High Court of M. P. v. R. C. Chandal — 1997 DIGILAW 95 (MP)

ORDER Dharmadhikari, J. -- 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court has been preferred by the High Court (from its administrative side) against the judgment of learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Shri N.P. Singh, J.) dt. 18.10.96, passed in Writ Petition 413 of 1996. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent Shri R.C. Chandel, presently posted as District & Sessions Judge, Rewa. 2. The learned Single Judge by allowing the petition has made direction to the High Court to re-consider the case of petitioner for his admission to the Higher Selection Grade, on the norms which existed in the year 1992 with all consequential benefits. The facts leading to the petition by the respondent are as under :- 3. The respondent Shri R.C. Chandel is a confirmed Member of the Higher Judicial Service of the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 5.5.85. He was held entitled to be awarded the Lower Selection Grade by order of the High Court passed on 7.9.90 w.e.f 24.3.89. 4. His case for awarding Higher Selection Grade came up for consideration in June 1992 but his case was deferred and officers junior to him were granted the grade. He was served with two adverse remarks from his annual confidential reports for the year ending 31.3.93 and 31.3.94. The remarks respectively for the above two years were as under: "Inspection note shows that the quality of his performance is poor. His disposals were below average. His reputation was not good. Grade - 'g' " 5. The other adverse entry for the period ending 31.3.94 reads as under: "His performance quantitatively and qualitatively has been poor. The officer does not enjoy good reputation. Grade - 'g' " 6. Against the above adverse remarks, the petitioner filed two separate representations. Alongwith the representations he enclosed the statement of the judicial work disposed by him during the relevant years. 7. The above two representations preferred against the adverse Confidential Reports were rejected by the communication of the Registrar dated 30.8.94. The respondent was informed that his representations were placed before Hon'ble the Chief justice, who after going through the contents of the representations and after due consideration had rejected the same. 8. The respondent then made another representation for the same purpose against adverse confidential reports of the same period 1992-93 and 1993-94. The respondent was informed that his representations were placed before Hon'ble the Chief justice, who after going through the contents of the representations and after due consideration had rejected the same. 8. The respondent then made another representation for the same purpose against adverse confidential reports of the same period 1992-93 and 1993-94. The second representation was also rejected by the communication of the Registrar dt. 5.1.95 informing the similar reason as mentioned above. 9. The petitioner then sent another representation on 27.7.95 on the same subject with enclosures regarding his disposal on judicial side. The last representation also came to be rejected by communication of the Registrar dt. 26.8.95. The respondent went on persisting on his stand and moved another representation describving it as a Review Petition dt. 21.12.95. The said review petition also suffered rejection by communication of Registrar dt. 16.1.96. Thereafter the petitioner has filed the present petition on 21.2.96 giving rise to this L.P.A. In the petition the respondent sought the relief of quashing of the two adverse remarks communicated to him and the communications rejecting his representations. He also claimed a relief of his consideration to the Higher Selection Grade on the norms as existed in the year 1992 with all consequential benefits. 10. The petitioner's supersession or non-selection to Higher Selection Grade was challenged on the ground that the adverse remarks communicated are arbitrary and are not based on the objective assessment of his work and performance. 11. In the return submitted on behalf of the High Court the criteria for consideration for selection to Higher Selection Grade from Lower Selection Grade is stated to have been fixed under the resolution of the Full Court dt. 16.12.88. The relevant part of the resolution containing the criteria of selection reads as under :- "RESOLVED THAT the resolution relating to selection of Judicial Officers• in the Lower Selection Grade, Higher Selection Grade and Principal Secretary's Grade, passed at the last meeting be modified as follows :- 1. 16.12.88. The relevant part of the resolution containing the criteria of selection reads as under :- "RESOLVED THAT the resolution relating to selection of Judicial Officers• in the Lower Selection Grade, Higher Selection Grade and Principal Secretary's Grade, passed at the last meeting be modified as follows :- 1. "for judging the suitability of a member of Higher Judicial Service for being selected in the Lower Selection Grade, Higher Selection Grade or Principal Secretary's Grade, the High Court shall take into consideration (i) the reputation regarding integrity and the performance of the concerned judicial officer during his entire career as a judicial officer as evidenced by the annual confidential reports and by assessment slips, if any, recorded by Hon'ble Judges. (ii) the ability of the concerned judicial officers to be in charge of the district and the quality of judgments delivered by such judicial officer. (iii) the quality of judgment delivered by such judicial officer. 2. The High Court shall also take into consideration that normally the judicial officer should have obtained at least two 'B' Grades in the preceding five years for selection in the Higher Selection Grade and at least four 'B' Grades in the preceding five years for selection in the Principal Secretary's Grade." 12. Placing reliance on the above criteria, the non selection of the respondent to the Higher Selection Grade was sought to be justified by stating that he had not two 'B' Grade to his credit in his confidential reports in the preceding five years on the date of consideration of his case for selection to Higher Grade. On behalf of the High Court it was pointed out that the respondent had the following grading in the relevant preceding five years: "1986-87 Grade D 1987-88 Grade C 1988-89 Grade D 1989-90 Grade was not given 1990-91 Grade C 1991-92 Grade D" The further stand of the High Court in the return was that the confidential reports of the District Judges are written by the Chief Justice after taking into account the relevant records, material and assessment about the performance of work, character and conduct of the District Judge concerned. It is stated in the return that Hon'ble the Chief Justice had assigned gradings to the respondent in his confidential rolls on the basis of the inspection reports of Hon'ble Shri Justice V.S. Kokje, Hon'ble Shri Justice K.M. Agarwal and Hon'ble Shri Justice J.G. Chitre who had inspected the work of the respondent at different places where he was posted such as Betul and Jhabua. It was submitted that the case of the respondent for admission to Higher Selection Grade was duly considered on objective basis after looking into his confidential reports and the gradings which he had earned. It was stated that the work and performance of the respondent was objectively assessed and for want of requisite number of 'B' gradings he could not be granted the Higher Selection Grade. 