JUDGMENT 1. - This revision is directed against the order dated 6.12.1997 passed by the Special Judge, Merta whereby he reversed the order dated 2.9.1996 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar passed on an application under section 145(5) Cr.P.C. 2. The short facts of the case are that the S.H.O. P.S. Pilwa filed a complaint under section 145 Cr.P.C. before the S.D.M. Parbatsar in respect of the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 232 situate in Village Du diya. It was stated that Ram Kanwar widow of Sujan Singh sold most of the lands and she executed a Will in favour of Guman Kanwar daughter of Bhanwar Singh for the remaining agricultural land. Ram Kanwar and Guman Kanwar both resided in the huts raised on the agricultural land. After the death of Ram Kanwar, Guman Kanwar and Bhanwar Singh resided on the land and they cultivated the land. Kishore Singh (petitioner in this revision), claiming to be the adopted son of Sujan Singh, asserted his right on the land and wanted to take possession. He even got mutation done in his name. The Tehsildar, Parbatsar inspected the site on 16.4.1988 and he found that the possession of the land was that of Guman Kanwar. The S.H.O. prayed that the land be attached. The learned S.D.M. passed preliminary order and attached the land vide order dated 31.7.1991. The Tehsildar, Parbatsar was appointed receiver on the land. An application was filed by Smt. Guman Kanwar to vacate the order of attachment under sub-sec. (5) of Section 145 Cr.P.C. for vacating the order of attachment. After hearing the counsel for parties, the learned S.D.M. vide order dated 2.9.1996 dismissed that application. Smt. Guman Kanwar preferred revision against that order which was allowed by the learned Special Judge on 6.12.1997, vacating the attachment order. 3. Mr. Mohanani contended that the revisionsal Court has interfered in the orders of the Magistrate without sufficient reasons. According to him the order passed by the Magistrate was perfectly legal. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Joshi contended that there is already a revenue suit pending between the parties and therefore no order of attachment could be passed by the Magistrate in the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. and the learned Special Judge has not committed any error in passing the impugned order. 5. I have carefully considered the above arguments. On the other hand, Mr. Joshi contended that there is already a revenue suit pending between the parties and therefore no order of attachment could be passed by the Magistrate in the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. and the learned Special Judge has not committed any error in passing the impugned order. 5. I have carefully considered the above arguments. It is no more in dispute that there is a revenue suit pending in respect of the disputed land. The copies of the order sheets made available during arguments indicate that the revenue suit had been filed by Kishore Singh, petitioner in 1987 i.e. before the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. started. Even order of status quo was passed by the Revenue Court in that matter. 6. It is settled principle of law that once the Revenue Court or Civil Court is seized of the dispute regarding the property, it is not proper for the criminal Court to pass any order of attachment or injunction. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 472 the Apex Court has clearly held that where a civil litigation is pending wherein the question of possession is involved, initiation of parallel proceedings under section 145 of the Code would not be justified and the parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue. It is true that in that case a decree had already been passed by the civil Court, but the principle laid down by the Apex Court is that even when it is found that a civil Court or revenue Court is seized of the dispute, the criminal proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. should not be permitted. Here it will be profitable to read the following observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court:- "When a civil litigation is pending for property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code. There is no scope of doubt or dispute the position that the decree of Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. There is no scope of doubt or dispute the position that the decree of Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation." 7. It is obvious that even when the civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved normally it is improper to initiate parallel proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. 8. This Court following the Apex Court ruling has made similar observations in the cases of Meghraj v. State & Ors., Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1986-395, Udmi Ram v. Dharam Singh, RLW 1988 (2) 269, Pratapvan v. Chhoganath, RLW 1990 (2) 151 & Yaqub All v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cri. L.J. 1376. 9. The cases of Budhi v. Gyana, 1996 Cri. L.J. 616 , Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 (3) Crimes 91, Gajendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 RCC 463 & Gulam Farid v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 RCC 296 cited by Mr. Mohanani are clearly distinguishable. 10. In view of the settled legal position, there is no illegality in the order passed by the Special Judge. 11. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this revision petition which is hereby dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******