Judgment 1. The appellant is the Corporation of Madras represented by Sanitary Inspector. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment in N.M.P.No.47 of 1989 on the file of XIX Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras acquitting the respondent in respect of the charges under Secs.2 (la) (a) and (n) read with Secs.7(1) and 16 (1) (a) (1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rule A.17.11 in Appendix B of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. 3. The facts of this case are these: On 17.3.1989 at about 10 a.m. at 123, Wall Tax Road,Ma-dras-3, P.W.I Food Inspector went and purchased a sample of 375 grams of Gingelly Oil for Rs.7.50 from the accused II. Devaraja Mudaliar for the purpose of analysis. On analysis it was found that the sample of gingelly oil did not conform to the standards for Gingelly oil in respect of Acid valued which was excess over the maximum prescribed limit. 4. The public analyst gave a report that the sample was adulterated. On the basis of this report, P.W.I fileda complaint before the lower court and under Sec. 13(2) of the Act he served a notice and public analyst report on the accused. 5. On service of the notice, the respondent filed an application under Sec. 13(2) of the Act before the lower court requesting for second bottle to be sent for second analysis by Central Food Laboratory. On the second analysis as well it was found to be adulterated. The Central Food Laboratory also sent such report to the court confirming the first report given by the Public analyst. 6. On the basis of this material, P. W. 1 gave evidence before the court, He was thoroughly cross-examined. Through P.W.1, Exs.P-1 to P-l 5 were marked. 7. On consideration of the material, the trial court found the respondent not guilty of the charges mainly on the ground that P.W.1 was not a qualified Food Inspector, since he did not undergo three months training as per Rule 8(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. This judgment is challenged in this appeal. 8. 7. On consideration of the material, the trial court found the respondent not guilty of the charges mainly on the ground that P.W.1 was not a qualified Food Inspector, since he did not undergo three months training as per Rule 8(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. This judgment is challenged in this appeal. 8. The counsel for the appellant would strenuously contend that these reasonings are wrong inasmuch as Rule 8(c) itself provides for a proviso under which nothing in this rule shall be construed to disqualify any person who was already working as Food Inspector on the date of commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1980. 9. Admittedly, the appellant, P.W.1 was working as Food Inspector even from the year 1978. Therefore, under the second proviso as contained in Rule 8(c) of the Rules, he need not have no undergo any training for three months. 10. Therefore, the ground on which the accused was acquitted is untenable. 11. Even assuming that such a training is required to be undergone and the same was not undergone, it cannot be a ground for acquittal. This is clear from the decision rendered by the Apex Court in State by Public Prosecutor v. Palani State by Public Prosecutor v. Palani , (1997)2 L. W. (Crl.) 782. The relevant observation is this: “We find that the Magistrate illegally proceeded on that assumption. The qualifications of the Food Inspector cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings. What is material is whether the Food Inspector had taken the samples in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. In case, the court finds that if the committed any contravention, what would be its effect on the prosecution is a matter to be considered but his qualifications cannot be looked into when he lays the prosecution for adulteration of the articles of food under the Act.” 12. Therefore, the mere failure to undergo the required period of training would not entitle the accused to ask for acquittal on the ground that the proceedings are vitiated because of disqualification. Whether the appointment of the Food Inspector is valid or not, is a question to be considered in a separate proceedings. But here, the court has to see whether the Food Inspector had taken a sample in accordance with the mandatory provisions contemplated under the rules of Food Adulteration Act. Whether the appointment of the Food Inspector is valid or not, is a question to be considered in a separate proceedings. But here, the court has to see whether the Food Inspector had taken a sample in accordance with the mandatory provisions contemplated under the rules of Food Adulteration Act. In that view of the matter, in this case, I find that all the mandatory provisions have been complied with. Despite that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has committed a serious illegality in acquitting the respondent. 13. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is to be set aside as I find that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent has to be found guilty of the offence with which he was charged. 14. Following the principles enunciated in the above referred decision and the non-applicability of Rules 8(c) of the Act, I am of the view that acquittal of the respondent/accused is not sustainable in law. 15. At this stage, Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham, requests this court to consider sympathetically in view of the fact that the respondent is now aged about 74. The sample was taken in the year 1989 and the judgment of the acquittal was rendered in 1991 and as such 9 years have elapsed. 16. In view of the above submission, taking into consideration of the long lapse of 9 years as the offence was detected on 17th February, 1989 and having regard to the age of the accused, I do not purpose to impose any punishment on the respondent, except to point out the above illegality committed by the trial court. 17. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.