Judgment :- JANARTHANAM, J. Desirable it is, on the facts and circumstances of these cases, to pen down a common order The assessee, namely, Velimalai Rubber Co., Ltd., Kottayam, is one and the same in both these actions. This apart, the assessing authorities are also the same. Further, the questions pressed into service also appear to be common. The former action is relatable to the assessment year 1983-84, while the latter action is relatable to the assessment year 1982-83. In the former action, the assessee claimed the following, among other, deductions before the Agricultural Income-tax Officer-II, Nagercoil, in the computation of "agricultural income". (i) Insurance claim of Rs. 3, 884. Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 1, 000 has been disallowed. (ii) Claim regarding repairs to vehicles to the tune of Rs. 42, 109.90. On this head, a sum of Rs. 21, 054.95 had been disallowed (iii) Income from rubber, by way of subsidy---Rs. 38, 694. The claim under this head had been entirely disallowed The assessee aggrieved by the disallowances as abovestated, preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Grade-I, Nagercoil Before the said Assistant Commissioner, the disallowance relatable to rubber subsidy had not been agitated. The disallowance relatable to accident insurance premium amounting to Rs. 1, 000, though agitated, had faced dismal failure, in the sense of the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer having been confirmed So far as the repairs to vehicles are concerned, the said Assistant Commissioner granted a further relief at 25 per cent. over and above the relief granted by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer The assessee further agitated the matter before the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras-104 (for short "the Tribunal"). The assessee, apart from agitating the disallowance to the extent of 25 per cent. relatable to the repair of the vehicles, also agitated the disallowance of rubber susbidy, though it had not, as already stated, been agitated before the Assistant Commissioner claiming that there is no bar for the agitation of the said claim---being a pure question of lawThe assessee, before the Tribunal also, faced dismal failure, in the sense of not getting any relief, apart from the relief, he was able to get from the Assistant Commissioner. In the latter action, the assessee made the following, among other claims, by way of deductions in the computation of "agricultural income", before the Agricultural Income-tax Officer-II, Nagercoil. (i) Expenses incurred by way of fuelling cars to the tune of Rs. 9, 925.11. Under this head, 50 per cent. had been disallowed, that is to say, Rs. 4, 962.50. (ii) Personal accident insurance of Rs. 1, 000. This has been disallowed, as having no nexus with agriculture, in the computation of "agricultural income". (iii) The income from rubber subsidy of Rs. 27, 177. This claim has also been disallowed and added in the computation of "agricultural income". The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Grade-I, Nagercoil. Unlike in the former action, the assessee, apart from agitating the disallowance of the claims to repairs to the vehicles, insurance claim, etc., also agitated the claim relatable to "subsidy". The said Assistant Commissioner as in the other case granted allowance in respect of repairs to vehicles of 25 per cent. more than what the Agricultural Income-tax Officer had granted. He, however, rejected the claim relatable to personal insurance and thereby, confirmed the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. Coming to "subsidy", he also confirmed the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Officer. The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal simply confirmed the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax in those respectsThe assessee therefore was impelled to resort to the present actions T. C, (R) Nos. 931 and 933 of 1985. Arguments of Mr. S. Devanathan, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, and Mr. K. Elango, learned counsel representing the Revenue were heard Firstly, we will endeavour to embark upon a discussion as to whether rubber subsidy can ever be construed as "agricultural income". It appears that the Rubber Board grants subsidy for the growth and promotion of rubber plantations. "Subsidy", it is said, is usually granted for two purposes, namely (i) for maintaining the existing rubber plantations ; and (ii) for replanting rubber plants Very often, a question is raised, as to whether the rubber subsidy is in the nature of "capital" or "revenue" expenditure. Superior courts of jurisdiction happened to consider such questions. "Subsidy", it is said, is usually granted for two purposes, namely (i) for maintaining the existing rubber plantations ; and (ii) for replanting rubber plants Very often, a question is raised, as to whether the rubber subsidy is in the nature of "capital" or "revenue" expenditure. Superior courts of jurisdiction happened to consider such questions. Axiomatic a proposition laid down by the said court is that if the subsidy granted is relatable to maintaining the existing rubber plantations, the receipt is of "revenue" nature. But, on the other hand, if the subsidy is granted for replanting rubber plants, the receipt is of "capital" nature. A catena of decisions had been cited before us. We rather feel that it is not necessary to refer to all those decisions, except to refer to a decision emerging from the apex court of this country, in the case of V.S.S.V. Meenakshi Achi v. CIT. (a) That case arose under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The