Judgment 1. Murugan, the petitioner herein was convicted for the following offences is three counts. 1. Under Sec.6 (1), Rule 3 (1) and 2, 2. Sec.6(1), Rule 4 (1)2 and 3 and 3. Sec.7(1), Rule 12 of Tamil Nadu Factories Act, 1948 and Tamil Nadu Factories Rules, 1950 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000 on each count, in default to undergo to two months simple imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of this revision are the following: The petitioner who is the proprietor of Vinu Match Works is manufacturing match boxes. On 13.3.1990 at about 4 p.m. P.W.1 Assistant Inspector of Factories inspected the factory and found 12 persons were working and found out that the factory was working with the aid of the power. Since there was no licence to run the factory, P.W.1 sent a show cause notice to the petitioner asking for an explanation. Ex.P-1 is the report prepared by P.W.I at the time of inspection. In the said report all the twelve persons who were found working at the relevant time in the factory had signed. On the basis of the report as stated earlier, Ex.P-2 show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and since it was not served on him it was returned unserved to P.W.1. Thereafter in person the said show cause notice was served on the petitioner. The acknowledgement is Ex.P-4. Ex.P-5 is the reply sent by the petitioner. In the said reply the petitioner stated that only five persons were working in his factory and as such, he is not bound to obtain any licence. Since this explanation was not satisfactory, P. W. 1 sent another letter Ex.P-6 proposing to launch a prosecution against him. This letter also was returned unserved. Therefore, P.W.1 served the said letter on the petitioner in person and obtained acknowledgement Ex.P-7. Thereafter, after obtaining sanction Ex.P-10, P.W.2, filed a complaint. 3. During the course of trial, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined. On the side of the defence, the petitioner examined himself as D.W.1 and examined another person by name Natarajan as D.W.2. The case of the defence is that the petitioner was having three factories and one of such factory is Vinu Match Factory in which only five persons were working. 1 and 2 were examined. On the side of the defence, the petitioner examined himself as D.W.1 and examined another person by name Natarajan as D.W.2. The case of the defence is that the petitioner was having three factories and one of such factory is Vinu Match Factory in which only five persons were working. Therefore, it is stated that unless there is a material to show that twelve persons were working in the same premises, it cannot be called to be a ‘Factory’. 4. On considering the materials produced by both the parties, the trial court found the accused guilty of the above offences on three counts and imposed fine as referred to above. 5. As against the trial courts judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal before the lower appellate court in which in turn confirmed the conviction imposed by the trial court. Hence, this revision. 6. Mr.R.Antony Xavier, the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed into service, challenging the impugned judgments, the following three contentions: 1. According to the report Ex.P-1 prepared by P.W.I at the time of inspection P.W.I found that 10 women and 2 men were working. But in the evidence he would state that 10 men and 2 women were found working. This is a material contradiction. Therefore, the prosecution case cannot be believed. 2. Under Sec.105 of the Factories Act, a complaint could be filed and cognizance could be taken by the learned Magistrate only on the complaint of Inspector of Factories. In the instant case the Assistant Inspector had filed a complaint and the learned Judicial Magistrate took congnizance on that. So, this is not a valid congnizance. 3. Under Sec.8 of the Factories Act, only an Inspector or an Additional Inspector could alone conduct inspection and file a complaint. In this case, the Assistant Inspector has filed the complaint, Moreover, the officer who granted sanction in this case cannot be said to be competent authority as provided under Sec.8 of the, Act. Furthermore in the instant case, the original sanction had not been produced. Ex.P-10 which had been marked in this case is only a copy. 7. On these three contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.R.Antony Xavier submitted that the prosecution case cannot be sustained and as such, the petitioner is entitled to be acquitted. 8. Furthermore in the instant case, the original sanction had not been produced. Ex.P-10 which had been marked in this case is only a copy. 7. On these three contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.R.Antony Xavier submitted that the prosecution case cannot be sustained and as such, the petitioner is entitled to be acquitted. 8. Mr.Gunasekaran, the learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, in support of the impugned judgments, would contend that all these three contentions have no substance, inasmuch as these aspects have been dealt with by the trial court and the lower appellate, court and therefore, there is no need for interference by this Court. 