Judgment AMARESH KU. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 19th Dec. 1994 passed by the learned single Judge in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5655/94 whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that the writ petition had arisen out of contractual obligation and the petitioner desired a direction that the respondents may be asked to execute lease deed in his favour. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that the writ petition was belated. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant (petitioner) has submitted that both the grounds on which writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed, were not sufficient to dismiss the writ petition because the right of the appellant to get lease deed executed in his favour did not arise from any private contract but it had its origin in the Rules made by the Government under the U. I. T. Act and, therefore, the right of the appellant to get the lease deed executed by the respondent No. 1 in his favour had statutory origin rather than a contractual origin as pointed out by the learned single Judge. Regarding the second ground, on which the writ petition was dismissed, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the writ petition was not belated as pointed out by the learned single Judge because the appellant (petitioner) had been repeatedly asking the respondent No. 1 to execute the lease deed and the right to get the lease deed executed in his favour does not come to an end so long he is in the possession of the property in accordance with the terms and conditions of agreement for lease and the rules. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order passed by the learned single Judge and added that the appellant has constructed a building in the leasehold plot without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. and that he had encroached upon a strip of adjoining land and thereby contravened the terms and conditions of the licence granted in his favour. ( 5 ) AT the outset it would be proper to point out that the respondents had no opportunity to file the reply before the learned single Judge. Therefore, in this appeal we do not deem it fit to decide whether the appellant constructed a building on the leasehold land without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. or he committed any encroachment on the adjoining land. The respondent would be free to raise such objections as they deem fit, on the basis of the allegation that the appellant has constructed a house without obtaining permission from the U. I. T. and committed trespass on the adjoining land, in their reply. ( 6 ) IN the present appeal, we, are, concerned with the question whether the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned single Judge on the ground that the right claimed was contractual in origin and the writ petition was belated was unjustified. ( 7 ) A bare perusal of the provisions of the U. I. T. Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder show that U. I. Ts. have been created under the authority of law for the purpose indicated by the U. I. T. Act. The functions which are to be performed by the U. I. T. , are regulated by the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and Rules made thereunder. The rights and obligations of the U. I. T. are governed by the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the U. I. T. is as free as private citizens in the matter of entering into the contracts and settling the terms and conditions of contracts. For the same reason private persons who want to obtain plots of land from the U. I. T. , whether on lease or otherwise, have to comply with the provisions of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. They cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the U. I. T. Act and the Rules. Viewed in this light, the rights and obligations which are created by the U. I. T. Act and the Rules made under the U. I. T. Act cannot be said to have their origin in the contract entered into between the U. I. T. and the private citizens. The origin of these rights and obligations must be said to be statutory. The origin of these rights and obligations must be said to be statutory. ( 8 ) THE facts of this case as alleged by the appellant are to the effect that the respondent No. 1 auctioned plot No. 6 situated in Idgah Bari, Bikaner on 13th May, 1971. The appellant was the higher bidder and his auction bid was accepted and he deposited first instalment of Rs. 515/- on 13th May, 1971 and on the same day obtained the possession of the plot. The balance of auction amount deposited by the appellant on 27th August, 1971 within the prescribed time and it was accepted by respondent No. 1 by receipt No. 797 and agreement of lease was executed on 8th June, 1972 by the respondent No. 1 and the same has been marked as Annexure 3. After that the appellant obtained permission from the Municipal Board, Bikaner for construction of a house. The permission was given to him on 14th July, 1973 and after obtaining permission he constructed a house over the plot. The entire amount which was payable by him upto 88-89 was paid by him. He made repeated efforts to persuade the respondent No. 1 to execute lease deed in his favour but in vain. The appellant, therefore, filed the writ petition S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5655/94. The relief sought in the writ petition was that by appropriate writ order or by direction the respondent be directed to execute lease deed in respect of plot and the respondents be restrained from passing any judicial order in the interest of the petitioner and if such order is passed it should be declared null and void. ( 9 ) THE grant of sale deed and licence is governed by Rules 20 and 26 of the U. I. T. Rules. Clause (a) of Rule 20 provides: "that sale deed for the land shall be issued by the Trust only when terms and conditions of the lease agreement have been complied with by the purchaser/allottee and that 2-3rd of the maximum permissible covered area has been constructed on ground floor, provided that in the case of land sold by auction, the sale deed shall be issued by the Trust on completion of one dwelling Unit. " clause (b) of Rule 20 provides :"that after the full cost of the plot is deposited by the allottee under sub-rule (5) of Rule 17, he shall be given a licence permitting him to enter into the land construct a building thereon within the period specified under Rule 21. "rule 26 provides :"that for every allotment or disposal by auction under these rules a document evidencing the same shall be prepared in the manner prescribed in appropriate form as may be prescribed by State Government which shall be signed for and on behalf of Governor of the State by the Chairman and Secretary of the Trust and shall be duly stamped and registered at the expense of the allottee or the purchaser. " ( 10 ) A bare perusal of Rules 20 and 26 of the Rules made under the U. I. T. Act shows that the execution of sale deed or of the document to evidence sale or allotment of the land to auction purchaser is not dependent upon the terms and conditions which were agreed to between the U. I. T. and the purchaser but it is governed by the provisions of Rules 20 and 26. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the right to get the sale deed/lease deed executed by the U. I. T. in accordance with the provisions of Rules 20 and 26 , is a statutory right and not a contractual right as observed by the learned single Judge. We are fortified in our view by the judgments of this Court given in U. I. T. v. Vijay Surana and others,, D. B. Civil Appeal No. 416/91 (and three other appeals) decided by the judgment dated 26th August, 1993 and the judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 67/88, Balbir Kumar and another v. U. I. T. and another which was decided on 19th April, 1988. ( 11 ) SO far as delay in filing the writ petition is concerned, we are of the opinion that in case of rights which do not come to an end with the lapse of time, the right of petitioner to get the lease deed executed by the U. I. T. cannot be negatived by holding that the writ petition filed by him was delayed because in such cases the cause of action can be said to be recurring everyday. In the case of agreements for lease, the right of the lessee to get the lease deed executed in his favour by the lessor is available to him for the entire duration for which lease was granted. The reason being that lease deed is the evidence of the lease for which the agreement for lease deed is entered into. In cases where the possession of the land is delivered to the lessee and he is permitted to construct a house or buildings on the leasehold plot, and neither the agreement for lease is revoked nor possession of land is taken away from him, it must be said that the right to get lease deed executed in his favour is available to the lessee for the whole duration of the lease. Besides there is nothing in Rules 20 and 26 of the U. I. T. Rules to indicate that the right to get lease deed executed in accordance with Rules 20 and 26 comes to an end with the lapse of time. We are, therefore, of the view that in cases of this kind the writ petition cannot be said to be belated. ( 12 ) FOR above-mentioned reasons, this appeal is allowed. The order dated 19th Dec. 1994 passed by the learned single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside and the writ peition is remanded to the learned single Judge for disposal according to law. The respondent shall be at liberty to file their reply before the learned single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own cost. Appeal allowed.