JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - Plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 filed O.S. No. 178 of 1986 for a declaration that his correct date of birth is 15.4.1943 and the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate was wrong. The suit having been dismissed, he filed an appeal and during the pendency of the appeal, an application for amendment of the prayer portion of the plaint was filed and accordingly, the lower appellate Court permitted the amendment. By virtue of the said amendment, the Plaintiff sought for an additional direction to Defendant No. 1 to correct the date of birth of the Plaintiff as 15.4.1943 instead of 15.4.1939 in the Service Book. The lower appellate Court while reversing the decree of the trial Court has passed a decree declaring the date of birth of the Plaintiff to be 15.4.1943 and further declaring that the date of birth as mentioned in the High School Certificate as 15.4.1939 was wrong. The Defendants were also directed to reflect the correct date of birth in the service record. The State which was Defendant No. 1 has come up with this Second Appeal against the aforesaid reversing decree of the lower appellate Court. 2. The Plaintiff, who at the time of filing of the suit was admittedly serving as a lecturer in a Government College, claims that though his correct date of birth is 15.4.1943 and had been so entered in the School Admission Register in Raghunarayan M.E. School, Markona, subsequently his date of birth was wrongly recorded as 15.4.1939 in Khaira School where he was admitted in 1956 and consequently, the said wrong date was incorporated in the High School certificate Examination conducted by the Board of Secondary Education. The Plaintiff claims that the aforesaid error crept into the records of the High School due to the fact that in the Transfer Certificate issued by the M.E.School, Markona, a wrong date of birth i.e. 15.4.1939 had been mistakenly indicated which could not be detected by his father due to the illiteracy of the latter. The Plaintiff further claims that he could know about his real date of birth only in the year 1984. when his Horoscope was shown to an astrologer Thereafter, an Advocate's notice was served on the Defendants, particularly Defendant No. 2, the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, who refused to rectify the mistake, thereby forcing the Plaintiff to file the suit. The Plaintiff further claims that he could know about his real date of birth only in the year 1984. when his Horoscope was shown to an astrologer Thereafter, an Advocate's notice was served on the Defendants, particularly Defendant No. 2, the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, who refused to rectify the mistake, thereby forcing the Plaintiff to file the suit. 3. In the suit apart from impleading the State of Orissa as Defendant No. 1, the Board of Secondary Education has been impleaded as Defendant No. 2; the Headmaster of Khaira High School and Headmaster of Raghunarayana High School (former Raghunarayan M.E. School having become a High School/in the meantime) as Defendants 3 & 4 respectively. Defendants 2 & 4, that is to say, the Board of Secondary Education and the Headmaster of Raghunarayana High School did not contest the suit and were set ex parte, whereas Defendants 1 and 3, that is to say, the State of Orissa and the Headmaster, Khaira High School contested the suit. In their joint written statement while denying the plaint allegations, it was not disputed that the Plaintiff was studying in Raghunarayana M.E. School and was subsequently admitted to Khaira High School. It was indicated in the written statement that in the Transfer Certificate on the basis of which admission was allowed* in Khaira High School, the date of birth had been indicated to be 15.4.1939. It has been further pleaded that the date of birth as indicated in the School Register and the matriculation certificate having been accepted in subsequent stages including service career, the Plaintiff was estopped from claiming any relief in the suit. 4. The trial Court found that there was no cause of action for the suit and the suit was barred by limitation in view of specific Regulation 39 in Chapter-X of their Regulations. It also disbelieved the case of the Plaintiff as to the correctness of the allegations made by the Plaintiff regarding his date of birth. 5. In appeal, the lower appellate Court differing from the finding of the trial Court held that the correct date of birth of the Plaintiff was 15.4.1943 and an error had crept into the School Admission Register of Khaira High School. 5. In appeal, the lower appellate Court differing from the finding of the trial Court held that the correct date of birth of the Plaintiff was 15.4.1943 and an error had crept into the School Admission Register of Khaira High School. It differed from the finding of the trial Court regarding bar of limitation by holding that the allegations contained in the plaint regarding cause of action had not been specifically denied by the Defendants. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court decreed the suit and directed the Defendants to consider 15.4.1943 to be the correct date of birth of the Plaintiff. 