Abdul Wahid v. Ram Narain Verma — 1997 DIGILAW 98 (RAJ)

Honble SAXENA, J. – This revision petition has been preferred against an order dated 18.5.1995 passed in Civil Suit No. 60/94 by the Additional District Judge No.5, Jaipur City Jaipur, whereby he rejected the defendant petitioners applications filed one u/O.6 R. 5, CPC and the other u/s. 15 r/w Sec. 151 CPC, seeking better particulars and for return of the plaint to the Court of competent jurisdiction. (2). Succinctly stated the relevant facts are that the plaintiff non-petitioner filed his suit in the Court of the District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur for the relief of recovery of possession of suit premises and arrear of rent amounting to Rs. 900/- on the ground of bona fide requirement, denial of title and sub-letting, and also for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant petitioner from selling, transferring or alienating the suit premises to any other person. The said suit was transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City Jaipur. On 12.1.1995 and 8.3.1995, the petitioner sought adjournment for filing written statement. On 5.4.1995, he filed two separate applications, one u/O. 6 R.5 CPC for better particulars and another application u/s. 15 r/w Sec. 151, CPC for returning the plaintiff for presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction. (3). In Para 2 of the plaint, the plaintiff referred to the terms of agreement as regards to the adjustment of an advance of Rs. 3,000/- paid by the defendant as also his asking the defendant to vacate the suit premises but did not advert to the material fact as to whether the said agreement was oral or in writing and as to the date on which he had asked the defendant to vacate the premises. The learned trial Court by the impugned order held inter alia that the fact as to whether the agreement was oral or in writing was not material one to be clarified in the plaint as it was a matter of evidence and that such a fact could be elucidated by putting relevant question in cross-examination. The trial Court further held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to disclose the exact date falling in the month of July, 1994 when the plaintiff is alleged to have asked the defendant to vacate the suit premises. The trial Court further held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to disclose the exact date falling in the month of July, 1994 when the plaintiff is alleged to have asked the defendant to vacate the suit premises. The learned Judge also took into account the fact that the defendant petitioner had sought two adjournments for filing written statement and while rejecting the said application, it also saddled the petitioner with a cost of Rs. 200/-. (4). In his another application, the petitioner averred that the main relief sought in the plaint is for eviction of the suit premises and recovery of arrears of rent and for which the plaintiff has rightly valued the suit at Rs. 3,600/- being 12 months rent and Rs. 900/- for arrears of rent and thus total valuation of the suit was Rs. 4,500/-. However, the plaintiff for ousting jurisdiction of the court of lower grade competent to try such a suit has unnecessarily sought a superfluous relief for perpetual injunction valued at Rs. 46,000-/-. The petitioner alleged that the plaintiff has intentionally exaggerated the valuation of the suit which has caused prejudice to him and prayed that the plaint be returned for its presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The learned trial Judge held that since the plaintiff has also sought the relief for perpetual injunction and valued the suit at Rs. 46,000/-, and averred that the defendant had denied his title in the month of July, 1994, there- fore, at this stage it cannot be held that the plaintiff has exaggerated the valuation of the suit, and rejected the said application. It also directed that all such objections should be taken in the written statement, that after framing necessary issues. Such a controversy in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court shall be decided. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioner has filed this revision petition. (5). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the lower Court. Application u/O.6 R. CPC. (6). In the plaint, it has been pleaded that initially on 14.6.1982 the petitioner had taken the suit premises from him on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and executed a rent deed, that at that time, the petitioner deposited an amount of Rs. Application u/O.6 R. CPC. (6). In the plaint, it has been pleaded that initially on 14.6.1982 the petitioner had taken the suit premises from him on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and executed a rent deed, that at that time, the petitioner deposited an amount of Rs. 3,000/- as advance with the plaintiff and it was agreed between them that the petitioner shall pay Rs. 100/- per month in cash and remaining rent amount of Rs. 100/- per month shall be adjusted from the advance amount and the plaintiff shall issue a receipt of Rs. 200/-; and that in pursuance of the said agreement, entire advance amount of Rs. 3,000/- was adjusted on 10.11.1984 and thereafter from 1.1.1994, the petitioner voluntarily enhanced the rent from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 300/- per month. However, he committed default and did not pay rent since 1.7.1994, that plaintiff required the suit premises for his personal and bona fide necessity; that the petitioner sub-let the suit premises and also denied his title in July, 1994. The plaintiff, therefore, sou- ght the relief of ejectment and recovery of possession of the suit premises. The plaintiff also pleaded that the petitioner after denying the title was trying to sell the suit premises and, therefore he valued the suit at Rs. 46,000/- and prayed that the petitioner be restrained through a perpetual injunction from selling, transferring or alienating the suit premises to any other person. In this back drop of the afore men- tioned facts enumerated in the plaint, it was really necessary for the petitioner to have asked for further better particulars from the plaintiff as to whether the alleged agreement for adjustment of Rs. 100/- per