JUDGMENT 1. - The questions of law which arise for determination of this court in this writ petition are as under -Whether an official of the rank of Deputy Superintendent Jail who was appointed on the said post by the State Government pursuant to his selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short 'RPSC') and placed on probation initially for a period of two years and thereafter for another six months t s on extended period of probation which was further extended from time to time gets an automatic and vested legal right for confirmation on the said post ?Whether the State Government is under any statutory obligation to confirm the said official on expiry of probationary period notwithstanding complaints of gross irregularities, misconduct and misdemeanour committed by the said official from time to time and whether he gets any legal right of deemed confirmation on the expiry of his probationary period which resulted in framing of charges against him followed by a departmental enquiry, his suspension and thereafter his termination from service ? 2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this writ petition as briefly stated are as follows: 3. The petitioner initially joined service of Central Government where he was appointed as a trainee Type B Plan Tables w.e.f. 9.9.1975 in the Department of Survey of India where he worked upto 28.2.1985. In the year 1983 the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer, held a combined competitive examination for giving appointments to perspective and eligible candidates to the post of Deputy Superintendent jail in Rajasthan Jail Services of the State Government in accordance with the relevant provisions of Rajasthan Jail Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1959'). 4. Pursuant to the recommendations of the 'RPSC' the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Superintendent Jail vide order of the State Government, dated 14.3.1985 and was placed on probation for a period of two years vide Annexure-1. He joined the said service w.e.f. 13.1985. Thereafter, the petitioner was sent for requisite training for foundational course at H.C.M. State Institute for Public Administration and he completed the said course in April-May, 1985. This fact is borne out from the letter dated 29.10.1985 vide Annexure 2 on the record. 5. The probationary period of two years as initially fixed by the State Government had come to an end w.e.f. 28.4.1987. This fact is borne out from the letter dated 29.10.1985 vide Annexure 2 on the record. 5. The probationary period of two years as initially fixed by the State Government had come to an end w.e.f. 28.4.1987. Thereafter a number of orders were passed by the respondents extending his probationary period from time to time during the period 8.4.1987 to 28.2.1990 vide the following orders as detailed in para 3 of the writ petition (i) Order dated 8.4.1987 period of probation extended by 6 months. (ii) Order dated 24.11.1987 period of probation extended by 6 months from 1.9.1987. (iii) Order dated 18.4.1988 period of probation extended by 6 months from 1.3.1988. (iv) Order dated 17.11.1988 period of probation extended from 1.9.1988 to 31.12.1988. (v) Order dated 6.1.1989 period of probation extended from 1.1.1989 to 31.1.1989. (vi) Order dated 3.3.1989 period of probation extended from 1.2.1989 to 30.4.1989. (vii) Order dated 25.5.1989 period of probation extended from 1.5.1989 to 31.7.1989. (viii) Order dated 31.7.1989 period of probation extended from 1.8.1989 to 30.9.1989. (ix) Order dated 7.12.1989 period of probation extended upto 31.12.1989. (x) Order dated 29.1.1990 period of probation extended upto 28.2.1990. 6. While the petitioner was posted as Deputy Superintendent jail at Pali he was placed under suspension vide order of the State Government, dated 8.4.1987 following the departmental enquiry initiated against him under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 1958 (for short 'the Rules of 1958) vide Annexure 14. 7. Against the aforesaid suspension order the petitioner made a representation to the Home Commissioner on 24.7.1987 vide Annexure 15. Thereafter after the lapse of about four months, the State Government passed an order on 5.8.1987 whereby the aforesaid suspension order was revoked and the I.G. Operations vide his order, dated 7.8.1987 directed the reinstatement of the petitioner vide Annexurc 16. On 11.4.1988 the petitioner was served with a memorandum containing articles of charge and statement of allegations vide Annexure 17, consequent upon which a regular departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. 8. On 11.4.1988 the petitioner was served with a memorandum containing articles of charge and statement of allegations vide Annexure 17, consequent upon which a regular departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. 8. From the perusal of pleadings on the record as well as the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it has conic to light that the respondents had provided the petitioner ample opportunity of not only inspecting the relevant documents of which he had done inspection but had also adhered to the principles of natural justice by providing him sufficient opportunity of inspecting the record so as to enable him to file his reply by meeting allegations made against him. The petitioner has however advanced his contentions which are absolutely contrary to the record by contending inter-alia that incomplete record was made available to him for inspection on 11.5.1.989 and 12.5.1989 respectively. This fact is also borne out from para 14 of the writ petition wherein the petitioner himself has conceded that department of personnel vide its letter dated 25.5.89 had insisted that full record be shown to the petitioner and which was accordingly made available to him for inspection pursuant to his request vide letter dated 2.6.89 vide Annexure 18. Hence it is not open to the learned counsel for the petitioner now at this stage to plead to the contrary in this regard. 