Honble KOKJE, ACTG.C.J.–This is a reference on the question of Court Fees payable on a memorandum of appeal in an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, `the Act, 1953). Two questions have been referred by the learned Single Judge, in view of the conflicting and contradictory decisions of this Court in H. Martin De Silvas case (1) and C. Alexanders case (2). The ques-tions formulated are as follows: ``(i) Whether the proceedings before the learned Judge on the reference having been made by the Land Acquisition Officer are in the nature of suit? and, whether the nature of the decision or the award cannot be considered to be `decree in the strict sense and in the me-mo of the appeal, court fee should be held to be payable as if the appeal has been filed against the order and not against the decree? (ii) Whether advalorem Court fee is payable on an appeal under Section 54 of the Act, 1953 ? (2). The learned counsel for the appellants contended in this case that the quantum of total compensation awarded in lieu of the acquired property was not under-challenge. What is under-challenge is the apportionment of shares in the property, by which the appellants are aggrieved. As ad valorem court fees is to be paid on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed, when there is no difference in the amount awarded and the amount claimed, ad valorem court fees cannot be demanded. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon decision of this Court in H. Martin De Dilva vs. Martin De Silva (AIR 1957 Rajasthan 275). It was also contended that the single Bench in Rajasthan State Industrial Development Corporation vs. State of Rajasthan (3), does not notice decision in H. Martin De Silvas Case (supra). It was also contended that a distinc-tion has to be made between the cases referred to by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Court under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act and under Section 30 of the Act. In the former, the question involved is as to adequacy of compensation, whereas in the latter, the claim relates only to apportionment and not to enhancement of compensation. In the former, the question involved is as to adequacy of compensation, whereas in the latter, the claim relates only to apportionment and not to enhancement of compensation. It was further contended that even the Divi-sion Bench judgment in C. Alexanders case (Supra), the decision was based on concession and, therefore, could not have any value as a precedent. It was further contended that the law of precedent requires that a Division Bench follows the decision of an earlier Division Bench, and in case of difference of opinion, has to refer the dispute to a larger Bench, but it cannot take a different view by itself. On this principle, the later decisions of the Division Bench and the Single Bench cannot be taken as precedents. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the contrary, submitted that in view of the clear provisions of law, ad valorem court fee is attracted on an appeal under Section 54 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the distinction sought to be drawn between cases in which reference is made under Section 18 and cases in which reference is made under Section 30 of the Act, is imaginary so far as payment of court-fee is concerned. It was contended that when an apportionment of compensation is challenged, what is actually claimed is a higher share in compensation. There is still a difference between the amount awarded on the basis of apportionment, according to the appellants. The ad valorem court-fees, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, shall be attracted on the basis of the difference decision of the appellate court, may make to the appellant in terms of money. Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act, 1961) provides for fee on memorandum of appeal agai-nst order relating to compensation. It is worded as follow- ``46. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation.-The fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. (3). Much would depend on the interpretation of words ``the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. (3). Much would depend on the interpretation of words ``the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. Whether the aforesaid words relate only to the total amount awarded in lieu of the property or they will also take into account the amount awarded on the apportionment under challenge and the amount claimed on correct apportionment, according to the appellants would be the question. (4). The relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 are reproduced for the sake of convenience hereunder- ``S.18(1) The State Government on whose behalf acquisition is being made or any person interested who has not accepted the award or the amendment thereof may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the amount of the costs allowed, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. S.30. Dispute as to apportionment.-When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. S. 54. Appeal in proceedings before Courts. -Subject to the provisions of the Code applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enanctment for the time be-ing in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan from the award of from any part of the award of the Court and any decree of the said High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid shall be subject to further appeal in accordance with the provisions contained in Sections 109 and 110 and Order XLV of the Code. (5). In Hakim Martin De Silvas case (Supra), the Division Bench held that when the dispute involved in the appeal is about the apportionment of compensation and not the amount of compensation, ad valorem court-fee would not be attracted. (5). In Hakim Martin De Silvas case (Supra), the Division Bench held that when the dispute involved in the appeal is about the apportionment of compensation and not the amount of compensation, ad valorem court-fee would not be attracted. It was