Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor none appeared on behalf of the non-petitioner No.2. (2). By this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the petitioners have challenged the order dated 2.5.1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ratangarh in criminal revision No. 191/92. By the above mentioned order the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition which was filed by the Poosa Ram (non petitioner No.2) and set aside the order dated 29.6.1990 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ratangarh. (3). The facts of the case may be briefly summarised as below: (4). On 1.6.1990 Poosa Ram (non-petitioner No.2) lodged the first information report No. 71/90, alleging there in the commission of offences under Sections 147, 447 and 323 IPC. On the basis of the first information report No. 71/90 lodged by non-petitioner No.2 the police registered a case and after investigation submitted the final report No.20/90, under Section 173 Cr.P.C. In the final, report submitted by the police it was stated that the allegations made by Poosa Ram were false and that he was actuated with the intention of obtaining possession in an unlawful manner. (5). The Station House officer of the Police Station, Ratangarh, filed a complaint in the Court of learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Ratangarh, against Poosa Ram (non-petitioner No.2) in respect of offence under Section 182 IPC and prayed that suitable action be taken on that complaint. On the basis of the com- plaint filed by Station House Officer, against the non-petitioner No.2, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 182 IPC and directed the issue of summons calling upon the accused Poosa Ram before him. (6). Poosa Ram filed a revision petition against the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate whereby the cognizance of the offence under Section 182 IPC was taken against him and process was issued under Section 204 Cr.P.C. The revision petition was transferred to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge where it was registered at No. 191/92. After hearing the learned counsel for Poosa Ram and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the order on 2.5.1995. After hearing the learned counsel for Poosa Ram and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the order on 2.5.1995. He allowed the revision petition and set aside the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate where by the cognizance of the offence under Section 182 IPC was taken and process was issued against Poosa Ram. (7). A perusal of the order dated 2.5.1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge shows that it was submitted before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that Poosa Ram had filed a complaint in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate regarding the same incident as was alleged in the first information report No. 71/90 and the complaint filed by Poosa Ram was dismissed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 203 Cr.P.C. but in revision the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by which he dismissed the complaint of Poosa Ram under Section 203 Cr.P.C, was set aside and the complaint was remanded to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for disposal according to law. It was urged before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that since Poosa Ram filed a complaint alleging the same facts which he has alleged in first information report No. 71/90, he cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 182 IPC. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found force in the arguments advanced before him and he held that since he had set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, dismissing the complaint of Poosa Ram under Section 203 Cr.P.C. and reman- ded the case, cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 182 IPC againstPoosa Ram was not permissible. Consequently, he allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on the complaint filed by Station House Officer. (8). Consequently, he allowed the revision petition and set aside the order passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on the complaint filed by Station House Officer. (8). The petitioners against whom Poosa Ram had lodged the first information report No. 71/90 and the complaint, which is still pending in the Court of learnedAdditional Chief Judicial Magistrate, have filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer that the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge be quashed and set aside and the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by which cognizance of the offence under Section 182 IPC was taken against Poosa Ram and process was issued against him be restored. (9). The learned counsel for the petitioners has made several arguments. The first argument is that the offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC are distinct offences and, therefore, even if the prosecution of the non-petitioner No.2 for the offence under Section 211 IPC is barred by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., the prosecution for offence under Section 182 IPC on the complaint of the concerned public servant is not barred and, therefore, the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that since complaint had been filed by non-petitioner No.2 on the facts and that complaint was pending in the Court the prosecution for the offence under Section 182 IPC on a complaint by the Station House Officer is also barred, cannot be said to be correct. He has placed reliance on the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in State vs. Bala Prasad (1). (10). In State vs. Bala Prasad (supra) the facts of the case were that Bala Prasad sent an application to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bikaner, in April, 1950, in which he said that certain persons had murdered an old woman for her money and had thrown her body in a tank and had spread a false rumour that she had left the village. It was also alleged in the application that the body of the woman had come afloat on the tank after three days and was quickly cremated and no information was given to the police about it. The Dy. It was also alleged in the application that the body of the woman had come afloat on the tank after three days and was quickly cremated and no information was given to the police about it. The Dy. Inspector General of Police forwarded this application to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gersar, who investigated the matter and came to the conclusion that the information given by Bala Prasad was false and was given with the intention of putting the persons named in the application to harassment. Thereupon, a