Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned subordinate Judge, Thenkasi in Appeal Suit No. 128 of 1982 in confirming that of the learned District Munsif, Sankarankoil in Original Suit No. 6 of 1982. The defendant in the suit is the appellant in the above Second Appeal. 2. The suit was filed on a promissory note. The plaintiff claimed that on 7.1.1975 the defendant had received a sum of Rs. 6,800/- and executed a promissory note. Therefore, the total amount Rs. 8571.40 was due. The plaintiff contended that the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Debt Relief Act, 1979; 3. In the written statement, the defendant contended that he has not received any amount under the suit promissory note and he was only acting as a commission agent between the plaintiff and one Jayapal, who was running a shop. He was acting as an agent for the purpose of sale of Cotton and it is only in view of the Commission due to the defendant, the said promisery note has been executed. The defendant also claimed that he was a debtor entitled to the relief under Section 13 of the Debt Relief Act, 1980. 4. On the basis of the said contention, oral and documentary evidence, both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the suit promissory note has been validly executed and that the defence taken by the defendant was not sustainable. Both the Courts have found that the defendant had received consideration for the suit promissory note and hence the plaintiff was entitled to receive the amount from the defendant. As regards the defence by the defendant that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act 13 of 1980, both the Courts have recorded a concurrent finding of the fact that the defendant was in possession of more than 5 acres of irrigated lands and therefore he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. In the result, the suit was decreed and hence the above Second Appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends as regards the sustainability of the judgment of the Courts below in respect of finding relating to the entitlement of the protection under the Debt Relief Act. In the result, the suit was decreed and hence the above Second Appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends as regards the sustainability of the judgment of the Courts below in respect of finding relating to the entitlement of the protection under the Debt Relief Act. According to her, the total extent as arrived at by the trial Court was 5 acres alleged to be owned by him. This is not correct and the defendant had sold a portion of the property in 1973 itself and to substantiate the same an additional evidence was filed before the lower Appellate Court; Exhibit B-3 was marked and allowed as additional evidence by the first Appellate Court. A perusal of para 14 of the Appellate Court judgment shows that even apart from the sale which is said to have taken place in 1974, the defendant was also owning and possessing an extent of 2.45 acres in Sevalkulam village. Therefore, even if the extent which is said to have been sold by the defendant is taken into account, the total extent of land owned by him would be 6.08 acres and deducting 75 cents, even then it exceeds more than 5 acres of land. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that a portion of the land in Survey No. 246 was not an irrigated land. But the Appellate Court on a consideration of the evidence has held that the said item is an irrigated land and therefore the conclusion of both the Courts below that the defendant was possessing more than 5 acres of irrigation land has to be upheld 6. However the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that he also owns other non-agricultural immovable properties and therefore the defendant will fall only under Section 3 (b) (vii) and not under Section 3 (b) (v) of Act 13 of 1980. According to her, if a person possesses properties other than agricultural lands, then the aggregate value of the agricultural lands and the non-agricultural lands should be calculated and only if the market value of both the properties would exceed Rs. 25,000/- the proviso can be applied against the defendant. She also relies on the judgment reported in T.S. Kothandaraman v. Sub-Collector, Mettur (1982)95 L.W. 435). The learned counsel relies on this judgment to substantiate her contention that each of the Clause could operate independently. 25,000/- the proviso can be applied against the defendant. She also relies on the judgment reported in T.S. Kothandaraman v. Sub-Collector, Mettur (1982)95 L.W. 435). The learned counsel relies on this judgment to substantiate her contention that each of the Clause could operate independently. Therefore, the defendant in the present case being a person in possession not only of agricultural lands but also non-agricultural lands, it is only Clause (vii) which will apply to the facts of the present case. I am unable to agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. The judgment itself makes it clear that if a person hold only agricultural lands, the proviso (v) would operate and if he is found to come within the scope of the said proviso, then there will be no question of applying the other provisions as provided under Proviso (vi) and (vii). Even otherwise, common-sense interpretation would make it obvious that to hold otherwise would lead to anomalous and ridiculous situations. If I person holds only 5A acres of agricultural lands, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the Act. But a person holding about 6 acres of land and in addition holds some other non-agricultural properties, would be debtor under the Act, if he could produce a certificate of the valuation of the property as not exceeding Rs. 25000/-. It would be defeating the very object of the exemption: Clause (vii) is intended only to cover a case where a person is possessed of both agricultural and non-agricultural properties, the agricultural holding being less than 5 acres, Then the value of both have to be added and if the value exceeds Rs. 25,000/-, he cannot claim the benefits of the Act. 7. Therefore I am unable to accept the interpretation which is sought to be placed upon by the learned ‘counsel as regards the relevant statutory provisions under Act 13 of 1980 as well as the judgment of the Division Bench. 8. With the result, I do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of both the Courts below and the above Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.