Pratapsang Naranji Jadeja v. STATE — 1998 DIGILAW 105 (GUJ)

K. G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THE fourth rcspondent a Public Limited Company requested the state Government to acquire certain lands for the purpose of a housing Colony for its employees and steps were initiated for the acquisition of lands belonging to the petitioners herein. The petitioners are agriculturists having landed properties in village Moti Khavadi comprising survey Nos. 43 paiki and 224. The petitioners have alleged that the lands sought to be acquired are agricultural lands having high potential value and if their lands are acquired, the petitioners would be denied of their only source of earning. The petitioners came to know of Sec. 4 notification published and they filed objections on 3rd april, 1996, wherein they contended that the State Government had not followed the procedure prescribed under Secs. 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act and also under Rules 3 and 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. According to the petitioners, no inquiry was conducted by the authorities under Sec. 40 of the Land acquisition Act and the objection raised by the petitioners that alternative lands were available was not considered by the authorities. The petitioners have also contended that if these lands are acquired, it would completely destory Marine National Park along with its valuable flora and fauna. The petitioners have alleged that the Land Acquisition officer had not given a fair hearing to the petitioners and the objections raised by them were not properly considered and that the authorities failed to comply with the provisions contained in Sec. 39 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners contend that there is serious violation of procedure laid down under Part-VII of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners have prayed for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction to quash the notifications issued under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 2 ) AN Under Secretary to Revenue Department has sworn to an affidavit denying the allegations contained in the petition. It is contended that the objections raised by the petitioners were fully considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and the petitioners were given sufficient notice regarding inquiry under Rule-4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter mentioned as "rules" ). It is contended that the objections raised by the petitioners were fully considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and the petitioners were given sufficient notice regarding inquiry under Rule-4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter mentioned as "rules" ). It is contended that there was no violation of Sec. 39 of the Land Acquisition Act as alleged by the petitioners in view of Central Amendment by Act No. 68/1984. The allegations regarding violation of environment Protection Act are denied in the affidavit. ( 3 ) A Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) has also sworn to an affidavit denying the allegations made in the Special Civil Application. It is stated in the affidavit that the petitioners were served with notices and they filed objections. The notices were published in his Office as well as in the Office of Gram Panchayat. All the petitioners were given notices to file their objections on or before 6. 4. 1996 and personal hearing was afforded to them on 10. 4. 1996. On 10. 4. 1996, two land owners had remained present. The inquiry contemplated under Rule-4 was held and the report was submitted to the Government on 2. 1. 1996. The Company had also sent letters to the land owners on 15. 9. 1994 informing land owners to remain present at the Companys Office. All the petitioners were not present and only two land owners were present and they demanded that Rs. 2 lacs per bigha must be paid to them. The Company had offered Rs. 17,500/- per Bigha for Jirayat land and Rs. 35,000/- per Bigha for Bagayat land. It is stated that demand made by the land holders for Rs. 2 lacs per Bigha was highly excessive. Availability of alternative land was also considered. The market value of the land in question was ascertained having regard to Secs. 23 and 24 of the Act. The Company had offered reasonable price for land to the land owners. The allegations and contentions raised in the affidavits-in-reply are denied in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioners. The statements made in the affidavits are denied and the petitioners have reiterated that they were not given effective participation in the inquiry held by the Collector. ( 4 ) WHEN the Special Civil Application camp-up for admission, learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Addl. The statements made in the affidavits are denied and the petitioners have reiterated that they were not given effective participation in the inquiry held by the Collector. ( 4 ) WHEN the Special Civil Application camp-up for admission, learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Addl. Advocate General and the Counsel for the 4th respondent-Company agreed that the petition could be heard finally and disposed of. We have elaborately heard the matter. ( 5 ) THE Counsel for the petitioners contended that there was violation of various provisions contained in Land Acquision Act and also the provisions contained in the Land acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. It was argued that Sec. 6 notification itself is illegal and contrary to Sec. 39 of the Land Acquisition Act. The argument of the petitioners Counsel is to the effect that Sec. 4 notification was issued by the Government prior to the consent of the appropriate Government. In this case, the land is sought to be acquired for the purpose of a house colony of the employees of the 4th respondent- company. As regards acquisition of land for the purpose of Company, Secs. 38 to 44-B of part -VII of the Land Acquisition Act would apply. As per Sec. 41, the Company has to enter into an agreement with the Government and before any such agreecment is entered into, the consent of the Government is necessary. Sec. 40 of the Act says that such consent shall not be given unless the Government is satisfied that the purpose of proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for providing any amenities to such workers or for construction of any building for any Company who is engaged in any industry or work which is for public purpose or for construction of any work which is likely to prove useful to the public. Before entering into any agreement with the Company, the Government shall consider the report of the officer who held enquiry under Sec. 40 and also the report if any submitted under Sec. 5-A of the Act. Sec. 41 says that before such agreement, the Government should be satisfied that the entire cost of the acquisition is paid to the Government and the company would hold the land in terms of the agreement. Sec. 41 says that before such agreement, the Government should be satisfied that the entire cost of the acquisition is paid to the Government and the company would hold the land in terms of the agreement. The Government should also be satisfied that the Company will carry out the purpose for which the land is acquired within the time stipulated in the agreement. ( 6 ) SECTION 39 of the Land Acquisition Act is another relevant provision. The purpose and intent of this Section is that various proceedings relating to acquisition shall not be put in force unless the consent of the appropriate Government is obtained and an agreement is entered into with the Company. Prior to the amendment by Act 68/1984, sec. 39 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was to the following effect :"39. Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary : the provisions of Secs. 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, not unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned. "acquisition and requisitioning of property being a matter included in the List-Ill of seventh Schedule, the State Legislature is competent to bring out amendment to Land acquisition Act, 1894 subject to the limitation prescribed under Art. 254 of the constitution. The Gujarat State Legislature amended the various provisions in the Land acquisition Act, 1894, by Act 20 of 1965. Sec. 39 of the Principal Act was amended. In sec. 39 of the Principal Act, for the figure "6" the figure "4" was substituted. Act 20/1965 received the assent of the President and it came into force on 9th July, 1965. The effect of the amendment of Sec. 39 by Act 20/1965 is that in the case of acquisition of land for any company, Secs. 4 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force unless the consent of the state Government is obtained and an agreement is executed with the Company. Section 39 of the Principal Act was amended by the Parliament by Act 68 of 1984. For the figures and brackets of "secs. 6 to 37 (both inclusive)" the figures and brackets "secs. 6 to 16 (both inclusive) and Secs. 18 to 37 (both inclusive)" were substituted. The effect of such an amendment was that Secs. Section 39 of the Principal Act was amended by the Parliament by Act 68 of 1984. For the figures and brackets of "secs. 6 to 37 (both inclusive)" the figures and brackets "secs. 6 to 16 (both inclusive) and Secs. 18 to 37 (both inclusive)" were substituted. The effect of such an amendment was that Secs. 6 to 37, except Sec. 17, which relate to acquisition of land in cases of urgency, shall not be put in force unless consent of the appropriate Government is obtained and an agreement is reached by the Government with the Company. ( 7 ) THE contention of the petitioners Counsel is that the Sec. 39 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Gujarat State Legislature by Act 20/1965 shall be the law applicable in the State of Gujarat and since Sec. 4 notification was published on 15. 2. 1996 and the consent of the State Government was obtained on 1. 6. 