JUDGMENT J.B. Koshy, J. 1. Defendants 1 to 3 in O.S. No. 35 of 1963 on the file of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda are the Appellants in this appeal. In the above suit for recovery of possession of property, plaintiffs claimed that their father deceased Venkiteswara Mallan who was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property had executed Ext. P2 sale deed dated 24th March 1955 alongwith the 4th defendant, the elder son in favour of the 1st defendant. According to the plaintiffs, they and 4th defendant are members of an undivided Hindu Mithakshara joint family and the suit items belonged to their family having been obtained in the partition of the family in the year 1951 as per Ext. P1 partition deed dated 15th July 1951. Venkiteswara Mallan who was their father and who was in management of the property died in 1131 Kumbam M.E. It was contended that the sale deed is not binding on the family as being unsupported by valid consideration as well as necessity or benefit to the estate. It was also contended that, at any rate, their father Venkiteswara Mallan and their elder brother (4th defendant) had no right to transfer the interests of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the plaintiffs are at least entitled to recover 6/8 shares in the suit properties. The consideration shown in the document is only Rs. 21,000 and the entire amount of Rs. 21,000 is seen reserved for discharge of a kuri liability payable in future instalments for a period of 12 1/2 years. It was further stated that the family was in a position to pay up the subscription from the income from the properties and there was no necessity for transferring the property especially when the property was the seat of the family house. It was contended by the 1st defendant that it was not joint family property. It was not ancestral properties. On the death of Janardhana Mallan, grandfather of the 4th defendant, his assets were partitioned between his two children Venkiteswara Mallan and Narayana Mallan and those two persons were entitled to deal with the properties as their own self acquired properties and the A schedule properties were set apart to the plaintiffs father Venkiteswara Mallan and those properties are his separate properties. It was contended that the 4th defendant joined as a party to the document as an abundant caution at the instance of 1st defendant as 4th defendant was residing in the property. Venkiteswara Mallan was heavily in debts and to discharge the liabilities sale of some of the properties were necessary. But, while taking assignment of one prized kuri from one Ramaswamy Iyer, entire properties of Venkiteswara Mallan were hypothecated to the Lord Krishna Bank. By executing Ext. P2 sale deed hypothecation liability was also discharged and, therefore, there was sufficient consideration. Even if the property covered by Ext. P2 sale deed is family property it was sold for discharging the debts of Venkiteswara Mallan and for family necessity. Question of limitation etc. were also not raised. Defendants 2 and 3 who were the children of the 1st defendant did not file separate written statements. 4th defendant who joined in Ext. P2 sale deed and who was a member of the joint family of the plaintiffs did not file any written statement. The Trial Court found that Ext. P2 sale deed is not supported by adequate consideration and it dealt with family property and for sale of the above property there was no family necessity and, therefore, Ext. P2 sale deed is invalid and liable to be set aside. By Judgment dated 10th July 1973, a Division Bench of this Court confirmed the Judgment and decree of the lower court except regarding a minor point with regard to the value of improvements. It was found by the then Division Bench that the entire contentions were raised by the defendants on the assumption that the property belonged to Venkiteswara Mallan. Even though the Trial Court found that there was no family necessity to sell the property, this Court did not go into that question on the ground that there was no pleading to that effect in the written statement. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that there was alternative pleading in the written statement to the effect that even if it is family property it was sold for family necessity and for clearing antecedent debt of father and, therefore, Division Bench was clearly in error in proceeding on the basis that there was no such pleading. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that there was alternative pleading in the written statement to the effect that even if it is family property it was sold for family necessity and for clearing antecedent debt of father and, therefore, Division Bench was clearly in error in proceeding on the basis that there was no such pleading. Therefore, by Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1197 of 1974 dated 10th May 1996, the Judgment of this Court dated 10th July 1973 was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal. 2. It is common case that the plaint items were originally acquired by Janardhana Mallan, grandfather of 4th defendant, by Exts. P8 and P9 sale deeds. Ext. P8 is the sale deed executed by one Subramanian Pattar in favour of Janardhana Mallan and Ext. P9 dated 12th Medam 1088 is another sale deed executed by one Ananthan Kammathi in favour of Janardhana Mallan. After the death of Janardhana Mallan, his sons, who inherited the properties, entered into a partition deed, Ext. P1. Thus, property of Janardhana Mallan was divided as per Ext. P1 among his two sons, Venkiteswara Mallan and Narayana Mallan. Properties covered by Ext. P2 sale deed was obtained by Venkiteswara Mallan under Ext. P1 partition deed on inheritance from his father. The property admittedly belonged to Venkiteswara Mallan's father. Under Mithakshara law property obtained from ancestors or father must be treated as family property and the sons in the family will get a right by birth to such property. Therefore, the property covered by Ext. P2 sale deed is a joint family property. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants rightly conceded that this is a joint family property. The main contention in the written statement however was that it was personal property of Venkiteswara Mallan. 