observed that in effect the appellant wants a declaration that he alone was the owner of the property which had been acquired the apportionment would follow the declaration as a matter of course. Section 8 of the Court Fees Act was held to be not applicable to case of this nature because the amount awarded as compensation for the property acquired was not at all in dispute. It was further observed that when a relief of declaration that the appellant alone was the owner of the property is sought Schedule II Article 17 Clause 3 would be applicable. (6). In C. Alexander vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that ad valorem court fee was attracted in such appeals. However, this decision proceeds on concession and is directly against the earlier Division Bench. Therefore, it will have no force as a precedent. (7). In Indore Development Authority vs. Tarak Singh (4), the Supreme Court held that when the appellant seeks to avoid the decree of reference court, it must be construed that the appellant is seeking to avoid the amount of higher compensation determined by the reference court, ad valorem court fee was held to be attrac-ted in such appeal. However, this was not a case of apportionment, but was a case in which a body for the benefit of which acquisition was made, challenged the enhancement of compensation by the reference court. The case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable because it was case in which the appellant directly wanted to avoid payment of a sum of money arising out of a difference between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and the amount enhanced by reference court. (8). The case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable because it was case in which the appellant directly wanted to avoid payment of a sum of money arising out of a difference between the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and the amount enhanced by reference court. (8). In Daryodh Singh vs. Union of India (5), a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that the dispute as to apportionment would be a dispute relating to compensation and being a dispute under the Land Acquisition Act where the land has been acquired for the public purpose, the Court-fee has to be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded to the appellant and the amount claimed by the appellant as provided in Section 8 of the Court-fees Act. It was further observed that the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act discloses that the Collector, the Court as well as High Court are only called upon to determine the matters pertaining to compensation. The dispute in such matters may relate to the area of the land acquired, its quality and the amount of compensation payable for it as well as the persons who are entitled to the compensation or its apportionment. Whatever from the dispute assumes, it, all the time, is a dispute relating to compensation inasmuch as when land is acquired what the owners or persons having interest in the land are entitled to, is its equivalent in money or in other words compensation. Apportionment, as divorced from compensation, has no meaning. It is the compensation money which has to be apportioned between the various persons having interest in the land acquired. It will be apparent from the definition of `persons interested in Section 2(b) of the Act that this expression includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on the acquisition of the land; and the definition includes a person to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. This is a very wide definition and that is why, the disputes as to apportionment sometimes assume considerable proportions. (9). In Balakrishnan Nambiyar and others vs. Kanakathidathil Madhavan and Others (6), a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court also took the view that appeal against the decision of land acquisition court apportioning compensation would attract ad valorem court fee. This is a very wide definition and that is why, the disputes as to apportionment sometimes assume considerable proportions. (9). In Balakrishnan Nambiyar and others vs. Kanakathidathil Madhavan and Others (6), a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court also took the view that appeal against the decision of land acquisition court apportioning compensation would attract ad valorem court fee. It was observed that the word `awarded has to be given wide and generic sense as meaning ``ordered to be paid. (10). In Ghouse Saheb vs. Sharifa Bi (7), a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court observed that there is no doubt a distinction between a dispute as to amount of compensation and a dispute as to right to receive it, but in either case the decision whether on the adequacy of compensation or to the right to receive it, must necessarily relate to the compensation awarded in a given case, because when once the property is vested in the State upon acquisition, the only right that remains in the person interested is to receive the compensation awarded thereof, and nothing more. It was further observed that the words `relating to compensation found in the first part of Section 48 should not be narrowly construed so as to confine them only to the question of adequacy of compensation. That means, if the appeal is against a decision or an award or order adjudicating a dispute with refe-rence to compensation awarded in respect of a property acquired for public purpose, then the fee payable on the appeal shall be computed under the second part of Section 48 on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the applicant. There will be a difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed not only in a claim for compensation but also in a case where there is a right to compensation to be adjudicated. Therefore, the appeal relating to both these matters squarely fall within the ambit of the provision attracting ad valorem court fees. (11). In Purshotam vs. Jaishi Ram (8), a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court held