Honble SINGH, J. – Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. (2) This special appeal is directed against the order dated 20th June, 1986 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3151/84 Sujan Singh vs. R.S.R.T.C. & Ors., whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writpetition filed by the appellant on the ground that having regarding to the facts and circumstances of the case no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution was warranted. (3). The facts of the case may be briefly summarised as below :– The appellant Sujan Singh was in the employment of the respondent No. 1since 1979. He was holding the post of a driver. On 31st January, 1982, he was working as driver on bus No. RJG 3764, which was to carry passangers from Munaba to Barmer. Shri Deravar Singh was working as conductor on the aforesaid bus on 31st January, 1982. When the bus reached Ashada, which was at a distance of 20 kms. before Barmer, the bus was checked by Depot Manager, Barmer. It was alle-ged that there were five passangers without ticket in the bus. The appellant was suspended vide order No. 305 dated 8th February, 1982 passed by the D.M.E. and the charge-sheet dated 26th February, 1982 was served on the appellant alongwith the notice. The appellant filed his reply, denying the charges and Shri Magraj Ujjawal was appointed as Inquiry Officer. During the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer exa-mined the A.T.I. and the Depot Manager in support of the charges. After conducting the inquiry, the appellant was given the order No. 156 dated 9.9.82 passed by the D.M.E. Jodhpur. A copy of that order is Ex. 4. By that order the services of the appellant were terminated. (4). The appellant filed an appeal to the higher authority, but the same wasdismissed vide order dated 27th August, 1983 passed by the General Manager (Operation). Thereafter, appellant made several representations to the Managing Director and the Chairman, but to no result. (5). Being aggrieved by the order dated 9.9.82, by which the services of the appellant were terminated and the order dated 27th August, 1983 by which the appe-llant was dismissed, the appellant filed the writ petition No. 3151/84. Thereafter, appellant made several representations to the Managing Director and the Chairman, but to no result. (5). Being aggrieved by the order dated 9.9.82, by which the services of the appellant were terminated and the order dated 27th August, 1983 by which the appe-llant was dismissed, the appellant filed the writ petition No. 3151/84. In his writ petition the appellant prayed that the order dated 9.9.82 and 27.8.83 be quashed and the non-petitioners (respondents) be directed to allow the petitioner to continue in service and they may be further directed to pay the back wages. The grounds on which above relief was sought, were that the orders dated 9.9.82 and27.8.83 were void and without jurisdiction and the inquiry was conducted contrary to Clause 34 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, and there was violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the appellant was denied the opportunity to defend himself in as much as he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness produced by theCorporation, nor he was allowed to be represented by a counsel or adduced evidence in defence. It was also pleaded by the appellant that the impugned order dated 9.9.82 was not at all speaking order and the Inquiry Officer was not an employee of the Corporation, and therefore, he could not be appointed as Inquiry Officer in the case. (6). The non-petitioners (respondents) filed the reply. In their reply the respondents pleaded that the petitioner (appellant) was not entitled to protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, because the post of a driver in the employment of R.S.R.T.C. was not a civil post and that the petitioner was governed by the Standing Orders of 1965. It was further revealed by the non- petitioners in the reply that on31st January, 1982 the petitioner (appellant) was discharging the duties of a driver and Deravar Singh was the authorised Conductor and when the bus was checked at the Ashada by the Depot Manager, five passangers were found travelling without ticket and in place of the authorised Conductor, namely Shri Deravar Singh, an unauthorised person, namely, Guman Singh, who was not in the employment of the non-petitioner No. 1 was found performing the functions of the Conductor. It was also stated in the reply that after the service of charge-sheet on the petitioner, Shri Magraj Ujjawal, a retired Officer was appointed as Inquiry Officer and he conducted the inquiry against the petitioner and during the inquiry, the petitioner was given full opportunity to represent his case and to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the corporation and to produce his case and when the inquiry report was submitted to the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, the D.M.E. went through the whole record and the evidence recorded in the matter and after being satisfied thatthe findings of the inquiry report were correct, he passed the termination order (Annex. 4) and the order dated 27th August, 83 was passed by the appellate authority after satisfying itself that no illegality or irregularity had been committed by the disciplinary authority. (7). The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the argumentsadvanced before him and the facts and circumstances of the case held that no interference with the impugned orders warranted in view of the brievity of the charge that the petitioner deliberately permitted an imposter, namely, Guman Singh to work as Conductor in place of Deravar Singh and thereby committed a serious breach of the discipline and in view of this fact, the learned Single Judgedeclined to interfere with the impugned orders notwithstanding that the impugned orders were not speaking orders (8). The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses produced on behalf ofthe Corporation, nor he was allowed to be represented by a counsel and he was also denied the opportunity to produce evidence in defence and the impugned orders are not speaking orders and the allegations made against the appellant did not amount to any mis-conduct, and therefore, the order of termination (Annex. 