9. The perusal of the pleadings on the record reveal that serious allegation of gross irregularities and misconduct/misdemeanour were committed by the petitioner in the tenure of his service as Deputy Superintendent Jail and he was served upon a charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules 1958 to which the petitioner submitted his reply on 15.7.89 vide Annexures 20 and Annexure 21 respectively. Hence it cannot be said that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to meet out the allegations made nor he was deprived of opportunity to submit his reply to the same and which fact is fully borne out from the relevant documents on record. 10. Hence it cannot be said that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to meet out the allegations made nor he was deprived of opportunity to submit his reply to the same and which fact is fully borne out from the relevant documents on record. 10. I am of the view that the respondents have not made any departure from the settled practice since they had conveyed to the petitioner adverse remarks as recorded in his Annual confidential reports by his superiors with a view to provide him sufficient opportunity to improve his conduct and performance for the period in question and this fact is borne out from para 18 of the writ petition wherein the petitioner himself has admitted that on 29.9.87, the State Government had conveyed the adverse remarks in his annual performance appraisal report for the year 1985-86 against which he has submitted a representation to the Department on 2.11.1987. His explanation against the adverse remarks had been accepted by the Government vide its communication dated 10.6.88 and adverse entries for the year 1985-86 were directed to be expunged vide Annex. 24. 11. Inspite of the above, the petitioner had ample opportunity to improve his conduct and performance for the subsequent period but he failed to avail the same and instead again he committed lapses and consequently another communication was sent to him or. 6.4.89 by then D.I.G. Prisons containing adverse entries recorded in his A.C.Rs. for the period 1987-88 vide Annex. 25 to which the petitioner objected that he had not been supplied the relevant documents and in order to meet this request he was again informed by the respondents on 6.10.1989 and 27.10.1989 that he should furnished the list of documents which he was desirous of inspecting to which he was called upon to explain the relevancy of the said document and was again given opportunity to inspect the relevant record on 4.1.1990 vide Annex. 20. 12. The above stated position is borne out from para 20 of the writ petition wherein the petitioner has himself admitted to have inspected the relevant records again and submitted a detailed representation on 19.1.1990. Thereafter the petitioner was communicated adverse remarks from time to time by competent authority and also for the years 1988-89 and 1989-90 (from April to July) and this fact is borne out from Annexures 27 and 28 on the record. Thereafter the petitioner was communicated adverse remarks from time to time by competent authority and also for the years 1988-89 and 1989-90 (from April to July) and this fact is borne out from Annexures 27 and 28 on the record. Against communication of the adverse remarks for the aforesaid period the petitioner had again submitted his representation and this fact is borne out from Annexures 31 and 32 respectively. 13. Yet having not been satisfied with the above, the petitioner made another unsuccessful attempt by making another representation dated 7.10.89 to the competent authority requesting him to allow him to cross-examine one Shri B.K. Mathur who had made entries in his A.C.R. for the year 1988-89. In this regard I am of the view that no official of the State Government against whom several delinquencies are alleged should be given the liberty to question either the A.C.Rs' recorded against him by his immediate superiors or to cross-examine them in the manner as suggested by the petitioner's counsel since otherwise the very purpose of recording the appraisal reports of an employee by his immediate superiors would stand lost and defeated and no superior officer would then take the risk of making assessment of performance of an employee if his authority is allowed to be challenged in the manner as stated. I am of the considered view that this act by itself amounts to breach of conduct Rules and calls for disciplinary action to be taken against the erring official. 14. Notwithstanding the above, the petitioner has alleged bias and mala fides against the respondents which is absolutely false, baseless and contrary to the record. As a matter of fact, in my considered view the respondents have adopted a very fair approach in having giving him ample opportunity from time to time of not only inspecting the records which he wanted to inspect but was also given ample opportunity to make representations to the Department which he made and have already been decided and disposed of by the department from time to time. Hence, it cannot be said that there has been violation of any principles of natural justice by the respondents and rather the petitioner being guilty of his conduct on account of having committed gross irregularities for t which he was charge sheeted has made wild and baseless allegations against the respondents with a view to cover up his own lapses. I am of the view that the allegations of bias and malafides etc. are entirely unfounded and baseless being contrary to the records. 