13. In reply to the claim made by the respondent of the required standard of disposal of judicial work, it was pointed out that in Jhabua district where he was posted even in contested Sessions Trial, witnesses had turned hostile and the cases could, therefore, be disposed of quickly. It is submitted that such disposal was not considered by the High Court to have depicted the true image of the judicial work performed by the petitioner so as to treat him as diligent worker. In this respect, the following note of the then Hon'ble Chief Justice UL Bhat who admittedly had visited Jhabua for Court Inspection has been relied. The note of the then Hon'ble Chief Justice U.L. Bhat reads as under :- "I found that Sessions Judges and Additonal Sessions Judges in Jhabua District to a large-extent and officers in Dhar to a lesser-extent are able to dispose of a large number of 'contested' sessions cases. They told me that in 80-90% of those cases almost all witnesses are hostile. In some districts we do not have a large number of cases where almost all the witnesses are hostile, with the result that officers in such districts are able to report only a lesser number of sessions cases 'contested' disposals. The result is that officers in the latter districts may suffer by comparison. I think some way must be devised to assess the real work turned out in district like Dhar, Jhabua, etc." 14. The result is that officers in the latter districts may suffer by comparison. I think some way must be devised to assess the real work turned out in district like Dhar, Jhabua, etc." 14. So far as the non-consideration of his re-presentation in objective manner is concerned, the High Court produced the necessary file to demonstrate before the Court that the representations repeatedly made by the respondent against the adverse confidential reports were perused, the comments on the same were offered by the Registry and they were placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice who after due perusal and consideration of the contents of representations, rejected them as not at all substantial. Adverse comments in the inspection notes of the Hon'ble High Court Judges who inspected his work were also read in the relevant part at the time of hearing before the learned Single Judge and before us. Since they were stated to be confidential they were placed for perusal before the Learned Single Judge and before this Court in appeal. 15. After hearing the respondent and the High Court, the learned Single Judge decided to interfere in the decision taken by the High Court on its administrative side and granted relief of quashing of the adverse confidential reports communicated to the respondent with directions to consider him for admission to Higher Selection Grade retrospectively from 1992. 16. It would be necessary to deal with in detail the decision of the learned Single Judge which is contained in paragraphs 21 to 27 of his Judgment under appeal for deciding the present L.P.A. 17. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 21 of his judgment held that the AC.Rs. of respondent communicated to him as contained in Annex. P. 6 and Annex. P. 7 were written by the then Chief Justice Mr. U.L. Bhat in some sitting and relying on the inspection notes of Justice Kokje in a casual manner. It is held that in view of the disposal statement shown by the respondent in Annex. P. 10 & 11 to the petition the work and performance of the petitioner was much above the norms prescribed and his AC.Rs., therefore, do not reflect a fair and objective assessment of his work. 18. It is held that in view of the disposal statement shown by the respondent in Annex. P. 10 & 11 to the petition the work and performance of the petitioner was much above the norms prescribed and his AC.Rs., therefore, do not reflect a fair and objective assessment of his work. 18. The actual language employed by the learned Single Judge as contained in paragraph 21 may be quoted: "In the present case, it appears that the adverse remarks in the AC.R. of the petitioner as contained in Annexures-P/6 and P/7 were written by the Chief Justice Mr. U.L. Bhat in the same sitting, heavily relying upon the inspection notes submitted by Justice Kokje in a casual manner. The assessment and grading of subordinate officers in no-doubt to the subjective satisfaction of the recording officer, but it must reflect a fair and objective consideration. In view of the disposal statement of the petitioner for the relevant periods as contained in Annexures-P/10 and Pill, it is evident that the work and performance of the petitioner was much more than the norms prescribed by the High Court and the same was not fairly and objectively considered while writing the A.C.Rs." 19. Similar view is expressed on the recording of adverse remarks by' the then Chief Justice U.L. Bhat in paragraph 25 of the impugned order to hold that the adverse remarks communicated as, contained in Annexures P/6 and P/7 (to the petition) deserved' to' be expunged. :The said para 25 of the order reads -', "The adverse remarks recorded by the Chief Justice Shri U.L. Bhat does not reflects. fair and objective assessment of the work and performance of the petitioner. Therefore, the adverse remarks in the A.C.Rs. (Annexure – P/6 and P/7) deserve to be expunged, accordingly they are expunged as also the orders passed on the representations Submitted by the petitioner. 20. In paragraph 22 of the impugned 6rder, the learned single Judge records that he had gone through the inspection notes on the 'work of respondent recorded by Justice K.M. Agarwal, Justice V.S. Kokje arid Justice J.G. Chitre. It has' also been mentioned that the A.C.Rs. of the respondent from the year'1988 'were perused. 21. The learned Single Judge then in paragraph 23 and 24 came to the conclusion that the law grading given, to the respondent in the A.C.R. of 1988-89 by the then Chief Justice Mr. It has' also been mentioned that the A.C.Rs. of the respondent from the year'1988 'were perused. 21. The learned Single Judge then in paragraph 23 and 24 came to the conclusion that the law grading given, to the respondent in the A.C.R. of 1988-89 by the then Chief Justice Mr. S.K Jha is not justified by the contents of inspection notes of Justjce K.M., Agarwal. On the inspection notes of Justice K.M.; Agarwal and lastly of Justice J.G. Chitre, it is held, that the respondent deserved better gradings for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91. On the above aspect the conclusion of learned Single Judge is contained in paragraph 23 and 24 of his judgment 'and needs reproduction. "23. In the inspection notes of Justice K.M. Agarwal for the year 1992, nothing was found against the petitioner for denying him the benefits of the Higher Selection Grade Justice V.S. Kokje, however, was not satisfied with the work and performance of the petitioner and for his admission to the benefits of Higher Selection Grade. Justice J.G. Chltre, who inspected the work arid performance of the petitioner, after Justice Kokje, was very such satisfied with the work and performance of the petitioner and the petitioner was graded 'B' in the inspection notes. "24. It appears that for the year 1988-89 the A.C.R. drawn against the petitioner by the then Chief Justice Shri S.K.