ORDER A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. THE applicant, who is impleaded in the suit afterwards as defendant No. 2 on the footing of unlawful sub-tenancy, has filed this Civil Revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 9-12-1994 rendered by Eleventh Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore, in C.O.S. No. 1-A/92 thereby striking out his defence against eviction in terms of section 13(6) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') on the linchpin of failure to deposit or pay entire arrears of rent as stipulated under section 13(1) of the Act. 2. Facts are in a narrow compass. Non-applicant No. 1 filed the suit for eviction and rent/mesne profits against non-applicant No. 2 on the fulcrum of relationship of landlord-tenant. Later, she joined the applicant on the footing of his being an unlawful sub-tenant. Non-applicant No. 2 or applicant did not deposit remaining amount of arrears of rent, quantified at Rs. 12,150.00, after 14-9-1994 despite last chance for that purpose. 3. The applicant, though categorised as unlawful sub-tenant by non-applicant No. 1, claims himself to be the tenant. He had deposited some rent but not full on the plea that he was inducted as a tenant from a later date and is thus not liable to deposit the full arrears as claimed in suit. 4. The trial Court struck out defence of the applicant as well as non-applicant No. 2 against eviction under the Act. The applicant has questioned the validity of the order limited to himself. 5. I have heard Shri Iqbal Hussain, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri V. K. Jain, learned counsel for non-applicant No. 1/plaintiff. None appeared for non-applicant No. 2. 6. The counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is dubbed as a sub-tenant and is, thus, disclaimed to be the tenant. He further submits that according to non-applicant No. 1, and nature of suit, there is no privity of contract between the applicant and non-applicant No. 1. On that basis, he argues that the applicant cannot be compelled to deposit arrears of rent or monthly rent and is not liable to be labelled as a tenant under the Act. He further submits that according to non-applicant No. 1, and nature of suit, there is no privity of contract between the applicant and non-applicant No. 1. On that basis, he argues that the applicant cannot be compelled to deposit arrears of rent or monthly rent and is not liable to be labelled as a tenant under the Act. He goes on to say that non-compliance of section 13(1) of the Act cannot result in wrath of section 13(6) despite the defence that he himself claims to be the tenant of non-applicant No. 1 and, thus, declares the privity of contract. The counsel, thus, urges that order to the extent of striking out the defence of the applicant merits to be mortalised as being without jurisdiction. He submits that sub-tenant is not the tenant for the purposes of the Act. In support, he has placed reliance on 1978(I) MPWN 17, Vithaldas v. Kalabai. On identical fact-situation, order striking out defence was set aside in revisional jurisdiction but without consideration of section 2(i) of the Act. 7. The counsel for non-applicant No. 1, however, supports the order and submits that word "tenant" may be construed liberally so as to include "a person claiming to be a tenant" and that some deposit by him should attract doctrine of estoppel. 8. Sections 13(1) and 13(6) of the Act use the expression "tenant" and focus liability on tenant. Section 2(i) of the Act defines the expression "tenant". The word tenant is defined as a person by whom rent would be payable and is stated to include "any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant." 9. The legislative protection cannot be narrowly tailored. The Apex Court in AIR 1990 SC 808 , Smt. Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (dead) by his L.Rs. held that the word "tenant", as used, should be taken as including a person claiming to be a tenant for the purpose of the Act. I quote para 25 from this decision:- "It is time for us to be explicit. Taking into account of the intention of the legislature and the purposes for which the proviso was enacted, we are of the opinion that the obligation to tender the rent under the proviso on the first hearing date does not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant. Taking into account of the intention of the legislature and the purposes for which the proviso was enacted, we are of the opinion that the obligation to tender the rent under the proviso on the first hearing date does not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant. When an action for eviction is brought by the landlord on the ground of default, the proviso stands attracted. The benefit of the proviso could be availed of by the tenant and also by those who claim to be the tenant. The view to the contrary expressed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ram Gopal and Onkar Mal cases 1963(65) Pun LR 1112 and 1977(1) Rent LR 195 is likely to be of greater mischief to the tenants than a protection for them and is therefore overruled." As the benefit is available to the person who claims to be the tenant, liability as imposed by the Act is also unavoidable. In view of the aforesaid decision, case of Vithaldas (supra) is manifestly unhelpful as a precedent particularly when the applicant himself claims to be the tenant and answers the expression "tenant" for the purposes of the Act. The applicant was, thus, liable to make deposit of arrears of rent. 10. Lord Denning in Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, 1949(2) KB 481 stated in classic terms that when conflicting interests arise or defect appears from the language of the statute, the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement the written word with "force and life". Creases, if any, can certainly be ironed out. In the instant case two factors, apart from legality and logicality, are luculently visible. One Applicant himself claims to be the tenant. Two Person in occupation as a sub-tenant is particularised in section 2(i) of the Act. The aforesaid decision, thus, clinches the point against the applicant and sustains the validity of the order under challenge. Rights and responsibilities under the Act do not depend on existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant. 11. The order is legal and proper and is supportable in law. The revision petition is, thus, an exercise in futility and should suffer mortality. 12. As to the consequence of striking out the defence, the section itself envisages the loss of "defence against eviction". 11. The order is legal and proper and is supportable in law. The revision petition is, thus, an exercise in futility and should suffer mortality. 12. As to the consequence of striking out the defence, the section itself envisages the loss of "defence against eviction". It is unconcerned with any other plea or defence of the defendant, unrelated to ground of eviction, and permissible in law. 13. Legal position is not in tenebrosity. In AIR 1989 SC 162 , Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo, it is ruled that:- "For the above reasons, we agree with the view of Ramendra Mohan Datta, ACJ, that, even in a case where the defence against delivery of possession of a tenant is struck off under section 17(4) of the Act, the defendant, subject to the exercise of an appropriate discretion by the Court on the facts of a particular case would generally be entitled: (a) to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses; and (b) to address argument on the basis of the plaintiff's case. We would like to make it clear that the defendant would not be entitled to lead any evidence of his own nor can his cross- examination be permitted to travel beyond the very limited objective of pointing out the falsity or weaknesses of the plaintiff's case. In no circumstances should the cross-examination be permitted to travel beyond this legitimate scope and to convert itself virtually into a presentation of the defendant's case either directly or in the form of suggestions put to the plaintiff's witnesses." The applicant shall, thus, remain entitled to this extent. Nothing more, nothing less. 14. This revision petition is, thus, dismissed with no orders as to costs. 15. The order of stay passed on 5-5-1995 now terminates. Return the record, if received, immediately. As the suit is number One of 1992, I also direct that the trial Court shall decide the suit in conformity with law expeditiously particularly when later part of section 13(6) of the Act contains the mandate that the Court "shall proceed with the hearing of the suit" once the defence against eviction is struck out. Law has to lead to justice. 16. Transmit a copy of this order to the trial Court.