4th defendant, the elder son, joined only because he was residing in the property. However, in the written statement itself an alternative contention was raised stating that Ext. P2 sale deed was executed because of family necessity to clear off the debts. It is also submitted that Venkiteswara Mallan being father and manager of the family can sell the property for clearing his own antecedent debts and it is binding on the sons in view of pious obligation. P2 sale deed was executed because of family necessity to clear off the debts. It is also submitted that Venkiteswara Mallan being father and manager of the family can sell the property for clearing his own antecedent debts and it is binding on the sons in view of pious obligation. Therefore, the main questions to be considered in this appeal are whether there was antecedent debts; whether there was family necessity; whether there was due enquiry by the purchaser; and whether there was adequate consideration. All these aspects were considered by the Trial Court and found against the appellants. 3. The case developed by the appellant is that Venkiteswara Mallan had contracts and business. He was conducting a ration shop. He was heavily involved in debts. He had purchased a prised kuri from one Ramaswamy Iyer and he had to pay future subscriptions to the kuri. He had hypothecated all the properties obtained by him under Ext. P1 partition deed in favour of Lord Krishna Bank as a security for the future subscriptions. Ext. P7 is the hypothecation deed executed by Venkiteswara Mallan in favour of Lord Krishna Bank. Kuri instalment is payable in every three months and it is Rs. 200 per instalment. According to the defendants situation was such that it was impossible for Venkiteswara Mallan to liquidate the debts unless some of the properties are sold. But, the properties were subject to hypothecation to Lord Krishna Bank. So, unless the hypothecation is released there will be no purchaser. Therefore, the 1st defendant was contacted and the 1st defendant agreed to buy the property covered by Ext. P2. Consideration was that the 1st defendant will clear the liability to pay future subscriptions to the kuri and mortgage deed will be released so that other properties can be sold. 1st defendant has executed a fresh security bond to the bank. On execution of that security bond the other items of properties of Venkiteswara Mallan were released from the mortgage. Liability to pay future subscriptions was also undertaken by the purchaser even though no cash consideration was paid at the time of sale. Only because of the release of the hypothecation in respect of the other properties Venkiteswara Mallan was able to sell some of the properties to discharge family debts. Therefore, it was contended that there was family necessity and there was due consideration. 4. Only because of the release of the hypothecation in respect of the other properties Venkiteswara Mallan was able to sell some of the properties to discharge family debts. Therefore, it was contended that there was family necessity and there was due consideration. 4. As per A schedule to Ext. P1 partition deed, Venkiteswara Mallan got various items of properties from his father. Item I has an extent of 1 acre and 14 cents which is the subject matter of Ext. P2. It was the seat of the family house where the parties were residing. Apart from the residential house, there was coconut trees. It is contended by the appellants/defendants that 1 acre 1.4 cents assigned by Ext. P2 contained only 52 fruit bearing coconut trees apart from the house. Only because of this assignment charge on other properties were released. After release of the other items from Ext. P7 hypothecation deed, out of item No. 2 in Ext. P1 partition deed, i. e., 5 acres 94 cents of coconut garden, one acre 97 cents was assigned under Ext. D1 and 66 cents in item 4 was assigned under Ext. X1. It was contended that consideration for Exts. D1 and X1 was utilised for discharge of the debts of deceased Venkiteswara Mallan and other family debts. Therefore, Ext. P2 was executed in furtherance and as part of a scheme put into effect by Venkiteswara Mallan and his well wishers to clear off his debts. It was pointed out that there was challenge to Exts. D1; and X1, transactions and challenge to Ext. D1 was settled pending suit and Ext. X1 transaction was affirmed by the Trial Court; but, set aside by the High Court. The Honourable Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court as Ext. X1 assignment deed was executed to clear off the antecedent debts. 5. Consideration shown in Ext. P2 is Rs. 21,000. No cash consideration was there. But, the entire amount was reserved with the assignee with directions to discharge the kuri subscriptions as and when they fell due. There was no defaulted kuri dues. Venkiteswara Mallan was subscribing regularly to the kuri from the income from other properties until the date of assignment. There was no arrears of subscription on the date when Ext. P1 was executed. Consideration for the sale of property covered Ext. There was no defaulted kuri dues. Venkiteswara Mallan was subscribing regularly to the kuri from the income from other properties until the date of assignment. There was no arrears of subscription on the date when Ext. P1 was executed. Consideration for the sale of property covered Ext. P2 which has got residential houses and fruit bearing coconut trees was only the liability to pay future subscriptions of the kuri spreading over a period of 12 1/2 years. It is contended by the plaintiffs that the above was an imprudent transaction. No enquiry was conducted by the purchaser. It was sold not for any antecedent debts. The kuri subscriptions could have been continued to be paid from the income from the other family properties. Since he has got other extensive land, without selling the property with residential houses, part of other properties could have been sold to clear off the other debts. There was no family necessity as there was no arrears of kuri subscription and all kuri instalments were paid out of the income from the other properties. There was no immediate necessity. There was no demand from the creditors. There was no execution of any decree and, therefore, there was no family necessity at all to execute Ext. P1. It was also contended that there was no proper consideration. From the Commissioner's report, it is clear that there is no adequate consideration. Even Rs. 21,000 fixed as consideration was to be paid only in a period of 12 1/2 years in instalments. It was further contended by the plaintiffs that the liability to pay future instalments in a kuri transaction cannot be considered as an antecedent debt. 6. Before dealing with the merits of the case, we may first deal with the general principles of law applicable to the case and referred to by the learned counsel for the parties relying upon authoritative text books like Mulla on Principles of Hindu Law; Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage; and N. R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law Principles and Precedents and various decisions of the Privy Council and Supreme Court. 