month from the advance amount of Rs. 3,000/- was oral or in writing. (7). The pleading regarding the said agreement was apparently vague and in- sufficient. The object of obtaining further and better particulars is to enable the opposite party to know as to what case he has to meet and the prevent a surprise at the trial so that he may not have to go to trial embarrassed by the obscurity or the incompleteness of the case which he has to face. The object of obtaining further and better particulars is to enable the opposite party to know as to what case he has to meet and the prevent a surprise at the trial so that he may not have to go to trial embarrassed by the obscurity or the incompleteness of the case which he has to face. It is the prime duty of the Court to see that the parties plead their case so plainly, fully and clearly that each side knows the nature of the case which is has to be met. It is also the duty of the Court to bring out the parties to specific points of dispute so that they may not later on take shifting stands. In view of this, the observation of the lower Court that the pleading in the plaint on this count was not vague, and whether the said agreement was oral or written, was a matter of evidence and that necessary questions could be put to the plaintiff in cross- examination, do not appear to me to be sound and sturdy. (8). As per pleadings, an amount of Rs. 100/- per month was to be adjusted against the advance amount of Rs. 3,000/-, alleged to have been deposited by the petitioner on 14.5.82 and that the entire amount was adjusted after 30 months on 10.11.1984. As a matter of fact from 14.5.1982 a period of 30 months expired on 13.11.1984, but in para 3 of the plaint, it has been pleaded that the said amount got adjusted on 10.11.1984. The petitioner in order to clarify this apparent incongruity, and inconsistency sought better and further particulars in this regard, but the learned trial Judge has disallowed the same simply on the ground that it was not necessary. In my consideredopinion, the learned trial Judge has not applied his mind on this material fact and Committed material irregularity in rejecting the petitioners request for explaining this apparent inconsistency as to whether the amount stood adjusted on 10.11.1984 or 30.11.1984. (9). As regards, cause of action, the plaintiff in para 9 of the plaint has simply pleaded that he had asked the defendant petitioner to vacate the suit premises in July 1994, but the latter denied his title and refused to vacate the suit premises. (9). As regards, cause of action, the plaintiff in para 9 of the plaint has simply pleaded that he had asked the defendant petitioner to vacate the suit premises in July 1994, but the latter denied his title and refused to vacate the suit premises. The petitioner, therefore, rightly preaged for further and better particulars about the exact date on which he had allegedly denied the title of the suit premises. But the learned trial Judge rejected this prayer on the stereo typed ground that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to give the exact date. To my mind, the learned trial Judge has apparently committed material irregularity on this count, which has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Besides that, the learned trial Judge has also saddled the petitioner with cost of Rs. 200/-, which was unjustified. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order in respect of the petitioners application u/O. 6 R. 5 CPC cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set aside and the plaintiff non-petitioner is directed to furnish further and better particulars sought by the petitioner. Application u/s. 15 r/w Sec. 151, CPC (10). Shri R.K. Agrawal has vehemently contended of that admittedly there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, that as per plaint the alleged monthly rent of suit premises was Rs. 300/- per month, hence the suit for ejectment on the basis of the personal and bona fide necessity, denial of title and sub-letting and arrears of rent was rightly valued at Rs. 4,500/- and the same ought to have been filed in the Court of lowest grade i.e. Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) but the plaintiff non-petitioner in order to oust the jurisdiction of the said Court has improperly exaggerated the valuation for the superfluous relief of perpetual injunction at Rs. 46,000/- and thus has deprived the petition of his one more right of appeal to the Court of District Judge and in such circumstances, the learned trial Judge ought to have returned the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation to the Court of competent Court. 46,000/- and thus has deprived the petition of his one more right of appeal to the Court of District Judge and in such circumstances, the learned trial Judge ought to have returned the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation to the Court of competent Court. According to him, u/s. 21(2) CPC an objection as to the competence of the Court with regard to its pecuniary jurisdiction, has to be taken in the Court of first instance at the earlier possible opportunity and, therefore, the petitioner was not precluded from taking such an objection before filing the written statement. For this, Shri Agarwal placed reliance on the decision in Sasa Musa Sugar Works vs. Chunilal(1), wherein it has been held that u/s. 21 of the CPC an objection should be taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, that there is nothing in the Code that such objection cannot be taken at any stage before filing of the written statement, and that if it is held by the Court that it has no jurisdiction, there will be no necessity to file any written statement setting out the case of the defendant. (11). Shri R.K. Agarwal has asserted that the lower Court has failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff could have valued the suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction at Rs. 4,500/- only for the relief of ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent, and that the relief for perpetual injunction was not at all warranted and that the plaintiff has wrongly exaggerated the valuation of the suit for Rs. 46,000/- and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower Court