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1997 DIGILAW 958 (ALL)

Priyambda Devi v. Prescribed Authority Aligarh

1997-08-22

S.RAFAT ALAM

body1997
JUDGMENT (1.) S. Rafat Alam, J. In the instant writ petition, the short grievance of the petitioner is that her application for the release of the shop filed on 25-2-1995 under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (for short the Act), has not been disposed of till date, although the rule provides that such applications are to be disposed of as far as possible, within a period of two months from the date of its filing. Therefore, the petitioner seeks a direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to dispose of the above application within a reasonable time fixed by this Court. (2.) IN view of the order which is being passed, no notice is required to be given to the respondents No. 2 and 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. The petition is being finally disposed of at the admission stage itself, as agreed to by the learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 1. (3.) MR. M. K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the Prescribed Authority is required to dispose of the application filed under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act within the time prescribed in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, (for short the F. ules), unless there are sufficient reasons for the delay of the disposal. He further urged that where the Prescribed Authority has failed to comply with the aforesaid provisions in its spirit, this Court can issue mandamus directing the Prescribed Authority fixing the time limit for disposal of such application. (4.) RELIANCE has been placed on a Single Judge judgment of this Court dated 5th April, 1993, rendered in the case of Dileep Kumar and others v. Prescribed Authority (Additional Civil Judge), Budaun and others, 1996 (2) ARC 471. From the facts disclosed in the petition, it appears that the petitioner is the landlady of the shop in question, which is under the tenancy of respondents No. 2 and 3. An application for release of the shop was filed on 25-2-1995 on the ground of personal necessity which was registered as U. P. U. B. Case No. 17 of 1995. An application for release of the shop was filed on 25-2-1995 on the ground of personal necessity which was registered as U. P. U. B. Case No. 17 of 1995. Despite valid service of notice on respondents No. 2 and 3, they did not appear in the Court below and therefore, by order dated 10-4-1995, it was directed to proceed exparte. Thereafter, the respondents No. 2 and 3 appeared on 15th April, 1995 along with an application for recalling of the order to proceed exparte, which was allowed on 20-4-95. When the respondents again did not take any steps in the proceedings, the Court below by its order dated 25-7-1995, ordered to proceed ex pane. However, respondent No. 3 appeared and sought time on different dates for filing written statement, but the same was not filed and ultimately, the Court below by order dated 1-12-1995, directed that if the written statement is not filed today by 4 P. M. on behalf of respondent No. 3, no further opportunity shall be given for the same. Again by order dated 15-12-1995, the Court below allowed time till 30-1- 1996 to file written statement by the opposite party. In the meanwhile, the sister of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 made an application for her impalement in the proceeding which was also rejected on 9th July, 1996. In short, it appears that the proceeding was being adjourned or delayed on some or the other pretext at the instance of tenant/respondents with a view to linger the disposal of the case. (5.) RULE 21 (1) (a) of the Rules provides eviction of a tenant from the building under the tenancy on the ground of bonaflde requirement of the landlord either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or business. Since the building is required on the ground of personal necessity of the landlady, the rule insists for its disposal as far as possible, within two months from the date of its presentation, to remove the hardship of the landlord. (6.) RULE 15 (3) of the rules framed under the Act provides as under: "every application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. (6.) RULE 15 (3) of the rules framed under the Act provides as under: "every application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. " Although the provisions contained in rule 15 (3) are not mandatory in nature but the Prescribed Authority is required to ad here to it strictly and the proceeding shall not be allowed to be delayed or lingered unnecessarily, unless there is sufficient and compelling reason for such a delay. In the absence of any plausible ground, the Prescribed Authority has to dispose of the application within the time provided in rule 15 (3). The intention and object of the rule is to ensure expeditious disposal of the cases where eviction is sought for on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord, so that the hardship of the landlord should not be allowed to continue for a long period and it should be remedied at the earliest. It has been seen that the proceeding of ejectment of the tenant is unnecessarily delayed at the instance of the tenant on some or the other frivolous grounds. A protracted proceeding will destroy the very object and spirit of the provision contained in rule 15 (3), there fore, in my view, the Prescribed Authority should not allow unnecessary adjournment and follow the rule strictly with all serious ness and decide such cases with promptness and without any delay to satisfy the requirement of rule 15 (3). From the facts of the case, it is apparent that twice the Prescribed Authority passed the order to proceed exparte but it was ultimately recalled on the tenant's application. Thereafter unnecessary adjournments were sought for, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner only with the idea to stall the disposal of the proceedings. (7.) HAVING considered the submissions and in the facts of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner at the first instance, may make an application before the Prescribed Authority drawing his attention to sub-rule (3) of the Rule 15 of the Rules with a prayer to dispose of her application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act at the earliest. This Court hopes and trust that in the event of filing of such an application along with the certified copy of this order, the Prescribed Authority shall try to dispose of the aforesaid application on merit, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of filing of such application, after hearing the par ties. (8.) IT may be pointed out that I have not gone into the merits of the claim of the petitioner and leave it to the Prescribed Authority to decide the same on the basis of evidence and material produced before him. With the aforesaid observations, this petition is finally disposed of. Petition disposed of. .