1996, there is infraction of Sec. 39 of the Act. therefore, the very notification under Sec. 4. which is the foundation for this acquisition is illegal and void. ( 8 ) LEARNED Addl. Advocate General and the Counsel for the 4th respondent- company contended that the amendment of Sec. 39 by the Gujarat State Legislature by act No. 20/1965 had no application, as there was subsequent amendment of Sec. 39 by the Parliament, Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the respondent that amendment of Sec. 39 effected by the Parliament by Act No. 68/1894 shall have over-riding effect over the gujarat Amendment Act in view of Art. 254 of the Constitution. It is argued that there is repugnancy between law made by that State Legislature and the law made by the parliament in respect of same subject matter and therefore, the law made by the legislature of the State to the extent of its repugnancy to the law made by the Parliament shall be void. Art. 254 of the Constitution reads as follows :"254. Art. 254 of the Constitution reads as follows :"254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the legislatures of States (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provisions of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail, and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provision of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in the State: provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament form enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the state. "article 254 of the Constitution enables the State Legislature to enact any provisions which may go repugnant to the law made by the Parliament in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list. If any such law is made by the State Legislature with respect to any matters included in the Concurrent List, the law so made by the legislature of such State shall prevail in the State if it has been reserved for consideration of the President and has received his assent. Proviso to Art. 254 (2) says that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to. amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Originally under Sec. 39 of the Act, before the consent of the appropriate Government is obtained, Secs. amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Originally under Sec. 39 of the Act, before the consent of the appropriate Government is obtained, Secs. 6 to 37 should not have been put in force. This was amended by the Gujarat State Legislature and instead of figure 6, figure 4 was added and this amendment of the Slate Legislature received assent of the President. This amended law prevailed in the Stale till the Parliament amended Sec. 39 by the Act no. 68/1984 and the amendment brought out by the Parliament by Act No. 68/1984 comes within the proviso to Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, whatever amendment made by the State Legislature is repealed by amendment of Sec. 39 by Act no. 68/1984 and the law so amended shall prevail over the law made by the State legislature. ( 9 ) A similar question came-up for consideration before this Court in Dinesh Soni and others vs. O. N. G. C. and Anr. , 1994 (2) GLH page 131. By Act No. 20 of 1965 the Gujarat state Legislature amended Sec. 11 of the Act and for the first time introduced the concept of "consent award" and the Collector was empowered to act on agreement between the parties and to pass an award. As per this amended provision if all the parties interested in the land appear before the Collector and agree to the award, he can require such persons to execute an agreement in the prescribed form and pass an award. After this amendment of Sec. 11 by the Gujarat State legislature, the Parliament amended Sec. 11 by Act No. 68 of 1984. By this amendment by the Central Legislature, the Collector is authorised to pass award if the interested persons appear and agree in writing on the matters to be included in the award in the prescribed form. In the above decision, a question arose whether the procedure prescribed by Sec. 11 as amended by the gujarat State Legislature or the procedure prescribed under Sec. 11 as amended by the Central Legislature would apply. It was held by the Division bench of this Court that the law enacted by the Parliament shall prevail, as there is repugnancy. The Division Bench held in Para-36 as under :". . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-ART. It was held by the Division bench of this Court that the law enacted by the Parliament shall prevail, as there is repugnancy. The Division Bench held in Para-36 as under :". . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-ART. (2) of Art. 254 undoubtedly authorises the legislature of a State to enact any provision repugnant to the provisions of any earlier law made by Parliament or existing law with respect to the manner in Concurrent List provided that such law of the legislature of a State is reserved for consideration of the President and has received his assent. In such a contingency the law shall prevail in that State. The State of Gujarat when it enacted Gujarat Act No. 20 of 1965 so as to amend the same and provisions of land Acquisition Act, 1984 as stated hereinabove, it introduced Sub-sees. (2) to (4) in Sec. 11 of the Principal Act. By specifically enacting such provision, the State Legislature permitted the Collector to make award based on an agreement between all the persons interested. It thus, authorised the Collector to make award based on consent or agreement duly signed and executed between the parties. However, the Union Parliament has subsequently with the effect from 29. 4. 