JUDGMENT 1. - The matter is listed on my board today as first case as part heard. The appearance of the learned counsel for the parties is duly shown in the cause list. From the perusal of the order sheet of this case file. It is apparent that the appeal was initially listed on 5-9-1997 when the appellant was himself present in person and at his request the case was adjourned for four weeks. Thereafter on 17-10-1997 Shri Rajesh Kapoor Advocate appeared for the appellant and made a request for adjournment and the Court again adjourned the case for two weeks. Thereafter on 5-11- 1997, learned counsel for the parties, appeared and made a joint request for adjournment and the matter was again adjourned to be listed after four weeks along with GSA No. 318/1997. Thereafter on 10th December, 1997 again learned counsel for the parties appeared and at their joint request, the matter was adjourned to 16th December, 1997, for admission along with CSA No. 318/97. Thereafter on 16th December, 1997, learned counsel for the respondent appeared and request was made for adjournment and the case was adjourned for two weeks. On 12-1-1998, the case did not reach and hence, it could not be taken up for hearing. On 17th August, 1998 learned counsel for the parties appeared and again made a request for adjournment and at the joint request, the matter was again adjourned to 24th August, 1998. Thereafter on 24th August, 1998, none was present for the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondents were present. The appeal was directed to be listed for final disposal at admission stage itself on 15th Sept., 1998. It was further directed that trial Court's record is not necessary in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below deciding issue of bona fide necessity in favour of respondent/landlord to occupy the suit premises in question. In this manner, at least ten adjournments were sought by the learned counsel for the appellant on one pretext or the other and today without seeking the leave of the Court, taking it for granted that the matter will be adjourned, the counsel for the appellant has intimated by the learned counsel for the respondent that he took his 'no objection' on the urgent slip and thereafter walked away with impunity without informing the Court or taking its leave. In the context of the above background, it was not possible for this Court again to accede to the request of the learned counsel for the appellant to adjourn the matter and the appeal was accordingly taken up for hearing since learned counsel for the respondent was ready to argue the same, and the request of the appellant's counsel for grant of adjournment as per the adjournment slip vide Annx. C1 was declined. 2. This second appeal has been preferred to this Court by the appellant-tenant against the findings recorded by the two courts below i.e. trial Court as well as appellate Court who have concurrently held the need of the landlord to occupy the suit premises in question as his genuine and bona fide and being aggrieved by the decisions of the two courts below, the appellant has challenged the judgment and decree dated 31-5-1997 passed by the Additional District Judge, Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. 108/1992 whereby the said appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant confirming the order and decree of the trial Court dated 24-8-1987. 3. The brief facts which are relevant for deciding this appeal are that a suit for ejectment of the appellant-tenant was filed by respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) who purchased the property in question vide registered sale deed from Rukmani Devi, the erstwhile owner of the property. Thereafter since the plaintiff required the suit premises for his bona fide need on account of his family members who were living with him and facing hardship on account of scarcity of accommodation, he filed the suit for eviction of the tenant-appellant on 7-9-1977 in the Court of Munsiff, Ajmer vide Civil Suit No. 358/1977 on the ground of default in payment of rent and bona fide necessity of the landlord to occupy the suit premises as per Section 13(1)(a) and (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The appellant and proforma respondents in this appeal are the legal representatives of original defendant Shri Parasram. The tenant contested the suit by filing written statement on the ground, inter alia, that the entire premises was let out to Paras Ram, the original tenant who died during the pendency of the suit on 23-7-1980. The appellant and proforma respondents in this appeal are the legal representatives of original defendant Shri Parasram. The tenant contested the suit by filing written statement on the ground, inter alia, that the entire premises was let out to Paras Ram, the original tenant who died during the pendency of the suit on 23-7-1980. It was contended that a shop on the residential portion on the first and second floor which was originally under the tenancy of Dharamu and who thereafter vacated the same, came to be occupied by Shri Paras Ram, the original tenant. After his death, his legal heirs were brought on record and they contested the suit. The bona fide need of the landlord was also challenged by way of additional pleas. It was contended that since five years had not elapsed from the date of the alleged purchase of the property by the plaintiff till filing of the suit, the suit was not maintainable. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed nine issues out of which the material issue on which the trial Court decided and decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-landlord was the ground of his bona fide necessity to occupy the suit premises. This fact was duly established by way of leading reliable and satisfactory evidence on record. It was pleaded that the plaintiff has a large family to support and he has been in occupation earlier of a rented shop where he is being pressed hard by his landlord to vacate the premises since the same was required by the said landlord and on the ground of comparative hardship qua the landlord of the premises, where he was running business, it was proved on record that the suit premises is reasonably and bona fide required by him for shifting his business of timber which he was running and for which there was no other alternative accommodation available to him. It has been recorded in the pleading that the respondent-landlord has only one room to live in on the first floor of the shop which is in occupation of the tenant. This fact is duly born out from the evidence of DW/1 himself who confirmed and testified this fact. It has been recorded in the pleading that the respondent-landlord has only one room to live in on the first floor of the shop which is in occupation of the tenant. This fact is duly born out from the evidence of DW/1 himself who confirmed and testified this fact. On the question of comparative hardship, the trial Court has recorded a positive evidence to the effect that the landlord is facing a great difficulty on the ground of scarce accommodation whereas the tenant is having 12 other shops in his possession where he is running his business in other localities of Ajmer City. 4. After having taken full stock of the situation and after giving an opportunity to both the parties, to lead their evidence, the trial Court declared the plaintiff's suit on the ground of bona fide requirement vide its judgment and decree dated 24th August, 1987. 