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1998 DIGILAW 1054 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Panna Ram

1998-10-07

R.R.YADAV

body1998
Honble YADAV, J.–The present writ petition has been filed questioning legality and validity of the ex parte award dated 28.6.93 (Annex.3) passed by Judge, Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal Bikaner (respondent No. 2). (2). Indisputably, the ex parte award dated 28.6.93 (Annex.3) was published on 25.10.93. After expiry of 30 days from the date of publication, the award impugned subject to the provisions of Sec. 17 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 becomes final within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Sec. 17 of the said Act. Under the aforesaid provisions the finality of the award Annex. 3 cannot be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Date of publication of the award is the date of notification by the Government and not the date of its appearance in the gazette. (3). In the present case, application for setting aside Tribunals ex parte award dated 28.6.93 (Annex.3) was made by the petitioner on 28.12.93 much after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication as envisaged under Sec. 17 readwith Section 17 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (4). The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards Rule 22 (A) of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1958) which provides that on an application within 15 days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part an ex parte decision. It is vehemently urged by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vyas that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 22A, the Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may on an application extend the time of 15 days prescribed under sub-rule (1) on sufficient cause being shown. According to Mr. Vyas, in the present case, the application moved under sub-rule (1) and (2) was supported by an affidavit within the meaning of sub-rule (3) of Rule 22 A of the Rules of 1958 therefore even if the application was moved after 15 days from the date of publication, the delay ought to have been condoned by respondent No.2. (5). The aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vyas is not acceptable to me for the reasons given hereinbelow. (6). (5). The aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vyas is not acceptable to me for the reasons given hereinbelow. (6). It is true that an application for setting aside Tribunals ex parte award within 30 days from the date of its publication can be validly entertained by the Tribunal but if such application is made after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award then it is not maintainable. I have no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal cannot entertain an application for setting aside ex parte award after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award. Indisputably, in the present case, application for setting aside the ex parte award dated 28.6.93 (Annex.3) was moved by the petitioner on 28.12.93 which was beyond 30 days from the date of publication of award. When the petitioner moved application on 28.12.93 for setting aside the ex parte award dated 28.6.93 before the Judge Labour Court (respondent No. 2) he had already become functus officio within the meaning of sub-section(2) of Section 17 readwith Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. (7). The argument of Mr. Vyas, to the effect that under Rule 22 A of the Rules of 1958 the petitioner was entitled to move an application within 15 days from the date of publication of ex parte award and in case an application was moved along with an affidavit under the said Rules of 1958 the limitation ought to have been extended in present case is attractive but fallacious. (8). It is true that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 22 A of the Rules of 1958, the Tribunal has been given discretion to extend 15 days prescribed limitation under sub-rule (1) of aforesaid Rules but it cannot extend the period more than 30 days from the date of publication of the award within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 17 read with Section 17 A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. (9). (9). It is to be imbibed that mandatory provisions envisaged under sub-section (2) of Section 17 readwith Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 create an embargo to extend limitation beyond 30 days from the date of publication of an award, prohibiting a Court of law or Tribunal to call in question an award whether on merit or ex parte after expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in any manner whatsoever. (10). I am of the view that the Judge Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Bikaner (respondent No.2) has discretion only to extend 15 days more time in addition to 15 days limitation prescribed under Rule 22 A of the Rules of 1958 but cannot be allowed to transgress the mandatory provisions of Section 17(2) readwith Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. It goes without saying that the Rules cannot be allowed to travel beyond the scope of an Enactment and as such Rule 22 A of the Rules of 1958 cannot be allowed to travel beyond the scope of Section 17(2) readwith Section 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed in limine.