JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :---The sole question that requires consideration in this second appeal is : Whether the Will Exhibit-79 executed by Balu Mahadu on 17-5-76 is duly proved, valid and genuine? 2.The trial Court held that the plaintiff propounder of Will was not able to explain the suspicious circumstances satisfactorily surrounding the execution of the Will and, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 30-8-1980. The first Appellate Court disagreed with the decision of the trial Court. The first Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 24-1-1985 held that the plaintiff has successfully dispelled the circumstances sought to be shown as suspicious by the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and the Will Exhibit-79 has been duly proved by the plaintiff propounder and the same is valid. The Appellate Court accordingly decreed plaintiff's suit. 3.The second appeal arises from the facts which may be summarised with brevity and these facts are :- One Balu Mahadu Holmukhe vide registered sale deed purchased the land in question comprising of Gat No. 334 admeasuring 2 hectares and 45 acres and the well in Gat No. 3353 by registered sale deed from Jagjivan Madhavrao Inamdar. About two years prior to his death, Rajaram Shidu Ghadge, the plaintiff, was cultivating the said land on behalf of Balu Mahadu. Balu Mahadu was also staying with the plaintiff along with his wife. Balu Mahadu had one daughter Kalawati Dinkar Adsule, the defendant No. 1. Kalawati was married to Dinkar Bandu Adsule, defendant No. 2. Kalavati did not look after her father Balu Mahadu and rather she used to beat and harass him and her mother Yeshwade Balu Holmukhe, original defendant No. 4. Balu Mahadeo could not bear the beating and harassment of his daughter Kalawati and started residing with the plaintiff. Initially Balu Mahadu decided to sell the aforesaid land to the plaintiff and an agreement for sale was also executed. It appears that after the agreement of sale was executed by Balu in favour of plaintiff, the relations between the father and daughter deteriorated and the defendant No. 1 daughter even lodged a criminal complaint against her father Balu Mahadu on 17-5-1976. On that very day, Balu Mahadu executed the Will in favour of plaintiff Rajaram and bequeathed the aforesaid land to the plaintiff. On that very day, Balu Mahadu executed the Will in favour of plaintiff Rajaram and bequeathed the aforesaid land to the plaintiff. The Will was written by scribe Ganesh R. Inamdar and attested by Thaksen Nivruti Kadam and Vasant Ghole and was duly registered by the Sub-Registrar, Waduj. In the Will, the testator Balu provided that the plaintiff Rajaram would look after his wife Yeshwada during her life time. Balu Mahadu died on 3-10-1976. At the time of his death, he was residing with plaintiff Rajaram and after his death, his wife Yeshwada continued to reside with the plaintiff. The plaintiff continued to cultivate the suit land in view of the Will executed by Balu Mahadu in his favour. Kalawati, Balu's daughter, her husband Dinkar and her father-in-law Pandu sought to obstruct the lawful enjoyment of the aforesaid lands by the plaintiff which gave rise to the filing of the suit by plaintiff Rajaram against them who were inpleaded as defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Yeshwada, wife of Balu was also impleaded as defendant No. 4. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 contested the claim of the plaintiff and as regards the Will dated 17-5-1976 plea was set up by them that the Will was not voluntarily executed by Balu and it was sham and bogus document. The defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 set up a plea that plaintiff was member of Maratha community and Balu belonged to Cobbler Community and, therefore there could not have been love and affection between them. Balu's wife Yeshwada supported the case of the plaintiff and after filing the written statement to that effect she died. 4.The plaintiff - propounder of the Will - examined the scribe Ganesh Raoji (Exhibit-77), Thaksen Nivruti Kadam (Exhibit-78) one of the attesting witnesses and himself (Exhibit-71) in proof of the Will dated 17-5-1996 (Exhibit-79). The defendant No. 1 examined herself. 5.The Will set up by the propounder has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The defendant No. 1 examined herself. 5.The Will set up by the propounder has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. One important feature which distinguishes Will from other documents is that the propounder is called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator; the testator was at the relevant time in sound mind; he understood the nature and consequences of the disposition and put his signature on the document of his own free will. If the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the propounder has to discharge the burden by dispelling the suspicious circumstances. 6.In (H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma others)1, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 443, the Apex Court held thus :- "It would prima facie be true to say that the Will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of Wills it would be idle to except proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters." In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said report, the Apex Court held thus :- "19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the Will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his Will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the documents propounded is proved to be the last Will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of Wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. Even so, in dealing with the proof of Wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the depositions and put his signature to the document of his own free Will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the Will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances : or, the Will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicious should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter." 7.The view in H. Venkatachala (supra) was relied upon by the Apex Court in (Rani Purnima Debi and another v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another)2, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 567 and (Ramchandra Rambux v. Champabai and others)3, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 354. Again in (Surendra Pai and others v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and another)4, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1999, the aforesaid view of the Apex Court was reiterated. 