RUKSHANA PARVEEN v. CHAIRMAN, P. G. COUNCIL, SAMBALPUR UNIVERSITY
1997-05-07
ARIJIT PASAYAT, S.N.PHUKAN
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) CHALLENGING her non-selection for admission to M. B. A. Course conducted by the Sambalpur University, petitioner has filed this writ application. Factual position is substantially undisputed and in essence runs as follows :petitioner was an applicant for admission to the M. B. A. Course. She received interview card from the Head of the P. G. Department, and was allowed to appear in interview test of 1996. Though she appeared at the written test, she was not called for the viva voce test. Her case is that the students who secured lesser number of marks than her in the qualifying examination had been called to viva voce test while she was not called. She claims to have submitted mark sheet in respect of B. Sc. Examinattion after declaration of the result on 19-8-1996. She had secured first Class honours with Distinction in B. Sc. Examination. The viva test was held on 23rd and 24th of September, 1996. ( 2 ) THE University is its counter disputed the stand that the mark sheet was submitted on 19-8-1996. It is asserted that for the first time on 13-9-1996 a representation was made to the Chairman of the P. G. Council about submission of mark sheet earlier. This claim was varified and it was found that no mark sheet was submitted on 19-8-1996. It is, therefore, submitted that in view of the prescription that the mark sheet was to be submitted on or before 30-8-1996, question of permitting the petitioner to appear in viva voce test did not arise. ( 3 ) MR. G. P. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even though it is accepted that the mark sheet was not submitted on 19-8-1996, yet it having been filed before the vive voce test, there was no bar on the authorities to consider her case. It is submitted that the academic career of a brilliant student should not be jeopardised on this technical plea. ( 4 ) MR. Ashok Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the University submitted that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. She made a false claim of having submitted the documents on 19-8-1996 which on varification appeared to be a false claim.
( 4 ) MR. Ashok Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the University submitted that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. She made a false claim of having submitted the documents on 19-8-1996 which on varification appeared to be a false claim. It is pointed out that the petitioner was not the sole applicant, who has not been permitted to appear in the viva voce test, because of non-submission of requisite documents. Total number of applicants were 734 out of which 563 students appeared in written test. As 404 students submitted mark sheets, they were called for the viva voce test and in view of the aforesaid position the petitioner cannot claim for admission which shall provide a basis to others to make such claims. Mr. G. P. Mohanty, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that others have not come to this Court, and in view of interim orders passed by this Court on 30-9-1996 the University should be directed to admit her. ( 5 ) PETITIONER does nott appear to have presented the actual state of affairs before the authorities truly. She made a false claim about submission of the documents on 19-8-1996. The authorities on receipt of the representation varified the claim and found it to be false. The last date for submission of mark-sheet before the Chairman of the P. G. Council was 30-8-1996. The mark-sheet was actually submitted with the Vice-Chancellor on 21-9-1996. Even though others have not moved this Court for interference, that is really of no consequence. The question is whether the University was at fault in not permitting the petitioner to appear at the viva voce test. Date line was indicated for submission of the documents. That was not adhered to by the petitiner for the reasons best known to her, while 404 other applicants did submit their requisite documents. In academic matters decision of the concerned authorities is not to be lightly interfered. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal over decisions of Selections Committees in educational matters. The decision of such a committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality, of patent material irregularity in the procedure adopted of proved mala fides affecting the decision. Such decisions are administrative in nature.
It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal over decisions of Selections Committees in educational matters. The decision of such a committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality, of patent material irregularity in the procedure adopted of proved mala fides affecting the decision. Such decisions are administrative in nature. An administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with basic requirements of justice. When there is no such obligation, the decision is called "purely administrative" and there is no third category. ( 6 ) AN administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative' and there is no third category. This is what was meant by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66, 75-76. "in cases of the kind with which I have been dealing the Board of Works. . . . . . . was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding like a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding her he should be treated - something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty. . . . . . . . . . So it was easy to say that such a body is performing a quasi-judicial task in considering and deciding such a matter and to require it to observe the essentials of all proceedings of a judicial character the principles of natural justice. Sometimes the functions of a minister of department may also be of that character and then the rules of natural justice can apply in much the same way. . . . . . . . . . . " ( 7 ) PROF. Wade says "a judicial decision is made according to law. An administrative decision is made according to administrative policy. A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A quasi-judicial decision is, therefore, an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure, such as the principles of natural justice.
An administrative decision is made according to administrative policy. A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A quasi-judicial decision is, therefore, an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure, such as the principles of natural justice. " (Administrative Law by H. W. R. Wade 6th Ed. pp. 46-47 ). An administrative order which involves Civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. It means that the decision maker should afford to any party in a dispute an opportunitty to present his case. ( 8 ) THE shift now is to a broader motion of 'fairness' or 'fair procedure' in the administrative action. The administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. (See : Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973 -3 SCR 22 at p. 30 : AIR 1973 SC 389 at pp. 393-94); Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. , (1978) 1 SCC 405 at p. 434 : AIR 1978 SC 851 at pp. 871-72); Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India ; (1981) 1 SCC 664 : AIR 1981 SC 818 and Management of M/s. M. S. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (Civil Appeal No. 1102 of 1990 decided on February 9, 1990 ). For this concept of fairness, adjudicative setting are not necessary, nor it is necessary to have lites inter parties. There need not be any struggle bbetween two opposing parties giving rise to a 'lis'. There need not be resolution of lis inter parties. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision making are now covered under the general rubric of fairness in the administration. But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal rights or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would judicially be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept.
But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal rights or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would judicially be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept. ( 9 ) IN the light of above considerations in the case at hand, we do not find any error in the decision of the authorities. That being the position, there is no scope for interference in this writ application which is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ( 10 ) S. N. PHUKAN, C. J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed. .