Ravathayammal v. The District Collector, Collectors Office, Erode District
1998-07-28
S.S.SUBRAMANI
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. In both these writ petitions, parties are same; facts are also similar. The latter writ petition had to be filed since the relief sought for in the earlier writ petition became inappropriate. 2. In W.P. No. 7478 of 1998 the petitioner has sought for issuance of writ of mandamus forbearing respondents 1 to 4 from issuing licence tp the fifth respondent to run an IMFL retail shop at the premises bearing Nos. 82, 83, 83-A and 83-B, E. M. Muthukumaraswamy Road, Erode opposite to Railway Station. 3. It is seen that the fifth respondent obtained licence in spite of the interim order and that necessitated the filing of the subsequent writ petition where in the relief sought for is to revoke the licence granted to the fifth respondent to run IMFL shop. 4. In the affidavit it is stated that the property originally belonged to one Kettimuthu Gounder who died in the year 1978 leaving behind the petitioners who are his widow and daughter and also a son by name Rajamanickam. The son also died in the year 1988, leaving his widow and a posthumous daughter by name Annapoorani and the mother (1st petitioner). 5. The building which is the subject matter of the writ petition was taken on lease by the fifth respondents father, for running liquor shop. It is the case of the petitioners that without their knowledge, the widow of the deceased son Rajamanickam along with the minor child sold their share of the property to the fifth respondent who is running the liquor shop occupying the entire building. It is their further case that lease in favour of the fifth respondents father still continues and he is paying rent for their share. According to them, the fifth respondent is not entitled tp run a liquor shop he is neither a tenant nor an exclusive owner and without the permission of the petitioners, the authorities acted illegally in issuing licence to him. It is further said that at any rate, the petitioners being the major shareholders are entitled to prevent fractional sharers from utilising the entire building for their own convenience. Under Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending Rules, the successful bidder has to produce a lease deed executed by him with the landlord for a period not less than a year.
Under Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending Rules, the successful bidder has to produce a lease deed executed by him with the landlord for a period not less than a year. In this case, the fifth respondent is neither a lessee nor an exclusive owner. 6. It is further submitted that even before auction, the petitioners informed the authorities not to grant licence to the fifth respondent and in spite of the interim order that was passed in the earlier writ petition, licence was granted to the fifth respondent. This is an act of collusion between the authorities and the fifth respondent and therefore, the licence already granted is liable to be revoked by the Court. 7. When the matter came for admission, I directed both these writ petitions to be posted in the motion list. I further directed that since I have already issued an order of injunction in the earlier writ petition and in spite of the same, the authorities have issued licence the same cannot be recognised by this Court, Respondents 1 to 3 were directed to remove all stocks in the building and report this matter to the Court, after closing the shop. I also directed compliance by the respondents within 24 hours. Pursuant to my subsequent direction the shop has been closed. Thereafter, the fifth respondent has filed an application to vacate the interim order and also filed a counter affidavit in the main writ petition. 8. It is submitted that the counter affidavit filed in the latter writ petition may be treated as a common counter affidavit for both the writ petitions. The main contention raised by the fifth respondent is that he has purchased 1/3rd share from the lawful owner and the relationship between the petitioners and the fifth respondent is that of co-owners. His father still continues to be the tenant in record, to the share which he has not purchased and the proportionate rent is being collected by the owner. He is occupying the building as the owner of the building. Petitioners are not entitled to interfere with the business of the fifth respondent. He prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 9. I heard all the counsel in detail. Even though respondents 1 to 4 have not filed any counter, the learned Additional Government Pleader argued the matter on instructions and also placed before the entire file.