complaint under Sec. 182 IPC was filed against Bala Prasad in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate (North) Bikaner. That Magistrate acquitted the accused and thereupon there was a revision before the District Magistrate who made a reference with the recommendation that the order of acquittal should be set aside. (11). In the case of State vs. Bala Prasad (supra) the Magistrate had acquitted the accused on two grounds. The first was that the facts disclosed a case under Sec. 211 IPC therefore, accused should have been prosecuted under Sec. 211 IPC and not under Sec. 182 IPC. The second was that the complaint should have been made by the Dy. Inspector General of Police and not by the Superintendent of Police. The District Magistrate disagreed with the conclusions of the Magistrate concerned on both these points and made a reference to the High Court. After hearing the parties, the Division Bench held that the first ground on which acquittal was based was not proper but the acquittal on the second ground was proper. Re- garding the first ground the Division Bench held that on the facts, a case of falsely charging the persons named in the application for murder might be made out and Bala Prasad might have been prosecuted under Section 211 IPC, but these very facts also make out a case of giving false information to a public servant with intent to use the lawful power of such person to the injury or annoyance of any person and, therefore, the Magistrate was not right in acquitting Bala Prasad on the ground that he should have been prosecuted under Sec 211, and not under Sec. 182 IPC. In other words the Division Bench held that if the facts constitute both offences; the offence punishable under Sec. 182 and the offence punishable under Sec. 211 IPC the acquittal on the ground that accused was not prosecuted for the offence under Sec. 211 IPC would be improper because even if he was not prosecuted for the offence under Sec. 211 IPC he could be lawfully prosecuted under Sec. 182 IPC I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court. (12). Regarding the second ground, the Division Bench held that in prosecution for offence under Sec. 182 IPC the complaint must be filed either by that public servant to whom false report was made or by superior officer to whom such public servant is sub- ordinate. In other words the Division Bench held that unless complaint alleging the commission of offences under Section 182 IPC was filed by the public servant to whom the false information was given, or by a superior officer the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence under Sec. 182 IPC in view of the pro- visions contained in Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench. (13). The law laid down by the Division Bench in State vs. Bala Prasad (supra) does not help the learned counsel for the petitioners because in that case it was not considered whether a prosecution for offence under Section 182 IPC was per- missible in those cases in which after investigation the police submitted the final report and the complainant instituted criminal proceedings in a competent Court under Sec. 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. by making complaint orally or by writing. (14). The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that since the offence under Section 182 IPC is committed by making false report to public servant such offence is completed as soon as false report is submitted to public servant. Irrespective of the fact that criminal proceedings were initiated on such report is not irrelevant to the question when an offence under Section 182 IPC is made out and, therefore, the offence under Section 182 IPC cannot be said to be included in offence under Section 211 IPC. (15). Irrespective of the fact that criminal proceedings were initiated on such report is not irrelevant to the question when an offence under Section 182 IPC is made out and, therefore, the offence under Section 182 IPC cannot be said to be included in offence under Section 211 IPC. (15). The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Chaturbhuj & Ors . (2). In that case a report was lodged by Chaturbhuj on 27.10.1977 at the police station, Barlut, on which a case under Sections 420 and 406 IPC was registered and investigation was under taken. On investigation the case was found to be false, so the SHO presented a complaint under Sec. 182, IPC against the accused Chaturbhuj. During the trial of the accused an application was moved by his counsel on 9.6.1980, in which a plea was raised that as the final report was accepted by the Court, so the complaint under Section 182 IPC, could be lodged only by the Court and the complaint by the SHO was not maintainable. The learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi, after hearing the parties allowed the application and held that the complaint by the SHO was not maintainable and cognizance for that offence was barred under Sec. 195, Cr.P.C. The accused was, therefore, acquitted and appeal was filed against the acquittal of the accused. Re- lying on the judgment given by this Court in Pukhraj vs. Sheshmal (3), the learned Single Judge held that even if it be accepted that order accepting final report is a judicial order still it cannot be said that the offence under Section 182 IPC does not arise. It was further held in that case that if case comes both under Sections 211 and 182 IPC it is open to the public servant, to whom information is given to file complaint for the offence under Section 182 IPC cognizance of which will be taken under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. and in such a case the Magistrate will not be justified in acquitting or discharging the accused on the sole ground that the accused should have been prosecuted under Section 211 IPC on a complaint by the Court. 