4) and the order passed in appeal filed by the appellant are illegal and deserve to bequashed. (9). The learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order passed by the Learned Single Judge and prayed that this appeal has no merit and it should be dismissed. (10). We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by both the par-ties and pointed out the facts and circumstances of the case. (9). The learned counsel for the respondents has supported the order passed by the Learned Single Judge and prayed that this appeal has no merit and it should be dismissed. (10). We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by both the par-ties and pointed out the facts and circumstances of the case. The allegations against the appellant were to the effect that on 31st January, 1982, he was working as deriver of bus No. RSG 3764, which was going from Munaba to Barmer and when the bus reached Ashada, the bus was checked by Mohanlal Dahima, the Depot Manager. He found five passangers travelling without ticket and at the time of chec-king the authorised Conductor Shri Deravar Singh was not present and in his place another person, namely, Guman Singh was working as a conductor. The T.R. was found in possession of Guman Singh, who was neither in the employment of respondent No. 1, nor was authorised to work as Conductor in place of Deravar Singh. A certified copy of the statement of the appellant Sujan Singh has been filedby the respondents with the reply. A perusal of the statement of Sujan Singh shows that when the bus was checked, Deravar Singh was not found on duty and in his place Guman Singh was found working as Conductor. The appellant has not cared to deny the above statement marked as Annex. R/1, nor made out a case for drawing the inference that the statement contained in Annex. R/1 was not given by him vo-luntarily. We, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the statement contained in Annex. R/1 given by the appellant is reliable and is sufficient to prove that the appellant himself admitted in the statement contained in Annex. R/1 that Guman Singh was found working as conductor in the bus in place of Deravar Singh when the bus was checked on 31st January, 1982. (11). A perusal of Annexure R/2, which is a certified copy of the reply filed by the appellant in the departmental inquiry shows that in para no. 6 of his reply, the appellant completely denied the facts that Guman Singh was working as a Conductor in place of Deravar Singh when the bus was checked on 31st January, 1982. The averments made in para no. 6 of his reply, the appellant completely denied the facts that Guman Singh was working as a Conductor in place of Deravar Singh when the bus was checked on 31st January, 1982. The averments made in para no. 6 of the reply are obviously false in view of the admission made by the appellant in his statement (Annex. R/1) that at the time of checking Deravar Singh was not present and one Guman Singh was found working as a Conductor. (12). It is true that everyone, who is accused of having committed a mis-con-duct, is entitled to defend himself. But, the right to defend himself does not include the right to speak lies or set up false defences or to deny the truth in any manner. No one has a right to defend himself against the valid laws of the land or against the truth. The reason being that in a society, which is governed by the rule of law, laws cannot be allowed to be eclipsed, dis-obeyed and shattered by any personand since justice is founded on truth, no-one can be allowed to eclipse justice by setting up false cases whether he is a plaintiff or a defendant. Even those who are accused of offences and are entitled to guarantee against testimonial compulsion under Article 20(3) of the Constitution are not permitted to make false statements. They are entitled to remain silent if they so desire, but in case, they want to saysomething, the obligation to speak truth is there and even those who are accused of offences, are required to speak the truth before the public servants conducting investigation, inquiry or trial. (13). No civilised society and much less our society permits any person to speak the lies in any proceedings. The evil consequences arising from the disclo-sure of truth, do not operate as an excuse for speaking lies. In other countries also no one is permitted to speak a lie. In United States of America vs. James Knox. (1), the Supreme Court of United States of America held that a tax-prayer has no privilage under his constitutional right against self incrimination to file a false return when faced with the choice of prosecution for failure to file a return or for incrimi-nating statements in a truthful return. (14). In United States of America vs. James Knox. (1), the Supreme Court of United States of America held that a tax-prayer has no privilage under his constitutional right against self incrimination to file a false return when faced with the choice of prosecution for failure to file a return or for incrimi-nating statements in a truthful return. (14). The position of law in India is not different from the law in force in United States of America so far as the duty to speak the truth is concerned. (15). In S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (2), the Honble Supreme Court observed : ``The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life finding the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. (16). The observations of their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court clearlylay down that all those persons who set up false cases in any capacity are the persons who cannot be said to come to the Court with clean hands and in the mather of equitable reliefs, they are not entitled to any relief and their cases deserve to be thrown away at the earliest instance. (17). In the instant case, the appellant set up a false case in para no. 6 of hisreply, in as much as the case set up in para no. 6 of his reply in inconsistent with his statement contained in Annex. R/1. We are in agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge that the appellant (petitioner) is proved to have allowed Guman Singh, who was not authorised to act as a Conductor of the bus in place of Deravar Singh and that during the checking of the bus, the T.R. was also found in possession of Guman Singh. It is also obvious that the defence set up in para no. 6 of his reply was false in view of the statement contained in Annex. R/1. It is also obvious that the defence set up in para no. 6 of his reply was false in view of the statement contained in Annex. R/1. It is therefore, proper to say that the appellant has not come to this Court with clean hands. He is therefore, not entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, because as pointed out by the Honble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu (supra) a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. (18). The learned counsel for the appellant has cited before us Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. & Anr. (3), Modi Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.(4), Srila Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarsananidi vs. State of Madras & Anr. (5), Heera Bharti vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (6), Krishna Swami vs. Union of India (7), S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (8), ShriRam Yadav vs. R.S.R.T.C. & Ors. (9), S.D. Sharma vs. Trade Fair Authority of India & Ors. (10) and Vijai Singh vs. R.S.R.T.C. (11). (19). None of these cases justify the appellant in setting up false defences or to speak lies orally or by means of making false averments in the reply. Therefore, none of these rullings can be of any assistance in establishing that he is entitled toequitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution despite having set up a false case in para No. 6 of the reply. The observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu (supra) clearly disentitle the accused from invoking the equitable jurisdiction of this Court. (20). For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any force in this appeal.The appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. _