JUDGMENT This appeal arises out of an objection raised by appellant under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure in execution of decree. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit for eviction against respondent No.2 Prahlad Das. The suit was decreed and order of eviction was passed. After the order was passed, the case was contested up to Supreme Court. Thereafter the decree was sought to be executed. During execution of decree, the appellant, who is the mother of the judgment-debtor, moved an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure informing the Court about resistance of the decree. The trial Court adjudicated the application and dismissed the application. The order of dismissal was challenged in appeal. The appellate Court also affirmed the findings of the executing Court. In this second appeal, main question involved in the case is whether under the provision of Rule 97 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure a stranger to the suit can move an application before to be executed through a decree of the Court. Rule 97 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced below : "97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property -- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained." From here reading of this provision, it is apparent that a holder of decree for possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. The language of Rule 97 of Order XXI is clear and unambiguous. No person other than the decree holder and the purchaser in execution has right to file an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The language of Rule 97 of Order XXI is clear and unambiguous. No person other than the decree holder and the purchaser in execution has right to file an application under Order XXI Rule 97. Therefore, stranger to decree, may be a subsequent purchaser of the property from the judgment-debtor, is not competent to put an application contending that he has right to resist or obstruct delivery of possession. When a third party not bound by the decree approaches the Court to protect his independent right, title or interest before he is actually dispossessed from the immovable property, and files an application then the question arises whether such application can be entertained. The view of all the High Courts in this respect is settled that the third party has no locus standi to file such objection. This question is adjudicated by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Usha Jain and others v. Manmohan Bajaj and others, reported in 1989 JLJ 678. The Hon'ble J.S. Verma, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Bench has held that the language of Rule 97 of Order XXI is clear and unambiguous. After considering the scope of amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure after Amendment Act, 1976, it was held that no enquiry into the title or possession of a third party is contemplated at any rate at his instance either under rules 35 and 36 or rules 95 and 96 of Order 21, CPC when the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser applies for obtaining possession. Subsequently when the decree-holder or auction purchaser is met with obstruction or resistance in obtaining possession, one of the options open to him is to apply under rule 97 but that provision is merely permissive and not mandatory and it is open to the decree-holder/auction purchaser to apply instead for a fresh warrant of possession. The entire scheme of Order 21 was considered in that case with reference to the relevant earlier decisions including the Full Bench decision of this High Courts and it was pointed out that an enquiry at the instance of a third party in possession was contemplated only under Order 21, Rule 100 after he was dispossessed and not before it. The similar view is taken by different High Courts in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwale & ors. v. PhirozM. The similar view is taken by different High Courts in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwale & ors. v. PhirozM. Bhetane and others reported in AIR 1991 Bombay 328 resisted by an obstructionist, who has an independent right to possess. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to certain judgments of Supreme Court and submitted that the Supreme Court has directed that the enquiry be conducted even at the instance of a third party. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the judgment in the case of Ram Chandra Verma v. Shri Jagat Singh Singhi and others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1809 . This case related to section III of the Transfer of Property Act. The admitted position is that the property belonging to four persons and it was admitted that a third person to be in independent possession of demised premises as tenant; therefore, he is not bound by the compromise decree between the original tenant and co-owners. Such person cannot be evicted from premises except in accordance with law. An application under Rule 97 of Order 21 was filed by the stranger to remove the obstruction, which was ordered by the .executing Court. The Apex Court determined whether the appellant was bound by the compromise decree, but the question as to right of third party to move an application under Order 21 Rule 97 was not adjudicated. However, in the case of Babulal v. Raj Kumar and others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2050 , the Apex Court held that the order passed by the trial Court that the objector being not party to the decree for specific performance and the objector was not dispossessed, his application under Order 21 Rule 97 was not maintainable, was illegal and direction was given to adjudicate the application under rule 98 of Order 21. In the present case, the application is adjudicated under Rule 98. The finding of fact is recorded by both the Courts below that the appellant has no right to obstruct the decree. It is also held that the appellant has no independent right being mother of the judgment-debtor, who is trying to obstruct the execution of decree. The Court has also found that from the evidence of objector, the objector 'has failed to prove her independent right as tenant in the property. It is also held that the appellant has no independent right being mother of the judgment-debtor, who is trying to obstruct the execution of decree. The Court has also found that from the evidence of objector, the objector 'has failed to prove her independent right as tenant in the property. The objector has also raised an objection that she has entered into an agreement to purchase the property. If it was the correct fact, then the judgment-debtor, who is son of the objector, ought to have raised this ground in his written statement. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent No. 2/judgment-debtor has submitted an undertaking to vacate the premises within a period of six months before the Supreme Court. Even after this undertaking, number of objections were raised. Even the judgment-debtor has filed a suit on similar grounds. Considering all these facts the enquiry was conducted under rule 98 and a finding of fact was recorded that the objector has no independent right. The finding of fact recorded by the Courts below does not warrant interference and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule.