JUDGMENT : 1. - The appellant herein has come up by way of this appeal wherein, he has assailed the judgment and decree dated 5-8-1998 of the learned District Judge, Baran in Civil Appeal No. 26/97 whereby the said Appellate Court had affirmed the judgment and decree of eviction of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Anta dated 14-8-1997 in Civil Suit No. 55/96. 2. The facts which are relevant for deciding the present appeal briefly stated are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff") filed a suit for eviction against the appellant-defendant (hereinafter referred to as "the defendant") from the suit property which is a commercial premises on the following three grounds : (1) the tenant has defaulted in payment of agreed rent of Rs. 175/- per month for the period 1-9-1987 till the date of institution of the suit as per Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for short "the Act of 1950". (2) the tenant has wilfully caused substantial damage to the suit property as per Section 13(1)(b). (3) the suit premises is required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord as per Section 13(1)(h) for use or occupation by himself and also keeping in view the growing family requirements as well as for the establishment of business of his two sons. 3. The defendant contested the aforesaid grounds of eviction by filing the written statement. On the ground of default of payment in agreed rent, he advanced a plea that no arrears of rent were due for the period 1-9-87 till the date of institution of the suit since after the determination of rent he had deposited the rent with the trial Court. 4. As regards the second ground of substantial damage to the suit property, defendant contested the same by contending that no damage whatsoever had been caused to it. 5. 4. As regards the second ground of substantial damage to the suit property, defendant contested the same by contending that no damage whatsoever had been caused to it. 5. As regards the third ground of reasonably and bona fide requirement of the landlord, the defendant contested the same on the ground that the landlord had no such necessity to occupy the suit premises and on the question of comparative hardship, the defendant contested the same contending that he would be put to great difficulty if the rented suit premises is being vacated from him since he has no other alternative accommodation available to him for running his business whereas, the plaintiff has no such immediate necessity to occupy the suit premises since the plaintiff had got two shops and in one shop the plaintiff himself is running the Tailoring business while in the second shop his eldest son Kanhaiyalal is learning the Tailoring occupation. 6. However, on the question of comparative hardship it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the tenant-appellant did not press the said issue before the trial Court. Hence the same is not relevant for consideration. 7. The learned trial Court after framing the issues directed the parties to lead their evidence. As regards first two grounds of eviction i.e. (a) default in payment of agreed rent and (b) substantial damage to the suit property, since the defendant failed to establish the said grounds by leading any cogent and reliable evidence on the record, it was consequently held by the trial Court that the said grounds of eviction are not tenable and issues framed were decided against the defendant. Hence, the only ground which survived for consideration of the Courts below was ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff to occupy the suit premises. The findings recorded by the trial Court on this ground are that the plaintiff had four sons namely; Kanhaiyalal, Ganpatlal, Murari alias Murli and Radheyshyam. The third son Murli after acquiring the skill in Tailoring is sitting idle at home since he does not have any shop available for running the said occupation. His eldest son Kanhaiyalal is learning Tailoring in one shop. The third son Murli after acquiring the skill in Tailoring is sitting idle at home since he does not have any shop available for running the said occupation. His eldest son Kanhaiyalal is learning Tailoring in one shop. As on the date of institution of the suit his third son Radhey Shyam was a student who has left the study to learn the Tailoring and hence the accommodation available with the plaintiff is hardly sufficient to accommodate his four sons for running the business. Hence, he is in dire bona fide need and in imminent necessity to occupy the suit premises which he badly needs for his business. On the question of partial eviction, it was held by the trial Court that the disputed shop is measuring 8 x 10 feet only and hence it is not divisible. On the question of comparative hardship, both the Courts below have recorded the findings that the plaintiff is subjected to great hardship on account of non availability of second shop while he has only one shop where it is extremely difficult for him to accommodate his grown up sons for running the Tailoring business since he does not have any other alternative accommodation available to him and his comparative hardship is much greater than that of the defendant. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position on the subject. Prima facie, I am of the considered view that it is well settled law that the landlord is the best judge of his/her bona fide need and the same has to be objectively considered and appreciated in the light of the cogent, reliable and satisfactory evidence which the landlord has to establish on the record. Prima facie, I am of the considered view that it is well settled law that the landlord is the best judge of his/her bona fide need and the same has to be objectively considered and appreciated in the light of the cogent, reliable and satisfactory evidence which the landlord has to establish on the record. If the suit premises presently in occupation of the landlord is grossly insufficient for use and occupation of for himself and his family, then there is no reason as to why the suit for eviction should not be decreed in the light of settled position of law and also keeping in view that even on comparative hardship which has been objectively considered by both the Courts below on due appreciation of evidence and I am of the considered view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration of this Court as per requirements of Section 100(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides, as under : "100. Second appeal.