JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---This second appeal arises from the judgment and Decree passed by the first Appellate Court on 5-7-1994, whereby the first Appellate Court has set aside the consent Decree passed by the trial Court on 10-12-1990. Only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the decree of the trial Court for alleged breach of Order 20, Rule 5-A of C.P.C. ignoring the provisions contained in section 96(3) of C.P.C. 2.The facts, in brief, are that the appellant herein filed a Regular Civil Suit bearing No. 105/90, which was fixed for filing of the written statement on 22-10-1990 before the trial Court. On the said day, consent terms were placed on record by the appellant herein which, however, were not acceptable to the respondent, as it is apparent from the order recorded by the trial Court on the said consent terms. The matter was accordingly adjourned and fixed for written statement of the respondent on 10-12-1990 on which date, the respondent filed an application wherein the respondent stated that the terms and conditions mentioned in the consent terms dated 22-10-1990 were acceptable to her and she would vacate the suit house within a period of 11 months as stated therein, after complying with all other terms and conditions. While accepting the same, the trial Court passed judgment and decree based on the consent terms on the very day. As per the compromise terms, the respondent was required to vacate the suit premises within a period of 11 months from the date of the consent decree. Since the respondent did not comply the said consent decree, the appellant herein filed execution proceedings being Execution Application No. 8/92. When the respondent was served with the notice in the said execution proceedings, it was objected to by the respondent by filing her reply on 16-8-93 and, thereafter, on 4-3-1994 the respondent herein preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 23/94 before the District Court at Margao. The Addl. When the respondent was served with the notice in the said execution proceedings, it was objected to by the respondent by filing her reply on 16-8-93 and, thereafter, on 4-3-1994 the respondent herein preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 23/94 before the District Court at Margao. The Addl. District Judge, Margao who heard the said appeal and allowed the said appeal on the sole ground that the trial Court had not complied with the provisions of Order 20, Rule 5-A of C.P.C. 3.Shri A.P. Lawande, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant while assailing the impugned judgment and decree submitted that the consent decree passed by the trial Court was not appealable decree in view of section 96(3) of C.P.C. and, therefore, it was not obligatory upon the trial Court to comply with Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. which provides that in a case the order which is subject to appeal and parties are not represented by Lawyers, the trial Court should inform the parties present in the Court as to the Court to which an appeal lies and the period of limitation for filing of such appeal and place on record the information so given to the parties. 4.Shri D.P. Bhise, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the respondent is an old illiterate lady and was not aware of the contents of the application filed before the trial Court on 10-12-90 and, as such, had no knowledge about the consent decree that was passed in the matter and, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment and Decree passed by the first Appellate Court. 5.On hearing the parties and on perusal of the records, it is seen that the lower appellate Court set aside the consent decree solely on the ground that there is nothing on record to show that the trial Court had complied with the requirements of Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. and the provisions of the said Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. being mandatory, the consent decree was liable to be set aside. Moreover, at the same time, the lower Appellate Court has arrived at the finding that the judgment passed by the trial Court was on the basis of the consent terms filed by the parties and therefore, it was a consent decree. Moreover, at the same time, the lower Appellate Court has arrived at the finding that the judgment passed by the trial Court was on the basis of the consent terms filed by the parties and therefore, it was a consent decree. The provisions contained in section 96(3) of C.P.C. provide that on appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Being so, while deciding as to whether it was obligatory for the trial Court to comply with the requirement of Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. or not, it was absolutely necessary for the lower Appellate Court not to have lost the sight of the fact that the decree passed by the trial Court was a consent decree, and, therefore, not appealable in view of section 96(3) of C.P.C. The matter having been decided totally ignoring the provisions contained in section 96(3) C.P.C., the finding that it was obligatory on the part of the trial Court to comply with the provisions of Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C., cannot be sustained. The relevant rule reads as under :-- "5-A. Court to inform parties as to where an appeal lies in cases where parties are not represented by pleaders.- Except where both the parties are re-presented by pleaders, the Court shall, when it pronounces its judgment in a case subject to appeal, inform the parties present in Court as to the Court to which an appeal lies and the period of limitation for the filing of such appeal and place on record the information so given to the parties." On plain reading of the above Rule, it cannot be said that the provisions of Order 20, Rule 5-A, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature in each and every case. In can be mandatory only when the parties are not represented by Lawyers and when the judgment passed by the trial Court is appealable in nature. In view of section 96(3) which clearly provides that no appeal shall lie against the judgment and Decree passed based on the consent terms filed by the parties, it is first necessary to ascertain whether the decree is appealable or not. In this regard, there is a clear finding of the lower Appellate Court that the decree passed by the trial Court was a consent decree based on the consent terms filed by the parties. In this regard, there is a clear finding of the lower Appellate Court that the decree passed by the trial Court was a consent decree based on the consent terms filed by the parties. In view of this clear finding of the lower Appellate Court and there being no grievance made by the respondent about the said finding arrived at by the lower Appellate Court, the learned Advocate for the appellant is well justified in submitting that in view of section 96(3) of C.P.C., the decree passed by the trial Court was not appealable decree and, as such, there was no occasion for the trial Court to comply with the provisions contained in Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. Being so, the lower Appellate Court could not have set aside the decree of the trial Court for the alleged breach of Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C., more particularly in view of the fact that it is not in dispute that the decree passed by the trial Court was a consent decree. The lower Appellate Court, therefore, was not justified in setting aside the decree of the trial Court without considering the effect of section 96(3) of C.P.C. and, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained. There was no obligation on the part of the trial Court to comply with Order 20, Rule 5-A C.P.C. The decree dated 10-12-90 being the consent decree based on consent terms filed by the parties, consequently, the direction given by the lower Appellate Court to the trial Court to proceed with the suit is also liable to be quashed. 6.In the result the second appeal accordingly succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 5-7-1994 passed by the lower Appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 23/94 is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree dated 10-12-1990 passed by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 105/90 is hereby confirmed. The direction of the lower Appellate Court to the trial Court to proceed with the Regular Civil Suit No. 105/90 is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. *****