S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. Through this ap plication under Section 482, Cr. P. C. the applicants have challenged an order of the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Varanasi, dated 5-8-1998 insofar as he had directed the Superintendent of Police, Chandauli, to register a case under Section 58 of the N. D. P. S. Act and Section 394,1. P. C. against the applicants and to get the matter inves tigated into by L Circle Officer and to make feed back report to him. There is a further direction to return Rs. 1600/- to one Madan Lal, who was being prosecuted for an offence under the N. D. PS. Act. 2. The order in question indicates that one Madan Lal stood prosecuted under Section 20 of the N. D. P. S. Act in case Crime No. 404 of 1998 by the officials of the Government Railway Police at Mughalsarai. An application for bail was moved and was rejected by Sri Indra Bahadur Singh, III Addl. Sessions Judge, Varanasi, on 24-7-1998. On a subsequent date this very Sessions Judge had recorded the statement on oath as given by Madan Lal and upon that statement recorded on 5-8-1998 he had directed the aforesaid ac cused to be released on bail and had also directed that the statement given to him be forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Chandauli, with a direction that the Police Inspector, Uma Shanker Pandey, Head Constable Sant Kumar, and Constable Islam, who were responsible for the arrest of Madan Lal, be prosecuted under Sec tion 58 of the N. D. P. S. Act and also under Section 394, I. P. C. The Addl. Sessions Judge further directed that investigation should be made by some Circle Officer and the fact of registration of a case should be informed to the court and the materials snatched from Madan Lal should be returned. 3. The Sessions Judge appears to have been influenced by the statement of Madan Lal made to him in which he had stated that he was on his way to Jodhpur with his wife who was in the family way. He was having with him Rs. 1600/- for a surgery which was likely to be made. He came from Patna, dropped at Mughalsarai and waited for the train for Jodhpur. At Mughalsarai station he was sitting on a Bench and another person was also sitting there with an attache case. He was having with him Rs. 1600/- for a surgery which was likely to be made. He came from Patna, dropped at Mughalsarai and waited for the train for Jodhpur. At Mughalsarai station he was sitting on a Bench and another person was also sitting there with an attache case. When police personnel were approaching them that other person told Madan Lal to keep a watch on the attache while he comes back. He then left the place. Two police officials came and asked him to open his bag. Me gave a search of his bag which contained only his clothes. He was asked about the attache case. The police officials took a personal search and found Rs. 1600/- with him. They took away the sum. They charged him with possession of the at tache case, as well as locked him up. He was subsequently informed that Ganja was found in the attache case. 4. It was contended on behalf of the applicants that the police officials had found an attache case on the same bench where Madan Lal was sitting and that at tache case was containing Ganja and as such Madan Lal was arrested. It was stated further that the Sessions Judge had no power of cognizance under Section 190, Cr. P. C. and as such he could not have referred a complaint to the police under Section 156 (2), Cr. P. C. It was further contended that no case under Section 58 of the N. D. P. S. Act was at all made out. 5. The learned A. G. A. submitted on behalf of the State that the courts of law must be deemed to was necessary to do will be deemed forbidden unless there is a specific legal bar there for. It was submitted that the Sessions Judge was a responsible Judicial Officer and when commission of an offence was made known to him, he was within his rights to make a reference to the police and there was now rung in the order. 6. Sri Amar Saran appearing for the applicants, relied on a decision of the Pun jab Chief Court of the 1910. It made a reference to Sections 156 (3), 190 and 193, Cr, P. C. of 1898. Fortunately, the sections in the Cr. P. C. of 1974 also cover the same powers. 6. Sri Amar Saran appearing for the applicants, relied on a decision of the Pun jab Chief Court of the 1910. It made a reference to Sections 156 (3), 190 and 193, Cr, P. C. of 1898. Fortunately, the sections in the Cr. P. C. of 1974 also cover the same powers. It was held herein that an order by the Sessions Judge directing the police to make enquiry under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. was ultra vires. It was held that Section 156 gave a power to order an investigation only to a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 and as such the direction of the Sessions Judge was bad. 7. Reliance was also placed on another decision A. I. R. 1926 Lahore 309 to a point that statement of a person recorded against the sprit of law should be from consideration. It was con tended that while hearing a bail application, the Sessions Judge had no authority to second statement of Madan Lal and then to act upon the same. 8. The learned counsel made a refer ence to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. R. B. Chowdhari & others as reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 110. It was held herein that a statement of an accused under Sec tion 342 can be taken into consideration in an enquiry or trial, but it was not strictly evidence in the case. If he makes a state ment under Section 342-A, Cr. P. C. then, of course, it may be read as evidence. It was contended that there was no prayer by Madan Lal to record his statements and tire, Sessions Judge could not have recorded the statement at all. 9. In answer to these submissions, the learned A. G. A. took me through a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 710. In paragraph 43 of this judgment (as reported) it was ex plained what was administration of justice. It was observed "we have not been referred to any comprehensive definition of the expression administration of justice. But historically and in the minds of the people, administration of justice is exclusively as sociated with the Courts of Justice con stitutionally established. In paragraph 43 of this judgment (as reported) it was ex plained what was administration of justice. It was observed "we have not been referred to any comprehensive definition of the expression administration of justice. But historically and in the minds of the people, administration of justice is exclusively as sociated with the Courts of Justice con stitutionally established. " It was observed in the next paragraph of the judgment that "courts of justice have, in accordance with their Constitutions, to perform multi farious functions for due administration of justice. Any lapse from the strict standards of rectitude in performing these functions is bound to affect administration of justice which is a term of wider import than mere adjudication of causes from the seat of justice. " In paragraph 51 of this Judgment it was observed that judicial capacity was an ambivalent term which meant capacity of or proper to a Judge and was capable of taking in all functional capacities of a Judge whether administrative, ad-judicatory or any other, necessity for the administration of justice. These observa tions were made in respect of a question of criminal contempt of court where contemptuous averments were made with ref erence to administrative functions of the High Court. The Supreme Court, no doubt, indicated what is a judicial capacity and what a Judge is supposed to do in his capacity as a judge, but the case law may not be read to clothe a Judge with such power which the salute had hesitated to vest in him. Any Judge of the Lower Judiciary is a creation of a statue and he must act within the limits of the statute and the power to do anything for the ends of justice in the nature of an inherent power has not been conceded to the Lower Judiciary and the statute had kept it for the exercise by the High Court only. Section 190, Cr. P. C. speaks that subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of an offence either upon a complaint or upon a police report or upon information from any person other than a police officer, etc. Section 193, Cr. Section 193, Cr. P. C. specially excludes cognizance of offence by Courts of Session as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case is committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, there is a legal bar for the Sessions Judge to take cognizance of an offence except upon a commitment. Section 156 (3), Cr, P. C. empowers a Magistrate competent under Section 190, to take cognizance, to direct an investigation of a cognizable offence by the police. When the power under Section 190 may not be exercised by the Sessions Judge, he could not exercise the power under Section 156 (3) as well. Section 313, Cr. P. C. (parallel to Section 342, Cr. P. C. of 1898) authorises the Court to put any question to an accused to enable him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. But this power is to be exercised in an enquiry or a trial. Bail applications are filed before the courts under Chapter XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and these applica tions are of miscellaneous nature and may not be deemed to be either an enquiry or a trial. Thus, while hearing a bail application the Sessions Judge was not authorised to record the statement of the accused, far less to act upon the same. The order dated 5-8-1998 indicates that the accused was produced in custody before the Sessions Judge and the court had recorded his statement on a separate sheet. It is possible that the version of the accused was true, but the Sessions Judge could only have acted upon such version and could only have granted him bail as he had done and he should have directed him to make a complaint before the police or before the proper court. It was not permissible for the Sessions Judge within the four corners of the Code of Criminal Procedure, firstly, to have recorded his statement and, secondly, to have sent it to the Superintendent of police with definite directions.- 10. In this connection may be made to Section 39, Cr. P. C which speaks of information by public of certain offences. It was not permissible for the Sessions Judge within the four corners of the Code of Criminal Procedure, firstly, to have recorded his statement and, secondly, to have sent it to the Superintendent of police with definite directions.- 10. In this connection may be made to Section 39, Cr. P. C which speaks of information by public of certain offences. It speaks that every person, aware of the commission of, or of the in tention of any other person to commit any offence punishable under the I. P. C. (as detailed in the section) shall, in the ab sence of any reasonable excuse, forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate or police officer of such commission or intention. Certainly an offence under Sec tion 394 is covered by Section 39, but the primary condition is that a person liable under this section should be aware of the commission of an offence. This awareness in the context of the matter would mean personally aware either on immediate in formation or knowledge. It may not be extended to include awareness on infor mation through an application or in a proceeding in a court. 11. In any view of the matter, the action of the Addl. Sessions Judge is not supported by any provision of law and the order in question must be and is quashed to the extent of recording the statement of Madan Lal and forwarding it to police for action and directing a feed back, it is, how ever, made clear that it would be open for Madan Lal to lodge a complaint report either to a Magistrate or to a police officer and the present order will not stand on the way of action on such complaint or report according to law. 12. The application stands allowed with the a for said observations. Application allowed. .