-Jha is very favourable, but the petitioner "was not" given any grading. The A.C.R. of the petitioner drawn for the subsequent' year' by the Chief Justice Shri Jha is based on the inspection notes of Justice• KM. Agarwal But the, grading of the petitioner is not inconsonance, with the inspection notes of Justice Agarwal. The petitioner, therefore; deserves better grading for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91." 22. Having thus held that the gradings given to the respondent in his A.G.Rs. were not justified from the inspection reports of the Judges, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the case of respondent for admission to benefit of Higher Selection! Grade has been made out. By concluding as in paragraph 26, of his judgment the learned Single Judge virtually held, that, respondent to be eligible to two requisite 'B' gradings which was the minimum requirement for grant of admission to Higher Selection Grade. Grade has been made out. By concluding as in paragraph 26, of his judgment the learned Single Judge virtually held, that, respondent to be eligible to two requisite 'B' gradings which was the minimum requirement for grant of admission to Higher Selection Grade. In the ultimate direction that the learned Single Judge made in paragraph 27, the respondent was directed to be re-considered for admission to Higher Selection Grade retrospectively from 1992. 23. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava learned counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court questions the correctness of the order of learned Single Judge. The first contention advanced is that in expunging the adverse remarks and in holding that the gradings given by the two Hon'ble Chief Justices of this Court in the A.C.Rs. to the respondent were incorrect and in further directing his re-consideration for admission to Higher Selection Grade by treating him to have obtained the necessary 'B' Gradings, the learned Single Judge exceeded the power of judicial review and travelled beyond the settled parameters for exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Reliance is placed on Major Generall.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 383 , Air Vice Merahal S.L. Chhabra v. Union of India and another [1993 Supp. (4) SCC 441] & The Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah( AIR 1988 SC 1388 ). 24. It is next contended that the learned Single Judge was not justified in remarking and holding against the two Hon'ble Chief Justices of this Court that the gradings given by them in the A.C.Rs. of the respondent were not on objective basis and were not supported by the inspection reports of the learned Portfolio Judges who had actually inspected the work of the respondent. In this respect it is submitted that the very fact that the work and assessment is done by a High Court Judge, and gradings are given by the highest in the judiciary i.e. the Chief Justice and ultimate decision is taken by the Full Court consisting of all the Judges, there is a multiple safeguard and guarantee against arbitrariness. It is only on ground of alleged arbitrariness that the learned Judge set aside the' action of the High Court on the administrative side by directing re-consideration of the case of the respondent. It is only on ground of alleged arbitrariness that the learned Judge set aside the' action of the High Court on the administrative side by directing re-consideration of the case of the respondent. Reliance is placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahesh Prakash and others ( 1995 JLJ 205 = 1995 1 SCC 203 ). Reference in this connection is also made to All India Judges Association's case reported in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 288 in support of the contention that judicial service is to be distinguished from other Civil Services as the former is not 'employment' because the Judges are neither employees nor do they serve any master. They exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State. 25. On behalf of the High Court on the administrative side the entire file containing the inspection reports of three Hon'ble Judges Justice K.M. Agarwal; Justice V.S. Kokje and Justice J.G. Chitre and the A.C.Rs. of the respondent containing the remarks and gradings given by the Hon'ble two Ch . f Justices Hon'ble Shri S.K. Jha and Hon'ble Justice V.L. Bhat have been read in relevant parts in the Court and placed before us for perusal. On the basis of the above material produced before us, it is submitted on behalf for the High Court that the case of respondent was at every stage objectively considered on the basis of due assessment of his work and performance and since he did not secure the requisite number of gradings, he was not admitted to Higher Selection Grade. 26. Shri Rajendra Tiwari, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent very strongly supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and submitted that the material read before the Court and produced fully justified the remarks and conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge (which have been quoted above from his order). A fervent appeal has been made to this Court by stating that great injustice has been done to his client. A fervent appeal has been made to this Court by stating that great injustice has been done to his client. On the basis of the inspection report of Hon'ble Justice Kokje, it is submitted that only on the basis of the judgments of respondent passed in the two cases which were found to contain errors of law inference of lack of integrity could not have been drawn so as to condemn the respondent for remaining part of his judicial career. It is submitted that from the disposal figures given by the respondent in the Chart supplied to the Court, it was erroneous on the part of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to communicate to him that his work and performance both quantitatively and qualitatively were poor. 27. The further submission made is that the petitioner made repeated representations with enclosures containing statement of his disposals but all the representations suffered rejection due to non-application of mind and without communication of any reason. It is contended that the learned Single Judge, was, therefore, fully justified in holding that the A.C.Rs. of respondent do not reflect the correct and faithful picture of his work and performance. The adverse remarks, communicated and the gradings given to him were arbitrary. It is explained that an arbitrary action by authority howsoever high, is liable to be interfered with. 28. The allegations, made in the petition against the Hon'ble Judges and Hon'ble Chief Justices, it is said are not of 'Malice Infact' but are of 'Malice in Law'. His work and performance was not assessed objectively as is expected of the High Court in the matter of consideration of the case for grant of higher grade to a Member of Subordinate Judiciary. Strong reliance has been placed on V.K. Agarwal v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ( AIR 1988 SC 1403 ), K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1994 JLJ 83 = AIR 1994 SC 1031 ), Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana and another (1988) 3 SCC 370 , Vnion of India v. R.K. Desai (1993) 2 SCC 49 and Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of V.P. and others ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ). 