question posed for decision was whether replantation cess receipt of 5, 962 dollars is income assessable to tax. (b) The assessee owned rubber plantations in the Federated Malay States outside Penang. Out of a fund, into which cesses collected under the Rubber Industry (Replanting) Fund Ordinance, 1952, on rubber produced in Penang and rubber exported from the Federation other than Penang were paid, proportionate parts of the cesses so collected, after defraying expenses, were credited to the accounts of the assessee, corresponding to the amount of rubber produced by them and payments were made to the assessees from the amounts so credited against expenditure incurred on the maintenance of the plantations(c) In the context of such a factual matrix, the Supreme Court held that as the amounts from the fund earmarked for the assessees on the basis of the rubber produced by them were paid against the expenditure incurred by them for maintaining the rubber plantations and producing the rubber, the amounts received by the assessees were revenue receipts and therefore liable to be included in their assessable income. It is thus crystal clear that the replantation cess receipt was considered as "revenue receipt" and therefore liable to be included in the assessable income of the assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It is thus crystal clear that the replantation cess receipt was considered as "revenue receipt" and therefore liable to be included in the assessable income of the assessee under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In the case on hand, there is no tangible material available on record as to whether the rubber susbidy granted to the assessee was for the purpose of replanting rubber plants or for maintaining the existing plantations. The absence of tangible materials on those aspects, we rather feel is of no consequence, on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases, for us to come to a conclusion as to whether the subsidy---either for replanting rubber plant or maintaining the existing rubber plantations---can ever be construed to be an agricultural income in the computation of the income of the assessee relatable to the relevant assessment years for the purpose of agricultural income-tax. Section 2(a) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1955---for short "the Act"), defines "agricultural income" as below: "2. Section 2(a) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act V of 1955---for short "the Act"), defines "agricultural income" as below: "2. Definitions.---In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires--- (a) 'agricultural income' means--- (1) any rent or revenue derived from land ; (2) any income derived from such land in the State by --- (i) agriculture, or (ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render the produce raised or received by him fit to be taken to market, or(iii) the sale by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process had been performed other than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii) ; Explanation.---Agricultural income derived from such land by the cultivation of any crop means that portion of the income derived from the cultivation, manufacture, and sale of the produce of that crop as is defined to be agricultural income for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian income-tax and if it has not been so defined, the whole of the income; (3) any income derived from any building owned and occupied by the receiver of the rent or revenue of 'any such land or occupied by the cultivator or the receiver of rent-in-kind of any land with respect to which or the produce of which any operation mentioned in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (2) is carried on. Provided that the building is on or in the immediate vicinity of the land, and is a building which the receiver of the rent or revenue or the cultivator or the receiver of the rent-in-kind, by reason of his connection with the land, requires as a dwelling-house or as a store-house or other out-building." From the definition of "agricultural income", as extracted above, it is thus crystal clear that unless the income falls under any one of the categories mentioned in the said definition, it must not be construed as an "agricultural income" and, consequently, the same may not figure in the computation of "agricultural income", as contained in section 5 of the Act. In the whole of the definitions under the various clauses, the word "derived" figures or occurs. In the whole of the definitions under the various clauses, the word "derived" figures or occurs. The synonym or meaning to be given to the word "derived" assumes signal importance for the determination of the question as to whether an income is an "agricultural income" within the parameters fixed by the definition. Further, the word "derived" in the said definition is inextricably connected either with the "land" or with the "building occupied by the cultivator or receiver of the rent-in-kind of any land with respect to which or the produce of which any operation mentioned in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (2) is carried on." * The meaning of the word "derived" came up for consideration in the case of CIT v. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh. The point that arose for consideration in that case was as to whether interest paid on arrears of rent due to the landlord by the tenant can ever be construed as an "agricultural income". The question so posed in the said case has been answered as below: "Equally clearly the interest on rent is revenue, but in their Lordships' opinion it is not revenue derived from land. It is no doubt true that without the obligation to pay rent---and rent is obviously derived from land---there could be no arrears of rent and without arrears of rent there would be no interest. But the affirmative proposition, that interest is derived from land does not emerge from this series of facts. All that emerges is that as regards the interest, land rent and non-payment of rent stand together as causae sine quibus non. The source from which the interest is derived has not thereby been ascertained The word 'derived' is not a term of art. Its use in the definition indeed demands an enquiry into the genealogy of the product. But the enquiry should stop as soon as the effective source is discovered. In the genealogical tree of the interest land indeed appears in the second degree, but the immediate and effective source is rent, which has suffered the accident of non-payment. Its use in the definition indeed demands an enquiry into the genealogy of the product. But the enquiry should stop as soon as the effective source is discovered. In the genealogical tree of the interest land indeed appears in the second degree, but the immediate and effective source is rent, which has suffered the accident of non-payment. And rent is not land within the meaning of the definition There is no commercial connection between the interest and the rented land and an effective source---not land---has become apparent." The case of Kamakhaya Narayan Singh had been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kunwar Trivikram Narain Singh. (a) In the said case, the Supreme Court also referred to the observations made by it in Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT which are as below 'Agricultural income' as defined in the Act is obviously intended to refer to the revenue received by direct association with the land which is used for agricultural purposes and not by indirectly extending it to cases where that revenue or part thereof changes hands either by way of distribution of dividends or otherwise. "(b) The Supreme Court would further say that the same test was adopted in Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh v. CIT and the court again looked into the source of the right in order to determine whether the income was agricultural income or not. Shah J., observed (page 33 of 57 ITR). 'The appellant has no beneficial interest in the lands which are the subject-matter of the trust : nor is he given under the trust a right to receive and appropriate to himself the income of the properties or a part thereof in lieu of any beneficial interest in that income. The source of the right in which a fraction of the net income of the trust is to be appropriated by the appellant as his remuneration is not in the right to receive rent or revenue of agricultural lands, but rests in the covenant in the deed to receive remuneration for management of the trust. The income of the trust appropriated by the appellant as remuneration is not received by him as rent or revenue of land ; the character of the income appropriated as remuneration due is again not the same as the character in which it was received by the appellant as trustee. The income of the trust appropriated by the appellant as remuneration is not received by him as rent or revenue of land ; the character of the income appropriated as remuneration due is again not the same as the character in which it was received by the appellant as trustee. Both the source and character of the income are, therefore, altered when a part of the income of the trust is appropriated by the appellant as his remuneration, and that is so, not withstanding that computation of remuneration is made as a percentage of the income, a substantial part whereof is derived from lands used for agricultural purposes. The remuneration not being received as rent or revenue of agricultural lands under a title, legal or beneficial in the property from which the income is received, it is not income exempt under section 4(3)(viii)'." In the light of the meaning ascribed to the word "derived", as has been used in section 2(a) of the Act, while defining "agricultural income", can anyone dare say that the subsidy received by the assessee---whether for replanting rubber plants or for the purpose of maintaining the existing rubber plantations is "agricultural income" for computation purposes under section 5 of the Act. The answer to such a question cannot be anything other than an emphatic "no", on the facts and in the circumstances of these cases. We may add also a reason that the payment of subsidy is relatable to the source of the scheme evolved by the Rubber Board and not the "land". Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue also drew our attention to certain tangible materials in the file, in the shape of statements made by the managing director of the assessee-company. In the statement he had given in each of these cases, he had plainly admitted that the rubber subsidy granted to the assessee-company was not at all used or utilised for the purpose for which it was granted. To put it precisely, he had clearly stated in his statement that there was no new plantation or replantation of the rubber plantation during the relevant assessment years in question. If the assessee, though had not used the subsidy for the purpose for which it was granted it is for the Rubber Board to take action against the assessee. To put it precisely, he had clearly stated in his statement that there was no new plantation or replantation of the rubber plantation during the relevant assessment years in