that the expression `amount awarded cannot be limited to the award of total amount of compensation for the acquired land. Therefore, the appeal relating to both these matters squarely fall within the ambit of the provision attracting ad valorem court fees. (11). In Purshotam vs. Jaishi Ram (8), a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court held that the expression `amount awarded cannot be limited to the award of total amount of compensation for the acquired land. So far as each of the claimants is concerned, the amount awarded is the sum which is given to him in compensation for the extinguishment of his interest. When a Court decided a refe-rence either under Section 18 or under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, it does not give any declaration. Its function is limited, and is confined to the fixation of the quantum of compensation and to the apportionment of the same amongst the rival claimants. If while discharging this function the Court is called upon to decide some incidental questions such as the legal status of the contesting parties, the said decision is obviously for achieving the main purpose of fixing the quantum and apportioning the same. Therefore, a decision on such incidental questions cannot convert the nature of the proceedings. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act partakes the character of a declaratory suit simply because the Court has to make an incidental inquiry about the legal status of the rival claimants. The Court, therefore, held that ad valorem court fee was payable also on appeals, raising the questions of apportionment only. (12). In Kali Gopal Chatterjee vs. T. Banerjee (9), a Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court has disagreed with in Hakim Martin De Silvas case and has held that even in cases of apportionment, the ad valorem court fees would be payable. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court also took the view that the award passed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was a decree and such ad valorem court fee was payable on it. (13). The sum total of the entire discussion is that because of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the property acquired, would vest in the State and nothing but monetary compensation would be left to be divided amongst the claimants. (13). The sum total of the entire discussion is that because of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the property acquired, would vest in the State and nothing but monetary compensation would be left to be divided amongst the claimants. The disputes as to apportionment, therefore, are nothing but disputes as to share in the money to be received in lieu of the property. There is, therefore, no reason to keep the claims of apportionment in different class than the claims for enhancement of compensation. In effect, when land is acquired for a public purpose, it is considered as a whole and included in the scheme are given compensation in accordance with value of the property they own. In a sense, for the Government or the body for whose purpose the land is acquired, it makes no diff-erence whether there is one claim or 100 claims. The compensation is granted on the basis of the value of the property and looked from this angle in every case of acquisition where more than one owner of the property exists, there is in effect apportionment of compensation. When there are well defined separate units or portions of land included in the acquisition, owned by separate persons, no ques-tion of apportionment by the Land Acquisition Officer arises because the compensation is to be given according to value of that portion of land. Where a portion of land is owned by more than one person, the question of apportionment arises. As already stated, this apportionment is not of the property, but of the monetary compensation to be received in lieu thereof. So, in effect, when a sharer of compen-sation demands a larger share in the compensation, it is a claim for higher compensation. In the plain language of Section 46 of the Rajasthan Court Fees Act, an order on apportionment is an order relating to compensation and the court fees on memorandum of appeal against that order has to be computed according to difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. So when the appellant claims a larger share in the compensation, may be on the basis that he had a larger share in the property acquired; it is all the same a claim for higher compensation and he has to pay the court-fees on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. So when the appellant claims a larger share in the compensation, may be on the basis that he had a larger share in the property acquired; it is all the same a claim for higher compensation and he has to pay the court-fees on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. Whether the amount was awarded on wrong apportionment or on wrong valuation of the property, is not relevant for the purpose of court-fees. (14). The language of Section 30 also makes this clear. The provisions of Section 30 come in to play only ``when the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11 and the ``dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same. Obviously, words `the same relate to compensation and not to the property or shares therein. This does not leave any scope for the argument that claims of apportionment are mere claims for declaration and not for compensation. (15). We are, therefore, of the opinion that even in appeals, in which the dispute relates to apportionment only, ad valorem court fee is payable. We are also of the opinion that whatever be the nature of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer of reference court, the award passed is an order relating to compensation within the meaning of Section 46 of the Act and, therefore, even in cases of apportionment, ad valorem court fee is payable on the appeal. The reference is answered accordingly. The matter be now placed before the appropri-ate Bench for being dealt with in accordance with law.