Judgment :- A.R. LAKSHMANAN, J. (Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the high Court will be pleased to issue Writ or order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of Mandamus declaring incorporation of item 59 of Schedule IV to the extent it levies sales tax on Skimmed Milk Powder and Ultra High temperature Milk in Act No.5 of 2005 of Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax as violative of Article 14, 19(l)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly strike down the said provision and declare that Skimmed Milk Powder and Ultra High Temperature Milk being one form of Milk is exempt under Item No.16 of the Schedule I of value Added Tax Act, and Accordingly, interdict the state and its agencies from levying sales tax on Skimmed Milk Powder and Ultra High Temperature Milk under Item 59 of the IV Schedule to the Act.) Common Judgment: Bilal Nazki, J. W.P.No.11386 of 2005: A short point is involved in this case. The petitioners have challenged an entry in Item No.58 of Schedule IV of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) as unconstitutional. The petitioner No.2 is the partner of the 1st petitioner and he is aggrieved of the action of the State in taxing the skimmed milk powder and ultra high temperature milk (UHT milk) under Item No.58 of the Schedule IV of the Act. It is contended that the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 was repealed by the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax ordinance, 2005 which was, later on, enacted as Act No.5/2005. Under APGST Act 6 of 1957 the Government, in exercise of its power under Section 9, issued notification in GO Ms.No.1091 (Revenue), dt.10.6.1957 exempting from tax the sales of fresh milk, curd and butter milk sold by dealers exclusively dealing in them and their products realized from surplus thereof. Another G.O.Ms.No.20, dt.20.1.1980 was issued granting exemptions in respect of sales of Pasteurized milk. The said notifications fell for interpretation in various decisions before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as this Court. This Court, in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Another G.O.Ms.No.20, dt.20.1.1980 was issued granting exemptions in respect of sales of Pasteurized milk. The said notifications fell for interpretation in various decisions before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as this Court. This Court, in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Guntur District Milk Producers Co-Operative Unit Limited (79 STC 211) held that since the milk cannot be preserved for a long period, it is converted into powder and sold as such and it is nothing but dehydrated form of pasteurized milk which is exempted under G.O.Ms.No.20. Exemptions are provided under Section 7 of the Act. Schedule I of the Act contains 47 items of exempted goods. Item 16 of the said schedule exempts fresh milk and pasteurized milk other than UHT milk and skimmed milk powder from the purview of the Act. Item 58 of the schedule IV provides for levy of tax on skimmed milk power and UHT milk @ 4%. The grievance of the petitioners is that the skimmed milk powder and UHT milk are covered by item No.16 of the Schedule I of the Act and as such the Item 58 of the Schedule IV of the Act which provides for levy of tax on skimmed milk powder and UHT milk is unconstitutional. The only question that falls for consideration before this Court is whether, in the light of entry in Item No.16 of Schedule I of the Act which exempts fresh milk and pasteurized milk, the entry in Item No.58 of Schedule IV of the Act was constitutional which levies tax on skimmed milk powder and UHT milk. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it is a case of over classification and it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in D.S. Nakra and others Vs. Union of India ((1983) 1 Supreme Court Cases 305). This case, in our view, has no relevance. It was dealing with a case pertaining to the pensioners and the Court was examining as to whether the class of pensioners was further divisible for the purpose of entitlement and payment of pension into those who retired by certain date and those who retired after that date. The Court held that the classification was too microscopic classification. The reasons for coming to this conclusion were given in the judgment itself. The Court held that the classification was too microscopic classification. The reasons for coming to this conclusion were given in the judgment itself. In paras 28 and 29 the supreme Court made the following observations. “28. Pensions to civil employees of the Government and the defence personnel as administered in India appear to be a compensation for service rendered in the past. However, as held in Douge V. Board of Education (302 US 74: 83 L Ed 57) a pension is closely akin to wages in that it consists of payment provided by an employer, is paid in consideration of past service and serves the purpose of helping the recipient meet the expenses of living. This appears to be the nearest to our approach to pension with the added qualification that it should ordinarily ensure freedom from undeserved want. 29. Summing up it can be said with confidence that pension is not only compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension also has a broader significance, in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which inheres economic security in the fall off life when physical and mental powers is ebbing corresponding to aging process and, therefore, one is required to fallback on savings. One such saving in kind is when you give your best in the hey-day of life to your employer, in days of invalidity, economic security by way of periodical payment is assured. The term has been judicially defined as a stated allowance or stipend made in consideration of past service or a surrender of rights or emoluments to one retired from service. Thus the pension payable to a government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and therefore can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation or for service rendered. In one sentence one can say that the most practical raison d’etre for pension is the inability to provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and avoid unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing to fall back upon.” Another judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is the judgment of Gujarat High Court reported in Chunilal Mayachand Vs. State of Gujarat (86 STC 105). One may live and avoid unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing to fall back upon.” Another judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is the judgment of Gujarat High Court reported in Chunilal Mayachand Vs. State of Gujarat (86 STC 105). The question with which we are concerned and was before the Gujarat high Court was whether “Milkmaid full-cream condensed milk” was not “milk, whole or separated or reconstituted” as appearing in entry 10 (i) of Schedule I to the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. The Sales Tax Authority had held that the two products were neither “milk, whole, separated or reconstituted” within the meaning of entry 10 (i) of Schedule I to the Act, but were “food-staff or food provisions within the meaning of entry 6 of Schedule III to the Act. The Tribunal, however, held that “milk, whole, separated or reconstituted” would reasonably mean only three categories or varieties of milk, viz., whole milk, separated milk or reconstituted milk. The matter went to the Gujarat High Court. The Court held that the words “whole”, “separated” and “reconstituted” have been used in entry 10 out abundant caution and not for the purpose of restricting the meaning of the word “milk” and the legislature has used the words to clarify that not only whole milk in its original liquid form but even separated milk and reconstituted milk were also covered by that entry which exempts tax. In a judgment of the Madras High Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Indodan Milk Products (45 STC 498) the assessee was dealing with condensed milk. The assessee contended before the assessing authority that the condensed milk was also milk and was eligible for exemption, as milk was exempted from sales tax. The assessing authority and the appellate authority rejected the claim of the assessee. The matter went to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that the assessee was eligible for exemption. The High court relied on a judgment of Allahabad High Court in Indodan Milk Products Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax (33 STC 381 (FB)). The Allahabad High court came to the conclusion that the condensed milk was nothing but milk in concentrated form which is obtained by evaporating water from milk in a fluid state and thereafter some sugar to preservative is added to it. Commissioner of Sales Tax (33 STC 381 (FB)). The Allahabad High court came to the conclusion that the condensed milk was nothing but milk in concentrated form which is obtained by evaporating water from milk in a fluid state and thereafter some sugar to preservative is added to it. The Court held that the condensed milk, as a matter of fact, was milk and not product. The Madras High Court accepted the view of the Allahabad High Court and held that the condensed milk was milk. There was no separate entry for condensed milk. In a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Collector of Central Excise Vs. Technoweld Industries (2003 (155) E.L.T.209 (SC)) the question before the court was whether by drawing wire into a thinner gauge, manufacture had taken place. The further question was whether the wire of the thinner gauge was exigible to duty. The Supreme Court held in para-8. “We are unable to agree with the submission. It is to be seen that the initial product was wire rod. The ultimately product is also a wire. All that is done is that the gauge of the rod is made thinner and the product is finished a little better. In our view the earlier decisions of the tribunal are correct. There is no manufacture of a new product. Merely because there are two separate entries does not mean that the product becomes excisable. The product becomes excisable only if there is manufacture.” In our view, this judgment is not relevant for the purpose of present controversy because the court was dealing with the question as to whether converting wire rods into a thinner gauge was a manufacturing process or not. The contention raised by Mr. S.R. Ashok, learned senior counsel for the petitioners was that the skimmed milk powder and UHT milk are not milk products, but are milk, therefore they could not be made exigible to tax. This would have perhaps been accepted, had there been no specific entry with respect to skimmed milk powder and UHT milk. The contention raised by Mr. S.R. Ashok, learned senior counsel for the petitioners was that the skimmed milk powder and UHT milk are not milk products, but are milk, therefore they could not be made exigible to tax. This would have perhaps been accepted, had there been no specific entry with respect to skimmed milk powder and UHT milk. However, we are not concerned whether the skimmed milk powder and UHT milk are “milk” or “milk products” which had been the question before the Courts in the cases referred to above, but we are concerned with the question whether fresh milk and pasteurized milk and skimmed milk powder and UHT milk could be placed in two different schedules by the State. Therefore the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners would not be helpful in any way to come to a correct conclusion. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of A.P. Vs. McDowell & Co. ((1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 709) to submit that mere allegation of unreasonable was not enough to strike down an enactment. He submits that the Supreme Court has held that the Act can be struck down only on two grounds viz., (1) lack of legislative competence or (2) violation of fundamental rights or any other constitutional provision. The Supreme Court, in this judgment, categorically stated that an enactment cannot be struck down on the plea that it was unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. In State of U.P. Vs. Kamla Palace (AIR 2000 Supreme Court 617) classification made between cinemas receiving grant-in-aid and cinemas not receiving grant-in-aid upheld by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in TVL K.A.K. Anwar & Company Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (26 APSTJ 64). In this case the question before the Supreme Court was whether raw hides and skins which are subjected to purchase tax under the Tamilnadu General Sales Tax Act could again be taxed as tanned hides and skins sold in the course of inter-State trade. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that raw hiders and skins and tanned hides and skins were two types of commodities. In Rekha Timber Depot & Others Vs. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that raw hiders and skins and tanned hides and skins were two types of commodities. In Rekha Timber Depot & Others Vs. DCTO, Prakasam District and others (35 APSTJ 167) this Court followed the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of A.P. Vs. McDowell & Co. (4th supra). A similar question came before this Court in a case reported in Pallava Granites (India) Pvt. Ltd., Ongole and others Vs Commercial Tax officer No.1, Ongole and others (33 APSTJ 112) where the Court was considering two entries in the first schedule of the General Sales Tax Act, one entry pertaining to “raw granite stones” and other pertaining to “polished granite stones”. This Court held that since raw granite stones and polished granite stones were shown under two different entries, they could be taxed differently. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed before us the definition of milk. As we have already framed an opinion that the question before us is not whether skimmed milk powder and UHT milk is milk or not, the question is what is the effect of having two different entries for “fresh milk” and “pasteurized milk” and “skimmed milk powder” and “UHT milk”. Since there were judgments of this Court and other Courts that dehydrated milk was milk, the legislature, in its wisdom, thought it fit to place the milk and milk products under different categories and tax “skimmed milk powder” and “UHT milk” and not to tax “fresh milk” and “pasteurized milk”. For these reasons, we do not find merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. No costs. W.P.No.12328 of 2005: It is submitted that this case does not pertain to the controversy involved in the above case. Therefore this case be listed separately for hearing. The appellant filed this appeal only against the findings rendered by the learned single judge in para. 25 of his order dated July 4, 1995, and made in W. P. No. 13646 of 1994 (N. H. Mohnot v. Deputy CIT. Therefore this case be listed separately for hearing. The appellant filed this appeal only against the findings rendered by the learned single judge in para. 25 of his order dated July 4, 1995, and made in W. P. No. 13646 of 1994 (N. H. Mohnot v. Deputy CIT. The learned single judge by the said order partly allowed the writ petition by directing the respondents to return to the appellant/writ petitioner all the documents removed by the authorities by the conclusion of the survey by the respondents from the place of business or profession of the appellant except the promissory notes which have been attached by the Tax Recovery Officer The short facts which are relevant from the purpose of disposal of this writ appeal are as under : The appellant filed the writ petition for a mandamus directing the respondents to return the documents/promissory notes more fully described in the Schedule to annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition and for other suitable orders. On July 26, 1994, the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range-I, came to the place of business of the appellant at about 3.45 p.m. and wanted to conduct a survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on a consideration of the materials placed before him and of the arguments of the respective counsel for the parties, held that section 133A empowers the income-tax authority to enter only a place at which a business or profession is carried on by the assessee ; he cannot enter the residential premises of the assessee or the premises of the lawyer or chartered accountant of the assessee. The learned single judge has further held that while making a survey under this section, the income-tax authority has no jurisdiction to seize or impound any books of account or documents, and therefore, the authority may be compelled to return books and documents illegally seized under this section, but the said officer cannot be prevented from taking any appropriate proceedings on the basis of the information gathered from them. Paras. 12 and 13 of the order of the learned single judge can be usefully extracted in the present context. "Section 133A opens with a non-obstante clause. The income-tax authorities may exercise the powers conferred by this section notwithstanding anything contained in any of the other provisions of the Act. The power so conferred is also subject to certain limitations. Paras. 