question. If the assessee, though had not used the subsidy for the purpose for which it was granted it is for the Rubber Board to take action against the assessee. It is not out of place, we rather feel to air our opinion that even assuming for argument's sake that this rubber subsidy so granted to the assessee-company had been utilised for the purpose for which it was granted, the said subsidy may be construed as a "capital" or as a "revenue" receipt depending upon its utilisation. If it is to be construed as a "revenue receipt", then such a receipt has to be construed as an income of the assessee, which would fall as an assessable income under the Indian Income-tax Act, if the said company is liable to tax under the said Act. In this view of the matter, it is pretty certain that the subsidy granted can, never, in the eye of law, be construed as an "agricultural income" under section 2(a), in the computation of income under section 5 of the said Act. Therefore, addition of the subsidy in the computation of the agricultural income of the assessee-company by the Tribunal and the authorities below cannot at all be justified and the relief therefor must be granted to the assessee-company, in so far as it is relatable to the agricultural income-taxThe other question which requires to be considered relates to the accident insurance premium, repairs on vehicles and cost of fuel or petrol to the said vehicles, as disallowed by the Tribunal below. The expenses incurred in respect of those heads of items by the assessee-company can, if at all, be claimed by way of a deduction in the computation of the agricultural income of the assessee under section 5(e) of the Act. Section 5(e) reads as under: "5. The expenses incurred in respect of those heads of items by the assessee-company can, if at all, be claimed by way of a deduction in the computation of the agricultural income of the assessee under section 5(e) of the Act. Section 5(e) reads as under: "5. Computation of agricultural income.---The agricultural income of a person shall be computed after making the following deductions, namely:--- (e) any expenditure incurred in the previous year (not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the land." * The parameters prescribed by the said clause for the expenditure to be allowed as a deduction in the computation of the income are (1) The expenditure may be an expenditure inclusive of interest ; (2) It must have been incurred in the previous year ; (3) It should not be in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee ; (4) Such expenditure should be laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the land ; and (5) It is not necessary for any income to be derived from the said land The expression or phraseology "for the purpose of the land", as is used or couched in section 5(e) of the Act had been subjected to interpretation on occasions more than one by courts of superior jurisdiction. A few of the decisions in this connection, if referred to, would serve as a guideline for us in arriving at a just decision, with ease and grace, in the sense of giving a legal fitment to the factual matrix of the instant caseIn Kil Kotagiri Tea and Coffee Estates Co. Ltd. v. Government Madras a Division Bench of this court said: "Section 5(e) of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955, is in the nature of a residuary clause and would take in not only those expenditure incurred for the purpose of earning the agricultural income but also very many expenses involved in carrying on the agricultural activity as an occupation. The expression 'for the purpose of the land' is much wider in scope than the expression 'for the purpose of deriving the agricultural income from the land'. The expression 'for the purpose of the land' is much wider in scope than the expression 'for the purpose of deriving the agricultural income from the land'. It covers a wide range of expenses taking in not only the expenses incurred actually for deriving agricultural income but also expenses which are not directly incurred for deriving agricultural income but have been expended in connection with the lands'." which do not have any relationship to the agricultural income derived in the previous year. If the expenses are reasonably connected with the holding of the land and using it for the purpose of agriculture, those expenses will come under the expression 'for the purpose of the land'. "In Purtabpore Company Ltd. v. State of U. P., what their Lordships of the Supreme Court said in paragraph 11 is relevant, which is reflected, as below". It is well known that modern agricultural farming which has become mechanised involves a high degree of organisation, technical skill, etc., in the same way as a well run industry. If agricultural production has to be obtained with optimum results it is necessary that there should be a proper supervisory and other staff as also the employment of such means as would be conducive to maximum production and proper marketing of the produce. It is axiomatic that the staff would require residential accommodation which will have to be kept in a proper state of repairs. The staff will also need medical attention and other amenities which are normally afforded to employees nowadays. The benefit of provident fund can hardly be denied to them when it has become the accepted and normal feature in all forms of employment in modern times. If any motor vehicle is being maintained for enabling the supervisory or other staff to look after the farm the expenses incurred thereon cannot be regarded as foreign to farming operations. The expenditure incurred on postage, telegrams, printing