5. The above decision of the trial Court was challenged by the appellant before the learned Addl. District Judge No. 2, Ajmer and the said appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court after elaborately dealing with the matter vide CA No. 108/1992 decided on 31-5-1997, whereby the appeal was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 24th August, 1987 of the trial Court was upheld Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the appellants have come up by way of present appeal before this Court. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the respondent at length and examined the summoned record, the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence recorded by the Courts below. 7. Prima facie, I am of the considered view that in view of the well settled proposition of law that scope of second appeal as per Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited only to the substantial questions of law and also having regard to the fact that this Court in second appeal shall not go into appreciation of evidence unless some miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of findings of fact recorded by the Courts below by omitting to discuss any material aspect of the case which may warrant any interference in this appeal. I do not find any perversity or illegality committed by the Courts below. I do not find any perversity or illegality committed by the Courts below. I find support with regard to this proposition from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, AIR 1997 SC 2517 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:- "Generally speaking, an appellant is not to be allowed to set up a new case in second appeal or raise a new issue (otherwise than a jurisdictional one) not supported by the pleadings or evidence on record and unless the appeal involves a substantial question of law, a second appeal shall not lie to the High Court under the amended provisions. In the present case, no such question of law was formulated in the memorandum of appeal in the High Court and grounds (6) and (7) in the memorandum of the second appeal only which reliance is placed did not formulate any substantial question of law." It was further observed by the Apex Court in the above matter that:- "The High Court was, therefore, not justified in entertaining the second appeal on an altogether new point, neither pleaded nor canvassed in the subordinate Courts and that too by overlooking the changes brought about in Section 100, Civil Procedure Code by the Amendment Act of 1976 without even indicating that a substantial question of law was required to be resolved in the second appeal. To say the least, the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same." 8. From the perusal of the grounds raised in the memo of appeal and also the contentions advanced by appellants in this appeal. I do not find any question of law much less substantial question which may justify interference with, the findings recorded by the trial Court on the aspect of bona fide need of the plaintiff to occupy the suit premises in question which have also been confirmed by the first appellate Court and consequently the same are upheld. 9. In Bastichand Bhansali v. Dharam Vir Kalia, 1989 (1) RLW 103 , the landlord who was himself living in a rented apartment and had sought eviction of the tenant on the plea of reasonable and bona fide requirement. 9. In Bastichand Bhansali v. Dharam Vir Kalia, 1989 (1) RLW 103 , the landlord who was himself living in a rented apartment and had sought eviction of the tenant on the plea of reasonable and bona fide requirement. It was observed by this Court that a landlord cannot be denied his statutory right to possess and live in the purchased property, since he was facing a great difficulty by living in a rented house. It was observed in this context as under:- "A shelter with a roof on his head and pursuit of happiness, subject to his means, is the normal and ordinary desire of a human being. Apart from that it is the legal and statutory right of a person to actually possess the property owned by him. It would be purely against all logic to ask a landlord-owner to opt for rented premises instead of his own building." 10. Likewise in the matter of Bhanwaru v. Jeevani, 1991 (1) RLW 105 , this Court observed as under:- "Finding of fact is not open to challenge In second appeal. Sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is not a ground for interference." 11. In Navanethmmal v. Arjuna Chetty, 1996 (6) SCC 166 , the Apex Court has laid down the parameters within which the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction in second appeal:- "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower Courts. In the present case the lower appellate Court fairly appreciated the evidence and confirmed the conclusion of the trial Court that suit was not barred by limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate Court was based on no material." 12. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view of that the appellant has failed to make out any case for Interference with the findings recorded by both the Courts below. I find no substantial question of law for which this Court should interfere with the said finding. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view of that the appellant has failed to make out any case for Interference with the findings recorded by both the Courts below. I find no substantial question of law for which this Court should interfere with the said finding. Hence, the judgment and decree dated 31-5-1997 passed by the Addl. District Judge No. 2, Ajmer as also the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dated 24-8-1987 are upheld. 13. This appeal is dismissed being not maintainable on merits. 14. There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******