12 and 13 of the order of the learned single judge can be usefully extracted in the present context. "Section 133A opens with a non-obstante clause. The income-tax authorities may exercise the powers conferred by this section notwithstanding anything contained in any of the other provisions of the Act. The power so conferred is also subject to certain limitations. The power of survey may be exercised only at a place where a business or profession is carried on and the authority may enter any such place of business or profession only during the hours at which such place is kept open for conducting the business or profession, and in case of any other place, i.e., place where the business or profession is deemed to be carried on ; only after sunrise and before sunset. After so entering the premises, the income-tax authority may require the proprietor, employee or other person attending to or helping in the carrying on of business or profession at that place to afford him necessary facility to inspect such documents as the authority may require and which may be available at the place ; to check or verify cash, stock or other valuable article or thing which may be found therein ; and to obtain from such person such information as may be required by the authority as to any matter which may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under this Act. The authority acting under this section may place marks of identification on the books of account or other documents inspected and make or cause to be made extracts or copies therefrom ; make an inventory of any cash, stock, other valuable article or thing checked or verified, and record the statement of any person which may be useful for, or relevant to any proceeding under this ActIf any person connected with the business or profession at the time of such survey refuses or evades to provide the required assistance or information to the authority, then the authority is entitled to exercise all the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 131 for enforcing compliance with the requirement made by the authority for the purpose of the survey. Such requirement can only be for the purpose of inspection of the books of account or any other document ; checking or verifying any cash, stock or valuable article or thing; or furnishing any information or recording of the statement of the persons connected with the business or profession and present at the time of survey. The wide powers so conferred on the income-tax authority for the purpose of carrying out the survey is subject to the limitation expressly spelt out in sub-section (4) of section 133A. The authority acting under this section shall 'on no account' remove or cause to be removed from the place wherein he has entered, any books of account or other documents or any cash, stock or other valuable article or thing." The learned single judge after considering the arguments of learned senior counsel for the Department held that sub-section (6) of section 133A does not authorise the income-tax authority to impound any of the document found in the course of survey. That sub-section incorporates within itself the provisions of section 131(1) for the limited purpose of enforcing compliance with the requirement made by the authority with regard to the matters enumerated at (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 133A(1) and it is for this limited purpose the powers conferred on the officers referred to in section 131(1), viz., the same powers, as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit in respect of (a) inspection and discovery, (b) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, and (c) compelling the production of books of account and other documents, and (d) issuing of commissions, are also conferred on the income-tax authority while carrying out a survey, if the persons connected with the business or profession present at the time of survey, refuse or evade complying with the requisitions made in respect of the matters referred to in section 133A(1). The learned single judge also held in para. 19 of his order that the powers conferred on the authority constituted under the Act are to be exercised having due regard to the nature of the proceeding and all the powers conferred by statute cannot be exercised in all proceedings under the Act. The learned single judge also held in para. 19 of his order that the powers conferred on the authority constituted under the Act are to be exercised having due regard to the nature of the proceeding and all the powers conferred by statute cannot be exercised in all proceedings under the Act. Though section 132 authorises search and seizure and section 131(3) enables the authorities to impound documents produced before them in any proceeding under the Act, those powers cannot be read into the power to carry out survey under section 133A. The object of survey is not the same as of search or seizure under section 132. The power of survey also does not include the power to impound documents as the object of the survey is only to ascertain the existence, nature and contents of documents and valuables kept at the place of survey and to obtain information from the persons connected with the business or profession and present at the time of surveyThe learned single judge has also held that section 133A(6) does not empower the authority to proceed further and invoke sub-section (3) of section 131 on the ground that the power conferred under section 131(1) had been exercised. When the authority conducting survey exercises the powers conferred on it under sub-section (6) of section 133A which has incorporated within it, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 131, the powers so exercised are the powers exercisable in accordance with and for the limited purposes of section 133A and does not extend further. By holding so, the learned single judge held that the impounding of the documents found during the survey by the authority in exercise of the power under section 133 was illegal, being violative of sub-section (4) of section 133A and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to return of the documents so impounded. However, the learned single judge declined to grant the prayer of the appellant in so far as it relates to the return of the promissory notes that were seized during the survey. The learned single judge while rejecting the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner had observed as follows: "As regards the promissory notes that were seized during the survey, the seizure of the promissory notes stand on a different footing. The learned single judge while rejecting the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner had observed as follows: "As regards the promissory notes that were seized during the survey, the seizure of the promissory notes stand on a different footing. These promissory