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1997 DIGILAW 973 (DEL)

R. C. JUNEJA v. PREM DASS BAJAJ

1997-12-01

N.G.NANDI

body1997
N. G. Nandi, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the petitioner (original respondenttenant) has been challenging the order dated 6. 5. 1995 refusing leave to contestunder Sections 25-B (4) and (5) of the Act in the proceedings under Section 14-C of theact. ( 2 ) IT is not disputed that the petition under Section 14-C of the Act came to befiled on 12. 12. 1996. The petitioner retired from the service of the Central Government with effect from 31. 8. 1997. ( 3 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Sethi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, thatthe first and second floors having four rooms and two rooms respectively, with aseparate water and electric connection is available with the respondent/ (originalpetitioner-landlord) and that the demand for eviction under Section 14-C of the Actis mala fide inasmuch as the respondent has not been completing the flooring andthe water and electric fittings and that it is an artificial scarcity/ need created for the purpose of evicting the petitioner from the demised premises inasmuch as thedoors, flooring and sanitary fittings are not provided malafide and that there is nonecessity for residence much less bona fide, as contemplated under Section 14-C ofthe Act; that since first and second floors is available, Section 14-C of the Act cannotbe invoked as the demand for additional accommodation is not contemplatedunder Section 14-C of the Act; that the first and second floors cannot be said nothabitable and, therefore, not available for residence to the respondent; that the contentions raised in the leave to contest suggest triable issues which requirescrutiny of evidence. ( 4 ) AS against this, it is submitted by Mr. ( 4 ) AS against this, it is submitted by Mr. Dhir, learned Counsel for respondent,that the periodic increase in the rent cannot debar a claim of the landlord on theground of bonafide requirement, be it under Section 14 (l) (e) or under Section 14-C of the Act; that the first and second floor premises cannot be said to be availablefor residence as the same are not habitable and even if first and second floor arcconsidered available, even then first and second floor being not sufficient, looking to the number of family members namely petitioner, his wife, two married sons withtheir families, children; that the parameters of Section 14 (l) (e) of the Act cannot beextended to Section 14-C of the Act; that the petitioner has already retired fromcentral Government employment w. e. f. 31/08/1987 and that he has to handover the possession of the Government accommodation on or before 31. 12. 1997. ( 5 ) SECTION 14-C does not postulate non-availability of other premises to thelandlord for the purpose of invoking Section 14-C of the Act nor does it provide thata landlord cannot claim additional premises by invoking Section 14-C, if he does nothave premises sufficient available for his residence. In the case of Anand Swnroopvohra v. Bhim Sen Bahri and Another, (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases page 372, thesupreme Court, while dealing with a case under Section 14-C (1) of the Act filed bythe landlord - a retired Central Government employee on the ground of requirement of demised premises namely the ground floor for his own residence becauseof insufficiency of accommodation on the first floor of the house where his brotherwas residing, held petition under Section 14-C (1) of the Act maintainable. Thiswould provide an answer to the argument advanced by the learned Counsel forpetitioner on this score. ( 6 ) IT is not disputed that the first and second floors in the property wherein thedemised premises is on the ground floor were constructed during the years 1990-1992. It is also not disputed that there are no doors, sanitary fittings and the layingof the tiles on the floor. The premises which are not complete in every respect cannotbe said to be habitable and available to the landlord for the purpose of residencetaking the admitted facts as they are, as pointed out above. It is also not disputed that there are no doors, sanitary fittings and the layingof the tiles on the floor. The premises which are not complete in every respect cannotbe said to be habitable and available to the landlord for the purpose of residencetaking the admitted facts as they are, as pointed out above. ( 7 ) SIMPLY because the present petitioner has been granted leave to contest inthe proceedings under Section 14 (1 ) (e) of the Act, the same would not mean that thepetitioner would be ipso facto entitled to leave to contest in the proceedings undersection 14-C of the Act inasmuch as the bona fide requirement for residence by thelandlord for himself and his family members, as contemplated under Section14 (1 ) (e) of the Act, cannot be extended/stretched to Section 14-C of the Act and thatthe requirement for residence has to be within the parameters of Section 14-C of theact. It is not the say of the petitioner that the present respondent is not bona fideinasmuch as the respondent, after getting possession of the demised premises,wants the same to be converted into commercial complex or sold. The fact is thatthe respondent has retired from the Central Government employment with effectfrom 31/08/1997 and as per page 154 of the paper book, he has been servedwith a notice to vacate the Government accommodation, which was given to himwhile in service on or before 31. 12. 1997. ( 8 ) ALL what Section 14-C (2) of the Act contemplates is whether the landlord isin the employment of the Central Government or Delhi Administration and has aperiod of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premiseslet out by him are required by him for his own residence after his retirement. Hemay, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, applyto the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the petition under Section 14-C of the Act has been filedwithin one year preceding the date of his retirement on 31. 8. 1997. Having regardto the facts and circumstances, as pointed out above, I do not find any illegality orinfirmity in the impugned order so as to call for any interference therein. Thepetition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed. ( 10 ) ORDERED accordingly.