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1998 DIGILAW 1025 (ALL)

HIND MAZDOOR SABHA CLUTTER BUCK GANJ v. STATE OF U P

1998-09-08

ALOKE CHAKRABARTI

body1998
ALOKE CHAKRABARTI, J. Dismissal of the petitioner No. 2 workman after domestic inquiry raised a dispute and on its reference the Labour Court by award dated 31-3-1980 altered the penalty after holding that the domestic inquiry was not fair and proper followed by evidence of the employer in support of the order. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that in view of the nature of the charge levelled against the workman and there being no other evidence in support of the charge, the report of the handwriting expert became relevant. The first handwriting expert Mr. Mohd. Imanul Rehman submitted his report and on an objection against it, prayer was made by the employer for ap pointing another handwriting expert. So Mr. Purshottam Kashyap was appointed who submitted his report as expert but as the report went in favour of the workman, the employer did not examine him as wit ness. The Labour Court rejected the report of Mr. Kashyap and proceeded on the report of Mr. Rehman who was ex amined by the employer as witness. The petitioners complain is that after the employer made prayer for appointment of second handwriting expert the report of the first handwriting expert could not be looked into any further and when the second handwriting expert was not ex amined there remained no material what soever to prove the charge and, therefore, the petitioner No. 2 was entitled to full relief. The second contention of the petitioners was that the Labour Court it self came to a conclusion that no serious charge was proved against the workman and held the penalty of dismissal to be disproportionately high but while con sidering the quantum of punishment the Labour Court relied on the loss of con fidence by employer and so imposed the penalty of discharge simpliciter with com pensation of one years salary. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no basis for relying on such loss of confidence as the same was neither pleaded nor proved. 3. On behalf of the employer it has been contended that two handwriting ex perts submitted their respective reports and one was examined and the other was not. In such circumstances, the handwrit ing expert who was not examined, his report could not be looked into and had been rightly rejected by the Labour Court. 3. On behalf of the employer it has been contended that two handwriting ex perts submitted their respective reports and one was examined and the other was not. In such circumstances, the handwrit ing expert who was not examined, his report could not be looked into and had been rightly rejected by the Labour Court. The other handwriting expert was duly ex amined by the employer and, therefore, his report had to be accepted. 4. With regard to other contention, learned Counsel for the employer con tended that loss of confidence is apparent in view of the seriousness of the charge and, therefore, the Labour Court was right in its decision as regards quantum of punishment. 5. After considering the above con tentions, I find that the second handwrit ing expert had been admittedly appointed and both submitted their respective reports. The first handwriting experts report was against the workman and the second handwriting experts report was in favour of the workman. The workman himself was at liberty to examine the second handwriting expert as witness and when he did not do that and the second report was not proved, the Labour Court did not commit a mistake in not relying on the same. With regard to the first report the employer examined the handwriting expert and the report was proved. Un doubtedly, the Labour Court was at liberty to accept or not to accept the contents of such a report proved in the proceeding, but it should have taken into considera tion defects earlier alleged against the said report particularly when the employer asked for a second handwriting expert in view of the complains. But, in any event as regards evidence I do not find it proper that on the materials available the writ Court should interfere with the Labour Courts award reassessing a particular evidence. 6. With regard to the aspect of loss of confidence, law has been referred to by the learned Counsel for both the sides. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of L. Michael and another v. Mis. Johnson Pumps Ltd. , AIR 1975 SC 661 and on behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the case of Chembur Co-opera tive Industrial Estate v. M. K. Chhatra, AIR 1975 SC 1725 . 7. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of L. Michael and another v. Mis. Johnson Pumps Ltd. , AIR 1975 SC 661 and on behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the case of Chembur Co-opera tive Industrial Estate v. M. K. Chhatra, AIR 1975 SC 1725 . 7. After considering the aforesaid contentions, I find that the aspect of loss of confidence has been considered in the above case of L. Michael, (supra ). The relevant finding explaining the same in as follows: "20. In the light of what we have indicated, it is clear that loss of confidence is often a subjec tive feeling or individual reaction to an objective set of facts and motivations. The Court is con cerned with the latter and not with the former, although circumstances may exist which justify a genuine exercise of the power of simple termina tion. In a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started and a disciplinary enquiry cannot be forced on the master. " 8. The judgment in the case of Chem bur Co-operative Estate, (supra), does not lay down any legal proposition and it ap pears that on agreement by parties and upon facts involved therein, the said case was decided. Law in this connection was also considered in the case of workmen, Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. , AIR 1985 SC 251 , wherein the re quirement of satisfying the Court, when questioned, was reiterated. 9. Therefore, it appears that objec tive set of facts and motivations are to be proved as the Court is concerned with the same. Law appears to be settled that in reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensi tive or strategic position being abused it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started. But, such facts are to be available to the Court concerned for concluding on loss of confidence. 10. On behalf of the petitioner it has been stated that at no stage the employer disclosed any fact as regards loss of con fidence. But, such facts are to be available to the Court concerned for concluding on loss of confidence. 10. On behalf of the petitioner it has been stated that at no stage the employer disclosed any fact as regards loss of con fidence. On a specific query by the Court, the learned Counsel for the respondents employer could not show any material contradicting the petitioners contention. Therefore, it appears that loss of con fidence was relied on by the Labour Court without there being any basis. 11. Apparently, the award records that no serious charge was proved. At one place of the award (page 9 of Annexure 6 to the writ petition) the finding reached was that the petitioner No. 2 made the disputed entries, was not fully proved. Therefore, when loss of confidence could not be considered in the absence of any material before the Labour Court, the punishment imposed requires to be al tered in view of own finding of the Labour Court that penalty of dismissal was dis proportionately high and harsh. 12. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned award dated 31-3-1980 is set aside to the extent the penalty of discharge simpliciter with compensation was imposed. The Labour Court concerned is directed to decide afresh the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the petitioner No. 2 on the materials available on record. As the mat ter is very old one the Labour Court is directed to decide the same within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 13. There will be no order as to costs. Fallowed. .