7. The manager of a joint Hindu family has power to alienate for consideration, the joint family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the property provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. 7. The manager of a joint Hindu family has power to alienate for consideration, the joint family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor coparceners in the property provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. If the manager is father himself, he has got power to alienate family property for the discharge of his antecedent debts which is not illegal or immoral since the sons have pious obligation to discharge. In Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (1924) 51 IA 129 a Full Board of the Judicial Committee examined the whole subject and Lord Dunedin laid down the following five propositions: "(1) The managing member of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity; but (2) If he is the father and the other members are the sons, he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt. (3) If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate. (4) Antecedent debt means antecedent in fate as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached. (5) There is no rule that this result is affected by the question whether the father, who contracted the debt or burdens the estate, is alive or dead." 8. The power of the manager or kartha to alienate the family property for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate has been well explained in Hunooman Persaud v. Mussumat Babooee (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393. It was held that actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted or the benefit to be conferred upon it has to be considered. The Privy Council in the above case held as follows: "The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is under the Hindu Law, a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate. The Privy Council in the above case held as follows: "The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is under the Hindu Law, a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit of the estate. But where, in the particular instance, the charge is one that a prudent owner would make, in order to benefit the estate, the bona fide lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon it, in the particular instance, is the thing to be regarded ........ Their Lordships think that the lender is bound to inquire into the necessities for the loan, and to satisfy himself as well as he can, with reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, that the manager is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate. But they think that if he does so inquire, and acts honestly, the real existence of an alleged sufficient and reasonably credited necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of his charge, and they do not think that, under the circumstances, he is bound to see to the application of the money ....... The purposes for which a loan is wanted are often future, as respects the actual application, and a lender can rarely have, unless he enters on the management, the means of controlling and rightly directing the actual application. Their Lordships do not think that a bona fide creditor should suffer when he has acted honestly and with due caution, but is himself deceived." In Balmukund v. Kamla, Wati AIR 1964 SC 1385 the Supreme Court observed that for a transaction to be regarded as for the benefit of the family it need not be of a defensive character. In each case the Court must be satisfied from the materials before it that it was in fact conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. The real test is whether the transaction was one which a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge than available to him. 9. The real test is whether the transaction was one which a prudent owner would have carried out with the knowledge than available to him. 9. Where the manager of a joint Hindu family sells or mortgages joint family property, the purchaser or mortgagee is bound to enquire into the necessity for the sale or mortgage and the burden lies on the purchaser or mortgagee to prove either that there was a legal necessity in fact or that he made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of such necessity. A legal necessity justifying a sale or mortgage of family property arises only where the purposes above mentioned or similar purposes cannot be met out of the income of the family or the cash on hand. The purchaser or mortgagee is bound to make a bona fide enquiry as to whether the debt for which the mortgage or sale is executed could be met from other sources. 10. In Smt. Rani v. Mrs. Shanti Bala Dev Nath AIR 1971 SC 1028 , it was held that: "The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alience by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all what was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity." In the above case, the Supreme Court also held that "legal necessity does not mean 'actual compulsion'; it means pressure on the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient". It was held by the Supreme Court in Gangadharan v. Janardhana Mallan and others AIR 1996 S.C. 2127 that if the purchaser acts in good faith, after enquiry, it is not obligatory on his part to make further enquiries into the usage of the sale consideration by the seller. The Apex Court held as follows: "This question does not appear to be res Integra any more as it is settled by a number of judgments referred by Privy Council and approved by this Court. In Krishna Das v. Nathu Ram AIR 1927 P.C. 37 (supra) after referring to earlier came in Hunooman Persaud Pandav v. Mussumat Babooee [(1856) Mco. Ind. App. In Krishna Das v. Nathu Ram AIR 1927 P.C. 37 (supra) after referring to earlier came in Hunooman Persaud Pandav v. Mussumat Babooee [(1856) Mco. Ind. App. 393] the Court held that where the purchaser acts in good faith and after due enquiry and is able to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity, he is under no obligation to enquire into the application