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law." 9. From the perusal of the grounds urged by the appellant in the memo of appeal as well as the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties at the bar, I do not find any ground which may impel this Court to express its views contrary to the decisions rendered by the Courts below and hence the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are not open to challenge in this appeal. 10. I am fortified in my observations from the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Moti Lal Daulatram Bora v. Murlidhar Ram Chandra Bhutabe, 1996 (9) SCC 392 , Ninge Gowda v. Linge Gowda, 1997 (1) SCC 477 . , Makhan Lal v. Asharfilal, 1997 (9) SCC 604 and Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1968 SC 272. 11. I find that the ratio of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court is fully attracted to this case. 12. , Makhan Lal v. Asharfilal, 1997 (9) SCC 604 and Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1968 SC 272. 11. I find that the ratio of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court is fully attracted to this case. 12. Further, in the matter of Navnit Hammal v. Arjuna Chetty, 1996 (6) SCC 166 , the Apex Court has observed, as under : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the Courts below by the High Court under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower Courts. In the present case the lower appellate Court fairly appreciated the evidence and confirmed the conclusion of the trial Court that suit was not barred by limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate Court was based on no material." 13. I am further fortified in my observations from the following judgments of Supreme Court as well as High Courts : In the matter of Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 . , the Apex Court observed, as under: "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the reliet occur, the Court is not precluded from taking cautious cognisance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 14. Applying the ratio of the above decisions to the instant case, what was required of the respondent-landlord was to establish on the basis of evidence on record in the light of his pleadings, his bona fide need for the requirement of his sons to occupy another shop for betterment of their career prospects with regard to their family business. Applying the ratio of the above decisions to the instant case, what was required of the respondent-landlord was to establish on the basis of evidence on record in the light of his pleadings, his bona fide need for the requirement of his sons to occupy another shop for betterment of their career prospects with regard to their family business. Nothing precludes this Court from taking note of the said subsequent events which are correlated to the bona fide need of the landlord for additional accommodation which should not be underestimated and the suit had rightly been decreed which is not open to challenge. 15. In the matter of Tej Kumar v. Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Hardwar, wherein the Allahabad High Court while dealing with the identical situation in a writ petition filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant arising out of a case under Section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 with reference to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act relating to bona fide requirement of the landlord of non-residential premises to start his independent business observed, as under : "Each adult member of family is entitled to work for his own independent existence - Release of accommodation can be granted to provide a source to augment the income of a family member so that he may lead decent life and cater to the needs of his growing family." 16. This Court while dealing with the question of partial eviction In the matter of Vishvapriya Nagar v. Immamuddin Tailor Master, DNJ (Raj) 482 (sic) where the dispute before this Court was regarding a shop in question which was only 8x9 feet and there was no alternative shop available to the landlord for his occupation observed that questions of partial eviction is no longer resintegra where the tenanted premises is not divisible in nature. 17. 17. I have examined the aforesaid decisions and I am of the view that the ratio of the aforesaid decisions is fully attracted to the instant case for the reason that in view of growing needs of his sons which the landlord has been facing for a considerable spell of time to establish them in the business of Tailoring, the said need having been objectively examined by the Courts below, on the appreciation of evidence, findings are consequently not open to challenge in this appeal and which deserve to be upheld. 18. As a result, I find no merit in the present appeal and no justification for interference with the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below i.e. District Judge, Baran vide judgment and decree dated 5-8- 1998 passed in Civil Appeal No. 26/97 whereby the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Anta dated 14-8-1997 in C.O. No. 55/96 has been confirmed. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The impugned judgment & decree dated 5-8-1998 of the District Judge, Baran confirming the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Anta dated 14-8-1997 are upheld. There will be no order as to costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******