Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J. The assessee has filed these petitions under section 54(1) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955, against the order made by the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax rejecting the petitioner's revision petitions to revise the orders of assessment made against the petitioner for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84, after those orders has been rectified by the Assessing Officer, in exercise of his powers under section 35 of the Act. The initial orders of assessment were made on August 13, 1984, assessing the petitioner to tax in the sum of Rs. 2, 152.60 and Rs. 3, 689.50 for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84, respectively. Almost a year later, but well within the period of limitation prescribed under section 35 of the Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment in order, inter alia, to include any income escaping the assessment, the Assessing Officer issued a notice to the petitioner on February 15, 1985, which was received by the assessee on February 21, 1985. The assessee undertook to produce certain accounts required for the Assessing Officer, by March 26, 1985, but he did not do so. A reminder was sent to the assessee on July 24, 1985, which was duly received, but the assessee did not do anything thereafter. The revised orders of assessment came to be passed on September 13, 1985. The orders so made by the Assessing Officer set out that the mistake made in the earlier order of assessment has been rectified and that revised order is issued under section 4(b) read with section 17(3) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act. This order is clearly appealable under section 31 of the Act. The assessee however did not choose to file such an appeal. The assessee, instead, filed a revision petition after the period of limitation for filing an appeal had expired. The revision petition was filed on May 13, 1986. Those petitions were filed under section 34 of the Act which empowers the Commissioner to act on his own motion or on application by the assessee to revise the orders passed by the subordinate officers. In those revision petitions, the assessee urged only two grounds, (1) that sufficient opportunity had not been given and (2) that the petitioners are eligible for exemption under section 4(b) of the Act. In those revision petitions, the assessee urged only two grounds, (1) that sufficient opportunity had not been given and (2) that the petitioners are eligible for exemption under section 4(b) of the Act. The first point was negatived as the Commissioner found that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity but had failed to utilise the same. On the second point, the Commissioner held that though the assessee had non-agricultural income which was not unsubstantial, it had not produced any document to show that the income was exempted from assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act, and that proof of that nature was a prerequisite under section 4(b) for grant of exemption to an institution with charitable objects having agricultural income therefore the assessee was not entitled to have its income exemptedLearned counsel for the assessee contended that the Commissioner has erred in recording these findings and, therefore, that order should be set aside. It is not possible for us to grant any relief to the petitioner even if we assume for a moment that both the grounds urged by the assessee before the Commissioner have been decided erroneously. The present revision petitions which have been filed under section 54 of the Act have to be dismissed as not maintainable, as, by the, impugned order of the Commissioner, the assessee's prayer for setting aside the order of the rectified assessment order has been rejected, and there is no further order of the Commissioner to cast any burden or causing any pre-judice to the petitioner which had not been caused by the order of the Assessing Officer. The assessee has failed to avail of the remedy by way of an appeal, and instead, sought to have the assessment set aside by invoking the revisional powers of the Commissioner under section 34. The assessee has failed to avail of the remedy by way of an appeal, and instead, sought to have the assessment set aside by invoking the revisional powers of the Commissioner under section 34. The Privy Council in the case of CIT v. Tribune Trust while considering section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which provision enabled the Commissioner to revise the orders of his subordinates, held that the order passed by the Commissioner refusing to set aside the orders of assessment made against the assessee during the period when the assessee's appeal against the assessment made for the earlier year was pending before the Privy Council and in which appeal, the Privy Council after the assessment had been made for subsequent years held that the assessee's income was not taxable on the ground that it was applied for a charitable purpose, could not be said to have caused pre-judice to the assessee, as by the reason of refusal of the Commissioner, the assessee's position remained as it was at the time, the assessments impugned before the Commissioner were made. The assessee had not preferred appeal against those assessments and had not availed of the remedy which was available to it under the Act for having an illegal assessment set aside or corrected in appeal. The Privy Council also considered section 33 along with section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and held that a reference under the latter section could not be made in respect of an order made by the Commissioner which merely rejected the petition of the assessee to interfere with the order of assessment. The court concluded by stating that: ".... a reference does not lie from an order under section 33 unless that order is prejudicial to the assessee in the sense that he is in a worse position than before the order was made." In the course of the judgment, the Privy Council observed that the Income-tax Act, exhaustively defined the obligations and remedies of the taxpayer and that it would be wholly incompatible with the scheme of the Act that he should have a collateral right, necessarily vague and ill-defined, founded on the principles of equity and good conscience. It was also observed that the remedies open to the taxpayer whether in regard to appeal against assessment or to claim for refund are to be found within the four corners of the Income-tax Act That decision of the Privy Council was the basis for the decision of a Full Bench of this court in N. N. Seshadrinathan v. State of Madras wherein it was held that reading of section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act with section 54, an order of the Commissioner declining to interfere with the order of an inferior tribunal cannot be termed an order prejudicial to the assessee so as to fall within the scope of section 54, and therefore, an application for revision under section 54 does not lie from such an order. In so-holding, this court departed from the earlier decision to the contrary rendered by a Bench of five judges in the case of Voora Sreeramulu Chetty v. CIT. In that judgment it had been held that a reference under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was maintainable against the rejecting of a revision petition filed by an assessee under section 33. The Full Bench which decided the case of N. N. Seshadrinathan held that the earlier decision of this court in Voora Sriramulu Chetty's case was no longer good law. That decision of the Full Bench in N. N. Seshadrinathan v. State of Madras has been followed by the Division Benches of this court one such instance being in the case of M. V. S. Kathirvelu Nadar v. CAIT. The basis for the decision of the Full Bench and of the Division Bench which have followed the decision of the Full Bench is the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Tribune Trust. The statutory provision considered therein is not strictly in pari materia with section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Act. While section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, did not confer in express terms, a right on the assessee to invoke the revisional powers of the Commissioner, section 34 of the State Act expressly provides that the Commissioner's power of revision may be exercised not only on his own motion but also on "application by the assessee". While section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, did not confer in express terms, a right on the assessee to invoke the revisional powers of the Commissioner, section 34 of the State Act expressly provides that the Commissioner's power of revision may be exercised not only on his own motion but also on "application by the assessee". The second proviso to section 34(1) reads as under: "Provided further that an order passed declining to interfere shall not be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assessee." Sub-section (4) of section 34 is couched in wide terms. That provision reads as under: "34. (4) Any order passed under sub-section (1) shall, subject to revision by the High Court under section 54, be final." Section 34 of the State Act thus in express terms states that the order passed under section 34(1) being one passed either at the instance of the assessee or suo motu by the Commissioner will be final only subject to a revision by the High Court under section 54. Section 54 provides, inter alia, that in the case of an order under section 34, enhancing the assessment or otherwise prejudicial to the assessee, the assessee may prefer an application to the High Court against that order. Reading the two provisions together, namely, sections 34 and 54, it must be held that the wider language of section 34(4) has been whittled down by the express words used in section 54(1) which enables the assessee to approach the High Court only against an order under section 34 which is prejudicial to the assessee. The rejection of a revision petition filed by the assessee is declared by the second proviso to section 34(1) to be an order which shall not be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assesseeHaving regard to the express language used in these two sections the legislative intent is manifest that a revision under section 54 at the instance of the assessee against the order of the Commissioner rejecting the assessee's revision, is not maintainable and it cannot be entertained. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of jacob v. Deputy CAIT (Addl.) that it is only when the assessee is able to plead and prove that prejudice has been caused otherwise than by mere rejection of his revision petition by the Commissioner that the assessee can invoke section 54 of the Act. No such prejudice has been demonstrated before us. The revision petitions, therefore, have to be, and are accordingly dismissed.