JUDGMENT R.C. LAHOTI, J 1. The judgment of the Court was delivered by – The petitioner moved the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 49 of Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 for determination of certain disputed questions. 28th July, 1998 was a date appointed for hearing. Adjournment was prayed for on behalf of the petitioner. It was allowed but subject to payment of Rs. 200 by way of costs. The petitioner has come up invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashing of the order imposing the costs on the ground that the Commissioner of Sales Tax (hereinafter called "the CST", for short) does not have jurisdiction to impose adjournment cost as the law which has constituted the authority of CST, does not confer him with the power to do so. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the sales tax authorities appointed under,Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 (hereinafter "the Act", for short) are not courts. The provisions of CPC do not in terms apply to them except to the extent to which they have been specifically made applicable. A sales tax authority may not dismiss a case in default but must decide it on the merits; it does not have an inherent power to review its own order; and so also it cannot also impose adjournment cost. It was also submitted that the sales tax authorities are treating the parties before them with discrimination; though the adjournment costs are imposed on the assessee but if adjournment be occasioned on account of a prayer made on behalf of the Department/Revenue, no adjournment costs are imposed. 3. The basic issue is whether a sales tax authority can impose cost while adjourning a hearing on the party responsible for such adjournment. It is well-settled with a series of pronouncements of the Supreme Court that a Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority even in the absence of specific powers has inherent powers for achieving the ends of justice, to prevent the abuse of its process and to rectify its own mistakes, because such powers are a necessary concomitant to the principal jurisdiction conferred on it and it enables the Tribunal or the quasi-judicial authority performing its functions effectively. The principle is founded on the rule of necessity. The principle is founded on the rule of necessity. Reference may be had to J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 6 SCC 92 , Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P.) Ltd. [1991] 80 STC 263 (SC); (1990) 4 SCC 453 , Income-tax Officer v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi [1969] 71 ITR 815 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 430 , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma AIR 1965 SC 1595 , Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee AIR 1958 SC 79 , and Central Manbhum Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Additional Collector, Dhanbad AIR 1983 Cal 95 (DB). 3.1 In Mohammed Kunhi's case [1969] 71 ITR 815 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 430 their Lordships have quoted with approval from Sutherland on Statutory Construction an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective". Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes has been quoted saying 11 where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdiction explicatory non potuit." An instance is given based on EX parte Martin (1879) 4 QBD 212 that "where an inferior court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced." 3.2 In Mohammed Kunhi's case [1969] 71 ITR 815 (SC); AIR 1969 SC 430 the question had arisen in the context whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal can grant a stay if there was no express provision conferring such jurisdiction on it. Their Lordships held that-the Tribunal while exercising appellate jurisdiction which is judicial in nature, impliedly possessed the power of doing of such acts, or employ such means as are essentially necessary for its execution and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceedings as will prevent an appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory. 4. Section 49 vests jurisdiction in the CST to determine the disputed questions specified therein. Black's Law Dictionary defines "determination" to mean - "The decision of a court or administrative agency. 4. Section 49 vests jurisdiction in the CST to determine the disputed questions specified therein. Black's Law Dictionary defines "determination" to mean - "The decision of a court or administrative agency. It implies an ending 19991 RAHUL ENTERPRISES v. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX (Delhi) 285 or finality of a controversy or suit". The very use of the term "determination" implies that the jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner is quasi-judicial in nature. In view of the consequences flowing from such determination, it is implied that the parties to the question who are likely to be affected by the determination have to be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. This affording of opportunity may require adjournment being granted either at the instance of a party or otherwise. If there was no power to give an adjournment, in a given case, the refusal to adjourn the hearing may by itself amount to denial of an opportunity of hearing. On the other hand, if adjournments were to be liberally granted, then the adjournment may in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of law. A reasonable balance has to be struck between the two extremes. In a given set of facts, a prayer for adjournment may not be fully justified, still the authority may feel inclined to give an adjournment so that the ultimate cause of justice is not frustrated. While granting an adjournment, imposing of costs may convey a message to the party seeking an adjournment that adjournments are neither welcome nor to be granted merely for asking. Awarding costs acts as a deterrent to frequent prayers for adjournment it also compensates the opposite party for the inconvenience caused by adjournment. In our opinion, exercise of judicial power to determine a disputed question of fact consistently with the principles of natural justice contemplates occasions for adjournment and power to impose adjournment costs is incidental or ancillary to the exercise of principal jurisdiction obliging the adjudicating authority "to hear". 5. In our opinion, exercise of judicial power to determine a disputed question of fact consistently with the principles of natural justice contemplates occasions for adjournment and power to impose adjournment costs is incidental or ancillary to the exercise of principal jurisdiction obliging the adjudicating authority "to hear". 5. Learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted referring to Ved Parkash v. Om Parkash AIR 1981 P&H 263 (DB) that a quasi-judicial authority while exercising its jurisdiction is free to devise its own procedure in the field or area not covered by the law governing it and, therefore, there is nothing wrong if the Commissioner devises a procedure for adjournments and also imposes costs for an adjournment which in his opinion was not fully justified. 6. Official Liquidator v. Murlidhar S. Sharma AIR 1988 Born 429 is a Division Bench decision very close to the case at hand. Interpreting pari materia provision, Sawant, J. (as his Lordship then was) has held speaking for the Division Bench that if the power to grant adjournment has to be read as implicit in the provision before a quasi-judicial authority then the terms and conditions on which the adjournment may be granted have also to be read into it and thus there should be no difficulty in holding that the enquiry officer will have the power to grant costs if necessary for adjourning the hearing before him. 7. It was, however, complained by the learned counsel for the petitioner that after the passing of the impugned order the sales tax authorities have started imposing heavy adjournment costs which are at times vindictive. It is true that their Lordships have emphasised in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants [1975] 35 STC 413 (SC); (1975) 4 SCC 22 that delay in disposal of revenue matters adversely affects the steady inflow of revenue and financial stability of the State and hence the need for expeditious disposal. In our opinion, there is nothing wrong in costs for adjournment being imposed with the object of securing an expeditious determination and discouraging unjustified adjournments. However, the costs should not be vindictive. The assessee and the State - which also appears as a party before the sales tax authority performing quasi-judicial function-should be treated with even hands and whosoever occasions an adjournment not fully justified may be subjected to costs. However, the costs should not be vindictive. The assessee and the State - which also appears as a party before the sales tax authority performing quasi-judicial function-should be treated with even hands and whosoever occasions an adjournment not fully justified may be subjected to costs. The assessees should not be allowed to get an impression that the jurisdiction to impose the costs is meant to be exercised or is being exercised only against them and the State is being treated softly. Like all other discretions vested in a quasi-judicial authority, the discretion to impose adjournment costs must be exercised with reason and balance and not by whim, fancy or caprice. An arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction is open to correction in judicial review. 8. In the case at hand it is stated on affidavit that adjournment was prayed for because the counsel for the petitioner was indisposed and earlier there were several adjournments occasioned but none was at the instance of the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that jurisdiction to impose the cost was not properly exercised and therefore cannot be sustained. 9. For the foregoing reasons, though it is held that the respondent did have jurisdiction to impose adjournment cost, the impugned order dated 28th July, 1998 imposing adjournment cost of Rs. 200 is set aside. 10. No order as to costs of this petition.