to persons who may be lawfully taken in adoption to the effect that he must not be a boy whose mother the adopting father could not have legally married was always restricted to the daughter's son, sister's son or his mothers sister's son. In (Mallappa Parappa Hospeti v. Gangava Gangappa Hospeti)1, 1919 Vol. XXI Bom.L.R. 17 Division Bench of this Court was considering whether the adoption of the father's first cousin was valid under Hindu Law and the answer was affirmative. The Division Bench held that the doctrine of puttrachhayavham (reflection of a son) and virudh sambandh (improper relationship) are now confined to three categories only viz. i) daughter's son, ii) sister's son and ii) mothers sister's son. While reaching this conclusion the Division Bench relied upon two decisions of this Court in (Ramchandra Krishna Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi)2, 1908 Vol. i) daughter's son, ii) sister's son and ii) mothers sister's son. While reaching this conclusion the Division Bench relied upon two decisions of this Court in (Ramchandra Krishna Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi)2, 1908 Vol. X Bom.L.R. 948, and (Yamunava Govind Appaji v. Laxman Bhimrao Kulkarni)3, 1912 Vol. XIV Bom.L.R. 543. The view of this Court is consistent from Ramchandra's case (supra) to cases subsequently viz. Malappa Parappa Hospeti's case (supra), (Gajanan Balkrishna Deshpande v. Kashinath Narayan Deshpande)4, 17 Bom.L.R. 372, (Shripad Dattatraya Kamat v. Vithal Vasudevshet)5, Parker XXVII Bom.L.R. 674 and other cases. 6.The Division Bench of this Court in Shripad Dattatraya Kamat's case (supra) was dealing with the question whether under Hindu Law a husband's brother can be validly adopted by a widow. The question thus was whether adoption of brother was permissible under Hindu Law and the Division Bench of this Court held thus: "This decision was followed in Ramkrishna v. Chimnaji (4) and Gajanan Balkrishna v. Kashinath Narayan (5) and if we were to hold in the face of those decisions that the adoption of the husband's brother was invalid, we should be going contrary to the opinion expressed by so many of the Judges of this Court in the case we have referred to. But the question appears to have been conclusively settled by the decision of the Privy Council in Puttu Lal v. Musammat Parbati Kunwar (1) where it was held that a Hindu widow making an adoption by virtue of her deceased husband's authority could validly adopt her brother's son. Reference was made to the decision of Mr. But the question appears to have been conclusively settled by the decision of the Privy Council in Puttu Lal v. Musammat Parbati Kunwar (1) where it was held that a Hindu widow making an adoption by virtue of her deceased husband's authority could validly adopt her brother's son. Reference was made to the decision of Mr. Justice Banerji in Jai Singh Pal Singh v. Bijai Pal Singh, (2) where it was pointed out that on this question as to whether a widow can lawfully adopt to her deceased husband a son of her own brother, Nanda Pandita in the Dattaka Mimansa extended to adoption by females the rule of Hindu law that no one can be adopted as a son whose mother the adopter could not have legally married, an extension which was not based upon the authority of any of the Smritis or institutes of sages, and their lordships said (p. 555):- "As Banerji, J., further pointed out in the same case the extension of the rule by Nanda Pandita is not supported by any text of the 'Dattaka Chandrika' or by any of the texts of the sages Saunaka and Sakala from which most of the rule of the 'Dattaka Mimansa' were deduced. It has not been shown to their Lordships that the extension by Nanda Pandita to which they are referring has been accepted as the law in India, at least, so far as the adoption by widows to their deceased husbands are concerned." However, in the present case admittedly the parties were governed by the then law prevailing in erstwhile Kolhapur State. Then ruler of Kolhapur State had issued Wat-hukuma of 1920 and the said law also contained codified law on the point of adoption applicable to Hindu subjects of Kolhapur State. Chapter-IV, section 20 of the said Wat hukuma, 1920 on English translation which has been supplied by translator of this Court reads thus: "WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR ADOPTION 20 Any son (boy) Requisites of adoption (ka) Whose natural mother is not related to the ascendants of the adoptive father. (kha) and had his adoptive father been eligible to marry his natural mother in her maidenhood, then such a son; (Ga) irrespective of his age (Gha) may be married or have born children. (Da) or may be the eldest son of the natural father, or; (Cha) may be the only son of the natural father. (kha) and had his adoptive father been eligible to marry his natural mother in her maidenhood, then such a son; (Ga) irrespective of his age (Gha) may be married or have born children. (Da) or may be the eldest son of the natural father, or; (Cha) may be the only son of the natural father. Despite this, he is eligible to be the adopted son of the adoptive father. Exception: (1) In respect of the daughter's son and; (2) Sister's son; The restrictions or the possibility as mentioned in Sub-section (Kha) above is not applicable. Illustrations:- (Sub-section Ka) 1) A B are step brothers. After A's death his widow adopts "B" This adoption is illegal. 2) A is B's real uncle. B's widow adopts A- This adoption is illegal. 3) X is Y's real maternal uncle. X"s widow adopts Y. This adoption is illegal. Illustration: (Of Sub-section 'Kha') 4) The person "A" is the real brother of B's wife after the death of B, as he did not have any issue. B's wife adopts her brother A- This adoption is legal." 