and stationery for the purpose of and in connection with farming would also be allowable. If certain periodicals are being subscribed to for obtaining technical knowledge and up-to-date information in the matter of agricultural farming it is difficult to see how that could be disallowed. It is not necessary to refer to all other items the details of which have been given before. If certain periodicals are being subscribed to for obtaining technical knowledge and up-to-date information in the matter of agricultural farming it is difficult to see how that could be disallowed. It is not necessary to refer to all other items the details of which have been given before. What has to be essentially determined under section 6(2)(b)(iv) is whether the expenses were incurred on or for the purpose of the entire work and operations involved in raising the crops, making the same fit for marketing and the transportation of the produce to the market. The words 'raising the crop' cannot be confined simply to the ploughing of the land, sowing the seed and cutting the harvest. It must be emphasised that section 6(2)(b)(iv) is not to be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and must be given its full effect in the background of modern large scale farming and the organisation required for it. It must be emphasised that section 6(2)(b)(iv) is not to be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense and must be given its full effect in the background of modern large scale farming and the organisation required for it. "Coming to the factual matrix of the instant cases, the poser is as to whether "accident insurance premium"," repairs on motor vehicles"and" fuel cost incurred for the motor vehicles"can figure as" deductions" under section 5(e) of the Act, in the computation of the income of the assessee for the relevant assessment years in question We have perused the files produced before us at the time of hearing and our perusal does not reveal the factors as below (1) No tangible materials had been produced before the assessing authorities, in the shape of certificate of registration and other relevant documents, such as payment of motor vehicles tax, insurance premium, etc., in connection with the owning of the motor vehicles ; (2) No tangible material is available as to whether the motor vehicles were purchased for the personal use of the managing director or for the purpose of the staff to effectively supervise the estate ; (3) No material is available as to whether the motor vehicles had, in fact, been retained in the estate for the purpose of effective supervision of the estate ; (4) Even assuming for argument's sake that the said motor vehicles were used by the managing director to supervise the farming operations, even then, the trip-sheets, log books relatable to those vehicles had not been placed on record ; (5) No tangible materials, in the shape of voucher or accounts had been placed on record for consumption of fuel to those vehicles ; and (6) No material had been placed on record, in the shape of a policy relatable to personal accident insurance of whichever officer connected with the estate. Such being the factual matrix of these cases, we are unable to comprehend how the alleged expenses incurred by the assessee-company, as above, could ever figure as items of deductions under section 5(e) of the Act in the computation of "agricultural income" of the assessee. The assessing authorities, inclusive of the Tribunal, even without the factual foundation for giving relief in respect of those items of expenses, happened to give substantial reliefs to the assessee-company regarding those items of expenses, if not in full measure. The assessing authorities, inclusive of the Tribunal, even without the factual foundation for giving relief in respect of those items of expenses, happened to give substantial reliefs to the assessee-company regarding those items of expenses, if not in full measure. Strictly speaking, the deductions on account of those items of expenses granted by the assessing authorities, inclusive of the Tribunal, cannot at all be justified, on the facts and in the circumstances of these casesHowever, this being a revisional jurisdiction, we do not propose to take away the reliefs the assessee-company had, in the sense of getting deductions under section 5(e) of the Act, as had been granted by the authorities below, though, as already indicated, the assessee-company is not entitled to such benevolence. Therefore, the further relief claimed by the assessee company in respect of those items of expenses alleged to have been incurred by the assessee cannot at all be granted. To sum up, the subsidy granted to the assessee by the Rubber Board in respect of the previous years relevant to the assessment years in question cannot at all be construed as an "income derived by the assessee-company from the land" and, therefore, the addition of the subsidies relatable to those years as "agricultural income" is not at all justified and the assessee company is entitled to the tax relief therefor. The disallowance of the alleged expenses incurred by the assessee-company relating to personal accident insurance premium, repairs to motor vehicles and cost of fuel to the said vehicles cannot at all be interfered with and the assessee-company must thank its stars in getting a part of the relief if not in full measure, on those items at the hands of the assessing authorities below, though they are not entitled to the same. In fine, to the extent indicated above, the assessee-company will be entitled to the relief. The revisions, in other respects, shall stand dismissed. No costs.