6. It is first contented that for correction of date of birth as recorded in the High School Certificate, a definite procedure has been indicted in Board's Regulation 39 in Chapter-X, which also contemplates a time-limit. It is further contended that the date of birth as indicated in the High School Certificate having been accepted at all subsequent sages, the Plaintiff was estopped from raising the question after long lapse of time. The Board's Regulation 39 contemplates correction of date of birth as incorporated in the High School Certificate within a period of three years and only on the ground of typographical or clerical mistake or wrong entry. It is submitted that such a Regulation of the Board which is a" statutory authority is a bar for entertaining any suit and the date of birth as incorporated in the High School Certificate can be corrected only in the manner provided in the Regulation. As already indicated, the Board has power to correct the date if it is an obvious mistake or a typographical mistake. The Board's certificate is evidently based on the entries made in the Admission Register of the High School and if it is found that the age as reflected in Board's Certificate does not tally with the age as reflected in the Admission Register, such mistake may be permitted to be corrected. Where, however, the mistake occurs in the School Register at the time of admission, correction of such a mistake is not contemplated in the Board's Regulation. The period of three years prescribed by the Regulation is meant to guide the Board in entertaining such application and it does not lay down the period of limitation for entertaining a suit. Where, however, the mistake occurs in the School Register at the time of admission, correction of such a mistake is not contemplated in the Board's Regulation. The period of three years prescribed by the Regulation is meant to guide the Board in entertaining such application and it does not lay down the period of limitation for entertaining a suit. The provisions contained in the Board's Regulations do not have the effect of barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. As observed in the decision reported in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Indupali Babaji, the question of correct date of birth of a person relates to the question of his status. The question of correct date of birth has got several ramifications such as attainment of majority of a person, eligibility of a person to hold any civil post, or to contest in any election; date of retirement etcetera. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the provisions contained in the Board's Regulations prescribe the only method for correcting the date of birth of a person whose date of birth has been incorrectly reflected in the High School Certificate. The contentions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant on the above score are not acceptable. 7. The correctness of the finding of the lower appellate Court regarding the date of birth is challenged. The lower appellate Court has come to a conclusion that the date of birth had been correctly reflected as 15.4.1943 in the School Register of the M.E. School, but it had been wrongly reflected to be 15.4.1939 in the Transfer Certificate which led to the subsequent wrong incorporation in the High School Certificate. The aforesaid finding is essentially a finding of fat which is not liable to be challenged in Second Appeal. The finding of the lower appellate Court is based on the entry in the School Admission Register of Raghunarayan M.E. School (subsequently became high School), where the Respondent had been admitted prior to his admission in Khaira High School as well as the evidence, of P. W.3 who was the Headmaster of Raghunarayan M.E. School at that time. P.W.3 has clarified as to how a wrong date had been indicated in the Transfer Certificate which subsequently became the basis of entry in the School Admission Register of Khaira High School. P.W.3 has clarified as to how a wrong date had been indicated in the Transfer Certificate which subsequently became the basis of entry in the School Admission Register of Khaira High School. Apart from the above evidence, the lower appellate Court has also accepted the correctness of the Horoscope of the Respondent prepared by the deceased brother of P.W.2. When the lower appellate Court has referred to some relevant materials on record and has come to a finding regarding the date of birth of the Respondent differing from the finding of the trial Court, it cannot be said that the said finding is vitiated by non-consideration of material evidence or perversity in approach. The finding of the lower appellate Court on a question of fact cannot be interfered with unless it is vitiated by perversity or any non-consideration of material facts which is not evident in the present case. Accordingly, the aforesaid contention of the Appellant is not tenable. 8. The learned Additional Government Advocate has also contented that since the date of birth as reflected in the High School Certificate has been accepted by the authorities and has remained unchallenged for a long period, the Plaintiff is estopped from raising the question. In this connection the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India and others Vs. Mrs. Saroj Bala, and Chief Medical Officer Vs. Khadeer Khadri, the aforesaid cases the correctness of the findings of the Administrative Tribunals regarding the age of the incumbents was under challenge. In view of the peculiar facts of those two cases, the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the Tribunals. In the present case, as already found, the lower appellate Court for cogent reasons has already found about the wrong entry in the Transfer Certificate which resulted in the subsequent wrong entry in the High School Certificate. The two decisions of the Supreme Court do not purport to lay down as a matter of law regarding such matters and are based on the peculiar facts of those cases and have no application to the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the