8.In the present case, on the application of the aforesaid principle it has to be found out whether the will Exhibit-79 is valid. Since the two courts below concurred on one point that the requirements regarding due execution of will Exhibit-79 and testamentary capacity of Balu were satisfactorily proved, no further discussion is required by me in this respect. The crucial question involved in the present second appeal is whether the will Exhibit-79 is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the said circumstances have duly dispelled by the propounder. More than two years and ten decades before, in Chotynarain Singh v. Mussamat Ratan Koer, the Privy Council considered the theory of improbability and held that the improbability must be clear and cogent and it must approach very nearly to, if it does not altogether constitute, an impossibility. The Privy Council held thus : "The theory of improbability remains to be considered; and the first observation which their Lordships have to make is, that, in order to prevail against such evidence as has been adduced by the respondent in this case, an improbability must be clear and cogent. It must approach very nearly to, if it does not altogether constitute, an impossibility. It must approach very nearly to, if it does not altogether constitute, an impossibility. To give effect to the argument pressed upon this Board by the appellants, which seems to have found favour in the Court of First Instance, would be equivalent to holding that the Will of a Hindu gentlemen, attested by his own servants and dependents, must be held to be invalid, unless it is shown that the testator, at the time assigned for its execution, was placed in such circumstances that he could not secure the attendance of persons of a higher rank. That is a proposition which verges too closely on the absurd to be seriously entertained. There may be cases in which attestation by servants is an important element to be taken into account in considering whether a Will has been validly executed -- cases, for example, in which there is reasonable ground for suspicion that the will is not the voluntary act of the testator, but has been procured by the undue influence of members of his household. This case does not, in the opinion of their Lordships, belong to that class. In their opinion, there is nothing either unreasonable or improbable in the supposition that the deceased Rajan executed a Will attested by his servants for the purpose of securing the succession of his grand-daughter entertaining at the same time the intention of having the will further attested by the leading officials present at the durbar, and of then publicly proclaiming the arrangements which he had already made with respect to the devolution of his Raj." 9.The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in (Kristo Gopal Nath v. Baidya Nath Khan and others) 5, A.I.R. 1939 Calcutta 87 laid down the legal position aptly after considering the judgment of the Privy Council in Chhote Naravan Singh's case (supra) as follows :- "There is no presumption either in fact or law, as seems to be too commonly supposed, that a will, if propounded, must be a forgery. The party who applies for probate or for letters of administration with a Will annexed is no doubt required to prove the will. The party who applies for probate or for letters of administration with a Will annexed is no doubt required to prove the will. Such proof is usually furnished by the evidence of persons in whose presence the Will was actually executed or who sub-scribed their names to the document, that is to say of persons who saw the testator executing it and who put their own names to the document as attesting witnesses. In a case where such attesting witnesses are produced and they give clear and cogent testimony regarding execution, one should require very strong circumstances to repel the effect of such testimony. It will not to do talk airily about circumstances of suspicion. It is no doubt true that a person who takes it upon himself to dispute the genuineness of a Will cannot be expected to prove a negative in many cases. At the same time, the difficulty in which, on his own seeking, he places himself, will not relieve him of the burden -- it may be a heavy burden -- of displacing the positive testimony on the other side. If he rests his case on suspicion, the suspicion must be a suspicion inherent in the transaction itself which is challenged and cannot be a suspicion arising out of mere conflict of testimony." 10.The circumstances which weighed heavily in the mind of the trial Court while reaching the conclusion that the Will Exhibit -79 was shrouded by suspicious circumstances were :- (i) that Balu was depending upon the present plaintiff Rajaram and was acting according to his advice and, therefore, Rajaram played predominent role in execution of the will Exhibit-79 ; (ii) that the Will was executed at the house of Prabhakar at Waduj though the will could have been executed in Sub-Registrar's office at Waduj as it was not at far distance and the plaintiff and Balu had come in taxi to Waduj; (iii) Balu belonged to Cobbler Community while the plaintiff Rajaram belonged to Maratha Community and according to the plaintiff's own version he had provided a separate room to Balu in his house and if that was so how Balu could have affinity towards plaintiff giving him insulting treatment because of his low caste. (iv) Balu executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff Rajaram and according to the agreement of sale a sum of Rs. (iv) Balu executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff Rajaram and according to the agreement of sale a sum of Rs. 33 thousand was paid by the plaintiff to deceased Balu which did not appear to be true ; (v) the defendant No. 1 was the only daughter of Balu but the entire property has been bequeathed in favour of plaintiff Rajaram to her exclusion. 