1984 enacted Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 so as to introduce Sub-sees. (2) to (4) in Sec. 11 of the Principal Act which achieve the same result which was achieved by Sub-sees. (2) to (4) of Gujarat (Amendment) Act excepting that the procedure prescribed is slightly different. To the extent the procedure by Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 Central Act is different from the procedure prescribed in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the Gujarat Act it can be said that the Union Parliament has made law repugnant to the State law. However, under proviso to Sub-Art. (2) to Art. 254 it was permissible for the Parliament to enact any law at any time with respect to same on which the State has made a law. The Union Parliament was, therefore, competent to make statutory law and it is the said law which would thereafter apply even in the State which has made the law under Art. 254 (2 ). The Union Parliament was, therefore, competent to make statutory law and it is the said law which would thereafter apply even in the State which has made the law under Art. 254 (2 ). In that view of the matter, there is no manner of doubt in holding that the amendment made by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 would apply in the State of gujarat and the State amendment made by the Gujarat Act 20 of 1965 shall not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 10 ) THE same question arose before Supreme Court in S. T. Barai vs. Henry Ah Hoe and anr. , AIR 1983 SC 150 . In that case, Sec. 16 (1) (a) of Prevention of Food Adulteration act was amended by the West Bengal State Legislature by West Bengal State amendment Act of 1973 and by said amendment, offence under Sec. 16 (1) (a) was made punishable with imprisonment for life and, therefore, triable by a Court of Sessions, but later on a change was brought out by Central Amendment Act, 1976 which provided reduced punishment. There the punishment was reduced to 3 years instead of 6 years for the offence punishable under Sec. 16 (1) (a ). The procedure for trial of this offence was also materially altered. The Supreme Court held that when Parliament stepped in and enacted the Central Amendment Act, it being a subsequent law made by Parliament with respect to the same matter, the West Bengal Amendment Act stood impliedly repealed. It is also important to note that Supreme Court observed that whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow, unless a different intention is indicated in section itself. The law has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Para-15 of the said decision, which reads as follows:- "there is no doubt or difficulty as to the law applicable. Art. 254 of the constitution makes provision firstly, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central, and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List, and secondly, for resolving such conflict, art. Art. 254 of the constitution makes provision firstly, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central, and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List, and secondly, for resolving such conflict, art. 254 (1) enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. Clause (1) lays down that if a State law relating to a concurrent subject is repugnant to a Union law relating to that subject, then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, thet Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To the general rule laid down in clause (1), Clause (2) engrafts an exception viz. , that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his consideration, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union, both laws dealing with a concurrent subject. In such a case, the Central Act will given way to the State Act only to the extent of inconsistency between the two and no more. In short, the result of obtaining the assent of the President to a State act which is inconsistent with a previous Union law relating to a concurrent subject would be that the State Act will prevail in that State and override the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to that State only. The predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legislates under the proviso to Clause (2 ). The proviso to Art. 254 (2) empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law even though it has become valid by virtue of the Presidents assent. Parliament may repeal or amend the repugnant State law, either directly, or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the same matter. Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does, not expressly repeal a State law, even then, the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A state law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does, not expressly repeal a State law, even then, the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A state law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together, e. g. , where both prescribe punishment for the same offence but the punishment differs in degree or kind or in the procedure prescribed. In all such cases,the law made by Parliament shall prevail over the State law under Art. 254 (1 ). That being so, when Parliament stepped in and enacted the Central amendment Act, it being a later law made by Parliament with respect to the same matter, the West Bengal Amendment Act