29. 29. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the High Court and the respondent judicial officer, we have ourselves carefully gone through the inspection reports of the three Hon 'ble Judges on the work and performance of the respondent, the contents of his annual confidential reports and notings on the file concerning rejection of his representations against adverse confidential reports. 30. After going through the relevant records concerning the work and performance of respondent before us we have found that the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in observing in his judgment in paragraph 21 to 25 that there was no objective basis for giving a low grading to the respondent in his annual confidential reports by the two Hon'ble Chief Justices Shri S.K. Jha and Shri V.L. Bhat. 31. The respondent's first posting as District Judge was at Betul. Several complaints were received from lawyers and litigants against the respondent. Justice K.M. Agarwal inspected his work on 20.11.91. He made enquiries from the available sources from the members of the Bar and other persons who approached him concerning the complaints. Justice K.M. Agarwal did not find that any of the complaints made were substantiated by the complainants. So far as his work on the judicial side is concerned, this Court does not find any remark of appreciation in disposal of cases such so Civil Suit 39-A/89 (Suresh Kumar v. Chandrakala) decided on 16.3.92 and Criminal Revision 61/91 (Uma v. State) decided on 12.3.1991. It is commented that the respondent was not aware of the provisions of section 348 CrPC when he directed the case to be sent to C.J.M. for appropriate action against the parties to the matrimonial case and the marriage officer. Similarly in disposal of CR 61/91 it is commented by, the Inspecting Judge that the respondent over looked the provisions of section 52-C of the Forest Act by directing delivery of bullocks and bullock cart to the applicant involved in offence under the Act. 32. It is true that the opinion recorded by Agarwal, J. is that he had found ,nothing against Shri Chandel for denying him the Higher Selection Grade. The report of K.M. Agarwal, J was placed before Honble S.K. Jha, Chief Justice for giving him the appropriate, grade. 32. It is true that the opinion recorded by Agarwal, J. is that he had found ,nothing against Shri Chandel for denying him the Higher Selection Grade. The report of K.M. Agarwal, J was placed before Honble S.K. Jha, Chief Justice for giving him the appropriate, grade. For the period ending• 31.3.90, the then Chief Justice Shri S.K. Jha recorded that there was no reason to doubt the integrity of the respondent while he was posted at Betul. It is true that for that year he was not, assigned any grading. The. above lapse however, is of no consequence because even if he is assumed to have been graded 'B', he does not achieve to his credit two 'B' gradings in preceding five years for the purpose of admission to Higher Selection, Grade. ". 33. In the confidential report for the period. ending 31.3.91,..Hon'bie Shri S.K. Jha, the then Chief Justice has not made any adverse remarks but had given grading 'c' to the respondent describing him to be an average judicial officer. This grading cannot be said to have been subjectively made. Shri S.K. Jha, the then C.J. might have been new, to the -State having assumed the office a few months ago to the date of making entry in A.C.R. but it cannot be 'said that he had no material before him to assess the' work done in quantity and quality by the concerned Judge while his posting at Betul. It cannot be said by the learned Single Judge on the judicial side that Shri S.K. Jha, Chief Justice then should have given him a Higher Grading i.e. 'B'. 34. Similarly, for the period ending on31.3.92,Shri S.K. Jha, the then Chief 'Justice has graded him •'B' and by that time justice. K.M. Agarwal had already inspected his work and submitted a report on 30.4.92. The grading was given by Shri S.K. Jha, the then C.J. on 14.8.92. There. is no reason to assume that the Chief Justice had not gone through the report of Shri K.M. Agarwal, J. In the confidential remark of the year, it. has been said. that on investigation of complaints nothing was found against the respondent and nothing has been said about his integrity. Yet on the basis of his, work and performance he was graded 'D'. - 35. has been said. that on investigation of complaints nothing was found against the respondent and nothing has been said about his integrity. Yet on the basis of his, work and performance he was graded 'D'. - 35. The next posting of the respondent was at Jhabua, In that district his work was inspected by Justice V.S. Kokje. We have gone through his report. It was .wholly unjustified to describe it as 'casual' and not an objective report. Shri :Kokje, 3, took pains to go through the cases decided by the respondent at Jhabua. From the judgments which he read, none of them is found to be of above average quality. Mention of two cases decided by the respondent, on which arguments were advanced at length by the counsel appearing for the parties, need mention in some what detail. Civil Suit No. 10-A/89. was a case under Land Acquisition Act. In his inspection report, the learned Single Judge, Kokje, 3, observes that a case 'which had already been closed for evidence and was being adjourned awaiting some report from Water Resources Department was at such subsequent stage re-opened for evidence of the claimants by the respondent. According to Shri Kokje, J., proceeding showed that the respondent went out of way to re-open the case for allowing claimants to lead fresh, evidence. The case was treated as a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act when there was no acquisition of the land under section 4 or under section 6 of the Act. It was a case of acquisition by mutual, negotiation between the parties. In the absence of an award of the Land Acquisition officer, no reference under section 18 of the Act infact was competent before the Court. Yet the respondent by making reference to Article 31 of the constitution of India raised the rate of compensation, from Rs4,000/- per hectare to Rs. 10,000/- per hectare. The respondent has not even identified and mentioned the extent of land acquired, the part of land was admittedly a 'Beed' and this fact 'was overlooked in the judgment. 