of any surplus and is, therefore, not bound to make repayment of such surplus to the members of the family challenging the sale." (Para 17) 11. A Full Bench of this Court in Kumaraswami Mudaliar v. Balanaikkan Udayar 1996 KLT 361 held that burden is on the alienee to establish that that the sale is for leagal necessity or benefit of the family and reasonable enquiries which made him believe that the necessity existed even though no such necessity did in fact exist. Justice Krishnamoorthy Iyer speaking for the Full Bench also held that: "An alienation made by a coparcener, manager or father in excess of his powers is liable to be set aside at the instance of the other coparceners. An alienation of ancestral property by the father or manager of the joint family, even when not for the discharge of antecedent debt or for the benefit or necessity of the family is only voidable and not void." (Para 12) 12. Even if there is no legal necessity or benefit to the estate, if father is the manager, he may sell or mortgage not only his own share but also the shares of his male issue in family property for the purpose of satisfying antecedent debts of his own provided they are not immoral or illegal. It is for the alienee to prove that the antecedent debt existed or that after due enquiries he believed that it existed. The burden is then shifted upon the sons to prove that the debt was contracted by the father for an immoral or illegal purpose and that the alienee had notice that the debt was so contracted. In Lubar Amrit Lal v. Doshi Jayantilal (1960) 2 S.C.R. 842 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition that the burden lies on the sons who challenge the alienation to prove not merely that the antecedent debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice that the debt was so contracted. 13. In Lubar Amrit Lal v. Doshi Jayantilal (1960) 2 S.C.R. 842 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition that the burden lies on the sons who challenge the alienation to prove not merely that the antecedent debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice that the debt was so contracted. 13. In Raja Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad Rai AIR 1924 PC 50 , the Board held that: "Antecedent debt means antecedent in fate as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached." Justice M. S. Menon (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench in Virdhachaiam and another v. Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd. and others, 1960 KLT 442 after analysing the entire case held that in order to constitute an antecedent debt, it is, of course, unnecessary that the prior and subsequent creditors should be different persons and that the principle should be the same whether the subsequent transaction 'discharged' the antecedent debt or not, so long as the transaction was necessitated by the existence of the antecedent liability. 14. In Manibhai and others v. Hemraj and others 1990 (3) SCC 68 , it was held that where the sons are joint with their father, and debts have been contracted by the father even for his own personal benefit, the sons are liable to pay the debts under the doctrine of pious obligation provided they were not incurred for an immoral or illegal purpose and such debts were antecedent to the alienations impugned. If any alienation of the joint family property is subsequently made to discharge such antecedent debt or loan of the father, such alienation would be binding on the sons. The liability to pay the debts contracted by the father, for his own benefit, arises from an obligation of religion and piety which is placed upon the sons under the Mitakshara law to discharge the father's debt where the debts are not tainted with immorality. It was held that each transaction should be independently considered. The Court held as follows: "It is necessary to examine each transaction independently and then to arrive at a conclusion whether such a transaction or alienation Can be held to be valid or not." (Para 20) 15. It was held that each transaction should be independently considered. The Court held as follows: "It is necessary to examine each transaction independently and then to arrive at a conclusion whether such a transaction or alienation Can be held to be valid or not." (Para 20) 15. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that if the family property is sold by the father, kartha or manager of an undivided Hindu family for legal necessity or benefit of the estate, or if it is sold by the father for clearing his antecedent debts, coparceners will be bound by the same provided consideration is adequate. The father or the manager should act as a prudent man before alienating the property for inadequate consideration. In Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 13th Edition, revised by Alladi Kuppuswami, at page 671, it is stated as follows: "The father or the manager should act as a prudent man before sacrificing the property for in adequate consideration. An alienation of ancestral joint family property by a father would not bind his son if it is made for inadequate consideration even though there is legal necessity. A fortiori a transfer of coparcenary property without consideration would be void." 16. In Kailash Nath v. Tulshi Ram and others AIR 1945 All. 249, it was held that in case of alienation of family property by a Hindu father, adequacy of the price is also a factor to be emphasised and it is not merely enough that the consideration is calculated to relieve the necessity. It was also held that even though consideration was devoted to the payment of the just debts of the father, it was not open to him to sacrifice the family property for an inadequate consideration. Transaction was, therefore, held to be improvident and liable to be set aside. 17. In Ramacharan Lonia v. Bhagwan Das Mahashri AIR 1976 PC 68, the Judicial Committee observed as follows: "In these circumstances, a transaction even involving the disposal by Gopal Das of this entire immovable family property might well be justifiable and be binding on the whole family provided the property was not sacrificed for an inadequate price and provided the consideration was calculated to relieve the necessity the existence of which called for the disposition." 