stood impliedly repealed. " (Emphasis Supplied) ( 11 ) IN Lalbhai T. Patel vs. Addl. Special land Acquisition Officer, reported in 26 (2) glr 609, also similar question was considered and it was observed as follows :"in a case where there is parliamentary law in regard to one of the matters in the Current List, the State cannot make law except in accordance with Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution. That provision is an exception to the rule embodied in Art. 254 (1) that the law made by the Parliament would always prevail over the law made by the State in regard to the matter in the Current list. Such a question would arise only when there is inconsistency or repugnancy. If both provisions, i. e. , the State law and the Parliamentary law, cannot stand together, there would necessarily be repugnancy and the State law must give way to the law made by the Parliament. The exception to this is when the President examines, the law made by the State Legislatue and on examination finds that assent could not be given. But the Parliament may make a subsequent exercise. Such subsequent exercise may be such as to add to, amend, vary or repeal the law of the State. The legislation by the parliament would prevail over the State legislation thereafter. It is not necessary for the Parliament to expressly State that it addes to, varies, amends or repeals the law made by the State. Such subsequent exercise may be such as to add to, amend, vary or repeal the law of the State. The legislation by the parliament would prevail over the State legislation thereafter. It is not necessary for the Parliament to expressly State that it addes to, varies, amends or repeals the law made by the State. If there is repugnancy between subsequent legislation made by. the Parliament and the law operating in the state by virtue of Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution, the law by Parliament would prevail to the extent of such repugnancy. " ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the amendment brought out by central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 did not create repugnancy to the law made by the state Legislature. The argument of the petitionerss Counsel is that repugnancy to the law passed by the Parliament was created by Gujarat Amendment Act 20 of 1965 and as the law made by the State Legislature received assent of the President, it shall prevail and subsequent law made by the Parliament has no application. According to the petitioners counsel, by Act No. 68 of 1984, Sec. 17 was deleted from the Secs. 6 to 37 mentioned in sec. 39 of the Act and it has no effect of repeal to the law passed by State Legislature. We are not inclined to accept this contention, as the subsequent legislation made by the parliament is on the same subject and covers same area in respect of a matter included in the concurrent list. The repeal, if any, of the State law need not be by express words. If the Parliament has enacted law on the same subject, it can be deemed that the State law to the extent of which its repugnancy, stood repealed. Therefore, it is clear that the provisions contained in Sec. 39 as amended by Act 68 of 1984 shall prevail over the amendment brought out by the State Legislature. In view of that matter, Sec. 4 notification can be put into force even before a consent is obtained from the government and an agreement is reached between the Company and the Government. ( 13 ) THE next contention urged by the petitioners Counsel is that there was no proper inquiry by the Collector under Rule-4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. ( 13 ) THE next contention urged by the petitioners Counsel is that there was no proper inquiry by the Collector under Rule-4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. The appropriate Government has to be satisfied with certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings for which the Government shall direct the Collector to submit a report. The Collector has to conduct an inquiry and submit report giving out the certain details. ( 14 ) UNDER Rule-4 of the Rules, Collector shall conduct an inquiry and find out whether the Company had made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition and verify whether the Company had made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation. The Collector should also verify whether the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose and that the Company is in a position to utilise the land as expeditiously as possible. A further guideline is also given regarding the mode of inquiry to be done by the Collector. The Collector shall find out whether the land is good agricultural land or not and for that purpose, he must consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of the district. If the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, the Collector shall enquire whether any alternative land is available. The collector shall determine the approximate amount of compensation and verify whether the Company and offered a reasonable price to the land owners and such reasonable price shall not be less then the compensation assessed by the Collector. ( 15 ) IT has been held by various decisions of the Supreme Court that the inquiry under rule-4 is mandatory. In AIR 1975 SC 629 State of Gujarat and Anr. vs. Patel Chaturbhai narsinhbhai and Ors. it was held that Rule-4 inquiry is mandatory and that land owners must be given notices regarding inquiry. In that case, authorities could not substantiate the contention that notices were issued to the land owners. The argument on behalf of the state was that the inquiry under Sec. 5-A was sufficient for the purpose and there need not be any inquiry under Rule-4 of the Rules. In that case, authorities could not substantiate the contention that notices were issued to the land owners. The argument on behalf of the state was that the inquiry under Sec. 5-A was sufficient for the purpose and there need not be any inquiry under Rule-4 of the Rules. This argument was rejected and it was held that inquiry under Sec. 5-A of the Act does not satisfy the provisions contained in rule-4 of the Rules and that the owners of the land are entitled to the opportunity of being heard and inquiry under Rule-4 is mandatory. In AIR 1981 SC 866 , The General Government Servants Co. operative Housing society Ltd. Agra vs. Wahab Uddin and Ors. , AIR 1975 All 276 Sahkari Kraya vikraya Samiti Ltd vs. Ram Kumar and Ors. , and in (1993) 4 SCC 255 , Shyam Nandan prasad and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. also rule-4 inquiry was held to be mandatory. ( 16 ) IN the present case, the contention of the petitioners, Counsel is that there was no proper inquiry under Rule-4 and that the petitioners were not given notices. This fact is denied by the respondents. The contemporaneous document have also been produced to show that the petitioners were given sufficient notices regarding inquiry under Rule-4. From the Officer of the Deputy Collector, Jamnagar, information was given to the Talati- cum-Secretary of Moti Khawadi on 4. 11. 1995 to give notices to the petitioners. The details of survey numbers and the names of the petitioners were furnished to talati-cum-Secretary. The notices were tendered to them, but these petitioners had refused to sign the notices and therefore, rojkam was prepared on 5. 11. 1995. All the copies of the Rojkam are produced to show that the petitioners were attempted to be served with notices regarding inquiry under Rule-4. One of the petitioners had filed an affidavit denying the allegation that notice was refused to be served on 5. 11. 1995. The rojkam and notices are prepared in usual course of official business and we presume that they have been correctly prepared and we do not find any material to show that they have been got up falsely. The petitioners did not co-operate with the authorities in the matter of inquiry under Rule-4. 11. 1995. The rojkam and notices are prepared in usual course of official business and we presume that they have been correctly prepared and we do not find any material to show that they have been got up falsely. The petitioners did not co-operate with the authorities in the matter of inquiry under Rule-4. In the objections filed by the petitioners to the inquiry under Sec. 5-A, they have no case that they were not served with the notices under Rule-4. ( 17 ) THE Counsel for the petitioners contended that the Deputy Collector did not fix the compensation while holding inquiry under Rule-4 and that he did not ascertain that the company had offered a reasonable price for the land. This contention also cannot be accepted. A copy of the report submitted by the Deputy Collector is produced before us. In the report, it is stated that land owners wanted compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 lacs per bigha. The land value was approximately fixed at Rs. 17,500/- per Bigha for Jirayat land and Rs. 35,000/- per Bigha for Bagayat land. In the report, it is stated that this amount was offered by the Company to the land owners, but they did not accept this amount and all the petitioners had claimed value of the land at the rate of Rs. 2 lacs per Bigha. It is also pertinent to note that in the earlier acquisition proceedings, land value was fixed at Rs. 17,500/- per Bigha for Jirayat land and Rs. 35,000/- per Bigha for Bagayat land and it is stated in Clause 6 (2) of the report that the said amount was just as per the extract of land sales of private lands. It was stated that the Deputy Collector conducted an inquiry under Rule-4 and fixed approximate land value and ascertained whether the Company was prepared to pay the amount to these land owerns. It is also stated that the Company had issued notices to these petitioners to accept compensation, but they refused to do so. In these backgrounds, we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioners Counsel that there was violation of the procedure contemplated under Rule-4. It is also stated that the Company had issued notices to these petitioners to accept compensation, but they refused to do so. In these backgrounds, we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioners Counsel that there was violation of the procedure contemplated under Rule-4. ( 18 ) THE another contention raised by the petitioners Counsel is that the Deputy collector did not get report of the Principal Agriculture Officer to find out whether the land sought to be acquired was good agricultural land or whether any alternative