notes being negotiable instruments had been attached by the Tax Recovery Officer by issuing an order of attachment under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act, pursuant to a certificate for recovery of taxes due from the petitioner. The order of attachment so effected and seizure of the negotiable instruments pursuant to that order of attachment, cannot be interfered with, in these proceedings. The respondents have stated in their counter that the petitioner has filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) against the recovery of the amount covered by the promissory notes and that such recovery has been stayed in the appeal. It is open to the respondents to pursue other remedies that may be available to him with regard to these promissory notes." Aggrieved against the finding recorded in para. 25 alone, the appellant herein has come up with the above appeal by invoking clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. G. Rajagopalan, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the promissory notes that were seized during the survey stands on a different footing. Therefore, the learned single judge ought to have seen that the promissory notes are also documents and the protection given under section 133A(4) is also available to promissory notes. Explaining further, Mr. Rajagopalan submitted that the words used in sub-section (4) viz., "books of account or other documents or any cash or any other valuable article or thing", clearly suggest that promissory note will definitely come within any of the clauses mentioned above, and that since the promissory notes have been unauthorisedly removed during the survey, the learned single judge ought to have directed the respondents to return the same. The arguments of learned counsel for the appellant were countered by learned senior standing counsel for the Income-tax Department by taking us through the counter affidavits filed by the respondents. We have gone through the counter affidavits filed by the respective respondents and also the order passed by the learned single judge which is impugned in this writ appeal. The arguments of learned counsel for the appellant were countered by learned senior standing counsel for the Income-tax Department by taking us through the counter affidavits filed by the respondents. We have gone through the counter affidavits filed by the respective respondents and also the order passed by the learned single judge which is impugned in this writ appeal. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed by the Tax Recovery Officer, the third respondent herein that in the course of the survey conducted in the appellant's premises on July 26, 1994, by the officers of the Central Circle authorised by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-I(2), the Assessing Officer and the second respondent in the above writ petition, certain books of account and documents including 76 promissory notes were impounded and seized by him under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, after invoking the provisions of section 131 read with sub-section (6) of section 133A of the Act. It is further seen from the counter that the survey under section 133A of the Act was validly authorised by the second respondent as the assessing authority and the survey was carried out strictly in accordance with the limits of the statutory powers of the officers who conducted the survey. The books of account and other incriminating documents were impounded by the Assessing Officer after invoking the provisions of section 131 read with sub-section (6) of section 133A of the Act. The promissory notes were seized by the Tax Recovery Officer in his capacity as Tax Recovery Officer in accordance with rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act after issue of 1. T. C. P. No. 9. Rule 30 to the Second Schedule to the Act reads thus: "Where the property is a negotiable instrument not deposited in a court nor in the custody of a public officer, the attachment shall be made by actual seizure, and the instrument shall be brought before the Tax Recovery Officer and held subject to his orders." In such circumstances, it is submitted by learned senior counsel for the Department that the action of the income-tax authorities acting under the provisions of section 133A of the Act is perfectly legal and justified and not arbitrary and malicious as alleged by the appellant. We see much force in the contention of learned counsel for the respondents. We see much force in the contention of learned counsel for the respondents. We may also refer to certain other provisions of the Income-tax Act in order to appreciate the contentions of learned counsel for the respondents in a situation like this. Section 116 of the Act. "There shall be the following classes of income-tax authorities for the purposes of this Act, namely :--- (a) the Central Board of Direct Taxes constituted under the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 (54 of 1963) (b) Directors-General of Income-tax or Chief Commissioners of Income-tax (c) Directors of Income-tax or Commissioners of Income-tax or Commissioners of Income-tax (Appeals) (cc) Additional Directors of Income-tax or Additional Commissioners of Income-tax or Additional Commissioners of Income-tax (Appeals) (d) Deputy Directors of Income-tax or Deputy Commissioners of Income-tax or Deputy Commissioners of Income-tax (Appeals) (e) Assistant Directors of Income-tax or Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax (f) Income-tax Officers (g) Tax Recovery Officers (h) Inspectors of Income-tax." " Section 2. (7A) 'Assessing Officer' means the Assistant Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer who is vested with the relevant jurisdiction by virtue of directions or orders issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120 or any other provisions of this Act, and the Deputy Commissioner who is directed under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of that section to exercise or perform all or any of the powers and functions conferred on, or