JUDGMENT 1. - All these writ petitions are disposed of by this common judgment since the controversy involved is the common. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that writ petition suffers from laches and delay as they have been filed on 20-10-92 and 19-9-94 in which the order of the Addl. Collector, Bikaner dated 28-10-91 /28-12-91 has been challenged. Reliance is placed on the judgment given by this Court in the case of U.I.T. v. Gordhanlal S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4541/94 decided on 19-9-94. The Addl. Collector found that provisions of Section 11 -A are mandatory and award has to be passed within a period of two years and since the notifications were issued u/S. 52(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Acton 3-10-74,17-9-79 and on 10-12-80 and published in Gazette on 18-12-80 and 3-10-74, as such in accordance with the amendment Act, 1987 the provisions of Section 60A have been made effective from 1st August, 1987. The award having not been passed within two years, the acquisition proceedings were declared as lapsed. This Court in the case of U.I.T. v. Gordhanlal observed that a copy of the order be sent to the Chief Secretary and also the Chairman of the U.I.T Bikaner to fix the responsibility. The writ petition was dismissed being belated. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that land was required for scheme known a& Jainarain Vyas Nagar. Notification u/S. 52(2) of the Act was published in Gazette dated 3-10-74. The possession of the land was taken u/S. 52(6) by the State Government and was handed over to the Trust for improvement purposes in the year 1981. The Trust has allotted the plots in the year 1983 and 1984 and lacks of rupees have been spent for construction of roads and providing light, water and sanitary facilities. The State Government appointed the Collector for determination of compensation on 7-12-1987. The file was received from the office of the Addl. Collector, late i.e. on 11-8-94 and immediately on receiving the file, the writ petitions were tied. It is also submitted that possession is taken and land vests with the State Government, for not passing of the award within two years acquisition proceedings, have not lapsed. 4. I have considered over the matter. Collector, late i.e. on 11-8-94 and immediately on receiving the file, the writ petitions were tied. It is also submitted that possession is taken and land vests with the State Government, for not passing of the award within two years acquisition proceedings, have not lapsed. 4. I have considered over the matter. I would have referred this matter to the Larger Bench but in vie of the decisions of the Apex Court which were not taken note by the learned Judge who was deciding the writ petition of U.I.T. v. Gordhanlal considered the said decision is per incuriam and has not considered the law laid down by the Apex Court. 5. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U. P., 1993 (5) JT SC 385 it was observed as under:- Ordinarily, he Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has bean made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession, the land vests in the Government, that is to say. the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11 -A am intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly Section 11 -A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. 6. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly Section 11 -A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. 6. This judgment was followed in the case of Awadh Bihar Yadav v. The State of Bihar, 1995 (6) JT (SC) 248 in which following the above decision it war held that once possession of the land was taken by the Government, then if owner of the land entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment, such act does not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. 7. In Pratap v. The State of Rajasthan, 1996 (2) JT (SC) 759 the provisions of Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 were taken into consideration wherein it was observed that in Satendra Prasad Jain, referred to above, this Court has held that once possess on has been taken u/S. 17(1) and the land vested in the Government, then the Government could not withdraw from acquisition u/S. 48 and the provisions of Section 11 -A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make the award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held;- "This Court held that once possession had been taken under Section 17(10) and the land vested in the Government (hen the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance of Section 17(3-A) regarding part payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A. P., 1994 (5) JT (SC)320 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1995 (6) JT (SC) 248 . The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A. P., 1994 (5) JT (SC)320 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1995 (6) JT (SC) 248 . In view of the aforesaid ratio, it follows that the provisions of Section 11A are not attracted in the present case and even if it be ass umed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition oi land does not come to an end." 8. In P. Chinnanna v. State of A. P., 1994 (5) SCC 486 it was observed that when the possession of the land concerned is taken it vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Taking possession of the land concerned and its vesting in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances does not depend upon an award to be made under Section 11, making of which award alone in the case of ordinary acquisition of land could have empowered the Collector to take possession of the land u/S. 16 and the taking of which possession would have made the land vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In this case, the order dispensing with the inquiry u/S. 5A was set aside by the High Court and directions were issued to make inquiry under that Section. It was observed that the land had become the land of the Government. 9. The above decisions of the Apex Court make it clear that not passing of the award within the period of two years would not lapse the acquisition proceedings in a case where the possession has been taken. The land has already vested in the Government and has further been transferred to the petitioner UIT who has sold the plots to needy persons and developed the area of scheme. There is no notification or provision of law by which the land so vested can be divested or it could be considered that the acquisition proceedings have become infructuous. The order which has been passed by the Addl. Collector is non est in view of the binding judgment of the Apex Court. Even if there was no award, the land vests with the State Government, then respondents cannot take the benefit on that ground. The order which has been passed by the Addl. Collector is non est in view of the binding judgment of the Apex Court. Even if there was no award, the land vests with the State Government, then respondents cannot take the benefit on that ground. So far as writ petitions filed in the year 1992 there is no delay and in respect of the writ petitions which have been filed in the year 1994 I do not consider that delay would come in the way of the petitioner in quashing such an illegal order which is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 (3) JT (SC) 371 it was observed that State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual and there should be pragmatism in justice oriented approach in considering sufficient cause. In G. Ramegowda Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 1988 (2) SCC 142 even the procedural delay in Government action was taken into consideration and delay was condoned, as such the order passed by the Addl. Collector is hereby quashed and above mentioned writ petitions are allowed.Petition allowed. *******