Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 27.8.96 (Annexure 1), by which the petitioner was declared disqualified to hold the post of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred as ``the Act). (2). The facts and circumstances given rise to this case are that the petitioner was elected as the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Arthan, Panchayat Samiti Gadhi district Banswara in January, 1994. A complaint was filed against the petitioner that he incurred disqualification as his wife gave birth to the third child on 19.5.96, i.e., subsequent to the cut-off date, viz., 27.11.1995, and, thus, was liable to be removed from the post of Sarpanch under the provisions of Section 19-L of the Act. On the said complaint, respondent No.3, the Block Development Officer issued a show cause notice to the petitioner and the petitioner denied the facttum of having the child after the cut off date. In reply to the show cause notice he submitted the Certificate of Anand Maternity Home and Surgical Hospital, Banswara wherein it has been certified that the petitioner had a child on 17.10.95. Moreover, he filed a Certificate of Birth issued by the Office of the Government under the Birth & Death Registration Rules, 1969 showing the same date of birth of the petitioners child. Respondent No.3 submitted a report that the child was born after the cut off date and, thus, the respondent No.4, the Chief Executive Officer passed the impugned order removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Hence this petition. (3). Heard Mr. Mridul Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. D.S. Gehlot, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. (4). Under the provisions of Section 39 of the Act, the Chief Executive Officer is empowered to remove the holder of the post on incurring such disqualification only if he admits the grounds of disqualification. In case he disputes the allegations of having the third child after the cut off date, the provisions of Section 40 are automatically attracted as the provision of Section 39 are subject to the provisions of Section 40 of the Act, which provides that in case of denial of factum of having a third child after cut-off date, i.e., the ground of disqualification, the enquiry shall be entrusted to the District Judge. Therefore, if the provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act are read simutaneously, the enquiry regarding disqualification in such a case, falls within the exclusive domain of the Judicial Authority, In the instant case, as the petitioner has disputed the factum of having the third child after the cut off date, the Authority concerned was under an obligation to refer the question of disqualification to be adjudicated upon by the learned District Judge as the enquiry envisaged did not fall within the exclusive field of power of the Chief Executive Officer. In the instant case, no such enquiry has been held by the Judicial Officer and the impugned order is liable to be set-aside only on this ground. This view is fully fortified by the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Ajmera vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1). (5). It has been hither to uncontroverted legal positionthat where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that may or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. (Vide Taylor vs. Taylor (2); Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor (3); Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (4); Patna Improvement Trust vs. Lakshmi Devi (5); State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh and others (6); Nike Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (7); Ramchandra Keshav Adke vs. Govind Joti Chavare and others (8); Chettiam Veettil Ammad vs. Taluk Land Board (9); State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldanna (10); A.K. Roy and another vs. State of Punjab and others (11); State of Mizoram vs. Biakchhawana (12); and J.N. Ganetra vs. Morvi Municipality, Morvi (13). (6). In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Jagdish Lal and another (14); and Ballavdas Aggrawala vs. J.C. Chakraverty (15), the Apex Court held that once the Act entrusted particular authority with certain powers, the same can be exercised only by the said authority person/person and by no body else. Machinery provided in the Act must be followed in enforcing its provisions. Similarly, when a statute creates an authority to decide a matter, no other authority has power to decide the same. In Purtabpur Company Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar (16), the Apex Court observed as under :- ``The powers exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6 (1) is statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. Similarly, when a statute creates an authority to decide a matter, no other authority has power to decide the same. In Purtabpur Company Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar (16), the Apex Court observed as under :- ``The powers exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6 (1) is statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power, he cannot obligate his responsibilities in favour of any one; not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. it was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner ...... The Executive Officers, entrusted with statutory discretion, may, in some cases, be obliged to take into account consideration of public policy and in some context the policy of a Minister or the Government as the whole when it is relevant factor in weighing the policy but this will not absolve them from the duty to exercise the personal judgment in individual case. (7). Similar view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad vs. Ghan Shyam Das Utpal (17); Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another, (18); Chandrika Jha vs. State of Bihar and others (19) and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat (20). (8). The impugned order is a non-speaking order as it is not clear as on what basis the Authority has reached the conclusion that the petitioner had the third child after the cut off date. The evidence produced by the petitioner was admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act as explained by the Honble Supreme Court in Harpal Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (21). In Mohammed Ikram Hussain vs. State of U.P. (22), it has been held that entries in the school register amount to evidence under the Indian Evidence Act as the same had been made ``ante litem motam. The certificate produced by the petitioner had been issued by the competent authority under the Birth & Death Registration Rules, the Authority ought to have given reasons why such an admissible piece of evidence was liable to be discarded. (9). The certificate produced by the petitioner had been issued by the competent authority under the Birth & Death Registration Rules, the Authority ought to have given reasons why such an admissible piece of evidence was liable to be discarded. (9). It is a case of removal of a duly elected Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and the norms of democracy require very strict adherence to the statutory provisions as even minimal deviation from statutory requirement would sobotage the scheme of providing full-fledged protection by adopting the provisions of judicial enquiry in case of denial of incurring disability by having the third child after the cut off date. The impugned order has been passed in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions and, thus, liable to be set-aside. (10). The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.8.96 (Annexure1) is quashed. However, the respondents are at liberty to refer the matter to the learned District Judge for judicial enquiry, if the respondents are still willing to proceed against the petitioner. No order as to costs.