15. The basic grievance which has been agitated by the petitioner before this Court is that he was initially appointed on probation for a period of 2 years pursuant to his selection by the RPSC in Slate service as a Deputy Superintendent jail vide order dated 14.2.85 and this was a substantive and permanent appointment against the permanent vacant post and having, qualified the necessary foundation course from HCM Ripa Jaipur besides other departmental examination from the said Institution on 27.2.89, he had successfully completed the conditions laid down for his confirmation and regularisation in service. His Probationary period as per the appointment order had come to an end on 13.2.87 and the respondents were under obligation and were essentially required either to extend the probationary period on or before 13.2.87 or dispense with the services of the petitioner at that stage itself. His further grievance is that the respondent had no right, authority or justification to extend his probationary period after its expiry on 13.2.87 after which he is deemed to have been automatically confirmed in service even if there were any adverse entries in the record against him as so recorded by the competent authority. He has further stated that his extension of probation vide Annexure-4 dated 8.4.87 by which the period of probation was extended for six months, was not justified and any extension beyond the said period was contrary to Rule 34(a) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951. Rule 34(a) of the RSR reads as under "34. Future increments on reduction to lower grade or post -(a) If a Government servant is reduced as a measure of penalty to a lower stage in his time-scale, the authority ordering such reduction shall state the period for which it shall be effective and whether on restoration (the period of reduction shall operate) to postpone future increments and if so, to what extent." 16. In this context, he has challenged the extension order dated 8.4.87, 24.11.87, 28.4.88, 17.11.88, 6.1.89 and 3.3.89 (Annexures 4 to 9) as per-se illegal, void, ab-initio and de-horse the service rules. In my view Rule 34(a) of RSR, 951 is neither attracted nor applicable to the matter at issue.16-A. During the course of hearing, Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that even if there were any adverse entries against the petitioner as recorded buy the competent authority in the service record either during the probationary period of 2 years or even thereafter on which the probationary period was extended from time to time yet the same should not have been taken note of against the petitioner because once, having successfully completed the initial probationary period of 2 years, his confirmation in service should have been automatically deemed to have been made as per the rules. He has further stated that the law does not permit extension of the probationary period and having stood automatically confirmed in view of rules 28-A (2) of Rajasthan Jail Service Ice Rules, 195( the petitioner stood deemed/automatically confirmed in service on completion of the probationary period. Rule 28-A (2) (i) reads as under "(ii) Persons who hold lien in another cadre shall be eligible to be confirmed under this rule and they will be eligible to exercise an option whether they do not elect to be confirmed on the expiry of two years of their temporary appointment under this rule. In the absence of any option to the contrary, they shall be deemed to have exercised option in favour of confirmation under this rule and their lien of the previous post shall cease." 17. He has further challenged the vires of Rule 34(a) of RSR being void, illegal, and inconsequential in the eyes of law as applied to the petitioner by which the probationary periods were extended from time to time vide Annexures 10-13 and since those extensions were granted in the second phase under Rule 29(a)(i) of the Rules of 1959, the same has resulted in injustice to the petitioner being not permissible under the rules. He has further stated that the extension of the probationary period granted from time to time was illegal and rather beyond the scope of Rule 34-A of RSR, since the earlier orders were neither withdrawn nor modified and extension of probation under Rule 34-A of RSR rather amounts to acceptance by the respondents of petitioners' continuity in service as a regular employee which according to him is entirely baseless, misconceived and contrary to rules. 18. By way of alternative arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended at the bar that since the rules specifically provide that any adversity has to be communicated before or on the date of expiry of probation and no adverse communication received upto last date of the extended period of probation, i.e. 13.2.88, was ever communicated to the petitioner, the claim of the petitioner stands on better footing for deemed confirmation. Learned counsel in the same breath has also conceded the facts in his argument that first communication of adverse remark was made as on 30.4.1988 vide Annexure-35 by which the petitioner was conveyed that if he does not improve his conduct and performance within six months, he shall be sent back to his parent department where he had his lien, i.e. Survey Department of the Government of India. From this argument of the learned counsel, it cannot be inferred that there was any embargo under the rules or any estoppel under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act not to take any disciplinary action against the petitioner, since his service record during the initial probationary period of 2 years was not found good or satisfactory. The respondents were rather fair in my view by having given several opportunities to the petitioner to improve his conduct and performance by extending the probationary period initially for six months also thereafter from time to time till up to 28.2.1990. 