36. The other Civil Suit No. 3-B/89 .was a suit filed by, State Bank of India on mortgage. Instead of passing, a preliminary, decree under order 34 CPC straight away a final decree was passed. The barrower was granted remission of Rs; 10,000/-under the Loan waiver Scheme. 36. The other Civil Suit No. 3-B/89 .was a suit filed by, State Bank of India on mortgage. Instead of passing, a preliminary, decree under order 34 CPC straight away a final decree was passed. The barrower was granted remission of Rs; 10,000/-under the Loan waiver Scheme. Shri Kokje, J. in his, report states that such remission could not have been granted because condition of scheme was to deposit the entire balance within, the stipulated time which obviously had not been followed by the borrower and the remission could not be granted. 37. The learned Judge also commented detail on other cases to come to a conclusion that the respondent wrongly held that-Gift deed was admissible in evidence although it was not stamped 'under; section' 35 of the Stamps Act. Adverse assessments are to be found in the inspection report on conducting trials and disposing of Civil and Criminal cases. With regard to that disposal of Land acquisition cases in which without a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act award was passed by the respondent at an enhanced rate of compensation, Kokje, J. merely commented that the entire conduct of the case creates a doubt that every-thing was not above Board in the conduct the decision of this case'. Justice Kokje, J., therefore, did not recommend respondent for being granted the benefit of Higher Selection Grade. 38. On the above inspection report Shri Rajendra_Tiwari learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that merely because respondent committed an error in his judgment, inference of lack of integrity or honesty was wholly un-warranted. It is said that infact there were no complaint and no follow up action by investigation into the conduct of the respondent. The remark has resulted in communicating an adverse entry to him that he does not enjoy good reputation, and this his prospect have totally been impaired. On this aspect of the matter we would express our opinion at the later state of our judgment. We are, however, of the clear, opinion that the learned Single. Judge, Was obviously in error in holding that no remarks on objective basis were made by Shri Kokje, J. and the gradings given by C.J., U.L Bhat on' 'Said remarks are in a casual manner, Such a charge is wholly unfounded both against Shri Kokje, J. and Shri Bhat, C.J., In C.Rs. Judge, Was obviously in error in holding that no remarks on objective basis were made by Shri Kokje, J. and the gradings given by C.J., U.L Bhat on' 'Said remarks are in a casual manner, Such a charge is wholly unfounded both against Shri Kokje, J. and Shri Bhat, C.J., In C.Rs. for the years ending March 1993 and 1994 Hon'ble Bhat, Chief Justice described the officer as ‘poor in quality and his disposals below average, his reputation was stated to be not good and he was graded'E'.' 39. It has not been denied by the respondent that Hon'ble U.,L. Bhat, Chief justice took pains to personally visit Jhabua district. The Head of the judiciary has his own sources of information for getting reports about the work and performance of the members of Subordinate Judiciary. The remarks made by him and the grading given by him to respondent were based not only on the inspection report of Shri Kokje, J. but also on his own assessment of the quality and the quantity of work done by the respondent as District Judge at Jhabua. Shri V.L. Bhat, Chief Justice himself went to Jhabua and it cannot be said that the remarks and gradings given by him were subjective and not objective. 40. The petitioner represented repeatedly against the two adverse remarks communicated to him for the year ending 1993-94 and these representations were repeatedly rejected although without any speaking orders. The law on the subject of consideration of representations and the requirement of stating reasons therein is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of E.G. Memhudri ( AIR 1991 SC 1216 ) and it is held as under:- "In the absence of any staturtory or administrative provisions requiring the competent authority to record reasons or to communicate reasons, no exception can be taken to the order rejecting representation merely on the ground of absence of reasons. No order of an administrative authority communicating its decision is rendered illegal on the ground of absence of reasons ex facie and it is not open to the Court to interfere with such orders merely on the ground of absence of any reasons. However, it does not mean that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. However, it does not mean that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. In governmental functioning before any order is issued the matter is generally considered at various levels and the reasons and opinions are contained in the notes on the file. The reasons contained in the file enable the competent authority to formulate its opinion. if the order as communicated to the Government servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot beheld to be bed in law. If such an order is challenged in a Court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. It is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action." 41. After quoting the above decision, it is not necessary but to re-inforce, it, if may be pointed out that, that is the view also of the legal experts on administrative law. See 'An Introduction to Administrative Law', Second Edition Peter Cane, the following observations :-, 'A failure to give reasons may leave it open to a Court to find that the decision-maker had no legally satisfactory or relevant reason for the decision, or did not consider the matter properly; and this would amount to an abuse of decision-making power. But it is not the failure to give reasons, as such, which consttutes the unfairness (unless perhaps, there was a legitimate expectation that reasons would be given). Similarly, if a decision-maker who is under no duty to give reasons does so and it can be inferred from those reasons that the decision-maker has, for example, ignored some relevant consideration, this, too, could justify quashing the decision for abuse of power. But once again, the giving of inadequate reasons is not, by itself, a breach of duty for which a remedy can be given. " 42. The High Court on the administrative side has placed before us the entire file containing confidential reports of the respondent and the file containing consideration of his representations. We have looked into notings. We find from the relevant notings that the personal Secretary of Hon'ble the Chief Justice V.L. Bhat as he then was, had prepared a note with the contents of representations of the respondent. We have looked into notings. We find from the relevant notings that the personal Secretary of Hon'ble the Chief Justice V.L. Bhat as he then was, had prepared a note with the contents of representations of the respondent. Thereupon Hon'ble Bhat, C.J. made the following noting :-"I have carefully studied the relevant papers. I find no ground to revise the remarks made in the A.C.R. Representation is rejected. The officer may be informed." 