Usha Mehra, J. ( 1 ) A limited tenancy for a period of two years under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (in short the Act) of the second floor of house No D-403, Defence Colony was created by the present appellant in favour of the respondent. Permission for creation of this limited tenancy under Section 21 of the Act was granted on 16th May,1979. The second floor was thus let out to the respondent for a period of two years. The permission to creat limited tenancy was granted because two of the appellant s married daughters with their husbands at that time were residing at Bombay. Their husbands were posted at Bombay. The appellant was expecting that his son-in-law would retire in a period of one or two years and thereafter would settle in Delhi. They would be needing the premises in question. In view of this averment, the Controller after satisfying himself granted the permission for a period of two years. The appellant was not requiring the premises. After the expiry of the period of two years when the respondent did not vacate the premises faced with this situation, the appellant/landlord filed an execution application. The respondent filed objections. He objected to the execution on the ground that permission under Section 21 of the Act was obtained by the appellant by playing fraud upon the Court. The fraud alleged was that neither son-in-laws of the appellant had retired within a period of two years nor shifted to Delhi. That the appellant was living in a palacious house bearing No. C-80 Greater Kailash, New Delhi. He being the owner of that house, his daughters and sons-in-law who were quite well today could not be expected to live in a Barsati floor. Moreover, her sons-in-law were not dependent on him for the purpose of residence nor could be desiring to settle in such a small portion of the house. The Additional Rent Controller upheld the objections vide order dated 28th November,1993. He dismissed the execution application holding that the same was not maintainable and that the permission under Section 21 of the Act was obtained by committing fraud by concealing the facts of appellant having a big house bearing No. C-80, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi nor his sons-in-law by then had shifted to Delhi. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by that order this appellant filed an appeal. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by that order this appellant filed an appeal. The Rent Control Tribunal (in short the Tribunal) dismissed the appeal. He, however, accepted the contention of the appellant that in the absence of any evidence presumption of facts could not be drawn against the appellant. Tribunal held that since none of the sons-in-law of the appellant had shifted to Delhi hence the grant of permission by the Controller under Section 21 of the Act was without application of mind. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the Tribunal present appeal has been preferred. At the outset, it must be mentioned that from the time decision in S. B. Naronah Vs. Pren Kumari, AIR 1980 SC page 193 was delivered and now, the interpretation of Section 21 of the Act has undergone sea change. Admittedly in S. B. Naronah s case (supra) challenge to the validity of the grant of permission of limited tenancy was allowed by the Supreme Court even after the expiry of a period of limited tenancy. It is now settled law that the order under Section 21 of the Act can be challenged on the ground of fraud. This can be urged in defence against execution, but the ground of fraud must be taken up immediately and before the expiry of the period of tenancy. Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. M/s Shaw Brothers, AIR 1992 SC page 1555 while interpreting the scope of Section 21 of the Act observed that the law on procedural aspect under Section 21 should be taken as settled. (1) Any objection to the validity of sanction should be raised prior to expiry of the lease (2) The objection should be made immediately on becoming aware of fraud or collusion etc. (3) A tenant may be permitted to raise objection after expiry of lease in exceptional circumstances only and finally (4) burden to prove fraud or collusion is on the person alleging it. (3) A tenant may be permitted to raise objection after expiry of lease in exceptional circumstances only and finally (4) burden to prove fraud or collusion is on the person alleging it. Similarly on the substantive safeguards, the law is settled and should be followed by the authorities as stated thus - (1) permission granted under Section 21 of the Act can be assailed by the tenant only if it can be established that it was vitiated by fraud or collusion or jurisdictional error which in context of Section 21 is nothing else except fraud and collusion, (2) Fraud or collusion must relate to the date when permission was granted, (3) Permission carries a presumption of correctness which can be permitted to be challenged not only by raising objection but proving it prima facie to the satisfaction of Controller before landlord is called upon to file reply or enter into evidence, (4) No fishing or roving inquiry should be permitted at the stage of execution, (5) A permission does not suffer from any of these errors merely because no reason was disclosed in the application at the time of creation of short term tenancy, (6) Availability of sufficient accommodation either at the time of grant of permission or at the stage of execution is not a relevant factor for deciding validity of permission. In view of these guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, we have to see whether any fraud in this case was committed by the appellant at the time he sought the permission. Whether the respondent could file the objection on the ground of fraud even after having taken full advantage of limited tenancy and at the stage of execution. ( 4 ) IT must be mentioned that the Tribunal fell in grave error when after having held that in the absence of having afforded any opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence in order to rebut the allegations of the respondent, he drew adverse presumption against the appellant. He fell in serious error in presuming without there being any evidence that fraud had been committed by the appellant. He fell in serious error in presuming without there being any evidence that fraud had been committed by the appellant. In fact the Controller and the Tribunal committed manifest error of law both by entertaining the application of the tenant resisting the execution application of the landlord by placing burden