18. In D. Nagaratnamba v. K. Ramayya AIR 1963 AP 177 , the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that when there are minors, the father cannot, at any rate, neglect his duty to act as a prudent guardian or trustee of the property. Needless further to say that even in cases of necessity not only the sale should be for value but also the consideration should be adequate. In Soshil Kumar v. Madan Gopal AIR 1953 Punjab 292 also a similar view was taken. In Relava v. Sesigowda AIR 1960 Mysore 231, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held as follows: "If, however, the alienation is unreasonably excessive in the sense that more property has been sold than was necessary to relieve the existing necessity or for a grossly inadequate price, it could hardly be suggested that he exercised the required degree of prudence or did not unnecessarily sacrifice family property." 19. In Dudh Nath v. Narain Ram and others AIR 1956 All. 315, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as follows: "Consequently the Coparceners stand bound by the act of the father or the manager of the family only to the extent the act is prudent or for the benefit of the coparceners of the estate. For the reasons mentioned above I am of the opinion that in order to uphold an alienation of a joint Hindu family property by the father or the manager, it is not only necessary to prove that there was legal necessity, but also that the father or the manager acted like a prudent man and did not sacrifice the property for inadequate consideration." (Para 11) Therefore, even if there is legal necessity or benefit to the estate or there is an antecedent debt of the father which is not immoral, the family property cannot be alienated for inadequate consideration. 20. Based upon the above propositions, we may now consider the various points argued with respect to the particular facts of this case. First question to be considered is whether the purchaser has made bona fide enquiry as to whether the sale is incurred for family necessity or benefit of the estate and whether debt for which sale deed is executed could be met from other sources. In this case, admittedly, no enquiry was made by the alienee regarding family necessity or otherwise. First question to be considered is whether the purchaser has made bona fide enquiry as to whether the sale is incurred for family necessity or benefit of the estate and whether debt for which sale deed is executed could be met from other sources. In this case, admittedly, no enquiry was made by the alienee regarding family necessity or otherwise. The definite case put forward by the 1st defendant is that the 4th defendant was included in the sale deed only because he was residing in the residential house situated in the property covered by Ext. P2 and the property belonged to Venkiteswara Mallan alone. 1st defendant who was examined as D. W. 1 did not admit any right in favour of the plaintiffs or 4th defendant and he is positive that the rights of Venkiteswara Mallan in the property alone was purchased by him. During cross examination, answers were negative or evasive. We may quote the relevant portion of his deposition: " (Malayalam) " This clearly shows that he did not make any bona fide enquiry regarding family necessity or benefit to the estate even though an alternate contention was raised in the written statement. Therefore, it can be seen that alienee did not make any bona fide enquiry as a prudent purchaser at the time of purchase. It may be because his understanding that the property in question is Venkiteswara Mallan's personal property. 21. Now we have to consider whether the estate was sold for legal necessity or for benefit of the estate. As far as the future payment of kuri subscriptions are concerned Venkiteswara Mallan was paying the instalments of kuri without any default from the income from the existing properties. Ten items of properties were devolved on Venkiteswara Mallan as per Ext. P1 partition deed which includes large extent of coconut gardens with liability to pay debt amounting to total of Rs. 7,750. The property covered by item No. 1 of Ext. P1 has an extent of one acre 14 cents. Item No. 2 itself contained 5 acres 90 cents of coconut gardens. No evidence was adduced to show that there was a pressing necessity to sell the estate as there was no arrears of kuri instalments upto that date of the sale. Kuri instalments were paid in time. P1 has an extent of one acre 14 cents. Item No. 2 itself contained 5 acres 90 cents of coconut gardens. No evidence was adduced to show that there was a pressing necessity to sell the estate as there was no arrears of kuri instalments upto that date of the sale. Kuri instalments were paid in time. It only shows that as deposed by PW 1 income from the property would have been sufficient to pay off the kuri debts and there was no necessity for selling the property. Further, what is sold is a property containing residential houses of the family members. When property with homestead is being sold only to discharge future kuri instalments it cannot be stated as a prudent transaction. The contention of the defendant is that as per the hypothecation deed all properties were hypothecated and for discharging other debts, sale of other properties were necessary. That is why Ext. D1 and Ext. X1 were executed after Ext. P2 sale. But for Ext. P2 sale deed it was impossible. We note that out of 5 acres 90 cents only one acre 97.5 cents were sold by Ext. D1 and 66 cents from item No. 4 was assigned under Ext. X1. There were other sufficient properties. Even for releasing the charge over properties created by the hypothecation deed a part of other properties could have been sold leaving the residential houses with 1 acre 14 cents. At the time Ext. P2 was executed balance of the kuri subscriptions was only Rs. 21,000 which is to be paid in future instalments in a period over 121/2 years. No evidence was adduced stating that any of the family debts or even personal debts were at the execution stage and there was necessity for sale of the properties. A reading of the evidence would show that there was no real family necessity for executing Ext. P2 sale deed and 1st defendant who was a close relative of Mallan was using the circumstances to get undue advantage. Further, we also note that Ext. P2 also does not disclose that it is executed for getting release of other items. It is true that after getting release of other items Venkiteswara Mallan sold portions of the other property under Exts. D1 and X1. There is no recital in Ext. P2 assignment deed that it was executed for releasing the hypothecation. P2 also does not disclose that it is executed for getting release of other items. It is true that after getting release of other items