43. The second representation of the respondent was similarly placed by the Dy. Registrar reproducing the contents of his representation on which Hon'ble Bhat, C.J. made the following noting: "No ground to expunge or modify remarks." 44. On a subsequent representation in which the respondent had claimed that his disposal was quantitatively up to the expected standard Bhat, C.J. made a note :- "Put up with criteria of disposals and call information." The file was again put up before him and Hon'ble the Chief justice made the following note: "I have carefully gone through the statistics and the representation. I am satisfied that the remarks in the A.C.Rs. are correct and do not call for any modification. Representation is rejected." 45. The above notings on the file which have been placed before the Court for perusal, clearly go to show that each of the representations made by the respondent was considered after due application of mind and all were rejected as being without merit. Even the claim of the respondent of higher disposal did not find favour with the Chief Justice, may be because of his own observation that in Jhabua district in most of the Sessions Trials because of the witnesses being hostile the disposal figure appeared high but infact the Judge cannot be credited with diligent work. 46. We have also gone through the inspection report made on 5.2.95 by the Portfolio Judge Justice J.G. Chitre on the work and performance of respondent while his posting at Jhabua district. We do not find that the records seen by Hon 'ble Chief, J. had given him an impression about the work of respondent that it was above average i.e. 'Good' or 'Very Good'. We do not find that the records seen by Hon 'ble Chief, J. had given him an impression about the work of respondent that it was above average i.e. 'Good' or 'Very Good'. All that Hon'ble Chitre, J. has commented is : "His judicial work is satisfactory in comparison to other Judges of the State." Chitre, J. did not find any substance in the complaints made against the respondent and did not find anything adverse about his integrity. The grading on the report has to be given by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Hon'ble Chitre, J. gave him 'B' grade. This grading could not have been given by Chitre, J. and it was only the Chief justice who had to give grading in the Confidential reports of the District Judges. 47. After going through the inspection reports of the three Hon'ble Judges, the remarks in A.C.rs. by the two Hon'ble Chief Justices of this Court and the gradings given by them, we do not find that it could be said by the learned Single Judge that the work. and performance of the respondent was not objectively assessed. 48. The High Court on its judicial side while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 cannot remain oblivious to the limitations laid down in exercise. of that power. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Agmwal (supra) may be seen and the said case, relied upon on behalf of the respondent, is liable to be distinguished on the facts and the breach of Rules found therein: . "There can be no doubt that .whether a member of Higher Judicial ,Service should, be granted the Selection Grade or the super-time scale is matter exclusively within the administrative jurisdiction of the High Court. This Court will not ordinarily interfere with any decision of the High Court in Such a matter. This is, however, subject to the exception that if considering whether a member of the Higher Judicial' Service should be granted the super-time scale or not, the High Court acts in violation of any rule framed by it or of the principles of natural justice or comes to any finding not supported by any reliable material. This Court has to examined the matter for ends of justice. But, interference does not mean granting of the relief which the High Court is entrusted to grant' in its administrative jurisdiction. This Court has to examined the matter for ends of justice. But, interference does not mean granting of the relief which the High Court is entrusted to grant' in its administrative jurisdiction. All that the, Court will ordinarily do is to refer back. the matter for re-consideration of the High Court. 49. In the case of D.K. Agarwal (supra) the Supreme Court found that contrary to Rule 4 (b) of the rules framed for maintaining confidential reports the adverse remarks of one of the sitting Judges made on an information of a retired Judge, were communicated without these being placed for obtaining concurrence be the Chief Justice. Therefore, the Supreme Court interfered and granted monetary relief to Shri D.K. Agarwal because by that time he had already retired. 50. On power of judicial review of administrative action such as in the matter of maintaining annual confidential reports by higher authority of its subordinates, the following passage from the Article Judges and Decision-Makers: (The theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review, published in Public Law by Sweet & Maxwell Spring 1996 edition, pg. 68) is relevant and be quoted: "......:.:. judicial review is not an appellate procedure; the Court must not substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker; the Court must rule only upon the legality of a decision and not upon its correctness; the Court will concern itself with the manner in which a decision is reached rather than with the substantive merits of the decision itself." 51. The learned Single Judge; therefore, clearly transgressed the Powers of judicial. review by substituting his own opinion for the opinions on the work and performance of the respondent recorded by the three Hon' ble Judges of this Court and the two Hon'ble Chief Justices. So far as the direction given by the learned Single Judge that the respondent deserved better gradings is concerned the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Air Vice Marshall (supra) may be quoted to show that in doing so also the power of Judicial Review 'was-exceeded. "But according to the appellant, the High Court should have and now this Court can moderate the grading for the year 1987, in view of the fact that adverse remarks for the year 1986 have been expunged. "But according to the appellant, the High Court should have and now this Court can moderate the grading for the year 1987, in view of the fact that adverse remarks for the year 1986 have been expunged. According to us, neither the High Court nor this Court can moderate the appraisal and the grading of the appellant for a particular year. While exercising the power of judicial review, the Court shall not venture to assess and appraise the merit or the grading-of an officer. If the Appraisal Report of the year 1987 giving the appellant "S. 3" stands, then according to the 'criteria fixed, the case of the appellant could not have been considered for extension." 