19. Rule 28(1) of the Rules of 1959 provides that every person appointed against a substantive vacancy in services of the State in accordance with the Rules of 1959 in case of direct recruitment shall be placed on probation for a period of two years, while those appointed by promotion on the basis of special selection against any vacancy shall be placed on probation for a period of one year in accordance with this rule. Since the petitioner was appointed directly against a substantive vacancy as Deputy Superintendent, Jail pursuant to his selection by the RPSC he was placed initially on probation for a period of two years which was further extended for six months and thereafter from time to time, since his work was not found satisfactory to the satisfaction of the competent authority. 20. Rule 28-A(a) of the Rules of 1959 provides as under- "Notwithstanding anything contained in the rule if no order of confirmation is issued by the Appointing Authority within a period of six months, an employee appointed on temporary or officiating basis who has, after the date of his regular recruitment by either method of recruitment completed a period of two years service, or less in the case of those appointed by promotion where the period of probation prescribed is less, on the post of a higher post under the same Appointing Authority or would have so worked but for his deputation or training, shall on the occurrence of permanent vacancies he entitled to be treated as confirmed if the same conditions as are prescribed under the Rules for the confirmation of a probationer are fulfilled subject to the quota prescribed under the Rules and in accordance with his seniority. Provided that if the employee has failed to give satisfaction or has not fulfilled any of the conditions prescribed for confirmation, such as passing of Departmental Examination, training or promotion cadre course etc. the aforesaid period may be extended as prescribed for probation or under the Rajasthan Civil Services Departmental Examination Rules, 1959 and any other Rules, or by one year, whichever is longer. If the employee still fails to fulfill the prescribed conditions or fails to give satisfaction, he will be liable to be discharged from such post in the same manner as a probationer or reverted to his substantive or lower,post, if any, to which he may be entitled: Provided further that no person shall be debarred from confirmation after the said period of service if no reasons to the contrary about the satisfactory performance of his work are communicated to him within the said period." 21. Perusal of the above rule makes it clear that it is not mandatory for the competent authority by way of statutory obligation towards its employee that any employee who has been appointed against a permanent vacancy pursuant to his selection has a statutory right of confirmation notwithstanding his unsatisfactory performance and progress noted by the competent authority during the period he is placed on probation or during the extended period of probation and no such person shall be debarred from confirmation on the successful completion of his probationary period if no reasons to the contrary about his unsatisfactory performance are communicated to him during the said period. This fact is explicitly clear from the language to the proviso of the above rule and on application of the said proviso to the conduct of the petitioner as a Deputy Superintendent Jail it was found that the conduct of the petitioner either during the probationary period of two years when he was initially appointed or even during the extended period of probation, the same was not found satisfactory and since he had failed to give full satisfaction to the competent authority on his failure to fulfill the prescribed conditions for confirmation, the aforesaid probationary period was extended from time to time in accordance with the rules which subsequently resulted in his discharge from service. There is no embargo under the above rules for the competent authority not to extend the probationary period beyond the initial period of probation either of two years or during the extended probationary period whichever is longer and if the employee still fails to fulfil the prescribed conditions or fails to give satisfaction, he will be liable to he discharged from such post in the same manner as a probationer to his substantive or lower post, if any, to which he may be entitled. Generally as a matter of prudence and common practice the probationer gets automatic right of confirmation after the expiry of his probationary period, if no reasons to the contrary about the satisfactory performance of his work are communicated to him within the said period which obviously implies that if any reasons to the contrary are conveyed in writing to such erring employee regarding unsatisfactory performance of his work by the competent authority, then the said employee cannot claim automatic right of confirmation notwithstanding serious allegations against him as has happened in the facts of the instant case, which resulted in discharge of the petitioner pursuant to the order of the competent authority in accordance in sub-rule (b) of Rule 28-A of the Rules of 1959 which shall in the case of non-gazetted employee, have to be immediately recorded by the appointing authority in his service book and C.R. file, while in case of gazetted officer they have to be communicated to the Accountant General Rajasthan for being placed in the confidential report file and written acknowledgement has to he kept on record in all these cases. 