Venkiteswara Mallan sold portions of the other property under Exts. D1 and X1. There is no recital in Ext. P2 assignment deed that it was executed for releasing the hypothecation. Possession of all properties were with Mallan even though there was hypothecation. Sale of a smaller portion would have been enough to release the title. No evidence was adduced in this case regarding the circumstances which led to Exts. D1 and X1 sale deeds. As held by the Supreme Court in Manibhai's case (1990) 3 SCC 68 , it is necessary to examine each transactions independently and then to arrive at a conclusion whether the transaction can be held to be valid or not. No evidence was adduced to prove that there was legal necessity for assigning family properties with residential houses to the 1st defendant by Ext. P2. There was also no benefit to the estate by the sale. So, it can be concluded that the finding of the lower court that there was no family necessity or benefit of the estate for sale of the property covered under Ext. P2 assignment deed is correct. 22. The next question is whether there was any antecedent debt. 'Antecedent debt' means an indebtedness prior in time to and independent in origin of the particular dealing with the family property whether byway of sale, mortgage or other disposition in favour of the original creditor which it is sought to enforce against the son. According to the appellants, Ext. P2 sale deed was executed to discharge the kuri debt which is his antecedent debt and sons are bound by it. Here, no evidence was adduced to show that there is immorality or illegality in the transaction. It is contended by the plaintiffs that obligation to pay future instalments of kuri cannot be treated as an antecedent debt. Only when a default is committed, there can be a debt and once such a default is committed, to clear off that liability, properties are sold and then only it can be stated that property was sold for clearing an antecedent debts. 23. Various decisions were cited to prove that obligation to pay future kuri instalments is not a debt. Only when a default is committed, there can be a debt and once such a default is committed, to clear off that liability, properties are sold and then only it can be stated that property was sold for clearing an antecedent debts. 23. Various decisions were cited to prove that obligation to pay future kuri instalments is not a debt. A Full Bench of the High Court of erstwhile State of Travancore considered the question whether obligation of a prized subscriber in a kuri to pay future instalments is a debt and had answered it in negative. The court was considering the scope of the term 'debt' for the purpose of application of Debt Relief Act (Easwaramoorthiya Pillai v. Narayana Vadivu XVI T.L.T.143. This was followed in the decision reported in N. R. Krishnan v. Kunjamma Lekshmi Amma XVII TLT 721. This decision was approved by this Court in Varkey Thomas v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. 1962 KLT 383 . However, the Madras High Court has expressed a different view in Kannan v. Subramania AIR 1941 Mad. 231 and Maruta Konar v. Veerammal AIR 1936 Mad. 985. In State Bank of Travancore v. May C. George 1976 KLT 205 it was held that when the prized subscriber receives prize amount from the chit fund after executing a bond for payment of future instalments it has definitely the characteristics of a loan and it cannot therefore be said that the element of borrowing is not involved in such cases. This decision followed the Full Bench decision of this Court in Achuthan v. State Bank of Travancore 1974 KLT 806 wherein it was held as follows: "What actually transpires when a prized subscriber is allowed to draw the kuri amount is the grant of a loan to him from the common fund in the hands of the foreman with the concessional facility of effecting the repayment in instalments subject to a stipulation that the said concession is liable to be withdrawn in the event of a default being committed in payment of any of the instalments. Thus, it is really a debt in presenti but permitted to be paid by instalments, the benefit of the said facility being available to the debtor only so long as the instalments are regularly paid." 24. A learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the validity of Exts. X1. Thus, it is really a debt in presenti but permitted to be paid by instalments, the benefit of the said facility being available to the debtor only so long as the instalments are regularly paid." 24. A learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the validity of Exts. X1. assignment deed marked in this case when it was challenged in another suit, noticing conflicting views on the subject referred the following questions to a larger Bench: "A prized subscriber in a chitty receives the prize amount executing a security bond to secure payment of future subscription, which he is bound to pay under the terms of the chitty variola. The payment of future subscriptions are not defaulted. Nevertheless can it be said that a debt due to the foreman arises by reason of the receipt of the prize amount from the foreman on the execution of the security bond for securing future subscriptions?" 25. A five member Bench of this Court in Janardhana Mallan and others v. Gangadharan and others 1983 KLT 197 held that no debt due to the foreman arises by reason of the receipt of the prize amount or on the execution of the security bond for securing future subscriptions and debt arises only when a default occurs. Following the judgment of the larger Bench, it was held in Janardhana Mallan and others v. Gangadharan and others 1983 (2) KLT 20 that there is no antecedent debt and alienation was not valid as it was not effected to pay off an antecedent debt of the father. The matter went up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 2127 reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that the particular deed was executed for clearing the family debts. Ext. X1 assignment deed, in this case, was upheld as it was found that it was executed for family necessity as major portion of the consideration was spent to clear other family liability and before purchase, purchaser has made due enquiries and the transaction was a bona fide and prudent transaction. However, while disposing of the appeal, the Supreme Court held that it is unnecessary to decide the question whether liability to pay future instalments can be considered as an antecedent debt or not in that case and the question was left open. 26. However, while disposing of the appeal, the Supreme Court held that it is unnecessary to decide the question whether liability to pay future instalments can be considered as an antecedent debt or not in that case and the question was left open. 26. It is now contended that since the matter was left open and the earlier decision of the larger Bench of five Judges of this Court reported in 1983 KLT 197 was not reversed on this point and it is binding on us (two member Bench). 