S. R. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) -CYNOSURE of attention is the order dated 19. 12. 1997 passed by 2nd addl. District Judge, Dehradun in Civil Revision no. 114 of 1997, Sant Ram and another v. U. P. Jal Nigam and others, the correctness of which has been challenged in the instant petition. The aforesaid revision was preferred against the order dated 14. 7. 1997 passed by the 1st Addl. Civil Judge, (Sr. Division) Dehradun on an application for temporary injunction filed in suit No. 432 of 1997. ( 2 ) THE suit was instituted by Sant Ram and Ratan Singh in their own rights as zam1ndarna/kashtkaran/inhabi-TANTS OF Mauza Kharsi Pargana Jansar bhabar, District Dehradun and also in representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure on behalf of other zamindars/kashtkaran/basindagan of Mauza Kharsi for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from constructing tank for storing water quashing out of springlet in Mauza Kharsi Khet Vishlang pergana Jansar Bhabar, District Dehradun and from channelling the water through pipelines or other means from Mauza Kharsi Khet vishlang to village Hatgaon or any other village. The relief of mandatory injunction seeking removal of the pipelines already laid for channelling the water from Kharsi Khet vishlang Pargana Jansor to village Hatgaon was also claimed by the plaintiffs. The case as set out in the plaint was that the plaintiff and other denizens of village Kharsi in the district of Dehradun owned the SRINGLET and were entitled to use it to the exclusion of any one else as per customs in vogue since time immemorial. Wajeb-ul-arz entries made in the settlement years 1872 and 1884 were cited to magnify their claim over the SPRINGLET. It is also alleged in the plaint that Pargana jansar was partially prohibited zone/area and the laws prevailing in other areas of Uttar pradesh were not applicable in the said area and the rights of the inhabitants were regulated by customs prevailing there. Along with the suit, an application for temporary injunction was filed attended with an affidavit seeking injunction against the defendants and their servants from raising any tank and storing water issuing from the SPRINGLET situate in Kharsi Khat Vishlang Pargana Jhansar. The trial court vide its order dated 14. 7. 1997 declined to grant exparte injunction prayed for and issued notice to the defendants under order 39, Rule 3 CPC. The trial court vide its order dated 14. 7. 1997 declined to grant exparte injunction prayed for and issued notice to the defendants under order 39, Rule 3 CPC. The reason spelt out was that the plaintiffs had prayed for mandatory injunction as welt and no case for grant of exparte injunction was made out. Aggrieved by the order, the plaintiffs preferred a revision which culminated is being allowed on 19. 12. 97. The order of the revisional court embodied direction for the defendants to maintain status quo and not to make any construction on the suit land. ( 3 ) SRI Sabhajeet Yadav, appearing for the petitioner canvassed that no revision lay against an order refusing to grant exparte injunction and issuing notice to the defendants under Rule 3, Order 39 CPC 1908 (in short the code) and in any case, the revisional court was not vindicated in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the trial court. Sri RAJESH TANDON representing the plaintiff respondents made a rival submission that the order dated 14. 12. 1997 in so far as the trial court refused to grant exparte injunction, approximated to a case decided within the ambit of Section 115 of the Code and as such, it was revisable and on merit, the revisional court was justified in injuncting the defendants from making any construction on the suit land. 12. 1997 in so far as the trial court refused to grant exparte injunction, approximated to a case decided within the ambit of Section 115 of the Code and as such, it was revisable and on merit, the revisional court was justified in injuncting the defendants from making any construction on the suit land. ( 4 ) THE case posses a vexed question whether the order declining to issue exparte injunction and issuing notices to the defendants under Rule 3, Order 39, of the Code is a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code which, as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh, reads as under: "115a.-Revision-The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before August 1, 1978, and the district Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted beforesuch date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be make such order in the case as it thinks fit. Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation decided by the district Court, the High Court alone shall, be competent to make an order under this section: (i) provided further that the High court or the District Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order, including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings; except where- (ii) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings; or (iii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation.-In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding". The words "of the value of the twenty thousand rupees and above including such suits or other proceeding instituted before August 1, 1970 have been substituted by the words "of the value exceeding one lakh rupees or such higher amount not exceeding five lakhs rupees as the High Court may from time to time fix, by notification published in the official gazettee including such suit or other proceeding instituted before the date or commencement of the Uttar Pradesh civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 or as the case may be, the date of commencement of such notification" by U. P. Act 17 of 1991. ( 5 ) IN H. Bevis and Company v. Ram benari, the opinion on the question whether an order refusing ad interim exparte injunction and issuing notice to the defendant under rule 3, Order 39 is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 (R) was parted company between the Judges constituting the Bench. Mushtaq ahmad, J. held the view that such an order was appealable and in any case, a revision lay against such an order under Section 115 of the Code. The quintessence of the view held by the learned Judge is extracted below. ". . . . . Now Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code allows the court in which the suit is filed to "grant a temporary injunction. . . . . until the disposal of the suit or until further order", and in Rule 3 of that order it is provided that the Court shall direct notice of the application to be given to the Opp. Party, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay. That is to say, it may not issue notice to the Opposite Party, where there is a danger of this object being lost, and issues an injunction, of course ad-interim straight-way. Such an order, in my opinion, would be covered by the words "until further order" which Rule 1 of Order 39 concludes, It was argued that an order of this character could not be conceived to be one on the application for temporary injunction. Such an order, in my opinion, would be covered by the words "until further order" which Rule 1 of Order 39 concludes, It was argued that an order of this character could not be conceived to be one on the application for temporary injunction. Where an application purporting to be for such injunction is filed, there are three alternative orders that may possibly be made by the Court on that application. Firstly it may be rejected forthwith secondly, its final disposal may be postponed until after the opposite party has been heard, no ad-interim injunction, being granted and firstly, an order granting an ad-interim injunction, and then after the court has heard the opposite party, disposing of the application finally. In all these cases, it would be an order essentially on the application for temporary injunction, there being no other application at the time for that purpose. If the order is to take effect not for the period of the pendency of the suit, that is to say to use the words of Rule 1, Order 39, not "until the disposal of the suit", it may take effect only "until further orders" if it is one only for ad-interim injunction having the effect of a stay order. In all these cases, it would be an order under Rule 1. Order 39 and not outside that rule. This being so, again in all these cases it would be appealable under Order 43, rule 1 (R) of the Code. " The learned Judge held that the order refusing to grant ad-interim injunction exparte is as much appealable as the final order granting or refusing injunction and went on to observe. "even if the said order was not appealable, I would have been inclined to set it aside in revision in view of the particular facts of the case, to which I shall refer in the paragraph following. " ( 6 ) DESAI, J (as he then was) took a contrary view and held as under: "refusing to grant exparte injunction does not amount to refusing to grant it altogether. If the trial court had granted exparte injunction, the Opposite party would have been entitled to appeal from it, because as I stated earlier, an exparte injunction is still an injunction order under Rule 1 and 2 and does not require to be followed up by another injunction after hearing the opposite party. If the trial court had granted exparte injunction, the Opposite party would have been entitled to appeal from it, because as I stated earlier, an exparte injunction is still an injunction order under Rule 1 and 2 and does not require to be followed up by another injunction after hearing the opposite party. But if exparte injunction is refused, the applicant has no remedy by way of an appeal. . . . . . . . " Desai, J. placed reliance on Luis v, Luis, in which Wilkinson and Shephard JJ, ruled that there is no provision for an appeal against an order issuing notice to the defendant before granting temporary injunction against him. They observed:"the order made by the subordinate judge was not the formal expression of his decision on the question whether an injunction should be granted or not. A discretion is vested in the court by section 494 of refusing to grant a temporary injunction if satisfied that the object of granting an injunction will not be defeated and no appeal is provided in case of his refusal. " ( 7 ) THE matter was referred to a third judge-Agarwala, J. , for his opinion on the following questions; (1) Is an order refusing to issue an adinterim injunction as allowed by rule 8 of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code appealable? (2) If the order is appealable, did the appellant make out a case for the trial courts granting such an injunction? (3) If the order is not appealable, can it be question by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction? agarwala, J. , answered the first question in negative in the following words:- "i, therefore, think that when the court refuses to grant an exparte injunction issues notice to the other side of the application for injunction, it has passed no order under Rule 1 or 2 and, therefore, no appeal can lie from such an order. But when the court grants the application for injunction exparte, an appeal lies because the application made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 is disposed of. " in view of the answer to question No. 1, the second question it was held by the learned judge, did not arise. But when the court grants the application for injunction exparte, an appeal lies because the application