Petitioners are not entitled to interfere with the business of the fifth respondent. He prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 9. I heard all the counsel in detail. Even though respondents 1 to 4 have not filed any counter, the learned Additional Government Pleader argued the matter on instructions and also placed before the entire file. The learned Additional Government Pleader supported the stand taken by the authorities in issuing licence to the fifth respondent on the ground that the fifth respondent, being a co-owner is entitled to get a licence. Rule 13 has been fully complied with. 10. Admittedly, the property originally belonged to one Kettimuthu Gounder. He died in the year 1978 leaving behind his widow, daughter and son. In 1988 the “son Rajamanickam died and his share of the property devolved on his widow and his child and the first petitioner, who is the widow of Kettimuthu Gounder and the mother of the deceased Rajamanickam. Fifth respondent as per sale deed dated 6.10.1993 purchased the share of the widow and the child of the deceased son Rajamanickam and in the description of the property, it is stated that he has taken an undivided 1/3rd share of the entire property. While purchasing the share from the widow and the child of Rajamanickam, it is conceded by learned counsel for the petitioner himself that the status of the fifth respondent is that of a co-owner. According to him, the other co-owners are the petitioners in this case. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that under Rule 13 of the Tamilnadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, licences can be granted only to a owner or a lessee.
According to him, the other co-owners are the petitioners in this case. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that under Rule 13 of the Tamilnadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, licences can be granted only to a owner or a lessee. The relevant portion of the rules reads thus:— “Within seven days of receipt of the orders of confirmation of the sale of privilege in Form V, the auction purchaser shall make an application in Form VI to the licensing authority for the grant of the licence together with the application fee specified in sub-rule (3), a certificate in Form III from the Excise Officer or an officer not below the rank of the Deputy Tahsildar duly authorised by the Collector regarding suitability and also ownership or lease of the building for not less than a year of the shop from where he intends to sell liquor, and xerox copy of the document showing that the auction purchaser himself is the owner of the building or a xerox copy of the lease agreement executed with the landlord of the building wherein the proposed shop is to be located.” A successful bidder can get a licence to do busginess in a building approved by the authorities for which he is the owner or for which he is the lessee for not less than a year. Learned counsel argued that ownership contemplated in this case is sole-ownership or exclusive ownership,. Since the fifth respondent is not sole or exclusive owner, unless he produces a lease agreement, he will not be entitled to do business in liquor. It is further argued that the fifth respondents father still continues as a lessee. 12. As against the said contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Senior Counsel for the fifth respondent submitted that ownership referred to in Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, does not say sole or exclusive ownership, but only refers to ‘ownership’ and co-ownership comes within that word. He further submitted that what the fifth respondent purchased is an undivided share which means till division is made by metes and bounds, he is also a owner for each and every inch of the land along with the petitioners. So long as the limits of the right are not demarcated, his ownership also goes along with the petitioners.
He further submitted that what the fifth respondent purchased is an undivided share which means till division is made by metes and bounds, he is also a owner for each and every inch of the land along with the petitioners. So long as the limits of the right are not demarcated, his ownership also goes along with the petitioners. That right confers on him the right to do business and the petitioners who are other co-owners are not entitled to prevent him from doing a lawful business. 13. Salmond on ‘Jurisprudence’, after considering ‘Ownership’ has stated at para 46 about ‘Sole Ownership and Co-ownership’ thus:— “As a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at time, but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. This may happen in several distinct ways, but the simplest and most obvious case is that of co-ownership. Partners, for example, are co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in-trade, of the lease of the premises on which their business is conducted, and of the debts owing to them by their customers. It is not correct to say that property owned by co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a separate part. It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person. If two partners have at their bank a credit balance of 1,000, there is one debt of 1,000 owing by the bank of both of them at once, not two separate debts of 500 due to each of them individually. Each partner is entitled to the whole sum, just as each would owe to the bank the whole of the firms overdraft. The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. Co-ownership, like all other forms of duplicate ownership, is possible only so far as the law makes provision for harmonising in some way the conflicting claims of the different owners inter se.
Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. Co-ownership, like all other forms of duplicate ownership, is possible only so far as the law makes provision for harmonising in some way the conflicting claims of the different owners inter se. In the case of co-owners the title of the one is rendered consistent with that of the other by the existence of reciprocal obligations of restricted use and enjoyment. Co-ownership may assume different forms by virtue of the different incidents attached to it by law. Its two chief kinds in English law are distinguished as ownership in common and joint ownership. The most important difference between these relates to the effect of the death of one of the co-owners. In ownership in common the right of the dead man descends to his successors like any other inheritable right. But on the death of one of two joint owners his ownership dies with him, and the survivor becomes sole owner by virtue of his right of survivorship or jus accrescendi.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Mitra on ‘Co-ownership and Partition’ Seventh Edition 1994, had dealt with ‘co-ownership’ at page 2. Learned author says that on the death of the sole owner, his estate devolves on his heirs, they hold as co-owners. Learned author further says thus:— “All co-owners have equal rights and coordinate interest in the property. But their shares may be either fixed or indeterminate. If the shares are known they need not be equal. But whether the shares are known or indeterminate and whether the shares are equal or unequal, every co-owner has a right of enjoyment and possession equal to that of the other co-owners. Each co-owner is in theory interested in every infinitesimal portion of the subject-matter and each has the right, irrespective of the quantity of his interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property, jointly with the others. Each joint owner has the right to the possession of all the property held in common equal to the right of each of his companions in interest and superior to that of all other persons. He has the same right to the use and enjoyment of the common property that he has to his sole-property, except in so far as it is limited by the equal rights of his co-shares “ 15.
He has the same right to the use and enjoyment of the common property that he has to his sole-property, except in so far as it is limited by the equal rights of his co-shares “ 15. Right of the co-owner also came for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in a decision reported in (1976) 4 S.C.C.-184 corresponding to AIR 1976 S.C. 2335 ( Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others ). In this decision, after extracting the passage from ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’ referred to above has held thus in para 27 and 28: “Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner of a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f )- It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13(1)(0 as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants. Mr. Tarkunde also submitted that since the Calcutta High Court has held in Yogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha Base (ILR (1968) 2 Cal 70) that a permanent lessee is not an owner within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) a co-owner would not be in a better position. We are of the opinion that a co-, owner is as much as owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is. We, however, express no opinion about the case of a permanent lessee as this point does not arise in this appeal.” (Emphasis supplied). 16. In Super Forgings & Steels v. Thyabally Rasuljee (1995) 1 S.C.C. - 410, the question that came for consideration under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, was that whether the person who has become a co-owner of a non-residential building is entitled to evict a tenant. An argument was taken by the landlord that since he is a co-owner and not a sole-owner, he is entitled to evict the tenant.
An argument was taken by the landlord that since he is a co-owner and not a sole-owner, he is entitled to evict the tenant. This contention was repelled by the Honble Supreme Court and after following the passage in the decision in Sri Ram Pasrichas case (1976) 4 SCC 184 cited supra, Their Lordships said that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property is. Their Lordships further held thus: “The owner in the expression “if he is the owner” in Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Tenancy Act, 1956 when as opined by this Court ought to be regarded as “the co-owner” inasmuch as “the owner”, like any sole owner of property, there would be no justification for us to hold that “the non-residential building which is his own” in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, can only be that of its absolute ‘owner’ and not of its co-owner” (Emphasis Supplied) 17. On going through Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending Rules, it is seen that the authorities should be satisfied with the ownership or lease of the building. The ownership does not contemplate exclusive ownership or sole-ownership as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner. The only requirement on understanding the Rule is, persons who intend to conduct a liquor shop must be able to do business peacefully. For the said purpose, the law contemplates a right to occupy the building in the nature of ownership or a lease right for not less than one year. As interpreted by the Honble Supreme Court, if a co-owner, for all purpose, can be treated as a sole-owner. The fifth respondent is also be entitled to licence. The authorities are also perfectly justified in granting the same. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioners cited the following decisions: (i) 90 L.W. 633 (V. Ratnam & Others v. S.A.Arunachalam Chettiar & Others; (ii) 99 L.W. 246 (C.V. Ramaswami Naidu and others v. C.S. Shyamala Devi and others; (iii) 1993 (2) L.W.-165 (O.R. Abdul Hamid v. OR. Abdul Rahim and another , (iv) 1994-1 L.W. 82 (Avudaithangammal v. Subramania Thevar, etc. & Others. He also placed reliance on Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. 19. I do not think that any of these decisions have any application to the facts of this case.
