H. L. DATTU, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition, I am called upon to interpret the true scope of sub-rule (9) of Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' ). ( 2 ) THE facts material for the purpose of deciding points in controversy lie in a very narrow compass. Petitioner is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of fabricating sheet metal products and manufacture of Machine Tool Accessories. For the purpose of its manufacturing activity, petitioner has purchased a factory premises comprising of land and building bearing No. A-49 in plot No. 493 of Peenya IV phase, Peenya industrial Area from its previous owner M/s. Precision Rubber industries (P) Ltd. , under a Registered Sale Deed, dated 8-2-1996. The said M/s. Precision Rubber Industries upon the conveyance of the said property in favour of the petitioner, had addressed a communication, dated 4/12 March, 1996 to the 2nd respondent, intimating the Assistant Commissioner of Central excise of the fact of sale. ( 3 ) SOMETIME thereafter, petitioner company, by an application dated 12-7-1996, as required under Rule 174 of the Rules sought for registration to manufacture excisable goods for industrial purpose, before Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, bangalore. Pursuant to such an application, second respondent has issued a show-cause notice dated 7-8-1996, inter alia calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the application for registration should not be rejected for the reasons mentioned therein. This show-cause notice came to be replied by the petitioner-Company by its reply letter dated 12-8-1996 inter alia contending that there was no transfer of business in part or in whole from M/s. Precision Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. , to the petitioner and therefore Rule 230 (2) of the rules was not attracted and that the amounts allegedly due from M/s. ' Precision Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. , was not recoverable from the petitioner. ( 4 ) AFTER issuing a notice for personal hearing to the petitioner, the 2nd respondent has passed an order dated 6-11-1996 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner seeking registration under Rule 174 of the Rules. ( 4 ) AFTER issuing a notice for personal hearing to the petitioner, the 2nd respondent has passed an order dated 6-11-1996 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner seeking registration under Rule 174 of the Rules. The petitioner-Company is before this Court in a petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution seeking for a declaration that registration of the petitioner under Rule 174 of the Rules is deemed to have been granted in terms of Rule 174 (9) of the rules and further to quash the order bearing No. 330 of 1996 in c. No. IV / 16 / 367 / 96 Miscellaneous, dated 6-11-1996 and lastly, for a direction to the respondent from forbearing from interfering with the petitioner's right to carry on manufacturing activity in its factory. ( 5 ) MR. K. G. Raghavan, the learned Counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing of this petition did not contest the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the second respondent but confines his attack against the order on the ground that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction on 6-11-1996 to pass the impugned order rejecting the petitioner's application for registration. According to the learned Counsel, 2nd respondent had lost its power to pass any order on 6-11-1996 as the impugned order has not been framed within 30 days from the date of petitioner's application for registration. It may be noticed that the petitioner filed its application for registration on 12-7-1996 and the 2nd respondent has issued a notice dated 7-8-1996 to show cause why petitioner's application for registration should not be rejected and on 6-11-1996 has rejected the petitioner's application. If it is the date of the order, that is relevant under Rule 174 (9) of the Rules, then Mr. Raghavan is right in his contention that the impugned order made by 2nd respondent is barred under Rule 174 (9) of the Rules. If on the other hand, the relevant date is the initiation of proceedings by issuing a show cause notice under Rule 174 (9) of the Rules, then the order made by 2nd respondent is within time. ( 6 ) FOR deciding the contention raised by Mr. Raghavan, I have to look to Rule 174 (9) of the Rules. If on the other hand, the relevant date is the initiation of proceedings by issuing a show cause notice under Rule 174 (9) of the Rules, then the order made by 2nd respondent is within time. ( 6 ) FOR deciding the contention raised by Mr. Raghavan, I have to look to Rule 174 (9) of the Rules. That rule says "the proper officer shall proceed to grant a Registration Certificate under this rule within thirty days of the receipt of an application. If registration Certificate is not granted within the said period, the registration applied for shall be deemed to have been granted". The power conferred on the 2nd respondent under rule 174 (9) of the Rules as could be gathered from its language includes three different facets viz. , (1) proper Officer will proceed to grant a Registration Certificate; (2) the same to be done within thirty days from the date of receipt of the application and (3) if it not granted within the aforesaid time, it is deemed to have been granted. ( 7 ) THE meaning of the expression 'proceed' according to Websters Dictionary : to move forward; to advance; to renew progress: to pass one point to another or topic to another; to carry on series of acts: to take legal proceedings. The rule making authority in the opening part of the rule says that the proper Officer shall proceed to grant a Registration Certificate under the rule. That has to be done within thirty days from the date of receipt of the application. Taking legal proceedings in my view would include issuing a show-cause notice pursuant to an application within thirty days. In the present case, the facts