assigned to, an Assessing Officer under this Act." It is argued that the Tax Recovery Officer is an Income-tax Officer vested with the necessary powers for recovery of arrears of tax in respect of the assessees who carry on business or profession within his jurisdiction or who have their principal place of business or profession or vocation within his jurisdiction or who have their residence or own movable or immovable properties within his jurisdiction. Therefore, it is submitted that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are income-tax authorities under the Income-tax Act and hence they had the necessary power and authority to be present during the survey operations. As seen earlier, the books of account and documents found in the business premises of the appellant were seized after invoking the provisions of section 131 read with section 133A and as such there is no overstepping of the limits empowered to the income-tax authorities as alleged by the appellant. We see merit in the above submission. As seen earlier, the books of account and documents found in the business premises of the appellant were seized after invoking the provisions of section 131 read with section 133A and as such there is no overstepping of the limits empowered to the income-tax authorities as alleged by the appellant. We see merit in the above submission. It may be relevant in this context to point out that the appellant is in arrears of tax to the extent of around Rs. 1 crore to the Department. Though it is contended by the Department that the appellant is in huge arrears to the extent of around Rs. 25 crores, we are not inclined to go into that question in this proceedings, since it is not germane for us to consider that question. It was for the purpose of collecting the arrears of tax, the officers are authorised under section 133A of the Act by the Assessing Officer, and the survey was carried out by the officers of the Central range. It is the case of the Department that the survey has unearthed several valuable documents and information regarding the investments of the appellant and also his financial status. In our opinion, the survey under section 133A was validly authorised by the second respondent as the assessing authority and the books of account and the other incriminating documents were impounded by the Assessing Officer after invoking the provisions of section 131 read with sub-section (6) of section 133A of the Act. The promissory notes were seized by the Tax Recovery officer in accordance with rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act after issue of I.T.C.P. No. 9, as already noticed. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the Department, the promissory notes impounded at the time of search are being used only for the collection of arrears of income-tax due by the appellant to the Department, the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Department is fully justified under section 133A, as it is necessary that the authorities empowered to authorise action can also remain present at the spot for supervising and doing all that is necessary for the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the presence of the Tax Recovery Officer, the third respondent herein was also perfectly valid and justified by virtue of the powers vested in him under the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961As rightly pointed out by the learned single judge, the promissory notes were seized during the survey, the seizure of the promissory notes stand on a different footing. Those promissory notes being negotiable instruments had been attached by the Tax Recovery Officer by issuing an order of attachment under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act, pursuant to a certificate for recovery of taxes due from the petitioner/appellant herein. In our opinion, though the Tax Recovery Officer was present at the time of the survey, along with the other officers, it was pursuant to a certificate for recovery of taxes, and he is entitled to issue an order of attachment under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act. Though the third respondent was present along with the other officers at the time of the survey, rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act empowers him to pass an order of attachment and to seize the negotiable instruments pursuant to the order of attachment. Such an act on the part of the Tax Recovery Officer, cannot be interfered with as in our opinion, the Tax Recovery Officer has acted only within his limits under the powers given to him under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act. Therefore, though the impounding of other documents by the other Income-tax Officers and the attachment and seizure of the negotiable instruments (the promissory notes) by the Tax Recovery Officer were done at one and the same time, the action initiated by the Tax Recovery Officer invoking his powers under rule 30 of the Second Schedule to the Act is totally unquestionable, though such act was put in action along with the other officers who were present at the time of seizure. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate the contention of Mr. G. Rajagopalan that the promissory notes are also documents and the protection given under section 133A(4) is also available to the promissory notes. The writ appeal, therefore, fails and the findings rendered by the learned single judge in para. 25 of his order which is challenged in this writ appeal are confirmed. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. G. Rajagopalan that the promissory notes are also documents and the protection given under section 133A(4) is also available to the promissory notes. The writ appeal, therefore, fails and the findings rendered by the learned single judge in para. 25 of his order which is challenged in this writ appeal are confirmed. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. Any observation made by us in this judgment will not affect the rights of the appellant in his appeal pending now before the authorities.