made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 is disposed of. " in view of the answer to question No. 1, the second question it was held by the learned judge, did not arise. As regards the third question, the learned Judge answered it in affirmative in the following words: "where the court below does not apply its mind to the provisions of Order 39, rule 3 when it refuses to grant an exparte injunction, it acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction and a revision may lie. Under Rule 3 of Order 39, what the court has to see when requested to grant an exparte injunction is whether "the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay. " In the present case, the court did not apply its mind to this aspect of the case at all. On the facts of the Case, I am satisfied that it was a fit case in which an exparte injunction should have been granted" x X X X X having regard to all thecircumstances of the case, I think this court should interfere in revision and grant the ad-interim injunction prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant. I would therefore, treat this appeal as revision and allow it. " ( 8 ) IT would thus appear from the ratioeination of the aforestated decision that an order declining to grant injunction and issuing notices to defendants under Order 3, rule 39, is not appealable under Order 43 rule 1{r) of the Code but when the exparte ad-interim injunction is refused illegally, the court can, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Section 115 of the Code, grant ad-interim injunction. It may be recalled that Order 43, Rule 1 (R) provides for an appeal against an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 2a, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39. The word order here means the forma! expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree-Section 2 (4) of the Code. It may be recalled that Order 43, Rule 1 (R) provides for an appeal against an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 2a, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39. The word order here means the forma! expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree-Section 2 (4) of the Code. It cannot be gain-said that an order issuing notice to the defendant on an application for temporary injunction under rule 1 or rule 2 and declining to grant exparte ad-interim injunction is not the formal expression of the decision of the court on the application for grant of temporary injunction. ( 9 ) IN Rajvir Singh v. 7th Addl. District judge, Muzaffarnagar, the trial court on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 CPC directed notices to be issued to the defendants under Rule 3, Order 39 CPC there was nothing to indicate that any ad-interim injunction was pressed and was refused". D. R. Seth, J, held that such an order as revisable, and therefore, "revision was rightly preferred". The learned Judge, however, held that the revisional court may direct the trial court to reckon with the question of grant of injunction even before the notices are issued and objections are raised but it could not extend its jurisdiction to the extent of granting injunction which the appellate court could have done in respect of an appeal under Order 43, rule 1 (R ). The interim order granted while disposing of the said revision application was held not in consonance with the procedure laid down for the proceedings. " ( 10 ) A similar question cropped up in the case of Arya Pritinidhi Sabha v. Man Mohan tiwari J. K. Mathur, J. , held that "the order refusing to pass an exparte order would amount to a "case decided" in that observed the judge, "it can have serious effect on the right of the party concerned. In the facts of that case, the court granted injunction "until disposal of the application for injunction by the trial court". In the facts of that case, the court granted injunction "until disposal of the application for injunction by the trial court". ( 11 ) IN Iqbal Singh v. Chalan Singh, it was held that the order granting, injunction whether exparte or after hearing the parties which falls within the scope of Rule 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the Code shall be appealable under clause (R) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the code irrespective of whether a notice on application is also directed to issue to the defendants or not but an order declining to pass any order under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 of the Code and merely issuing a notice on the application for temporary injunction to the defendants, does not appear to be an order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC and would not therefore, be appealable under clause (R) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code. ( 12 ) RULE 3 is indissolubly an integral part of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 in that it lays down the procedure which is essential to be followed by the courts where an application for injunction is filed under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39. Normally, the procedure is that no injunction shall be granted under Rule 1 or rule 2 of Order 39 without giving notice on the application to the Opp. party, except where the court for reason to be recorded in writing, is of opinion that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. The power to grant injunction, albeit, includes powers to reject the application for temporary injunction but what is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 (R) is an order granting injunction with or without notice and an order rejecting the application for grant of the injunction under Rule 1 or Rule 2 and not an order just issuing notice under Rule 3 of Order 39. In other words, refusal to grant exparte injunction is not appealable. ( 13 ) AS a result of the foregoing discussion, 1 am of the considered view that the order dated 14. 