indicate petitioner-Company had filed an application for grant of registration Certificate on 12-7-1996 and the Proper Officer/2nd respondent had issued a show - cause notice on 7-8-1996 within thirty days from the date of receipt of the application. If the rule making authority had stopped at this, then it would have been difficult to accept the contention of Sri Raghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner. The rule making authority in the later part of the sub-rule says 'if the Registration Certificate is not granted within the said period', what consequence would follow. It says that the Registration Certificate is deemed to have been granted. The rule making authority in the later part of the sub-rule says 'if the Registration Certificate is not granted within the said period', what consequence would follow. It says that the Registration Certificate is deemed to have been granted. The expression 'grant' in Rule 174 (9) of the rules is wide enough to take within its sweep to confer or reject a right to the applicant. Even this has to be done by making an order within the thirty days. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order not on or before 12-8-1996 but on 6-11-1996. Since there was no refusal to grant within the specified period of thirty days, in my view, the Registration certificate is deemed to have been granted in favour of the applicant. Hence 2nd respondent loses the jurisdiction to pass any order on the application filed under Rule 174 after the expiry of period of 30 days as specified in Rule 174 (9) of the rules. ( 8 ) IT is well accepted principle of interpreting statutes that rules issued under the statutes have the effect, as if, of being enacted in the statutes. In the case of Associated Cement company Limited v Commercial Tax Officer, Kota and Others , the Supreme Court, while interpreting the Rajasthan Sales Tax rules, held that the rules which are framed under the statute should be read as a part of the statute itself in view of the express provision contained in sub-section (5) of Section 26 of the rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. The Supreme Court has further observed that whenever express provision in this statute is therefor making rules, the effect is that the rules become part of the statute. In support, the Supreme Court has cited the decision of House of Lords in the case of Institute of Patent agents v Joseph Lockwood, wherein Lord Herschell delivering the Judgment observed that in case of conflict between a section and another Section or between a section and a rule, one has to determine which one is a leading provision and which one is the subordinate provision and which must give way to the other. "that would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to the rules which are to be treated as if within the enactment"the judgment said. "that would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to the rules which are to be treated as if within the enactment"the judgment said. This judgment quoted with approval by the supreme Court makes it clear that not only the rules are to be treated as a part of the Act but Rules are to be interpreted as intra vires to the Act under which they have been issued. ( 9 ) KEEPING in view the well accepted legal principles of interpretation of rules framed under a statute, and applying this principles to sub-rule (9) of Rule 174 of the Rules it can safely said that Proper Officer shall proceed to consider to grant registration Certificate within 30 days of the receipt of an application. If no order is made within the aforesaid period, the registration applied shall be deemed to have been granted. Power to grant has to be exercised within thirty days and the order has to be passed within the aforesaid specified period, otherwise question of limitation would definitely arises. Power to initiate and complete proceedings by passing an order should be exercised within the time fixed under Rule 174 (9) of the Rules. They are all facets of one single power. ( 10 ) NOW coming back to the facts of this case, the petitioner-Company filed an application seeking for Registration certificate on 12-7-1996 and the Proper Officer should have passed an order either granting or rejecting the application within thirty days. Mere initiation of proceedings by issuing a show cause notice dated 7-8-1996 will not save the limitation provide under the rule framed under the statute. The Proper officer should have passed an order on or before 12-8-1996. Since the Officer has passed the order on 6-11-1996, the same is without jurisdiction and the registration applied for is deemed to have been granted. The use of the word 'deemed' in the rule is to impose for the purpose of this rule an artificial construction that would not otherwise prevail. By this statutory fiction, the rule making authority mandates that if the application for registration is not granted within the time specified in the rule, it is deemed to have been granted. Unlike all period of limitation, Rule 174 (9) of the Rules not only refers to initiation of proceedings but also its completion. By this statutory fiction, the rule making authority mandates that if the application for registration is not granted within the time specified in the rule, it is deemed to have been granted. Unlike all period of limitation, Rule 174 (9) of the Rules not only refers to initiation of proceedings but also its completion. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above, petitioner succeeds. In view of that, I make the following order, (a) Petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. Impugned order dated 6-11-1996 passed by the second respondent bearing Order No. 330 of 1996 C. No. IV / 16 / 367 / 96 Miscellaneous, dated 6th November, 1996, is quashed. (b) It is declared that the registration sought for by the petitioner vide its application dated 12-7-1996 is deemed to have been granted in terms of Rule 174 (9) of the Central Excise Rules, 1994. (c) In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .