JUDGMENT 1. - The above-mentioned eight writ petitions have been filed to call in question the acquisition proceedings commenced under notification issued under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. 2. In the notification dated 31-5-82 lands situate in villages Meluni and Gangapur were sought to be acquired for public purpose. A report under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Rajasthan Act was sent by the Land Acquisition Officer, Bhilwara, to the State Government. As the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was made applicable from 24-9-84, Notification under Section 6 of the said Act was issued on 12-2-87 which was published in the Official Gazette on 5-3-87. The possession of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and handed over to the Municipality, Gangapur for whose benefit the land was acquired. An award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer vide order dated 4-8-88 which was revised vide order dated 29-12-88. 3. In writ petitions filed in March/April, 1989, various grounds have been stated to assail the acquisition. The main ground in five Writ Petitions Nos. 1092/89, 1109/89, 1108/ 89, 1110/89 and 1111/89 is that no notification under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Act, 1953 or the Act of 1894 was issued in respect of the lands, which are the subject-matter of these writ petitions, and therefore, the entire proceedings are illegal and void. It is also averred that no notice for delivery of actual possession was given to the petitioners, and the petitioners are still in possession of the lands. It is further averred that various lands have been left out of acquisition proceedings, no plan was prepared by the Municipality for Housing Scheme in respect of the lands under acquisition, and the lands sought to be acquired are scattered in fragments, which are not useful for a planned development. It is stated that the award was passed on 4-8-88 but it was revised on 29-12-88 without notice to the petitioners. 4. In Writ Petition No. 1077/89 it is averred that in the notification under Section 4 and also in the declaration issued under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 the name of Bhanwarlal was shown, whereas he had died on 13-12-80 i.e. much before the proceedings started, and as such the proceedings which are against the dead person, are null and void. It is also averred that the notification under Section 6 was issued after the expiry of three years, and hence the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The other grounds stated in five writ petitions, have also been taken in this writ petition; that actual possession has not been taken of the land, there was no public purpose for acquisition proceedings, various lands have been left out, the land is in fragments and cannot be used for housing scheme and that the second award has been published without notice. In the remaining two writ petitions, same grounds have been stated. 5. In the reply filed by respondent No. 4 in all the writ petitions it is averred that the writ petitions have been filed after great delay and even after passing the award and, therefore, they are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches alone. It is pointed out that the petitioners have even made applications for reference to the District Court for enhancement of the compensation which amounts to acceptance of the acquisition by them. It is averred that the petitioners have concealed the above facts in the writ petitions and, therefore, on the ground of concealment, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. With respect to the five writ petitions, it is averred that the notification under Section 6 has been issued by the State Government on 5-6-95 which has been made effective from 5-3-87 and, therefore, it is wrong to contend that no notification under Section 6 was issued. In Writ Petition No. 1077/89 it is stated that the factum of death of Bhanwarlal was not recorded in the revenue record, and therefore, the respondents were not aware of his death. It is pointed out that after the notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act of 1953 was published Radhey Shyam s/o Bhanwar Lal appeared through advocate and he participated in the proceedings for determination of award and, therefore, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. It is stated that notice under Section 5-A was issued to Bhanwar Lal but was served on Radhey Shyam who appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and participated in the proceedings. 6. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have filed similar reply in all the writ petitions. 7. Arguments of learned counsel for the parties have been heard. The learned counsel for the parties have filed written arguments also. 6. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have filed similar reply in all the writ petitions. 7. Arguments of learned counsel for the parties have been heard. The learned counsel for the parties have filed written arguments also. 8. The first serious contention of Mr. Shishodia in respect of five writ petitions was that no notification under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Act, 1953 was published in the time fixed under Section 11 and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 9. Mr. Singhvi and Mr. Jasmatiya, on the other hand, submitted that by inadvertence the lands, the subject-matter of five writ petitions, were not mentioned in the notification dated 12-2-87 published on 5-3-87 and, therefore, corrigendum was issued on 5-6-95 which was published in the Official Gazette on 8-6-95. It was contended by them that as there was stay order of this Court, corrigendum could not be issued in time. Their contention was that the State Government has got powers to issue an order with retrospective effect and once the notification has been made effective from 5-3-87 it should be found proved that the notification under Section 6 was issued well in time. 10. I have given the matter my thoughtful consideration. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1984 reads as follows:- "6. 10. I have given the matter my thoughtful consideration. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1984 reads as follows:- "6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose-(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, [when the (appropriate Government) is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, subsection (2)J that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, sub-section (2)J: [Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:) Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. [Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2.- Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the-funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.] 11. Explanation 2.- Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the-funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.] 11. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that a declaration under Section 6 in respect of the land covered under Section 4 of the Act is to be made within a period of three years from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4. It has been provided that in computing the said period of three years, the period, during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4(1) is stayed by an order of Court, shall be excluded. 12. The notification under Section 4 dated 31-5-82 was published in Official Gazette on 10-6-82. Therefore, the outer limit of making of the notification under Section 6 was 10-6-85. The proceedings had been started under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 but the Central Act of 1894 was extended to the State of Rajasthan repealing the Act of 1956 with effect from 24-9-84. By virtue of Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the notification under Section 6 could be issued by 3-1-88. The notification under Section 6 was issued on 12-2-87 which was published 5-3-87 in respect of some of the lands covered by the notification under Section 4. However, it is admitted position of the parties that in respect of the lands which are the subject-matter of five writ petitions, no such notification was issued in the prescribed time limit. 13. The point for determination is whether the notification dated 5-6-95 published in the Official Gazette on 8-6-95 can be considered to have taken effect from 5-3-87. 14. The contention of the respondents, that the State Government could not issue notification prior to June 1995 because of the stay order of this Court, is without substance. The stay order dated 1-4-89 only restrained the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the land in question. This order was confirmed in the presence of both the parties on 7-12-95. The stay order did not restrain the respondents from issuing notification under Section 6. Therefore, there was no legal hurdle in issuing notification under Section 6 by the Govt. prior to June, 1995. 15. This order was confirmed in the presence of both the parties on 7-12-95. The stay order did not restrain the respondents from issuing notification under Section 6. Therefore, there was no legal hurdle in issuing notification under Section 6 by the Govt. prior to June, 1995. 15. It is significant to point out that even before issuing notification on 5-6-95, the respondents did not seek Court's permission, obviously because, they knew that there was no stay against issuing notification under Section 6. The respondents cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time. If the respondents were under bona fide belief that there was interim order staying the acquisition proceedings then they could not have ignored the stay order while issuing the notification on 5-6-95. It is obvious that the respondents are taking contrary stands. It cannot be accepted that because of the stay order passed by this Court the respondents could not issue the notification under Section 6 and the period from 1987 to 1995 is liable to be excluded under Explanation 1 of Section 6(1). 16. In the case of National Insurance Company v. Kamal Prakash Rohila (D. B. Special Appeal No. 783/95) decided on 5-12-1997 it has been observed that a person cannot be permitted to derive any benefit taking contrary stands. This ruling is based on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of R. N. Gusain v. Jaspal Dhir, AIR 1983 SC 352 , which are reproduced hereunder:- "Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of law which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing other advantage". 17. Consequently, I am of the view that the benefit of Explanation-1 is not available to the respondents and the period from 1987 to 1995 cannot be excluded on the ground of stay order of this Court. 18. 17. Consequently, I am of the view that the benefit of Explanation-1 is not available to the respondents and the period from 1987 to 1995 cannot be excluded on the ground of stay order of this Court. 18. The fact remains that the notification, under Section 6 in respect of the lands covered by the five writ petitions was not made within the time limit prescribed under Section 11 read with Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act. 19. The question that calls for consideration is whether because of the non-issuance of the notification under Section 6 within the time limit, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed. First proviso to Section 6 of the Act starts with prohibitory words which means that no declaration can be made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4. Therefore, if the declaration under Section 11 is not made within the time limit i.e. 3 years, the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 20. The plea that the land has vested in the State Government because of taking possession of the lands, by the Land Acquisition Officer is not available to the respondents. The possession of the land can be taken by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer only after declaration under Section 6 has been issued. Under Section 11-A an award is to be made within two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. In the instant case, in respect of the lands of five writ petitions, it is admitted position that the proceedings under Section 11 were taken without issuing the notification under Section 6 which is mandatory for acquisition. The acquisition proceedings are, therefore, vitiated. The subsequent proceedings of taking possession cannot be held to be valid. In these circumstances the land cannot be held to have vested in the State Government. 21. The plea that the State Government has got powers to issue notification with retrospective effect is not acceptable. If this contention is accepted, the very purpose of fixing time limit by the legislature under Section 6 will be frustrated. When the legislature fixes time limit of doing certain act, then it has to be performed within the said time limit. Performance of an act after the time limit and making it effective from retrospective date is not permissible. 22. When the legislature fixes time limit of doing certain act, then it has to be performed within the said time limit. Performance of an act after the time limit and making it effective from retrospective date is not permissible. 22. The case of R. L. Marwaha v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 31 , relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents is clearly distinguishable. The question in that case, was whether the benefit of the service rendered by an employee under the Central Government prior to his absorption in the autonomous body for the purpose of computing qualifying service, could be given. It was held by their Lordships that the concession is prospective in operation but at the same time it looks backward and taking into consideration the past benefit i.e. the period of benefit for the purposes of computing qualifying service was permissible. It was clearly observed that the Government order does not become an order of having retrospective effect. In the instant case, the controversy is whether the acquisition proceedings survived even though the declaration under Section 6 was not made in the fixed time limit. In my opinion, in such matters, the Government has no power to make declaration effective from back date as to render the mandatory provision inoperative. 23. So also in the case of Kapurchand v. B. S. Grewal, AIR 1965 SC 1491 , it was nowhere decided that a notification can be issued with retrospective effect. In that case the question before their lordships was that the conduct of the tenant prior to the coming into force of the new section of the Rent Control Act could be taken into account. It has been specifically held that a statute must be applied prospectively. 24. It is not understood as to how the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 , helps the respondents. It has been held in this case that under Article 20 of the Constitution of India the phrase law in force" must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law "deemed" to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. On the basis of this authority, it cannot be accepted that the State Government has got powers to make declaration under Section 6 effective retrospectively. When the legislature has not given power to the State Government in explicit terms to issue such a notification with retrospective effect, the contention of the respondents that the Government has power issue notification with retrospective effect cannot be accepted. 25. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands covered by tho five writ petitions did not survive, as the declaration under Section 6 was not made within the time limit provided for in that section. 26. We now switch over to the remaining three writ petitions Nos. 1077/89, 1093/89 and 1058/89. It is not disputed that no scheme or plan was prepared prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is settled legal position that in the absence of scheme/plan the acquisition proceedings are not vitiated. It is also not material that the land to be acquired is in patches or it is not capable of using for the systematic development. It is for the respondents to make use of the lands for public purpose. It is not the functions of the Court to see if the land, which is in fragments, can be used for public purpose. 27. The Government is empowered to take decision of acquiring a particular land for public necessity. Such exercise of power cannot be termed as arbitrary: vide Subhashgir Khushalgir Gosavi v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1996 SC 3169 . The Supreme Court has held in the case of Rudradhar R. Trivedi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1996 SC 3457 , that the land acquired for one public purpose can be transferred for another public purpose and the validity of the acquisition on the ground of insufficiency of public purpose cannot be assailed. 28. On the ground of alleged discrimination also, the acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed. It has been held in the case of Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 520 , that the wrong exemption under wrong action does not clothe others, to get the same benefit. It has been also held in that case that Article 14 cannot be pressed into service on the ground of invidious discrimination. It has been held in the case of Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 520 , that the wrong exemption under wrong action does not clothe others, to get the same benefit. It has been also held in that case that Article 14 cannot be pressed into service on the ground of invidious discrimination. Therefore, on the ground that some of the lands have been left out, the acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed. 29. The additional ground in Writ Petition No. 1077/89 is that Bhanwarlal had died before the issuance of the notification under Section 4 yet his name was shown in the notification. 30. The contention of Mr. Shishodia was that since the name of dead person was stated in the notification issued under Section 4 the acquisition proceedings should be quashed on this ground alone. In support of his contention, he cited the case of Bhishambhar Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 1 WLC (Raj) 680. 31. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the L. Rs. of Bhanwarlal have taken part in the acquisition proceedings and, therefore, no prejudice was caused to the petitioners and the acquisition proceedings are not vitiated. 32. I have carefully considered the above arguments. It is not disputed that Bhanwarlal, in whose name the land stood in the revenue record, had died before the issuance of the notification under Section 4. It is also on record that the L. Rs. of Bhanwarlal appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and raised objection against the acquisition. They even participated in the award proceedings. The question for consideration is whether on account of the mention of name of a dead person in the notification under Section 4 the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 33. The question is, if it is the requirement of law that the name of the owner of the land is mentioned in the notification under Section 11 of the Act. The question for consideration is whether on account of the mention of name of a dead person in the notification under Section 4 the acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 33. The question is, if it is the requirement of law that the name of the owner of the land is mentioned in the notification under Section 11 of the Act. Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, 1953 read as follows:- Section 11 - Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon:- (1) Whenever it appears to the (appropriate Government) that land in any locality (is needed or) is likely to be needed for any public purpose (or for a company) a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette (and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language) and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification). (2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workmen, to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality; to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle : Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention to do so. 34. It is evident that Section 4 nowhere required that the name of the owner of the land should be stated in the notification. 34. It is evident that Section 4 nowhere required that the name of the owner of the land should be stated in the notification. What was required to be stated was the description of the land and the locality where the land was situated. When the law did not require the mentioning of the name of the land owner in the notification under Section 4, the mention of the name of dead person as owner of the land cannot vitiate the acquisition proceedings. 35. The provision of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code cannot be made applicable to the issuance of notification under Section 4 or declaration under Section 6 of the Act or the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer, as there is no such provision in the Land Acquisition Act. Rather a reading of Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was also of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 make it clear that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable only to the proceedings before the Court under the Act, and not to the proceedings before the Government or the Land Acquisition Officer. That being so, a plea based on Order 22, Civil Procedure Code cannot succeed. 36. Coming to the Division Bench ruling relied on by Mr. Shishodia it may be stated that acquisition proceedings in that case has started under the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act as it stood then read as follows:- "52. Compulsory acquisition of land (1).... (2) Before publishing a notice under (sic) Section (1), the State Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government may be interested therein." 37. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that individual notice was required to be served on the owner of the land. There is a marked difference in the provisions of Section 11 of the Rajasthan Act of 1953 and Section 11(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that individual notice was required to be served on the owner of the land. There is a marked difference in the provisions of Section 11 of the Rajasthan Act of 1953 and Section 11(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959. It was the requirement of the law that before a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the Act of 1959 was issued a notice was to be served on the owner of the land and, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court held that if the correct name of the land owner was not shown in the notification the proceedings stood vitiated. There was no such requirement of law for a notification issued under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Act of 1956. 38. Apart from that, in the case of Bishambhar Dayal. (1991 (1) WLC (Raj) 680) (supra) the facts were that the person in whose name the land stood had died fifty years ago and even there was judgment of the Revenue Board in which it had been noticed that the Khatedar 'H' had died 50 years ago. In these circumstances, it was observed that if efforts had been made to know who were the owners of the property, notice could have been given to them, as the individual service of notice on the owners and interested person was necessary. It is obvious, that case was decided on the basis of the specific provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act of 1959. That being so, on the basis of the Division Bench ruling relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case cannot be held to have vitiated. 39. In this connection, the ratio of the case of State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabhau, (1995) 8 JT (SC) 508 , deserves notice. In that case, in the notification under Section 4 the names of purchasers of the land had not been mentioned though they had purchased the land before the issuance of the notification. On the ground that the mutation had not taken place in their favour the non-mention of the names of the purchasers was not held fatal. In that case, in the notification under Section 4 the names of purchasers of the land had not been mentioned though they had purchased the land before the issuance of the notification. On the ground that the mutation had not taken place in their favour the non-mention of the names of the purchasers was not held fatal. In the instant case, though Bhanwarlal had died on 13-12-80 but steps were not taken for mutation of the names of his heirs in the revenue record. Thus, the land stood in the name of Bhanwarlal on the date the notification was issued. It could not be possible for the Government to have known that Bhanwarlal had died and, the names of his L. Rs. were required to be shown in the notification. As, in the revenue record the land stood recorded in the name of Bhanwarlal, the Government was perfectly justified in showing his name in the notification under Section 4. 40. Moreover, it is not disputed that immediately after the notification under Section 4 was issued the petitioners who are heirs of Bhanwarlal appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and raised objections against the acquisition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners had no occasion to show cause against the proposed acquisition and they were prejudiced because of the mentioning of the name of their father who had died. 41. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Shishodia that since the name of dead person was stated in the notification under Section 4, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land covered by writ petition No. 1077/89 are vitiated. 42. On more contention raised by Mr. Shishodia was that physical possession of the land was not taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and only paper possession was taken and therefore the land has yet not vested in the State Government. 43. A copy of the revenue record has been filed by the respondents. There is an entry dated 11-6-87 to the effect that possession of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in the presence of the Khatedars but they refused to sign. It is further stated that after taking possession of the land, the same was handed over to the Municipality. 44. The question for consideration is if the land stood vested in the State Govt. on 11-6-87. It is further stated that after taking possession of the land, the same was handed over to the Municipality. 44. The question for consideration is if the land stood vested in the State Govt. on 11-6-87. The Supreme Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 2 JT (SC) 549 has observed as follows:- "It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum of Panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses singed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not co-operate in taking possession of the land." 45. This principle was reiterated in the case of M/s. Larson & Tubro v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 2 JT (SC) 536 and it was observed that even if the Panchas of the memorandum of the taking possession give affidavits to the contrary it cannot be held that actual physical possession of the land was not taken by the State. In the instant case, as already stated, it is recorded in the proceedings that the possession was taken from the Khatedars and was handed over to the Municipality. It cannot be accepted that possession was not taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and the land did not vest in the State Government. 46. In the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab, (1996) 3 JT (SC) 60 it has been held that normal mode of taking possession is drafting of the Panchnama in the presence of Panchas, and giving delivery to the beneficiary. In the Instant case, as the proceedings of taking possession were recorded and possession was handed over to the Municipality, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that actual possession was not taken by the Land Acquisition Officer. 47. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that when the Collector has taken possession of the land it shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Thus, on taking possession of the land by the Land Acquisition Officer, it vested in the State Government. 47. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that when the Collector has taken possession of the land it shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Thus, on taking possession of the land by the Land Acquisition Officer, it vested in the State Government. In the cases of State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 9 JT (SC) 327 and Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 it has been held that even if there was some irregularity in the proceedings it would not divest the title which was formally vested in the State Government. 48. As already stated, the writ petitions have been filed in March/April, 1989. The facts reveal that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 31-5-82, and declaration under Section 6 was made on 12-2-87 and even award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 4-8-88, and was revised on 29-12-88. It is obvious that these writ petitions were filed 7 years after the issuance of the notification and even after the award was passed. In the series of decisions, The Apex Court has held that if there are latches on the part of the petitioner the writ petition should be dismissed on that ground alone: See M/s. Larson & Tubro Ltd., (1998 (2) JT (SC) 536) (supra), Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Company Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 and State of Raj v. D. R. Laxmi, (1996 (9) JT (SC) 327) (supra). In this view of the legal position, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of inordinate delay. 49. One more contention raised by Mr. Shishodia was that the Land Acquisition Officer had passed award on 4-8-88, and thereafter he revised the same vide order dated 29-12-88 which he could not do as having passed the award on 4-8-88 he had become functus officio. Section 18 of the Act provides that if a person wants to challenge the award he may require the Collector to refer the matter for the determination of the Court. In the instant case, the petitioners have already moved the Collector to refer the matter of award to the civil Court and thus this objection can be raised before the Civil Court. In the instant case, the petitioners have already moved the Collector to refer the matter of award to the civil Court and thus this objection can be raised before the Civil Court. This Court in the writ petition is not required to go into the correctness or otherwise of the award. 50. No other point was pressed before me. 51. Consequently, the writ petitions Nos. 1092/89, 1109/89, 1108/89, 1110/89 and 1111/ 89 succeed. The notification under Section 4, so far as it relates to the subject matter of these writ petitions, is quashed. The Writ Petitions Nos. 1077/89, 1058/89 and 1093/89 being devoid of merit, are dismissed.Order accordingly. *******