52. Whether the material available with and reasons assigned by the Inspecting Judge and Chief Justice were adequate or sufficient, cannot also be gone into. See the following observations in the case of R. Sajish 's case (supra):-, 'There can be no doubt that when the High Court takes the view that an order of compulsory retirement should be made against a member of the Subordinate Judicial service, the adequacy or sufficiency of such materials cannot be questioned, unless the materials are absolutely irrelavant for the purpose of compulsory retirement." 53. The above observations are made in the matter of compulsory retirement and there is no reason why they should not apply in the matter of giving Selection Grade. As has to be noted, it was decided by full Court by its resolution that Higher Selection Grade has to be awarded only to officers who are above average i.e. those who have to their credit 'B' grade showing 'Good: or 'Very Good' work atleast in two years in preceding given years annual confidential reports. The quality of the Judge has to be assessed by the Full Court on the administrative side and if the action was supported by some material the High' Court on its judicial side has no justification to interfere. 54. The quality of the Judge has to be assessed by the Full Court on the administrative side and if the action was supported by some material the High' Court on its judicial side has no justification to interfere. 54. The learned counsel appearing on be half fo the High Court is right in submitting that the very fact that in the matter of consideration of ajudicial officer for selection or promotion, the cosnideration is made not by one individual or person but by a body of persons consisting of Judges of the High Court, with the Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary, is in itself a sure guarantee against arbitrary action. See the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Prakash's case (supra) : "The learned Chief Justice, as the head of the judiciary in the State and 'in over-all control of its administration, knows better than most of his brother Judges about his subordinate Judges. It is his function to appreciate their merits and demerits: He is entitled to record his comments upon them and made his views known during relevant discussions at a full Court meeting, Decisions regarding confirmation, promotion, supersession and the like of Subordiante Judges are taken at Full Court meetings. Every High Court Judge is of the same status, the learned Chief Justice being the first among equals. Every learned Judge is expected to contribute to the discussions of ~he Full Court and participate in the decisions arrived at. This mode - of dealing with the confirmations, promotions 'and supersession of those who man the subordinate judiciary is a sure safeguard against arbitrary or motivated decisions. The view of the learned Chief Justice could be heard with due respect but it would not hold away. It certainly cannot be said that the expressions of his view by the learned Chief Justice would prevent independent consideration by the Full Court." 55. It is on record that the inspection reports of the three Hon'ble Judges and the remarks and gradings given by the two Chief Justices were all under consideration before the Full Court which decided not to admit the respondent to the benefit of Higher Selection Grade. It is on record that the inspection reports of the three Hon'ble Judges and the remarks and gradings given by the two Chief Justices were all under consideration before the Full Court which decided not to admit the respondent to the benefit of Higher Selection Grade. On the basis of the above discussed material produced on behalf of the High Court before us, we are firmly of the opinion that the charge levelled by the respondent that his case was not considered objectively has absolutely no foundation and the learned Single Judge had no justification to hold that the assessments made of the work of the respondent were arbitrary and the gradings deserve to be treated as up to the standard fixed for re-consideration of his case retrospectively. 56. Before concluding, mention has to be made of an argument of the respondent repeatedly advanced forcefully, in the course of hearing. It is submitted that the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of KP. Tiwari's case (supra) (a portion of which has been reproduced by the learned Single Judge in his order) supports his argument that merely because judgments given by the respondent in some of the cases were found by the Portfolio Judges to have contained grievous errors of law and fact, inference of lack of integrity could not necessarily be raised. There was, therefore, no justification to communicate to him the adverse remark that he did not enjoy good reputation." 57. In the case of K P. Tiwari's (supra), the strictures made by the High Court in its judicial order against the Judge were expunged by the Supreme Court by clearly observing that such remarks should not have been made on as to avoid impairment of public confidence in the process of justice. The Supreme Court however, clarified that such observations and strictures could have been made against the Judge in his confidential reports on the administrative side. See the following observations in KP. Tiwari's case:• "Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. See the following observations in KP. Tiwari's case:• "Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such case, the proper course for the higher Court to adbpt is to make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work and to use it on proper occasions." 58. On the instruction of the respondent, who was present in the Court, in the course of hearing, the learned counsel appearing on his behalf explained that the controvercial case was his first case under Land Acquisition Act. He was not fully conversant with the nicities of the legal provisions. He was bona fide actuated by compassion towards the land owners who were poor Adivasis' and were deprived of their lands which were their only source of earning. May be in a zeal to grant them the needed relief of compensation at the legitimate rate, he gave them opportunity to lead evidence and decided the case in their favour by awarding just compensation. 59. We have given careful consideration and thought to the explanation offered on behalf of the respondent for the errors that he committed in deciding the cases which have been adversely commented upon by Portfolio Judge Kokje, J. (as he then was). 