Abdul Rahim and another , (iv) 1994-1 L.W. 82 (Avudaithangammal v. Subramania Thevar, etc. & Others. He also placed reliance on Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. 19. I do not think that any of these decisions have any application to the facts of this case. In 90 L.W. 633 ( V. Ratnams case ), the question that came up for consideration was whether the co-owner can be a tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In that case it was held thus: “In the case of co-owners, it would be idle and indeed strange for any one of them to lay their fingers upon any part of the joint property and claim that it is his or their own and that emphasis upon the ownership of an identifiable part of common properties will be available only after final decree for partition is obtained.” It was held in that case that a co-owner cannot be a tenant at the same time. This principle was again reiterated by the very same learned Judge (Ratnam, J.) in 1994-1-L.W. 82 (Avudaithangammal v. Subramania Thevar and Murugaiya Thevar and others ) which is one of the citations cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 91 L.W. 246 cited supra, was a case where the purchase was made by a co-owner and the question was that if he has utilised the funds belonging to other co-owners and where the property will be co-owner property. Their Lordships considered the scope of ownership. In fact, to certain extent, the decision is really against the petitioners. In paragraph 25 of the judgment it is held thus: “Co-ownership is a relationship which springs and slopes from consensus and contract. Legislation has only imprinted on the concept of co-ownership certain rights which have a supervening effect which are declaratory of the rights inter se as between co-owners. The legal relationship is always knitted in a frame work of jointness, and no one therein can predicate with certainty as to what portion of the property held in common is his; and an element of inseparability is inhered in the doctrine of co-ownership.” O.R. Abdul Hamids case (1993-2-L.W. 165) is a case where a property was purchased out of joint funds in the name of one of the co-owners.
The question was whether the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 45 of 1988 will apply in such cases. It was held that the co-owner stands in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis the other co-owners and he is a trustee for others. 20. I do not think that the above said decision also has any application to this case. 21. Lastly, learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision reported in 1998-2-L.W. 508 (Nallathambi Nadars case) cited supra. In that case, the property was joint property and the mortgage was executed by one claiming it as his exclusive property. It was held that the execution of mortgage was in the capacity of Kartha. On redemption, the property goes back to all the co-owners. 22. The said decision also cannot have any application to this case. Reliance was also placed on Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, i.e., what is the right of an alienee from co-owner? 23. In view of the finding that ownership contemplated under Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending Rules, includes a co-owners right also, fifth respondent is entitled to get licence as owner of the building, though his ownership goes along with the petitioners in this case. 24. Now, that, I have held that the petitioners and the fifth respondent are co-owners, the-petitioners will not be entitled to any relief. Admittedly, this building has been let out by the petitioners for running a liquor shop. Till 1995 fifth respondents father was doing the business. From 1.6.1995, the fifth respondent, on the basis of the sale deed, has taken licence and he was doing business in his own name. It is also stated by the fifth respondent that after his purchase, his father was paying proportionate rent for the undivided share. In fact, the same was admitted in paragraph 3 of the affidavit also. So, the petitioners themselves admit that they are entitled only to collect the rent proportionate to their share and regarding the remaining share the fifth respondent is the owner. Even though they have got definite share, the same is not earmarked by effecting a partition. Fifth respondent is also recognising the title of the petitioners and therefore, his possession can never be said as adverse to the claim of the petitioners. Under law, a co-owner is entitled to make use of a property without detriment to the use of others.
Fifth respondent is also recognising the title of the petitioners and therefore, his possession can never be said as adverse to the claim of the petitioners. Under law, a co-owner is entitled to make use of a property without detriment to the use of others. He is also entitled to possession and the petitioners who are the other co-owners are not entitled to get injunction restraining the fifth respondent from doing his lawful business. 25. As I said earlier, the building itself was let out for doing liquor business. Therefore, there cannot be any question of detriment to the interests of the petitioners. If the petitioners are not entitled to get injunction under common law, naturally, they are also not entitled to get the licence revoked. If any such direction is given, that will be impliedly granting a relief to the petitioners to which they are not entitled to, under common law. 26. When a licence has been granted by the authorities, taking into consideration the relevant materials and when it is found that the fifth respondent is also entitled to get licence under Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending Rules, merely because he happens to be only a co-owner, petitioners cannot claim that the licence given to the fifth respondent should be cancelled. 27. In the result, both the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.M.Ps. are also dismissed.