JUDGMENT (1.) D. C. Srivastava, J. This is plaintiff's second appeal. (2.) A suit for permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiff- tenant against the defendant-respondent- landlord praying that the landlord be restrained from obstructing in getting the roof and wall of the disputed shop in the tenancy of the appellant repaired. The shop in dispute was alleged to be in tenancy of the appellant on monthly rent of Rs/15/ -. The landlord wanted to evict the appellant and created all sorts of obstructions and made a plan in the year 1982 to forcibly demolish the shop so that it may be vacated. A suit for permanent injunction numbered 311 of 1982 was filed in the Court of Munsif, Hathras in which the relief sought was that the landlord be restrained from forcibly evicting the plaintiff-appellant. The said suit was dismissed, but the appeal was allowed. It was alleged that a wall of the shop and roof were got damaged and demolished by the defendant by digging ditches around the wall. The plaintiff wanted to carry out repairs which was obstructed, hence, the suit was filed. The landlord contested the suit on the ground that the shop was old construction and in the year 1986 it fell down in the rainy season and not that the roof and wall were got demolished by the defendant. (3.) THE suit was decreed by the trial Court but in appeal the judgment and decree of the trial Court were set aside and the suit was dismissed. It is, therefore, this second appeal. (4.) THE only point for adjudication in this appeal is whether the suit of the plain tiff-appellant could be dismissed on the ground of bar created by Order 2, Rule 2, C. RC. It may be mentioned that this bar was not pleaded in the written statement. It was raised for the first time in the trial Court during arguments. The learned appellate Court disagreeing with the findings of the trial Court on this plea dismissed the suit. (5.) FOR proper appreciation of this point Order 2, Rule 2, C. RC. has to be recapitulated. Order 2, Rule 1, C. RC. It was raised for the first time in the trial Court during arguments. The learned appellate Court disagreeing with the findings of the trial Court on this plea dismissed the suit. (5.) FOR proper appreciation of this point Order 2, Rule 2, C. RC. has to be recapitulated. Order 2, Rule 1, C. RC. provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. This rule, therefore, relates to splitting of the claim. Order 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. provides for relinquishing of part of the claim and mentions that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (6.) IT has, therefore, to be seen whether the plaintiff had relinquished any portion of his claim in earlier suit of. 1982 and whether this provision bars the filing of subsequent suit in the manner in which it was framed. As mentioned above, in view of Order 2, Rule 1, C. RC. whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of a cause of action should be made in a suit. The cause of action is to be understood in the manner it has been alleged in the plaint. It has to be seen on what cause of action the earlier suit was filed and for this copy of the plaint of earlier suit was relevant and material document. The plea of bar of Order II, Rule 2, C. P. C. was not a pure question of law like the bar of limitation or jurisdiction which could be permitted to be raised at any time. The plea of bar of Order II, Rule 2, C. P. C. was not a pure question of law like the bar of limitation or jurisdiction which could be permitted to be raised at any time. In order to succeed in raising this plea it has to be established by the defendant that earlier suit was filed on same cause of action on which the sub sequent suit was filed and since in the earlier suit the relief sought in the subsequent suit arising out of the same cause of action was not claimed, the subsequent suit is barred by Order 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. In the absence of the copy of the plaint it cannot be appreciated what was the cause of action in the earlier suit. It was also essential to plead in the written statement that the suit was barred by Order 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. (7.) THE Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhoomlal, AIR 1964 SC 1810 has laid down that it is necessary to plead the bar of Order II, Rule 2, C. P. C. and for establishing this bar the plaint of the suit is also required to be necessarily filed. It further laid down that in order to attract the bar of Order 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. it has to be established that the cause of action in two suits were the same and that the plaintiff in the former suit could have sought the relief sought by him in the subsequent suit. All these ingredients have not been established by the defendant and the lower appellate Court on mere surmises and conjectures observed that bar of Order 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. is attracted. (8.) THE, copy of the plaint in suit No. 311 of 1982 has not been filed. However, paper No. 33-C is the copy of the judgment in civil appeal No. 252 of 1983 arising out of the judgment and decree in suit No. 311 of 1982 and from this judgment it seems that the plaintiff, Mani Ram, in that suit sought permanent injunction restraining the landlord from forcibly dispossessing him from the disputed shop in his tenancy. It was averred in that suit that the defendant was making a plan to forcibly evict the plaintiff by causing damage in the shop. It was averred in that suit that the defendant was making a plan to forcibly evict the plaintiff by causing damage in the shop. Thus, the cause of action which can be gathered from the aforesaid copy of judgment in the earlier suit was the plan of the landlord to cause damage to the disputed shop so that the plaintiff may be forcibly evicted except in accordance with law and it is in this light that the decree was passed by the appellate Court in civil appeal No. 252 of 1983 restraining the landlord from forcibly evicting the plaintiff-tenant from the disputed shop. It further directed that the defendant landlord can take action for eviction of the plaintiff-tenant under U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The cause of action in the sub sequent suit as disclosed in paragraph 8 of the plaint is that it occurred firstly in June 1982 when some dispute arose between the parties when the plaintiff requested the defendant to get the shop repaired and lastly on 13-9-1986 when the defendant lastly refused to get the shop repaired. In this way the cause of action of subsequent suit is the refusal of the landlord to get the shop repaired. The controversy as to when the eastern wall fell down and portion of the roof was damaged is, therefore, not very material. The earlier suit was based on the cause of action that the landlord wanted to forcibly evict the tenant by causing damage to the accommodation. The cause of action in the subsequent suit was the failure of the landlord twice to get partly damaged tenanted portion repaired. As such, it can not be said that the two causes of actions in the two suits are the same. (9.) IT may also be mentioned that in paragraph No. 9 of the written statement the defendant admitted that the disputed shop fell down in rainy season of 1986. It is, therefore, difficult on the face of this admission of the defendant to accept the contention that the shop fell down in the year 1982, before filing of the previous suit. (10.) MY attention was drawn to the report and map prepared by the commissioner in the earlier suit and also the report of the commissioner prepared in the sub sequent suit. (10.) MY attention was drawn to the report and map prepared by the commissioner in the earlier suit and also the report of the commissioner prepared in the sub sequent suit. The report of the commissioner dated 6-11-1986 shows that the door of the shop is towards west. The western wall is intact. A thatch has been placed on the western wall. Northern and southern walls were also intact. Only eastern wall was found damaged and the roof was also partly damaged. Consequently, it is again difficult to believe that in the rainy season of 1986 the entire shop had fallen down. From the two reports and maps it is clear that only eastern wall has fallen down and portion of the roof of the shop had been damaged and not that it is a shop without roof. Consequently, if the tenant wanted to get it repaired at his own expense consequent upon refusal of the landlord to get the same repaired twice, it cannot be said that the cause of action in subsequent suit is the same. The bar of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. is, therefore, not attracted. The view taken by the lower appellate Court is, therefore, erroneous in law. The appeal was allowed only on this ground, hence, this second appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court have to be set aside and those of the trial Court have to be restored. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with cost. The judgment and decree dated 12-7-1996 of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree dated 28-9-1989 of the trial Court are restored.