11.The Appellate Court has extensively considered the aforesaid circumstances and other ancilliary circumstances pointed out by the trial Court and found that none of the circumstances can be said to be sufficient to invalidate the will. 12.It is well established from available evidence on record that Balu was residing with the plaintiff Rajaram which he had to do in view of strained relations with his daughter defendant No. 1 Kalawati and the harassment she was giving to him. The defendant No. 1 admitted in her deposition that the two years prior to the institution of the suit her parents namely, Balu and mother Yeshwada started residing with the plaintiff and he was looking after them by providing food and clothes. The plaintiff thus was looking after Balu and his wife and provided shelter, food and clothes. There is also evidence on record that after Balu had executed agreement for sale in favour of plaintiff, the relations between Balu and his daughter further deteriorated and as a matter of fact the defendant No. 1 Kalawati, lodged a criminal complaint against his father Balu under section 97 of Criminal Procedure Code for search warrant though she was well aware that Balu and Yeshwada were living with the plaintiff. There is also evidence on record which clearly establishes that the defendant No. 1 Kalavati used to beat her parents viz., Balu and Yeshwada and their lives were at danger at the hands of their daughter defendant No. 1. In her written statement also, the defendant No. 4 Yeshwada, the mother of defendant No. 1 had supported the case of the plaintiff. After filing written statement Yeshwada died and written statement becomes relevant and admissible in view of sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. Apparently, therefore, Balu had no love and affection for his only daughter. She never discharged her obligation and duty expected of her as daughter. After filing written statement Yeshwada died and written statement becomes relevant and admissible in view of sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. Apparently, therefore, Balu had no love and affection for his only daughter. She never discharged her obligation and duty expected of her as daughter. She was not looking after her father Balu and mother Yeshwada much less maintaining them, thus her exclusion cannot be said to be unnatural. Merely because the testator Balu belonged to Cobbler Community and the propounder plaintiff is from Maratha Community, no inference can be drawn that Balu could not have any love and affection for the plaintiff Rajaram or that he could not have bequeathed his property in favour of propounder. On the other hand, the fact that propounder was looking after Balu and his wife and also provided a room in his house to them clearly show that irrespective of caste Balu and the propounder had love and affection for each other. Balu had full faith in him in as such as during his life time he permitted plaintiff propounder to cultivate his land which he started almost two years before Balu's death and a provision was also made in the will that plaintiff would look after Yeshwada, his wife during her life time. Balu's faith in Rajaram was inimpeachable and any suspicion that may prima facie arise because of the difference of caste of the testator and propounder, the same has been duly dispelled and fully removed by plaintiff. The scribe Ganesh Ramji deposed that he had gone to the house of Prabhakar where the Sub-Registrar was taken, and Balu had then given the necessary information to him and on the basis thereof he had written the Will. He also deposed that the Will was read over to Balu who admitted the contents and put the thumb impression and then it was attested by the attesting witnesses. Balu presented the Will for registration before the Sub-Registrar. He was healthy and was in a position to know the nature and consequence of the act and disposition. The deposition of the scribe has been fully corroborated by one of the attesting witness Thaksen Nivruti Kadam, a social worker and bears an endorsement by the Sub-Registrar. The Will, therefore, can be said to be well proved in accordance with law and appears to be free from any coercion, influence or fraud. The deposition of the scribe has been fully corroborated by one of the attesting witness Thaksen Nivruti Kadam, a social worker and bears an endorsement by the Sub-Registrar. The Will, therefore, can be said to be well proved in accordance with law and appears to be free from any coercion, influence or fraud. Since the relations between Balu and his daughter were not good, he wanted the Will to be executed in secrecy and without the knowledge of his daughter and that was the reason Balu and Yeshwada had gone to the house of Prabhakar Ambile where the Sub-Registrar was called and Will was written and they did not go to the office of the Sub-Registrar. This circumstances, therefore, cannot be said to be suspicious and has rightly held to be so by the Appellate Court. It may be observed that the will was also not unnatural because of the strained relations of the testator with his daughter. Even then so far as defendant No. 2 Kalawati was concerned, she has not been left without any property because Balu did not bequeath the house to the plaintiff and the said house being the property of both Balu and his wife has been inherited by defendant No. 1. As regards the allegation that propounder had taken predominent part in execution of the Will, it may be observed that on the basis of the evidence on record the act of execution of Will Exhibit 79 by Balu is formal and it cannot be said in the facts and circumstances of the present case that the Will was vitiated because of that circumstance. It is true that if the propounder takes a predominent part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, it may give rise to suspicious circumstance but the facts which have come on record