22. Rule 29 of the Rules of 1959 provides as under "29. Unsatisfactory progress during probation: (1) If it appears to the Appointing Authority, at any time, during or at the end of the period of probation, that a member of the service has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or that he has failed to give satisfaction, the Appointing Authority may revert him to the post held substantively by him immediately preceding his appointment, provided he holds a lien thereon or in other cases may discharge or terminate him from service. Provided that the Appointing Authority may, if it so thinks fit in any Case or class of cases, extend the period of probation of any member of service by a specified period not exceeding two years in case of person appointed to a post in the service by direct recruitment and one year in the case of person appointed by promotion + special selection to such post. Provided further that the Appointing Authority may, if it so think fir in case of persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, extend the period of probation by a period not exceeding one year at a time and a total extension not exceeding three years. Provided further that the Appointing Authority may, if it so think fir in case of persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, extend the period of probation by a period not exceeding one year at a time and a total extension not exceeding three years. Notwithstanding anything contained in the above proviso, during the period of probation, if a probationer is placed under suspension, or disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or started against him, the period of his probation may be extended till such period the Appointing Authority thinks fit in the circumstances." 23. From the perusal of the rule again it is borne out that there is no embargo for the competent authority either to discharge or terminate the service of erring employee if he does not improve his work or conduct despite having communicated sufficient reasons in this regard and if he has failed to give full satisfaction to the competent authority he may be either reverted to the substantive post preceding his appointment or in appropriate cases may he discharged or terminated from his service. From perusal of sub-rule (2) of rule 29 it is apparent that if the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the delinquent who is placed under suspension even during the period of probation or thereafter his probationary period may he further extended till such time the Appointing Authority thinks just and proper in the circumstances of' the case. 24. In reply to show cause notice, the respondents while, controverting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, have contended that initially during the probationary period of two years the petitioner was placed under suspension on account of him misconduct and gross irregularities noted by the competent authority, but however, he vas, given another chance to improve himself and, thereafter, he was reinstated in service Inspite of this, he did not improve his conduct and performance aid on account of delinquency committed by him a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in accordance with Rule 17 of the C.C.A. Rules before he was placed under suspension. Thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under rule 17 of the C.C.A. Rules and as result of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and in which he was given sufficient opportunity of being heard and also of producing his defence, he was discharged from service. 25. Thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under rule 17 of the C.C.A. Rules and as result of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and in which he was given sufficient opportunity of being heard and also of producing his defence, he was discharged from service. 25. It has further been contended by the respondents that Art. 311 of the Constitution of India is not attracted to the instant case nor any penalty has been imposed on the basis of charges levelled against him under Rules 16 and 17 of the C.C.A. Rules but since the Rajasthan Jail Service Rules, 1959 is a complete Code by itself, in my considered opinion the competent authority was fully justified and right in passing the order of suspension and thereafter, initiation of departmental enquiry against him in which he was provided sufficient opportunity to be heard and it is only thereafter, as a last and final resort that the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner dated 28.2.1990 was passed in accordance with Rule 29 of the Rules of 1959 and other relevant rules. I am further of the view that initial revocation of the order of suspension dated 5.8.1987 and the order dated 7.8.1987 passed by the I.G. Prisons, the petitioner was reinstated in service, does not put any embargo on the competent authority to subsequently terminate the services of the petitioner in accordance with the rules. 26. I am further of the view that there has been no violations of rules of natural justice in this case and the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not help in advancing the case of the petitioner in any manner. 27. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner further contended at the bar that extension of probationary period as per Annexure 4 and onwards was not justified since the said period had been extended under rule 34-A of the R.S.R. which is essentially a provision dealing with the order of penalty of withholding increments of a Government servants or his reduction to lower grade or post or to lower time scale which can be set aside or modified by competent authority on appeal or review. In this regard I am of the considered opinion that this by itself would not make any difference or vitiate the order, dated 8.4.1987 (Annexure 4) by which the probationary period of the petitioner on its expiry of two years was extended by another six months for the reason that the impugned order of discharge from service dated 28.2.19 )t) (Annexure 38) subsequently states that since by the order dated 14.7.1985 issued by the Home Department of the State Government the petitioner was placed on probation for a period of two years in accordance with Rajasthan .Jail Service Rules, 1959 and after expiry of the said probationary period of two years his probationary period was further extended from time to time in accordance with Rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1959 and the last extension of the said probationary period was granted till 28.2.1990 and since the competent authority on its subjective satisfaction alter over all assessment of the petitioner's conduct and performance during the aforesaid period, was of the view that he does not deserve either confirmation or retention in service, consequently in view of the unsatisfactory progress during the probationary period as contemplated by Rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1959, his services were discharged in accordance with the said Rules. Hence I am of the view that since Rule 34A of the R.S.R. by which his probationary period was extended initially for a period of six months. would not make any difference since it is mere irregularity which does not vitiate either subsequent extensions which the petitioner had received from time to time or his final order of discharge Irani service dated 28.2.1990 whereby his services stood terminated in accordance with Rule 29(1) of the Rules. 28. Being yet not satisfied with the aforesaid discussion and the legal position on the subject, learned counsel for the petitioner further contended at the bar that the respondents were under obligation and were essentially required to either extend the period of probation on or before 13.2.1987 or dispense with the service of the petitioner. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is absolutely fallacious and contrary to the spirit of proviso to Rule 28-A(a) and also Rule 29(ii) of the Rules of 1959. 29. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is absolutely fallacious and contrary to the spirit of proviso to Rule 28-A(a) and also Rule 29(ii) of the Rules of 1959. 29. I am also of the opinion that the very nature of the post of Deputy Superintendent Jail is very sensitive for the reason that such an officer is entrusted not only with the administrative duties but also with the overall responsibility of security of inmates i.e., the prisoners who are lodged in the jail. Any slight deviation or departure from responsibilities on the part of the Deputy Superintendent Jail or on the part of his subordinate on whom lie is expected to have over-all control can prove to he fatal and, therefore, the competent authority would not like to take risk of posting irresponsible person on the said post. It is for this reason that the petitioner was granted temporary extension, from time to time during the probationary period and since his performance and conduct was not found satisfactory, the respondents were obviously justified and within their full competence and power to terminate the services of the petitioner in accordance with the Rules as aforesaid.Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions placed reliance upon the following decisions - Paramjeet Singh and Ors. v. Ramrakh & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1073 , State of Punjab v. Dharmsingh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 , State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav and Ors., 1987 (4) SCC 482 , Nepal Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 84 , Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Dev. Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 371 , Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 636 , State of U.P and Ors. v. Sughar Singh, 1974 (1) SLR 435 , Baidyanath Mahapaatra v. State of Orissa and Anr., 1989 (4) SCC 664 , Baleshwar Dass and others v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1980 (4) SCC 226 , N.S.K. Nayar and Ors. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 1574 , Rama Avtar Khandelwal v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 1992 (2) WLC 587 and Mahesh Singh & Ors. v. The Raj. High Court Jodhpur & Anr., 1994 (1) WLC 84 . 30. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 1574 , Rama Avtar Khandelwal v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 1992 (2) WLC 587 and Mahesh Singh & Ors. v. The Raj. High Court Jodhpur & Anr., 1994 (1) WLC 84 . 30. I have examined the ratio of the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and in my opinion the ratio of the aforesaid decisions is neither attracted nor applicable to the facts of this case and I am of the considered opinion that in view of the law which is so well settled on the subject that it is only on satisfactory completion of the probationary period the competent authority may at its discretion on over all assessment of the work performance and the conduct of the employee may confirm the said employee after the expiry of the probationary period or/and if the same is not found satisfactory to the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority, it is fully within its right to discharge the said employee or may revert him to the lower post from which he was promoted. Hence satisfactory performance of a probationer is a prerequisite condition for his confirmation and hence the question of deemed confirmation on the expiry of the probationary period would not arise. 