7. 97 passed by the trial court in the instant case was not appealable under order 43, Rule 1 (R) of the Code. However, the order is tantamount to a "case which has been decided. ( 13 ) AS a result of the foregoing discussion, 1 am of the considered view that the order dated 14. 7. 97 passed by the trial court in the instant case was not appealable under order 43, Rule 1 (R) of the Code. However, the order is tantamount to a "case which has been decided. " Within the meaning of Section 115-A of the Code which empowers the High court or the District Court, as the case may be, to call for the record of the case and satisfy on three counts; (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction (b)that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision (See M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapoor ). The expression "case" is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action. The expression case is a word or comprehensive import, which includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted or anything contained in Section 115 of the Code to the entirety of the proceedings in a civil court. To interpret the expression case, as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying the relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice but every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as "case decided within the meaning of Section 115. A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as "case decided within the meaning of Section 115. The expression case includes civil proceedings but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court or the District Court as the case may be, there would be no warrant for equating it to a suit alone; (See Baldevdas v. Filmistan Distributors and S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon ). The revisional court may "make such order in the case as it think fit" but it must be borne in mind that the revisional power under Section 115-A of the Code is circumscribed in the limits of keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Revision power does not comprehend the power exercisable by the appellate court and under the writ of prohibition of mandamus. It is distinguishable from the appellate lower in the sense that in appeal, the entire proceedings are before the appellate court which has been ceded the power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limitation, if any, while in revision, whatever power the revisional court may or may not have, the power to review the evidence is conspicuous by its absence unless the statue expressly confers that power. ( 14 ) IMPLICIT in the order dated 14. 7. 1997 is the opinion of the court that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case that the object of granting the injunction prayed for would be defeated by delay. In a revision preferred against such order the jurisdiction of the revisional court would be circumscribed to the question whether the delay would defeat the object of granting the injunction and if in its opinion, the dealy is likely to defeat the object of granting the injunction, the revisional court may exparte grant appropriate injunction until further orders and after hearing both the parties, remit the case to the trial. court for disposal of the injunction application with the direction, if necessary that the injunction granted by it would remain operative until the disposal of the injunction application by the trial court. court for disposal of the injunction application with the direction, if necessary that the injunction granted by it would remain operative until the disposal of the injunction application by the trial court. It may be observed that while exercising its revisional power the court must bear in mind the distinction between appellate power and revisional power. ( 15 ) THE revisional court in the instant case seems to neve clutched at the appellate power which is distinct from the revisional power and passed an order of injunction on appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the case which function was yet to be performed by the trial court in that the trial court had only issued notice to the petitioners on the application for temporary injunction. The revisional court erroneously observed at any basis that the application for termporary injunction had been rejected by the trial court. In my opinion, the only course open to the revisional court was to advert itself to the question whether the delay in granting injunction would render the object of injunction nugatory and, if in its opinion, the delay was likely to defeat the object of granting the injunction, it could grant ad interim injunction until further orders and after hearing the parties, relegate the matter to the trial court for disposal of the injuction application on its intrinsic merits after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties. The manner in which the revisional power has been exercised in this case, does not commend itself for acceptance by this court. However, in view of the statements made across the bar, I feel inclined to dispose of the writ petition finally attached with the direction that the trial court shall hear the parties and dispose of the application for temporary injunction on its intrinsic merit within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order and till then, the order of status quo passed by the revisional court shall remain operative. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the above directions. Writ petition disposed. Trial court directed to dispose of the injunction application on merits within one month, status quo order to remain operative till then. .