land was available. In fact, Deputy Collector consulted the Principal Agriculture Officer and also obtained report from him that except these lands, there was no alternative land available. Moreover, learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that these are pocket lands and all other contiguous lands have already been acquired by the Company and these are the only lands available for the purposes of Housing Scheme of the Company. It is pertinent to note that in the objections filed by the petitioners they have no case that any other alternative land is available. Their only contention raised in the objections is that the company had already acquired in the extensive area and so the proposed land is not required. That aspect was considered by the authorities and decision was taken that the lands are required for public purpose. Therefore, we do not find any illegality or procedural irregularity as regards inquiry under rule-4 of the Rules. ( 19 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has raised another contention regarding rule 4 inquiry. It is argued that Rule 4 inquiry must precede Sec. 4 notification. A reliance was placed on the decision reported in AIR 1975 SC 629 , State of Gujarat and Anr. vs. Patel chaturbhai Narsinbhai and Ors. and also the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 sc 2002 , State of Gujarat and Ors. vs. Amba Lal Haiderbhai. In both these decisions, the question whether inquiry under Rule 4 should be before Sec. 4 notification is issued, was not directly considered, but the same question came-up before the Supreme Court in AIR 1985 SC 736 M/s Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. vs. Gustavo Ranato da Cruz Pinto and ors. , where the Supreme Court specifically held that Sec. 4 notification ix the basis of acquisition and Rule 4 inquiry shall be after Sec. 4 notification. , where the Supreme Court specifically held that Sec. 4 notification ix the basis of acquisition and Rule 4 inquiry shall be after Sec. 4 notification. It was pointed out that there is no need of any inquiry before notification under Sec. 4, as there is no requirement as such. The Supreme Court laid down in the law in the following terms : "reading the Act and the Rules and keeping in view the scheme of the Act, it is apparent that before the issuance of Sec. 4 notification, there is no requirement as such of compliance with the procedure contemplated by Rule. 4 of the Rules. It cannot be said, therefore, that enquiry by Rule 4 must precede the issuance of notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Act. Furthermore, certain matters which are required to be done under Rule 4 cannot be done because the officer or the person authorised by him would have no authority unless notification under Sec. 4 is issued. " in view of the direct decision of the Supreme Court, we do not find any force in the contention advanced by the petitioners Counsel. ( 20 ) THE Counsel for the petitioners further contended that no inquiry was conducted under Sec. 40 of the Land Acquisition Act. This being an acquisition for the purpose of company, the appropriate Government has to give consent to such an acquisition. Before granting such consent, the Government shall consider report submitted by the Collector and also the report of the inquiry conducted under Sec. 40 of the Act. This inquiry under sec. 40 relates to the question regarding the purpose of acquisition. It shall be ascertained whether the acquisition is for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or whether the acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work of a Company, which could be said to be for public purpose. The Land acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 say that before the Government gives consent, report of the Committee shall also be obtained. The Government on ascertaining public purpose and after giving consent, shall enter into an agreement with the Company. The Land acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 say that before the Government gives consent, report of the Committee shall also be obtained. The Government on ascertaining public purpose and after giving consent, shall enter into an agreement with the Company. For these purposes, the Government shall constitute a Committee and the report of this committee which is also a relevant piece of evidence, has to be considered by the government while the consent is sought by the Company, In this case, report of such a committee was placed before the Government. The Deputy Collector submitted a report under Sec. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. Under Sec. 5-A of the Act, Collector is bound to give notices to the interested parties and he shall consider the question whether land was needed for public purpose. In the present case, notices were issued to these petitioners regarding the inquiry to be conducted by the Collector and in that inquiry, the petitioners did not effectively participate. They were not present when the inquiry was conducted and on 10. 4. 1996, these petitioners were asked to be present, but they did not respond to the notices and on 25. 4. 1996, Sec. 5-A report was submitted by the Collector. Thereafter on 10. 6. 