on him erroneously and deciding against him by misapplication and misconstruction of the Provision of Section 21 of the Act. The appellant had, when applied for permission categorically stated that he had only two daughters. Both were married. Their husbands were posted at Bombay. His sons-in-law were to retire in a period of one or two years and would come to Delhi to settle. Then they would be requiring the premises in question. Prima facie when he made this statement on oath, he stated so truthfully that he shall be requiring the premises after two years. He was not making a makebelief statement nor a pretence, but a general statement on the state of affairs as it stood then. The averments in the application that he would be requiring the premises after two years for the residence of his daughters and sons-in-law could not be construed as misrepresentation. The requirement of thelandlord includes the requirement of his sons and daughters or any member of his family. Since the appellant has only two daughters, at the time when he sought permission both were residing with their husbands at Bombay. He believed that permission be granted for two years because in the meantime his sons-in-law would retire or posted to Delhi. Then they would be requiring the premises in order to settle independently of the appellant. This presumption or belief of the appellant had not come out to be exactly as he desired it to be. Thus it cannot be said that the permission granted stood invalidated. Validity of permission should be judged on the date of grant of application. Availability of premises for indefinite letting could not be judged by subsequent events or the failure of the landlord to occupy immediately for personal, financial, economic or other reasons as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan (supra ). When this appeal was preferred on 19th July,1984, the appellant specifically averred that his son- in-law has since been transferred to Delhi. When this appeal was preferred on 19th July,1984, the appellant specifically averred that his son- in-law has since been transferred to Delhi. Had the opportunity been given to the appellant to lead evidence, he would have proved that his son-in-law has come to Delhi and required the premises and that when appellant sought permission he stated the truth. He would have proved that when he created the limited tenancy, he did not build up a sham plea but truthfully mentioned that his sons-in-law and daughters would be staying in Delhi after retirement which will happen within a period of two years. Having deprived the appellant a right to lead evidence in order to rebut the allegations of fraud levelled by the respondent, a valuable right of the appellant had been deprived by the Controller as well as by the Tribunal. The findings of the Tribunal having not been based on any evidence cannot sustain as it is based on surmises and conjuctures. ( 5 ) IT is an accepted fact on record that the respondent/tenant did not file the objections during the subsistance of tenancy of two years. He took advantage of the limited tenancy created in his favour. Only when the appellant/ landlord filed the execution, that he suddenly realised that permission was obtained under fraud. He has not given any reason for not approaching the Controller before the expiry of the period of limited tenancy. Therefore, it can safely be said that the objection regarding playing of fraud is an after thaught. ( 6 ) NOW turning to the objection that the appellant/ landlord has a palacious house of his own and, therefore, his daughters would not be requiring a separate accommodation is nothing but an erroneous presumption based on no evidence. It was nobody`s case that the daughters of the appellant would not reside on the second floor of the premises in question. In fact at the time of seeking permission the appellant had made it absolutely clear that his married daughters would be requiring separate accommodation as and when his sons-in-law retire and shift to Delhi. That is why after two years he would be requiring this premises for the use of the daughters. It was not necessary for him to have mentioned that he himself was having a palacious house. That is why after two years he would be requiring this premises for the use of the daughters. It was not necessary for him to have mentioned that he himself was having a palacious house. Had the permission been sought for his personal bonafide need after two years, then of course the objection regarding appellant having a palacious house would have been justified. The Tribunal fell in error in presuming that since appellant has a separate house and since he did not mention of the same hence permission was obtained by playing fraud. This conclusion of the Tribunal is not only erroneous but against the law laid down by the Apex Court. Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Shrisht Dhawan (Supra) while laying down substantive safeguards observed that availability of sufficient accommodation either at the time of grant of permission or at the stage of execution is not relevant factor. Hence the Tribunal fell in grave error in considering the availability of appellant s accommodation at C-80, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. The requirement for which permission sought was that of his daughters for whom he wanted this premises. On this account also, I find that the appellant did not mis- represent the Controller. It can be said that the respondent has not made out any case of fraud or misrepresentation nor it can be said that the appellant had given make-belief reasons to the Controller while obtaining permission for letting the premises for a limited period. The observations of the Tribunal, that the married daughters who are living with their husbands cannot be said to be depedant on their parents for residence, are wholly illegal observations. Such conclusion is contrary to the settled principle of law. The sons and daughters of the landlord can be dependant on their parents for the purpose of residence. The Tribunal committed error in concluding that the need of the daughters and the sons would not be the need of the landlord. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the order of the Controller as well as of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The impugned orders are set aside as I find that the respondent failed to prove that the permission was obtained by playing fraud or that the Controller while granting permission did not apply his mind. Consequently, the appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. 2000. 00.