31. I am fortified in my above observations from the following decisions of the apex court as well as this court- Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, 1991 SCC (L&S) 1046 , Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police and another, 1995 SCC (L&S) 1233 , Rajendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India and Another, AIR 1963 SC 1552 , M. Venogopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Ins. Corp. of India : Machilipatnam Andhra Pradesh and another, 1994 (1) J.T. (SC) 281 , U.T.I. and others v. T. Vijaya Kumar and another, 1992 (6) J.T. (SC) 82 and Sangeeta Pathak v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur and others, 1995 (3) WLC 44 . 32. In the matter of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the apex court was where the rules empower the authority to extend probation beyond the 5 prescribed period, continuous in service even after initial period of probation, in absence of express order of confirmation would amount to extension of probationary period ? The apex court while deciding the said question in the context of interpretation of Madya Pradesh Government Servant General Conditions of Service Rules, 1961, Rule 8 on probation held that in such a u situation termination of service after initial period of probation would amount to termination of probationary service and hence valid and further held that where the rules empower the authority to extend the probation beyond prescribed period, mere expiry of initial period of probation would not automatically result in deemed confirmation and an express order of confirmation is necessary to he passed in such cases. The ratio of this decision is that before confirmation, the appointing authority is fully empowered to terminate the service of a probationer by issuing him one calender month notice in writing and on expiry thereof, the service stands automatically terminated without any further notice and mere expiry of initial period of probation does not automatically envisage deemed confirmation of an employee or confer him with such status of deemed confirmation. 33. In Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police (supra) the apex court in the context of interpretation of Central Service (Temporary Service). Rules 1966 observed as under:- "A reading thereof clearly indicates that all direct recruits are required to be on probation for a period of two years and in no case the probation would extend beyond the period of three years. During the period of probation the probationer is required to complete successfully the probation complying with the conditions of passing the test etc. Thereafter, they need be confirmed in the Delhi Police Service. The confirmation in to the service, therefore, is a condition precedent, to continue as a member of Delhi Police Service. Inspite of giving repeated opportunity to improve himself he failed to improve his performance. So he was given notice on 14.9.1988 terminating his service by the impugned order." 34. Similar view was taken by the apex court in the matter of Rajendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India & another (supra) and UTI & others v. Vijaya Kumar & another . 35. So he was given notice on 14.9.1988 terminating his service by the impugned order." 34. Similar view was taken by the apex court in the matter of Rajendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India & another (supra) and UTI & others v. Vijaya Kumar & another . 35. In the matter of Sangita Pathak v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur & others (supra) similar question had arisen for reference before Division Bench of this court, wherein while dealing with the case of PBX Operator who was appointed on probation and did not improve her conduct or work performance despite several chances given to her by virtue of temporary extensions given from time to time, learned Division Bench of this Court held that if an employee is on probation no enquiry is contemplated in respect of any observations made by the competent authority against the said employee unless it is alleged to be actuated with any malice and if the employer is not satisfied with the work performance of such an employee, his service can be terminated without further enquiry or providing any further opportunity to such an employee. There is very limited scope for exercise of judicial view in such matters and it confines only to the cases of malice or where there is factual foundation for proving such malafides. Termination of such an employee after expiry of probationary period unless extended, it does not cast any stigma on such employee. 36. In my view the ration of the aforesaid decisions is fully attracted to the instant case and since the competent authority was not satisfied with the conduct and performance of the petitioner notwithstanding several extensions given to him from time to time, the competent authority was full justified in passing the impugned order of termination of the petitioner as a Deputy Superintendent Jail in accordance with the rules and no perversity, illegality or any violation of rules can be attributed in such a case. 37. In the light of the above observations I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is consequently dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******