here clearly demonstrate that because of the harassment and beating of the testator Balu and his wife by their daughter defendant No. 1 there was no love lost between them and the testator did not intend to give any agricultural land to his daughter. The facts and circumstances pointed out above would also show that not only that the defendant No. 1 Kalavati was not looking after or maintaining her father and mother but was father harassing them and also used to beat them. The facts and circumstances pointed out above would also show that not only that the defendant No. 1 Kalavati was not looking after or maintaining her father and mother but was father harassing them and also used to beat them. On the other hand Rajaram, the prepounder, though of different caste, took full care of the testator as well as his wife and provided him food, shelter and clothing and, therefore, if testator desired to bequeath his agricultural lands to the plaintiff propounder and acted in accordance to that wish by executing a will, it cannot be said that the propounder took predominent part in execution of the will which conferred substantial benefits on him. 13.A will is a solemn statement of the testator or testatrix, as the case may be, and if the execution of the Will is duly proved in accordance with law and does not suffer from any suspicious circumstances, the Court must always act in accordance with the desire of the testator or testetrix. 14.In (Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and another v. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. and others)6, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1684 the Apex Court held that the deprivation of the natural heirs by the testatrix should not raise any suspicion, because the whole idea behind execution of will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. The Apex Court held that therefore natural heirs would be debarred in every case of will; of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in others only partially. The same view was expressed by the Apex Court in yet another decision in (PPK Gopalan Nambiar v. PPK Balakrishnan Nambiar and others)7, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1852 and it was held that the fact that the whole of the estate was given by the testator's son in exclusion of daughter would not be itself sufficient to generate suspicion. 15.The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in (Guro (Smt.) v. Atma Singh and others)8, A.I.R. 1992(2) S.C.C. page 507. The legal position reiterated by the Apex Court is that the onus of proof of the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. The legal position reiterated by the Apex Court is that the onus of proof of the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine. Adverting to the facts in that case, the Apex Court held that the propounder was not able to discharge his burden and, therefore, Will was not held to be a genuine document. The facts in Goro's case (supra) and the facts of the present case are therefore entirely different. However, the Apex Court as regards interference by the High Court in the second appeal observed that the High Court was not justified in reversing the findings of facts recorded by the Appellate Court which was based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. 16.In (Vrindaanibai Sambhaji Mane v. Ramchandra Vithal Ganeshkar and others)9, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2086 held thus : "12. In Second Appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has, however, re-assessed the entire evidence and has come to the conclusion that the appellant has not dispelled suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. It is difficult to appreciate this kind of re-assessment of evidence in Second Appeal. Ordinarily, the decision on facts arrived at by the first Appellate Court is not disturbed in Second Appeal. That Appellate Court had, for cogent reasons, accepted the testimony of the two attesting witnesses. It is difficult to see why this testimony was not accepted in Second Appeal. Moreover, the Appellate Court had examined the question of non-dsiclosure of the Will on two earlier occasions and had found that there was nothing suspicious in that regard. The will had been produced in Court immediately after the appellant had relied upon it in her written statement. Moreover, the Appellate Court had examined the question of non-dsiclosure of the Will on two earlier occasions and had found that there was nothing suspicious in that regard. The will had been produced in Court immediately after the appellant had relied upon it in her written statement. Learned Single Judge of the High Court seems to consider this as a suspicious circumstance forgetting that there was no specific challenge to either the validity or proper execution of the Will." 17.The Appellate Court has taken into consideration the entire evidence on record and appreciated the same properly and it cannot be said that the assessment of the evidence by the Appellate Court suffers from any error. The trial Court treated certain circumstances as suspicious circumstances which in fact were not and Appellate Court on solid and valid grounds interfered with the findings recorded by the trial Court and did not commit any error in holding that the plaintiff propounder has been able to dispell the suspicious circumstances. 18.The ultimate test whether the Will is genuine and valid or not and the suspicious circumstances have been dispelled or not would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. If there is no justifiable reason to hold otherwise the wish and desire of the testator should be upheld once the execution of the will has been proved in accordance with law and there were no suspicious circumstances. 19.For the reasons recorded above, I have no hesitation in holding that the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court does not suffer from any error warranting interference by this Court in second appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs since nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents at the time of hearing of the second appeal. Appeal dismissed.