27. The Supreme Court in K. P. Subbarama Sastri and others v. K. I Raghavan and others 1974 KLT 806 upheld the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Achuthan's case (1987) 2 SCC 424 and held that lability to pay future kuri instalments will amount to a debt. But, the decision of the larger Bench reported in 1983 KLT 197 (Janardhana Mallan v. Gangadharan) was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. The question that was specifically considered by the Honourable Supreme Court was whether stipulation in the chitty agreement where a subscriber prized his chit providing that on default the kuri foreman would be entitled to recover the entire balance amount with 12 per cent interest in a lump sum without giving credit to the subscribers is penal in nature and it was found that a subscriber fully and really becomes a debtor for the prized amount paid to him that the facility of repayment in instalment is only a concessional facility and that stipulation enabling the foreman to withdraw the concessional facility on default of punctual payment of the instalments would not be penal or unconscionable. The Court was considering a case where there was already a defaulted kuri and found that contract providing for payment of nancy in instalments and stipulating that on default in payment of any of the instalments all the future instalments shall be payable at a time with interest is not penal in nature. Whether it was debt or not, was considered only with respect to the aspect whether such a clause will be penal in nature. Therefore, it was contended that the ratio decidendi of the case is entirely different and the decision of the larger Bench was not cited or considered in the case decidendi AIR 1996 SC 2127 and the atter was left open. Therefore, it was contended that the ratio decidendi of the case is entirely different and the decision of the larger Bench was not cited or considered in the case decidendi AIR 1996 SC 2127 and the atter was left open. The correctness of the decision of the larger Bench was also left open by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. 28. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1997 (2) SC 424 (Subbdrama Sastri's case) cannot be treated as an authority for a general proposition that before default is committed liability to pay future instalments can be considered as a debt. It was argued on behalf of the 1st defendant (appellant herein) that the larger Bench decision was held to be not good law in view of the Supreme Court decision reported in Mar Apraem Co. Ltd. v. Narendranath 1990 (1) KLT 866 and John v. Oriental Kuries Ltd. 1994 (2) KLT 353 . In all these cases effect of S.74 of the Contract Act alone was considered and in all those cases there was already default and the question whether liability to pay future kuri instalments is an antecedent debt of the father so as to be binding on the sons was not considered. The larger Bench decision is on the point and correctness of which was left open by the Supreme Court and therefore it was contended that the larger Bench decision is still binding on this Court in deciding identical questions. 29. It was further argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that as held by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others AIR 1968 SC 647 a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a Judgment and to build an argument upon it. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a Judgment and to build an argument upon it. The decision reported in the Regional Manager and another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey AIR 1976 SC 1766 was also cited to show that it is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. 30. Next decision cited was M/s Amarnath Om Parkash and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1985 SC 218 wherein it was held that judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Similar view was held in Smt. Sheela Devi v. Mohan Sarup and others AIR 1987 SC 1072 (Para 18) and M/s Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another AIR 1990 SC 781 (Para 29). Great stress was made on the observation in the decision reported in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat and others AIR 1987 S.C. 2323 . There, Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivaram Kavelekar ILR 1978 (2) Karnataka 1585 took a particular view of the statutory provision in Karnataka Rent Control Act on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore AIR 1977 SC 1555 . Later, Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court disagreed with the earlier Full Bench decision on the ground that earlier Full Bench decision lost its value with the subsequent Supreme Court decision rendered in different circumstances and setting in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai AIR 1987 SC 203 . Later, Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court disagreed with the earlier Full Bench decision on the ground that earlier Full Bench decision lost its value with the subsequent Supreme Court decision rendered in different circumstances and setting in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai AIR 1987 SC 203 . The Supreme Court held that the Karnataka High Court ought to have followed its earlier Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case ILR 1978 (2) Karnataka 1585. On the basis of this decision, it was argued that the Supreme Court decision in 1990 is based on a different setting and facts and is not binding on the facts of this case. It was also argued that observations of the two learned Single Judges' decisions reported in 1990 (1) KLT 866 and 1994 (2) KLT 353 that the decision of the larger Bench reported in 1983 KLT 197 is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in 1987 (2) SCC 424 requires reconsideration, as the Apex Court in that case was concerned with the effect of S.74 of the Contract Act only. As the five member Bench of this Court considered the exact point in the background of an alienation of the property for the alleged