1979 Allahabad Criminal Case (SC) 49 was cited before the learned Single Judge but the law report was not made available to his Lordship and, therefore, law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in that case could not be brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. (16). Before the controversy was set at rest by the Honble Supreme Court there was conflict of opinion between High Court whether the order accepting the final report, submitted by police under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is or is not a judicial order. Some High Courts took view that since the Magistrate who accepts final report, does not take cognizance of the offence, no judicial proceeding can be said to have been instituted in his Court and, therefore, the order accepting final report cannot be called a judicial order. On the other hand some High Courts had taken view that the order which Magistrate is required to pass on bail and on the final report and the order which is required to be passed for releasing accused from custody or discharging his bail bonds cannot be regarded as executive order and, therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate accepting final report is to be regarded as a judicial order. The controversy was set at rest by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Kamalapati vs. State of W.B. (4) in which it was held by the majority that the order passed by the Magistrate on final report, accepting the final report, must be regarded as an order passed by a Court. (17). Whether the act of loadging false report at the police station,can or cannot be said to be an act committed in relating to proceedings before the Court was also considered by Honble Supreme Court in Kamalapati Trivedi vs. State of W.B. (supra). At page 798 of the report the Honble Supreme Court observed: ``As the order releasing Trivedi (sic) (Pathak ?) on bail and the one ultimately discharging him of the offence complained of amounts to proceedings before a Court, all that remains to be seen is whether the offence under Sec. 211 IPC which is the subject-matter of the complaint against Trivedi can be said to have been committed ``in relation to those proceedings. Both the orders resulted directly from the information lodged by Trivedi with the police against Pathak and in this situation there is no getting out of the conclusion that the said offence must be regarded as one committed in relation to those proceedings. This requirement of clause (b) aforementioned is also therefore fully satisfied. For the reasons stated, I hold that the complaint against Trivedi is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in court and that in taking cog- nizance of the SDJM acted in contravention of the bar contained in the said clause (b), as there was no complaint in writing either of the SDJM or of a superior Court. (18). In view of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Kamalapati Trivedi vs. State of W.B. (supra) it must be said that the order which Magistrate passes on the final report, is to be regarded as order of Court and that the false information on the basis of which police registers the case, investigates it and submits the final report is an act which must be said to have been committed in relation to proceedings before a Court and, therefore, the provisions of Section 195 (1)(b) Cr.P.C. apply and cognizance cannot be taken unless there is complaint made by the competent Court. In Kamalapati Trivedi vs. State of W.B. (supra) it was not decided whether prosecution for the offence under Section 182 IPC on the com- plaint of public servant to whom false report was made was also barred, if there is no complaint by the competent Court as required by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. (19). In Ramdeo vs. The State of Rajasthan & Anr. (5) the learned Single Judge dealt with similar point. In that case a report was lodged by Ramdeo and on the basis of that report the police registered a case. The case was investigated by the Circle Inspector, Deedwana who submitted a final report to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate and stated that report was false and that Ram Deo may be ordered to be prosecuted under Section 211 IPC. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate accepted the report but did not file a complaint under Section 211 IPC. The case was investigated by the Circle Inspector, Deedwana who submitted a final report to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate and stated that report was false and that Ram Deo may be ordered to be prosecuted under Section 211 IPC. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate accepted the report but did not file a complaint under Section 211 IPC. Ram Deo thereafter filed a complaint before a Magistrate under Section 190 Cr.P.C. The Circle Inspector Police filed a complaint against Ram Deo under Section 211 IPC and on the basis of the complaint filed by the Circle Inspector the learned Magistrate fra- med a charge under Section 182 IPC in place of Section 211 IPC. Ram Deo filed an application before the Magistrate raising objection therein that prosecution under Section 211 or under Section 182 IPC was not competent except on a complaint by the Court. He filed a revision in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Merta praying to quash the charge against him. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the revision and made a reference under Code of 1898 recommending that charge framed by the learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate against petitioner under Section 182 IPC be quashed. (20). After carefully considering several authorities the learned Judge observed at page 763: ``Section 195 has been enacted mainly to regulate and control prosecutions in respect of offences against administration of justice and contempt of lawful authority. Necessarily therefore when a matter is being judicially investigated or considered by a Court or after it has been so investigated or considered, it will be an evasion of the provi- sions of Sec. 195 Cr.PC if a prosecution for offences against administration of justice or even contempt of lawful authority arising out of or connected with such matter can be permitted except on the com- plaint of the court. I am quite clear that both on the weight of authorities as also on a con- sideration of the general principles it is not competent to a police officer to prosecute an informant for an offence under Sec. 182 IPC after he has filed a complaint before a Magistrate in pursuance of the information lodged with the police and the question formulated above must be answered in the negative. In the present case the com- plaint by the police having been filed after the complainant had preferred a complaint before the Magistrate the proceedings for prosecution of the petitioner under Sec. 211 IPC or 182 IPC on the police complaint are incompetent and deserve to be quashed. (21). After carefully considering the authorities cited before me I am in respect- ful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Ram Deo vs. State & Anr. (supra) and I hold that though the offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC are distinct offences, in as much as the offence under Section 182 IPC is committed by giving to any public servant, false information with said intention or and knowledge as indicated by Section 182 IPC and that for the commission of offence under Section 182 IPC it is not necessary that any criminal proceeding must have been instituted on the information and the offence under Section 211 IPC is committed when any person institutes or causes to institute any criminal proceeding against any person with intention to cause injury or falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charging that person. The cognizance of the offence under Section 182 IPC can be taken by the Magistrate only if complaint is filed by concerned public servant or an officer to whom he is sub-ordinate. A private person or public servant other than those referred in Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. cannot file a complaint with a view to prosecute any person for the offence under Section 182 IPC and, therefore, citizens against whom a false complaint is filed or false information is given to a public servant cannot prosecute the offender, on account of provisions contained in Section 195(1)(a). On the other hand the person against whom any proceeding is instituted, as well as public servant to whom false information was submitted or before whom false charge was made, can file a complaint with a view to prosecute the offender for the offence under Section 211 IPC. In other words the person who is the victim of offence punishable under Section 211 IPC can file a complaint against the offender subject of course to the provisions contained in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. (22). In other words the person who is the victim of offence punishable under Section 211 IPC can file a complaint against the offender subject of course to the provisions contained in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. (22). Notwithstanding the above distinctions between the offences under Sections 182 and 211 IPC, it cannot be ignored that in some cases the acts which constitute aforesaid offences, form part of the same transaction. When a person gives false information to a public servant with a view to induce that public servant to institute criminal proceeding against any person, with the intention and the cir- cumstances mentioned in Section 182 IPC the offence under Section 182 IPC, committed as soon as false information is given, but that does not end the matter. The public servant before whom false information is submitted may be induced to initiate criminal proceedings against one or more person and in such a case, initia- tion of such proceeding in pursuance of the false information submitted to public servant forms part of same transaction. Therefore, the registration of the first information report on the basis of false information given by a person to police officer must be deemed to be a part of same transaction in which offence under Section 182 IPC is committed. After registration of the first information report the police investigates the case and submits the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The investigation of the case and the submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. being natural consequences of inducement caused by the offender by giving false information, should be regarded as part of the same transaction. Therefore, the act of the offender does not end at that point of time when the information is given by him to public servant. Consequences of the act occur subsequently when the police registers a case on the basis of the information and starts investigation and submits a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (23). For reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion, that the offence under Section 182 IPC merges into the offence punishable under Section 211 IPC when on the basis of the false information given by the offender to police officer, the po- lice officer registers a case and commences investigation. (24). For reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion, that the offence under Section 182 IPC merges into the offence punishable under Section 211 IPC when on the basis of the false information given by the offender to police officer, the po- lice officer registers a case and commences investigation. (24). So far as the application of Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. is concerned, so long the Court is not called upon to perform any judicial function whether by considering an application for bail and passing an order on that application or con-sidering report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. with a view to ascertain whether cognizance of offence should or should not be taken, the criminal proceedings which are initiated any registration of first information report cannot be said to be proceedings in relation to Court but as soon as court exercises its judicial power it must be said that the criminal proceedings initiated before the police are in relation to the proceedings of the Court because they cannot be regarded otherwise than in relation to proceeding of the Court. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the principle of ``merger is applicable and the offence punishable under Section 182 IPC merges into the offence under Section 211 IPC as soon as criminal proceedings are initiated on the basis of the false information given by the offender and Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. becomes applicable as soon as the Court is called upon to use its judicial power in relation to any matter concerning, the investigation initiated and conducted by the Police, the ``doctrine of merger is not unknown to Criminal Procedure Code. Section 222 Cr.P.C. reads: ``Section 222: When offence proved included in offence charged.– (1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. (2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted or an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted or an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied. (25). A bare perusal of Section 222 Cr.P.C. shows that sub- section (1) and (2) of this Section are founded on principle of ``merger according to which minor offence is included into a major offence. If the circumstances laid down in the Section are fulfilled. But for the application of the principle of merger of a minor offence into a major offence it would not be possible to convict an accused who is charged for a major offence and is convicted for a minor offence when the charge for major offence is not established. (26). For reasons mentioned above and in view of the law laid down in Kamalapati Trivedi vs. State of W.B. (supra) and the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Ram Deo vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (supra), I am of the opinion, that non- petitioner No.2 Poosa Ram could not have been prosecuted for the offence under Section 182 IPC on the basis of the complaint filed by the Station House Officer of the Police Station Ratangarh and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ratangarh appears to be in accordance with law it deserves to be upheld and is hereby upheld. (27). The petition has, therefore, no force it deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.