1996, an agreement was executed on behalf of the Government. Sufficient material is not placed before us to show that the petitioners were given notices regarding inquiry, if any, conducted by the authorities under Sec. 40 of the Act. But, in view of the inquiry made under Rule-4 and Sec. 5-A of the Act, we do not think that there was necessity to conduct further inquiry by the Deputy Collector under Sec, 40 of the Act. . ( 21 ) IN (1993) 4 SCC 255 , Shyam Mandan Prasad and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. it was held by the Supreme Court that the purpose of inquiry under Sec. 40 is to find out whether land is required for public purpose. In the cases where Sec. 5-A inquiry is not held, inquiry under Sec. 40 becomes important. For the purpose of acquisition, if urgency clause under Sec. 17 is involved, there may not be an inquiry under Sec. 5-A and inquiry under Sec. 40 may become necessary. But, in the instant case, Sec. 5-A inquiry was conducted and there was a report. For the purpose of acquisition, if urgency clause under Sec. 17 is involved, there may not be an inquiry under Sec. 5-A and inquiry under Sec. 40 may become necessary. But, in the instant case, Sec. 5-A inquiry was conducted and there was a report. The Supreme Court held in the above decision that the importance of such enquiry and report as contemplated under Sec. 40 in the light of Sec. 41, is to serve a double purpose as it may steer an acquisition if Sec. 5-A was dispensed with because of urgency under Sec. 17 and secondly, to provide a safe alternative, should there be by any fault in the conduct of enquiry under Sec. 5-A of the Act. So, one or the other must be kept handy and if per chance one is defective, when both existing, the other can be deployed to satisfy the requirement of law. ( 22 ) IN AIR 1960 SC 1203 , Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay (Now maharashtra) and Ors. , the Supreme Court has held that in the matter of acquisition of land for a Company, a question as to public purpose has to be investigated under Sec. 5-A or Sec. 40. As inquiry under Sec. 5-A and inquiry under Sec. 40 pertain to almost same matters, absence of any inquiry under Sec. 40 need not be viewed seriously. Before the Government giving consent and executing an agreement with the Company, sufficient materils were placed before the Government in the form of report under Sec. 5-A and also report of the Committee constituted for that purpose. Therefore, we do not think that there was any procedural irregularity. The petitioners have not been prejudiced by the absence of any inquiry under Sec. 40 of the Act. ( 23 ) IT may be noted that in the instant case, Sec. 4 notification was issued on 2. 1. 1996. The petitioners were served with notices regarding inquiry under Rule-4 as early as on 5. 11. 1996. The notification under Sec. 6 of the Act was published on 31. 10. 1996 and the present Special Civil Application was filed only on 19. 2. 1997 challenging the acquisition proceedings. There is delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching the Court. The petitioners have not been able to substantiate any of the contentions raised by them. 1996. The notification under Sec. 6 of the Act was published on 31. 10. 1996 and the present Special Civil Application was filed only on 19. 2. 1997 challenging the acquisition proceedings. There is delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching the Court. The petitioners have not been able to substantiate any of the contentions raised by them. The acquisition is for giving accommodation to the employees of the Company. Except seeking higher amount of compensation, the petitioners have not raised any tenable objection regarding the acquisition. We do not find force in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. ( 24 ) IT is also important to note that acquisition of land for the purpose of same company was challenged by the landholders and the challenge was rejected by the supreme Court in the decision reported in (1996) 4 SCC 579 Reliance Petroleum Ltd. vs. Zaver Chand Popat Lal Sumari and Ors. In that acquisition, Sec. 6 notification was issued on 18. 5. 1994 and the award was passed on 12. 12. 1994. The Special Civil Applications were filed on 20. 12. 1994 and the Supreme Court rejected all the petitions by holding that there was a delay in approaching High Court and the decision of the High Court was set aside on the ground that there was delay on the part of the petitioners. It may also be noted that when there is delay in challenging acquisition proceedings, Supreme Court has cautioned that Court shall be slow in granting stay or injunction in the land acquisition proceedings.- Having regard to all these facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any merits in the Special Civil Application and the same is dismissed. Notice is discharged. Parties to bear their own costs. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that possession of the land is not taken over by the Company and the status-quo as on today be continued for a period of six weeks. As we are dismissing the Special Civil Application at the admission stage, we do not think it proper to pass an interim order in this matter. The request made by the counsel for the petitioners, therefore, stands rejected. .