9. Mr.R.Antony Xavier, in support of his contention, cited the decisions in State by Public Prosecutor v. P.Kaleeswaran, Andiappan and others State by Public Prosecutor v. P.Kaleeswaran, Andiappan and others 1988 L. W. (Crl.) 500, and S.K.Gue and another v. State S.K.Gue and another v. State, 1987 Crl.L.J. 882. In the judgments in 1988 L. W. (Crl.) 500 and 1987 Crl.L.J. 882, it is observed that cognizance cannot be said to be valid, in the absence of the complaint by the Inspector of Factories or in the absence of the valid sanction obtained from the competent sanctioning authority. As regards the proposition laid down by these judgments, there is no dispute with regard to the point that under Sec.105 of the Factories Act, only a complaint given by the Assistant Inspector of Factories would be valid one and congnizance taken on the invalid complaint could not be sustained. Admittedly, in this case, on perusal of the records it is seen that the complaint was filed by the Assistant Inspector of Factories. On being returned by the Magistrate to submit the complaint along with the sanction, the sanction dated 25.5.1990 was filed before the Court of Magistrate. Only on the basis of the said sanction a copy which had been marked in this case as Ex.P-10. Congnizance was taken under Sec.105 of the Factories Act. The complaint could be entertained by the court either on the complaint by the Inspector or with the previous sanction in writing of an Inspector. Since in this case though the complaint was filed by the Assistant Inspector of Factories, the sanction which was obtained from the Inspector of Factories filed along with the said complaint would make the congnizance valid. Since in this case though the complaint was filed by the Assistant Inspector of Factories, the sanction which was obtained from the Inspector of Factories filed along with the said complaint would make the congnizance valid. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel with reference to the invalidity of congnizance does not merit acceptable. 10. As regards the contradiction with reference to the number of men and women working in the factory at the time of inspection, I can only say that P.W.1 who accompanied by other officers inspected the factory and obtained signatures with the help of assistance, from those persons. So, the earliest report in this case is Ex.P-1, A perusal of Ex.P-1 would make it clear that 10 women workers and 2 men workers were working. In order to show that other assistants accompanied him, P.W.1 obtained their signatures. It is also to be noticed that in the index column of their name and address, it is mentioned about their designation like Foreman, Professor and workers etc. Therefore, mere mentioning of P.W.I in the court that 10 men and 2 women were working, instead of 10 women and 2 men, would not, in my view, affect the credibility of the prosecution case, especially when both the courts below gave a factual finding on the basis of Ex.P-1 the report of P.W.1, that 12 persons were found working. Hence, I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Yet another aspect that has to be noticed in this case is that along with the report in the paper there is a letter pad of the said factory on which signatures were obtained. One of them is of one Devarajan-foreman. Suppose if the petitioner had examined the said Devarajan as a defence witness to show that in the said factory only five persons were working and others were working in other factories, then there would be some meaning in it. On the other-hand, the petitioner did not choose to examine him, but however, he examined one Natarajan, a foreman. But, there is no proof at the relevant time that he was working as a Foreman. On the other-hand, the petitioner did not choose to examine him, but however, he examined one Natarajan, a foreman. But, there is no proof at the relevant time that he was working as a Foreman. Therefore, in the absence of the clear proof on the side of the defence that only five persons were working at the relevant time, there is no difficulty for this Court to accept the case of the P.W.I that at the time of the inspection 12 persons were found working. 12. Yet another contention is regarding sanctioning authority i.e., the person who granted sanction was not a competent authority. This submission also, in my view, lacks substance. Both the original sanction filed, which formed part of the record-and its copy Ex.P-10 would go to show that the said sanction was signed by the Inspector of Factories working in the Office of the Deputy Chief Officer at Tirunelveli. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the sanction was not granted by the competent authority: 13. Thus, all these contentions, in my view, do not have any substance, so as to make this Court to interfere with the findings of fact rendered by both the courts below. However, it must, be noted that the sanction was obtained only for two counts namely, (1) Sec.6(1)Rule 3(1)2(2), Sec.6(1)Rule 4(1)2 and 3. But in the instant case, the conviction was imposed not only for these counts but also under Sec.7(1), Rule 12 which is not admittedly mentioned in the sanction. Therefore, as correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as regards the third count I conclude that the conviction imposed on the third count has to be set aside. Accordingly, the conviction on that count is set aside. I deem it fit to confirm the conviction as regards the other counts except the third count. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court, while imposing conviction, sentenced the petitioner to pay a fine of Rs.2,000. In view of the setting aside of the said conviction, the amount of fine of Rs.2,000 has to be refunded to the petitioner. 14. As regards the question of sentence, Mr.R.Antorny Xavier, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would request the court to reduce the fine. The learned Government Advocate was heard on this aspect. In view of the setting aside of the said conviction, the amount of fine of Rs.2,000 has to be refunded to the petitioner. 14. As regards the question of sentence, Mr.R.Antorny Xavier, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would request the court to reduce the fine. The learned Government Advocate was heard on this aspect. In view of the facts and circumstances, I feel that interests of justice would be met by reducing the fine from Rs.2,000 to Rs.250 for each count, and accordingly reduced. The balance amount of fine is directed to be refunded to the petitioner. 15. With the above observation, the revision is dismissed. Consequently, Crl.M.RNo.2710 of 1996 is dismissed.