8.According to the aforesaid law enacted by the then Kolhapur State which was governing the adoption at the relevant time, one of the requisites of valid adoption of a boy was whose natural mother was not related to the ascendants of the adoptive father. If a brother is adopted by brother obviously natural mother of adopted son shall be related to the ascendant of the adoptive father. To put it straight, the natural mother of adopted son (brother) shall be wife of father (ascendant) of adoptive father (brother). I do not think that there is any doubt whatever as to the meaning, for I find no ambiguity in clause (ka) of section 20 of Watan Hukuma, 1920. The illustrations appended to clause (ka) leave no manner of doubt where it is stated that if A and B are stepbrothers and after A's death his widow adopts B, the adoption was illegal. Similarly it is illustrated that A is B's real uncle and B's widow adopts A then such adoption was also illegal. The adoption of brother thus was not permissible and cannot be said to be in accordance with the requisites of adoption laid down by Wat-hukuma. Similarly it is illustrated that A is B's real uncle and B's widow adopts A then such adoption was also illegal. The adoption of brother thus was not permissible and cannot be said to be in accordance with the requisites of adoption laid down by Wat-hukuma. In view of the specific law enacted by erstwhile ruler of Kolhapur State which was applicable to the parties at the relevant time, a brother could not adopt his brother as his son. Clause (ka) of section 20. Chapter IV of Wathukuma of 1920, therefore, did not permit adoption of brother by brother and such adoption was not legal and valid and in this view implication and effect of Clause (kha) is not needed to be gone into. The contention of the learned Counsel for appellant that the rule that he must not be a boy whose mother the adopted father could not have legally married has been restricted by various decisions of this Court to three categories viz. daughter's son, sister's on and mother's sister's son did not help the Appellant defendant No. 3 since under the Wat-hukuma of 1920 the adoption of brother by brother was not permissible and had no sanction of the existing law in the then Kolhapur State. 9.Mr. Pandit, the learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in (Ramappa Vanappa Akale v. Laxman Malyappa Akale)6, 52 B.L.R. 839 wherein the full bench observed thus: "Incidentally we may add that what applies to these vat-hukums applies with equal force to the rules and vat-hukums issued by the Kolhapur Government in the matter of Hindu Law. The main body of the rules of Hindu Law which are enacted in Kolhapur is based principally on the translation of an old edition of Sir Dinshah Mull's Hindu Law published in 1919; and so the several important decisions which have since then substantially altered the earlier views in several branches of Hindu law cannot be applied by Courts administering Hindu law in Kolhapur. Government should consider whether it would not be expedient in the interests of justice to apply to Kolhapur the principles of Hindu Law as they are administered in the rest of the State of Bombay." 10.The said observations in Ramappa Akale's case were made entirely in different context. Government should consider whether it would not be expedient in the interests of justice to apply to Kolhapur the principles of Hindu Law as they are administered in the rest of the State of Bombay." 10.The said observations in Ramappa Akale's case were made entirely in different context. The Full Bench found that Wat-Hukuma were not artistically worded and presented difficulties in construction when it was seized of the question whether on the death of inam land-holder the lands reverted to State in view of Wat-hukuma issued by ruler of Kolhapur State. The observation made about Hindu law applicable to Hindu subjects of Kolhapur State do not help the appellant defendant No. 3 and rather it shows that principles of Hindu Law as were administered in the Kolhapur State were different from the principles as were applicable and administered in the rest of the State of Bombay. The Full Bench thus suggested that Government should consider whether it would not be expedient in the interest of justice to apply in the Kolhapur the principles of Hindu Law as they are administered in the rest of the State of Bombay. The general observations made by Full Bench that the main body of the rules of Hindu Law which were enacted in Kolhapur is based particularly on the translation of old translation of Sir Dinshaw Mulla's Hindu Law published in the 1919 does not mean that Wat-hukama of 1920 enacted by the then ruler of Kolhapur State, was the same Hindu Law as found in Sir Dinshaw Mulla's Hindu Law published in year 1919. Rather section 20(ka) of Chapter-IV of Wathukuma of 1920 referred to hereinabove clearly shows that law of adoption in Kolhapur State was distinct and different from the law applicable to the other parts of the region in State of Bombay. 11.In view of the discussion aforesaid, it can safely be held that in the erstwhile State of Kolhapur the adoption of brother by brother was not permissible and legal and, therefore, adoption of Shankar in the year 1944 by Pandurang was not legal and valid. The two courts below, therefore, did not commit any error in holding that adoption of defendant No. 3 was not valid and his adoption was illegal. The two courts below, therefore, did not commit any error in holding that adoption of defendant No. 3 was not valid and his adoption was illegal. 12.Having negatived the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that adoption of defendant No. 3 was valid, the learned Counsel sought to contend that the defendant No. 3 had become owner by adverse possession if it was held that his adoption was invalid. I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned Counsel for appellant. Firstly, the second appeal has only been admitted only on the substantial question of law: whether the adoption of defendant No. 3 appellant was valid in law? At the time of admission of second appeal, this Court did not frame any other question. Presumably because the Court did not think any other substantial question of law arising in the second appeal. Sub-section (5) of section 100 C.P.C. provides that though the appeal shall be heard on the question formulated but that shall not take away power of the Court to hear the appeal on another substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that case involves such question. A question of adverse possession is largely a question of fact. In the present case I am satisfied with the reasons recorded by two courts below that possession of defendant No. 3 over the land bearing R. S. No. 183/2 and 225/7-B was permissive and therefore question of adverse possession did not arise. This finding recorded by the courts below is concluded on facts and does not give rise to any question of law, much less substantial question of law. 13.Second appeal, therefore, has no merit and it is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.