60. To a Judge his reputation is too precious an attribute, hence attack on it is beyond his endurance. He may suffer criticism of lacking in knowledge and diligence but lack of integrity is taken by him as the gravest charge which may put him 'off' completely. Such charge should not readily be made merely by believing complaints against him or only on finding his work not upto the standard. The nature of duties of a Judge is such that it readily exposes him to charge of favouritism and even sometime of corruption because one of the parties or its counsel in the litigation before him, who loses the case is likely to feel disgruntled and may even adopt vindictive attitude. That however, is occupational hazzerd of a Judge. The nature of duties of a Judge is such that it readily exposes him to charge of favouritism and even sometime of corruption because one of the parties or its counsel in the litigation before him, who loses the case is likely to feel disgruntled and may even adopt vindictive attitude. That however, is occupational hazzerd of a Judge. The higher judiciary which has to assess his work and performance, therefore, has to be more cautious in raising inference of lack of integrity even where his judgments are found to contain grave errors of law or legis. 61. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice General Book Circular Part I Serial No.7 which is applicable to Government servants in the matter of maintenance of records of confidential reports. It is stated that the above mentioned G.B.C. circular Part I, serial No.7 appears to have been adopted by the High Court. A copy of the circular issued by the Registrar of the High Court to all the District Judges was placed before us in the course of hearing. The relevant part of the G.B.C. circular applicable to Government Servants requires that where a remark of 'lack of integrity' is recorded and communicated to Government servants, action to investigate into the allegation and consequent disciplinary, action, if necessary, should follow or else the remark be expunged. 62. Taking aid from the above Government circular, it is urged that since no such follow up action was taken after communicating such an adverse remark the remark doubting integrity of respondent should be expunged and was rightly done so by the learned Single Judge. 63. We have enquired and it has been clarified by the counsel appearing for the High Court that no such Government Circular concerning annual confidential reports has been adopted by the High Court. for subordinate judiciary. It is explained that the circular of the Registrar to the District Judges was issued only as a guideline after obtaining approval by a committee of Judges and the Chief Justice. It is denied that any resolution of the High Court exists to treat the G.B.C. as applicable to members of subordinate judiciary. A letter was issued to District Judge for their guidance for maintaining A.C.Rs. of Judges working under them. 64. What has been explained may be accepted. It is denied that any resolution of the High Court exists to treat the G.B.C. as applicable to members of subordinate judiciary. A letter was issued to District Judge for their guidance for maintaining A.C.Rs. of Judges working under them. 64. What has been explained may be accepted. We however, cannot resist from observing that it is high time that the High Court should frame rules to regulate the maintenance, communication, consideration of representation and expungment of adverse remarks against judicial officers to ensure a fair and uniform procedure on the subject. This is necessary to dispel doubt and apprehension in the minds of the members of the subordinate judiciary, that they are likely to be condemned unheard on unsubstantial grounds and without adequate proof. 65. The question, however, remains whether the remarks that the 'officer does not enjoy good reputation' as contained in the two impugned adverse communications (Annex. P. 6 and Annex. P. 7) were rightly expunged by the learned Single Judge. 66. Judicial integrity or honesty does not merely mean discharging duties un-mindful of gain or loss, fear or favour; affection or illwill. In another sense it demands discharge of duties with complete intellectural honesty. Where law is overlooked, its language is strained and logic is taken aid of to achieve the desired result suited to one's own prediliction and liking, criticism of want of integrity may be levelled against ,the decision maker. See the following observations of Justice frank furter of the United States in the case of Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Franklin S. Pallock, (343' US451 atA65-466). (1996 Law Edition 1968 and;1979) as quoted in the case of Bhajan Lal v. Jindal (AIR 1994SCW 39'05). '" '.' "the judicial process demands that a Judge' should move within the frame work of relevant legal roles and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispessionately arid sub-merge private feeling on every aspect' of a case/' "" 67. Judge, therefore, in that sense, is not completely free. In decision asking process he can show compassion or pity only when law permits it to be shown and in the manlier expected of in the relevant statute, provision or principle of law. He must think dispessionately arid sub-merge private feeling on every aspect' of a case/' "" 67. Judge, therefore, in that sense, is not completely free. In decision asking process he can show compassion or pity only when law permits it to be shown and in the manlier expected of in the relevant statute, provision or principle of law. There lies the difference between duties discharged for dispensing justice in an impersonal way by a Judge and-similar work performed by those in power in other departments of government-or walks of life. The career of the Judge and the course of his duties constantly demand of him a 'striving for killing of all personal elements in his decision making process. That is not to say, that a, Judge has to be inhuman and insensitive to the grievances and sufferings of the parties before him. It only means that he has to carry out not his personal will but of the society, so expressed in the law on the subject." ';, 68. The compassion, as alleged to have been shown to Adivasis' in the Land Acquisition Case, without examining relevant legal provisions, therefore, could form a basis to remark; "that everything was not above board" Which was the comment made by the Portfolio Judge in .his inspection note. 69. Before parting with this case, in all fairness, we consider it necessary to observe that the adverse remark on the reputation of respondent conveyed to him in the relevant years should not haunt him all through his judicial career and hemper his prospects for' all times. The above 'remark 'cannot be read to his prejudice in future if he 'shows improvement in-his work and performance and is able to achieve the requisite grades for being admitted to Higher Selection Grade. The very purpose of communicating adverse remarks is not to condemn an officer but to caution him at the right time so as to give him chance of improvement. 70.To conclude, we have found it difficult to sustain the order of the Learned Single Judge. In the result; we allow this 'appeal and set aside the impugned order dt. 18.10.96. In the Circumstances, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs.