JUDGMENT 1. :- Plaintiff-appellant, a Khalasi in Western Railway, challenged the order of his removal by instituting a civil suit. Learned Additional District Judge Kota vide its judgment and decree dated July 13, 1997 dismissed the suit. The appellant preferred instant appeal as indigent person. This court vide order dated July 12, 1979 allowed the application under order 41 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code filed by the appellant. 2. Mr. Arjun Karnani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, canvassed that the order of removal was against principles of natural justice. No reasonable opportunity was provided to the appellant to make representation against the proposed punishment. The order is vitiated being cryptic and laconic. Since the appellant crossed the age of superannuation, during the pendency of the proceedings, he may be awarded lump sum compensation. Reliance was placed on the Union of India vs. Ram Gopal Tanwar 1971 WLN 560 , Vasu Deo vs. The State of Rajasthan 1989(1) RLR 99 , Smt. Raj Kapoor vs. State of Rajasthan WLR 1991(S) Raj. 705 , G.S. Rajawat vs. R.F.C. WLC 1993(1) Raj. 117 , Shri Ram Yadav vs. R.S.R.T.C. 1995(3) WLC (Raj.) 462 . 3. On the other hand Mr. G.S. Bafna and Mr. K.S. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent U.O.I. supported the impugned decree and placed reliance on Tara Chand Khatri vs. Municipal Corporation Delhi AIR 1977 Supreme Court 567 . 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions and carefully perused the record. 5. A close look at the order sheets of the learned trial court demonstrates that on January 9, 1975 issues were framed and the case was posted for recording the evidence of the plaintiff appellant. On Feb. 21, 1975 the plaintiff appellant moved an application under Order 13 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code for bringing some documents on record. The application was allowed and the plaintiff appellant sought time for adducing evidence. On September 12, 1975 the evidence of the plaintiff appellant was dosed. The defendant respondent also dosed the evidence and both the parties agreed to argue the case on the basis of admitted documents. 6. Though the procedure of admission and denial in respect of the document of the defendant respondent was followed yet the documents submitted by the plaintiff appellant were neither admitted nor denied by the defendant respondent. The defendant respondent also dosed the evidence and both the parties agreed to argue the case on the basis of admitted documents. 6. Though the procedure of admission and denial in respect of the document of the defendant respondent was followed yet the documents submitted by the plaintiff appellant were neither admitted nor denied by the defendant respondent. It is rather unfortunate that the learned trial court proceeded to decide the suit on the basis of unexhibited documents. 7. The burden of proof in any particular case depends on the circumstances in which the daim arises. In general the rule which applies is 'ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit probation'. It is an ancient rule founded on considerations of good sense and should not be departed from without strong reasons. He who invokes the aid of the law must first prove his case. The plaintiff's case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. 8. The learned trial court did not deal with the documents produced by the plaintiff appellant before it in accordance with law. At this juncture it is necessary. to look into Rules 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil), 1986, which provides thus:- "50. Documents produced how to be dealt with-All documents produced must be received by the court and must be dealt with in one or other of the following ways, viz., (a) returned, (b) placed on the record, or (c) impounded. "51. Duty of court upon production of documents-The court shall inspect and consider all documents as soon as possible after issues are framed and before evidence is produced and shall:- (a) where they are held by the court under Order 13 rule 3 of the Code to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, forthwith reject them. (b) Where not rejected under order XIII, rule 3 of the Code, and held to be relevant and admissible in evidence, dealt with them as follows : (1) Documents, which do not require proof e.g. public documents and documents admitted by the party against whom they are produced in evidence shall be admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits in the manner prescribed in rule 50. (2) Documents which required proof by oral evidence shall be kept on the record pending proof. (2) Documents which required proof by oral evidence shall be kept on the record pending proof. They shall be admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits in the manner prescribed in rule 50 when evidence is tendered in proof of them. They shall be returned at the dose of the evidence if no evidence is tendered in proof of such documents. Note:-The endorsement referred to in Order 13, rule 4 of the Code shall be made on the documents which are admitted in evidence. No document shall be marked as an exhibit unless it is admitted in evidence." 9. A perusal of the above quoted Rules, goes to show that all the documents produced before the trial court must be received by the court and must be dealt with in the ways provided in Rule 50. It appears that the learned trial court neither returned the documents submitted by the plaintiff nor placed them on record and without following the procedure enumerated in rules 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil) the impugned judgment and decree came to be passed. Therefore the impugned judgment and decree are not sustainable and deserve to be quashed. Under these circumstances it is not necessary for me to discuss the rival contentions as there is a procedural illegality in the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Consequently, I allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and decree. The case is remanded back to the trial court. It is expected from the trial court to follow the procedure enumerated in the Rules 50 and 51 of the General Rules (Civil) 1986, after providing opportunity to the parties for adducing evidence and decide the case. It is further expected from the trial court to adjudicate upon the case within six months from the date of receipt of this order. The record of the case be sent back to the trial court. The parties are directed to appear before the leaned trial court on August 28, 1997. The parties if they so choose may move amendments of their pleadings in respect of the subsequent events.Appeal allowed-case remanded. *******