has miserably failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it in not returning the plaint for presentation thereof before the appropriate and competent Court of lowest grade. He has submi- tted that the relief for perpetual injunction has been sought by the plaintiff as an ancilliary to the main relief of eviction, in such circumstances, the non-petitioner could not have been given a right to have a Court of his own choice for adjudicating his suit. Besides this, even if the relief for perpetual injunction was treated to be based on a separate cause of action, still then valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court fees for the relief of perpetual injunction could not exceed Rs. Besides this, even if the relief for perpetual injunction was treated to be based on a separate cause of action, still then valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court fees for the relief of perpetual injunction could not exceed Rs. 300/- and in that eventuality also, the aggregate valuation of the suit for the pecuniary jurisdiction would not exceed Rs. 4,800/- and the suit was triable by the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and not by the Court of the Additional District Judge. (12). Shri R.K. Agarwal has placed reliance on the decision in Laxman Bhatkar vs. Babaji Bhatkar(2), wherein it has been held that an exaggerated claim thus brought for the purpose of getting a trial in a different Court from the one intended by the Legislature is substantially a fraud upon the law, and must be rejected whether it arises from mere recklessness or from an artful design to get the adjudi- cation of one Judge instead of that of another. (13). He has also cited Hamidunnissa Bibi vs. Gopal Chandra Malakar, (3) wherein it has been held that it is no doubt, a sound rule that the Court should not allow parties to evade the law relating to matters of jurisdiction, and that, where it is found that a party has intentionally exaggerated his claim in order to bring his suit in a Court which otherwise would not have jurisdiction to try it, before the merits of the claim have been gone into, the plaint should be returned to be presented to the proper Court. (14). Another decision cited by Shri Agarwal is Dayaram vs. Gordhan Das, (4) wherein it has been observed that for, whether or not a suit has been properly ruled is a preliminary question which should be disposed of before the case goes to trial. (15). I have carefully gone through the afore mentioned cases. All these cases pertain to the provisions of CPC, 1868 and not the provisions of the CPC, 1908. Morever, the facts of these cases are clearly distinguishable with the facts of this case on hand. (16). In the instant case, the petitioner has not filed any written statement. In his application also, he has not clearly admitted his status as tenant of the plaintiff. Morever, the facts of these cases are clearly distinguishable with the facts of this case on hand. (16). In the instant case, the petitioner has not filed any written statement. In his application also, he has not clearly admitted his status as tenant of the plaintiff. It is trite law that the rule requiring every suit to be instituted in the Court of lowest grade is only a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction. The District Judge and the Subordinate Judge have jurisdiction over all original suits cognizable by the Civil Court. The object of Sec. 15, CPC is that the Courts of the higher grade shall not be over crowded with suits and also to afford convenience to the parties and witnesses who may be examined by them. The institution in a Court of a higher grade, of a suit, which ought to have been instituted in a Court of lower grade, is only an irregularity in procedure covered by Sec. 99, CPC and does not affect the jurisdic- tion of the Court. Where a suit which ought to have been instituted in a Court of alower grade is instituted in a Court of a higher grade, the latter cannot be said to have no jurisdiction to try the suit. (17). In the case on hand, the plaintiff has pleaded that in July, 1994, the petitioner denied his title and that he was trying to sell, transfer or alienate the suit premises to other person. He, therefore, prayed that the petitioner be restrained through a perpetual injunction from selling, transferring or alienating the suit premises to any person or his agent and for this he has valued the suit premises at Rs. 46,000/- and paid the Court fees thereon. Thus, this relief cannot be said to be ancilliary to the relief of ejectment. The jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit has to be determined by the allegations made in the plaint. The suit valuation Act is purely fiscal and it has no bearing as to which is the proper Court of institution having regard to the property involved in the suit. (18). In Smt. Tara Devi vs. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj(5), it has been held that the valuation by the plaintiff is ordinarily to be accepted, unless such a valua- tion in the facts and circumstances of the case is arbitrary and unreasonable. (18). In Smt. Tara Devi vs. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj(5), it has been held that the valuation by the plaintiff is ordinarily to be accepted, unless such a valua- tion in the facts and circumstances of the case is arbitrary and unreasonable. The learned trial Judge has rightly held that at this stage it cannot be held that the plaintiff has exaggerated the valuation and thus, such an objection can be taken by the petitioner in his written statement and after framing necessary issues, the issue in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court, shall be decided. To my mind, the learned trial Judge has not committed any material irregularity or substantial error of law or of jurisdiction in rejecting petitioners application filed u/s. 15 r/w Sec. 151, CPC. (19). Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, this revision petition is partly allowed and the impugned order of the trial Court passed on the petitioners application filed u/s. 6, R. 5, CPC is hereby set aside. However, the impugned order in respect of the petitioners application u/s. 15 r/w Sec. 151 CPC, is upheld. The record of the trial Court be sent back immediately.