antecedent debt, in the very same setting and circumstance, it was argued that the larger Bench decision is binding on us. We see great force in this argument. But, we are of opinion that without deciding the above question whether liability to pay future kuri instalments is a debt or not, this appeal can be disposed off. 31. Even if it is held that liability to pay future kuri instalments is a debt and Ext. P2 was executed to clear such antecedent debt, if it is not supported by adequate consideration, the alienation cannot be accepted. The alienation for discharge of an antecedent debt of the father not being illegal or immoral can be treated as on the same footing as an alienation for family necessity. But, for such transfers there should be proper or adequate consideration. In this case, only Rs. 21,000 is shown as consideration. The properties consist of 1 acre 12 cents of land with residential houses and coconut trees. Commissioner's report as well as the evidence in the case show that at the time of sale it would have fetched more than Rs. 45,000. In Ext. In this case, only Rs. 21,000 is shown as consideration. The properties consist of 1 acre 12 cents of land with residential houses and coconut trees. Commissioner's report as well as the evidence in the case show that at the time of sale it would have fetched more than Rs. 45,000. In Ext. P2, no cash was handed over. 1st defendant purchased the property only with a condition that he will pay Rs. 21,000 to the Bank in 12 1/2 years in instalments and he will furnish security. So, Rs. 21,000 is to be paid in instalments spread over a period of 121/2 years. Therefore, if it is an outright payment, money equivalent would have been much less. No amount was received by the transferor for selling such a valuable property. There was also no default in payment of kuri instalments till that day and there was no pressing necessity to execute Ext. P2 sale deed as at that time there were other valuable properties in the possession of the father and from the income of such properties, periodical payments could have been made. It was also contended that there are other debts to be cleared and unless the hypothecation is released in respect of the properties in Ext. D1' and Ext. X1 could not have been sold for clearing other debts. It is true that suit regarding correctness of Ext. D1 was compromised. Ext. X1. transaction was upheld by the Supreme Court as it was found that it was executed to clear the family debt and alienation in that case has been made after bona fide enquiry by the purchaser. But, it is not proved in this case that alienee has made any proper enquiries as a prudent purchaser. Considering the total future kuri instalments and the large number of properties inherited by Mallan, it is clear that if a part of the property was sold, at the real price, the entire liability to pay the future instalments of the kuri could have been cleared and hypothecation could have been released. No sufficient evidence was adduced to prove that there is any justification for Ext. P2 sale deed where valuable property with residential houses and coconut trees were sold for a sum of Rs. 21,000, that too reserving the same with vendee for payment to the kuri company in a period of 12 1/2 years in instalments. No sufficient evidence was adduced to prove that there is any justification for Ext. P2 sale deed where valuable property with residential houses and coconut trees were sold for a sum of Rs. 21,000, that too reserving the same with vendee for payment to the kuri company in a period of 12 1/2 years in instalments. Substantial valuable property was alienated for this paltry consideration. That too, the residential house of the family members. This is stated by DW 1 as follows: " (Malayalam) How consideration was fixed in the document is mentioned by DW 1, as follows: " (Malayalam) " Considering the evidence adduced in this case as well as the Commissioner's report, we agree with the Trial Court judgment that there was no adequate consideration for alienating family property that the transaction was not at all prudent. We see no reason to accept Ext. P2 sale deed. Therefore, even if obligation to pay future kuri instalments is considered as an antecedent debt, Ext. P2 cannot be justified as there was no adequate consideration. Family property cannot be dealt with by the father or the manager in an imprudent manner and sacrificed for inadequate consideration and that too in favour of an alienee who was a close relative of the father. 32. During examination of DW 1, defendant No. 1, categorically stated that he has purchased only the interest of Venkiteswara Mallan. Venkiteswara Mallan's eldest son who was the present manager also joined the deed. Even though consideration was not adequate, it cannot be stated that no consideration at all was passed. Venkiteswara Mallan has alienated the property with full knowledge. 4th defendant, eldest son of Venkiteswara Mallan, who signed the deed did not question the alienation. Therefore, plaintiffs will be entitled only to 6/8 shares and shares of Venkiteswara Mallan as well as 4th defendant, that is, 2/8 shares will go to 1st defendant. Therefore, that part of the Judgment of the Trial Court cannot be questioned. In fact, no appeal is filed by the plaintiffs with regard to the above finding. 33. It is contended that the alienee has effected valuable improvements in the property as found by the Court below but the Trial Court ordered compensating the alienee as to the cost of improvement only. In fact, no appeal is filed by the plaintiffs with regard to the above finding. 33. It is contended that the alienee has effected valuable improvements in the property as found by the Court below but the Trial Court ordered compensating the alienee as to the cost of improvement only. For improvements in the area which have to be normally surrendered to the plaintiffs on final decree, we are of opinion that value of improvements were normally assessed not on the basis of cost of improvements; but, value determined in accordance with the accepted principles. Therefore, 1st defendant will be entitled to the value of the improvement on that portion of the property which has to be surrendered to the plaintiffs and not merely the cost of improvements. Except with regard to the above change, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. In the result, the appeal is dismissed excepting for the modification regarding improvements. Parties are directed to suffer their costs in this appeal.