P. S. MISHRA, C. J. ( 1 ) PRETENDING to be a researcher on law and judiciary and claiming he has successfully researched several judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Court in regard to interpretation of law and power exercised by the Courts, the petitioner - Deepak Kumar Prahladka has only exhibited ignorance of law by filing the instant petition. Since the Court, in the instant petition, is not concerned with the alleged activities of the first respondent - Shri Ajit Kumar Sengupta, who was a Judge of this Court, we see no reason why we should advert to any such allegation in the petition against him which is neither relevant nor acceptable for obvious reasons. Yet, we observe, overenthusiasm of the petitioner and his frequent meddling with the proceedings against or by the first respondent who is accused of certain offences and in respect of which certain cases are lodged, has not helped the Courts of Law at all and shown instead, a bias and vindictiveness in the approach of the petitioner in the matter. The only relevant facts in the petition are that the first respondent is charged of certain offences in respect of which a case is registered being one under Section 35 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 for alleged contravention under Section 8 (1) of the said Act and he moved Courts in several proceedings including for bail before this Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 4810 of 1996. The said bail application was heard by a Bench of this Court and disposed of by the order dated 27th November, 1996 by directing that the petitioner be released on bail of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties of Rs. Case No. 4810 of 1996. The said bail application was heard by a Bench of this Court and disposed of by the order dated 27th November, 1996 by directing that the petitioner be released on bail of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties of Rs. 25,000/- each, one of whom be a local surety, to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta on the following conditions :" (1) Before being released on bail the petitioner shall surrender his original passport to the FERA Authorities, if not already surrendered; (2) The petitioner shall notify his residential address in Calcutta where he will stay on bail; (3) He shall not leave the locality of his residence; (4) No interference in any way shall be made with the course of investigation, and he shall extend full co-operation with the investigating agency; (5) If necessary the Enforcement Directorate Officers may examine him in connection with the investigation of the matter at his residence between 12 noon to 4 p. m. but not exceeding 3 (three) hours in a day. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner has alleged that on 27-11-96 when the bail petition was taken up for hearing, the counsel for the first respondent produced a certificate allegedly issued by one Subir Mazumdar containing the statement that the entire cost of the first respondent's daughter's education in United Kingdom was borne by him (Subir Mazumdar ). The Court, according to the petitioner, considered the said statement in the certificate produced by the counsel of the first respondent and granted bail to him allegedly being satisfied by the said statement in the certificate by Subir Mazumdar. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has alleged -"sengupta made statement before this Hon'ble Court that the entire cost of his daughter's education and boarding in U. K. was borne by one Subir Mazumdar, a London based Solicitor and produced before this Hon'ble Court a certificate dated 18-11-1996 alleged to have been issued by Subir Mazumdar, a London based Solicitor, certifying that the entire cost of Sengupta's daughter's education and boarding in U. K. was borne by him. . . . . . In other words, countering the charges of the Enforcement Officers that Sengupta had illegally sent 75000 U. K. Pounds (Rs. . . . . . In other words, countering the charges of the Enforcement Officers that Sengupta had illegally sent 75000 U. K. Pounds (Rs. 40 lacs appx) to U. K. in 1994-95 either for his daughter's education and boarding or other purposes, Sengupta, first made statement that the entire cost of his daughter's education and boarding in U. K. was borne by Subir Mazumdar, a London based Solicitor, and then in order to prove his statement, Sengupta produced a certificate dated 18-11-96 alleged to have been issued by the said Subir Mazumdar certifying that the entire cost of Sengupta's daughter's education in U. K. was borne by him. The petitioner submits that in order to avoid arrest Sengupta left for New Delhi on 15-11-96 and either himself fabricated the said certificate to produce the same before the Enforcement Officer and to corruptly use the same in the judicial proceeding. Though both the Enforcement Officer and Ld. CMM refused to believe the said certificate, which prima facie appears to be false and fabricated, but Sengupta also used the said certificate in the judicial proceeding before this Hon'ble Court and successfully induced this Hon'ble Court to believe the said certificate, which prima facie appears to be false, fabricated, to be true and obtained a favourable verdict on 27-11-96, thereby committed a criminal offence punishable u/ss. 193 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code. "the petitioner has moved the instant application seeking enquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure into the said false and fabricated evidence in the shape of a certificate allegedly issued by one Subir Mazumdar. Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a provision to deal with the offences affecting the administration of justice. Section 195 of the Code bars cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, of any abatement of, or attempt to commit, such offence or of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code contains provision as to false evidence and offences against public justice. Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code contains provision as to false evidence and offences against public justice. Section 191 of the Code which speaks of giving false evidence, says, whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believe to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. ( 4 ) THE first respondent being accused in a case which is being investigated, was/is not bound by law to make a declaration upon the expenses of the studies of his daughter in the proceeding of the investigation of the case. He also had/has not bound himself by oath to state the truth. Thus, even if it is assumed that the statement in the said certificate which is allegedly made by one Subir Mazumdar and the statement on behalf of the first respondent that Subir Mazumdar had issued such a certificate which was correct, are accepted to have been made falsely, Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code is not attracted. Sections 192 to 196 of the Code which go together, are obviously not attracted for who shall say and when shall it be said that certificate by Subir Mazumdar which allegedly was produced at the hearing of the bail petition is a false certificate or that the statement therein are false, cannot be answered at any stage before the trial is taken up in the Court provided the charge goes to the Court after investigation is completed. If it is discovered, however, that it is a false certificate and that it has some bearing upon the prosecution, it shall always be open to the investigating agency to report in this behalf to the Court taking cognizance. ( 5 ) IT is indeed an attempt, in our view, to influence the investigation of the case or to start a parallel enquiry in respect of one part of the defence of the accused by the Court and the instant application, for the said reasons, is vexatious. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has addressed us in person. ( 5 ) IT is indeed an attempt, in our view, to influence the investigation of the case or to start a parallel enquiry in respect of one part of the defence of the accused by the Court and the instant application, for the said reasons, is vexatious. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has addressed us in person. When questioned as to his locus standi, he has drawn our attention to the expression 'when upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise' in Section 340 and contended that such application for action against a person who is guilty of perjury need not come from a victim of the offence and a stranger to the proceeding can also make such an application. Technically speaking or speaking generally, since an application as contemplated under Section 340 is merely a means of drawing attention of the Court, it might be anonymous as well as by a third party, that is, a person who is not interested in the proceeding against the accused otherwise than the interest of justice. Will it mean then, however, that the Court shall accept such intermeddling by highly motivated and charged persons who appear to show that they think for the interest of justice in their heart but indeed interfere with the course of justice? The answer to that, in our view, must be an emphatic - 'no'. ( 7 ) WE have avoided reference to several utterances by way of submission by the petitioner which are spread all over the body of the application filed by him. If he is a Judge, he has already pronounced that the first respondent is guilty. He has not stopped at accusation against the first respondent alone. He has spoken against the advocates who appeared for the cause of the accused in the proceedings before the Court. A biased and motivated application loses its value and even if there are reasons to pause to examine sometimes the allegation coming from a person of such disposition, the Courts feel reluctance in accepting their words. In other words, a person of such disposition as the petitioner and we say so on the basis of the statement as we have noticed in the petition, loses his credibility and his words deserve no consideration. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has claimed the credit of exposing corruption in judiciary. In other words, a person of such disposition as the petitioner and we say so on the basis of the statement as we have noticed in the petition, loses his credibility and his words deserve no consideration. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has claimed the credit of exposing corruption in judiciary. If there is corruption and the same is exposed in accordance with law, no one can ever find any fault. If someone cries wolf when the wolf is not sighted and continue crying wolf without sighting it, actually when he sees the wolf and cries, he is not believed. It is time that the petitioner should realise that a positive and not negative approach is necessary and that such scandalous petitions have to be avoided. ( 9 ) HENCE, we find no merit in the petition. ( 10 ) THE petition is dismissed. ( 11 ) WE cannot, however, avoid in this case imposition of cost to be realised from the petitioner for making such a petition in the Court, and fix the amount of cost at a token amount of Rs. 5000/- (five thousand) only to be paid by the petitioner within one week from today to the advocate on record of the respondent No. 2 - learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate. ( 12 ) BEFORE we part with the order, having seen the instant petition and number of other petitions by the petitioner which are on the Board of the Court, we are inclined to direct the Registry of the Court to note : (I) that no application/petition by the petitioner, in cases in which he himself is not called upon to show cause or in which he has a cause of action of his own, shall be entertained without the leave of the Court having determination; (II) that no application by the petitioner in the name of public interest or vox populi shall be entertained by the Court without the leave of the Chief Justice. ( 13 ) BARIN GHOSH, J. : -. I agree. Petition dismissed.