undisputed fact that the father of the Plaintiff was an illiterate person. The two decisions of the Supreme Court do not purport to lay down as a matter of law regarding such matters and are based on the peculiar facts of those cases and have no application to the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the undisputed fact that the father of the Plaintiff was an illiterate person. It is not the case of the Appellant that the Plaintiff would not have been taken into service if the date of birth as now found would have been reflected in the High School Certificate. In other words, the Plaintiff does not seem to have derived any particular benefit by showing his date of birth to be 15.4.1939 instead on 15.4.1943. Similarly, there is nothing on record to indicate that the Defendants including the Appellant have acted to their detriment in any manner by accepted the wrong date of birth. Since neither the Plaintiff has derived any advantage nor the Defendants have been subjected to any disadvantage because of the wrong date of birth indicated in the High School Certificate, there is no question of estoppel in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. In ground (A) of the memorandum of appeal, the Appellant had challenged the legality of the finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation. Though at the time of admission, the said ground has not been certified to be a substantial question of law required to be determined, since the same question has been again posed at the time of hearing, I am dealing with the same. As observed in the decision of this Court reported in Jodhistir Prusty Vs. Koshal Transport Trading and Co., the question of date of birth relates to the question of status of a person. The present suit appears to be a declaratory suit coming under Article 58 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act and the period of limitation is three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the present case, the right to sue for such a declaration arose when the Plaintiff for the first time became aware of his correct date of birth. In view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act it is, of course, for the Plaintiff to plead and prove that his suit is within the prescribed period of limitation. In the present case, the right to sue for such a declaration arose when the Plaintiff for the first time became aware of his correct date of birth. In view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act it is, of course, for the Plaintiff to plead and prove that his suit is within the prescribed period of limitation. It has been asserted by the Plaintiff that he became aware of his correct date of birth only in 1984 when his Horoscope was given to an astrologer. Such assertion of the Plaintiff has been denied in a general manner by the Defendants and, therefore, it was for the Plaintiff to prove that such assertion is correct. The Plaintiff while being examined as P. W. 1 has categorically stated that he became aware of his correct date of birth only in 1984. such assertion of the Plaintiff on oath has remained practically unchallenged and has not been rebutted by the Defendants in any manner. The lower appellate Court seems to have accepted such position though the finding seems to have been recorded in a garbled manner. Be that as it may, the Plaintiff-Respondent has been able to prove that he has filed the suit within three years from the date of his knowledge regarding his correct date of birth. Accordingly, in agreement with the finding of the lower appellate Court, I hold that the suit was not barred by limitation. 10. The learned Additional Government Advocate has also contended that in view of the provisions contained in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, particularly Section 28 thereof, the suit and the appeal were not maintainable and in view of Section 29 of the Act, the appeal pending before the lower appellate Court should have been transferred to the State Administrative Tribunal. In the present case, the suit is essentially for a declaration that the correct date of birth of the Plaintiff is 15.4.1943 and not 15.4.1939 as recorded in the High School Certificate. It is, of course, true that during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate Court, the Plaintiff has sought for a direction by way of mandamus for giving direction to the Defendants to correct the date of birth as indicted in the service books. It is, of course, true that during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate Court, the Plaintiff has sought for a direction by way of mandamus for giving direction to the Defendants to correct the date of birth as indicted in the service books. However, such prayer incorporated by way of amendment in the lower appellate Court is ancillary to the main relief which is regarding declaration of the date of birth. As already held, in the decision reported in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Indupali Babaji, such a declaration also relates to the question of status. Since the main dispute raised by the Plaintiff is cognizable in a Civil Court, the Plaintiff need not be driven to pursue his remedy before the Administrative Tribunal only for the purpose of the ancillary relief sought by way of amendment in the lower appellate Court, more so, in view of the fact that such a question is being raised for the first time at the time of hearing of the second appeal. As such I am not inclined to accept the above contention of the Appellant. 11. In the result, I do not find any merit in this Second Appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed