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1998 DIGILAW 106 (MAD)

Gordon Woodroffe and Company Limited, Madras v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras and Another

1998-02-03

C.SHIVAPPA

body1998
Judgment :- C. SHIVAPPA, JThis appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 7909 of 1985, dated October 19, 1995. The brief facts are that the second respondent herein filed T.N.S.E. Case No. I.A. 13 of 1985 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), Madras challenging the order of termination of his services with the Management of M/s. Gordon Woodroffe Limited, Madras, dated July 13, 1984 under Section41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. That Respondent No. 2 has stated in the appeal that he was initially appointed at Madras, transferred to Hyderabad and continued to serve under the petitioner though posted to Hyderabad till July 13, 1984, the date of dispensation of his service. The terms of employment are such that he will be under the control and supervision of Madras Office only and in fact he has to draw his salary even from Madras Office. He further contended that the order of termination, since opposed to the principle of natural justice, is illegal and liable to be set aside. 3. The appellant herein was the respondent in the appeal contended that the respondent No. 2 was not a person employed as he was an Executive, holding an independent charge of Hyderabad Branch with three persons working under his control whose leave he used to sanction and had power to decide day-to-day administration, sign cheques, etc. that he was employed outside Tamil Nadu and hence the provisions of the Act are not applicable and as such the appellant has no right to invoke Section41(2) of the Act to prefer the appeal and sought for dismissal in limine. 4. It was further contended that the Respondent No. 2 was employed from time to time only on a contract basis for fixed periods and, therefore, would not be a person employed in the eye of law. 5. In the appeal, the appellate authority observed that only a part of the cause of action arose in Madras Office, the appointment, exercising control, supervision and the termination since have emanated from Madras Office as per Exs. R-3, R-4 and R-8 series, disagreed with the contention of the appellant. 5. In the appeal, the appellate authority observed that only a part of the cause of action arose in Madras Office, the appointment, exercising control, supervision and the termination since have emanated from Madras Office as per Exs. R-3, R-4 and R-8 series, disagreed with the contention of the appellant. Respondent No. 1 further held that the appellant herein made no attempts to find out whether the absence of Respondent No. 2 was wilful, to bring him under Clause 7 of the terms of contract and noticed, even if that be so, ought to have conducted an enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. On these two reasons held the termination of Respondent No. 2 as bad in law. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of Respondent No. 1, the appellant herein has filed the writ petition in which the learned single Judge confirmed the order of Respondent No. 1. 7. In this appeal, the appellant has contended that the question of jurisdiction has not been properly considered and Respondent No. 2 was not an employee of the local branch at Madras at the time of termination and therefore, Respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It is further contended that Respondent No. 2 was terminated while he was working as a Branch Manager at Hyderabad branch which is not a shop establishment under the Act. It is also the case of the appellant that the employee admitted the unauthorised absence and therefore there was no occasion to hold a separate enquiry as laid down by the judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 335 of 1979, dated August 6, 1984. 8. The points that arise for consideration are : (i) Whether Respondent No. 2 was an employee in any shop or commercial establishment within the territorial jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1. (ii) Whether the termination of Respondent No. 2 is valid ? 9. The definition "person employed" under Sec. 2(12) and "commercial establishment" under Sec. 3 of the Act and Section41(2) of the Act, if all read together, the Act provides that a person employed shall have a right to appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer. The Act was intended to regulate the conditions of work in Shops and Commercial establishments within the State. The question of jurisdiction is normally related to cause of action. Wherever such or part of which arises, the authority having territorial jurisdiction therefore is clothed with the power to take up and decide such cause. The provisions of the Act clearly establish that the relationship of an employer and employee in a business or commercial establishment in Tamil Nadu is a pre-requisite for the termination of the services of an employee and it is for the employee to complain about it by preferring an appeal under Section41(2) of the Act. Whether the Company at Madras and the Branch at Hyderabad were separate and independent legal entities and the appellant company has controlling interest in the company at Hyderabad, or, is there anything to show under what arrangement these two establishments are managing their affairs are to be decided with reference to the order of appointment. It is noticed by Respondent No. 1 that no enquiry was conducted before the termination. Having regard to the nature of the defence taken by the appellant herein, questioning the jurisdiction, it was all the more necessary for Respondent No. 1 to examine the question referred to above with reference to evidence. 10. In M/s. Brooke Bond India Pvt. Ltd. v. Chandra Nath Choudhary (1969-II-LLJ-387), the Apex Court has held that the appellate authority has wide jurisdiction to record evidence where no evidence was recorded at the domestic enquiry and the principles of natural justice were violated. In cases in which an opportunity of hearing was not given to an employee or the principles of natural justice were in any way violated, the appellant authority shall also have jurisdiction to record evidence, if necessary, in order to come to its conclusion on the vital question whether the employee was guilty or not of the the charges framed against him. 11. In Salem Shevapet Sri. Venkateswara Bank. Ltd. v. Krishan K. K. and another (1959-II-LLJ-797), this Court has held that the Appellate Authority under Sec. 41(2) had the jurisdiction to enquiry whether the statutory conditions subject to which alone an employee could be dismissed, have been complied with. It would imply that the Appellate Authority can also record evidence specially when it has also to record the findings whether the charges were established or not. 12. It would imply that the Appellate Authority can also record evidence specially when it has also to record the findings whether the charges were established or not. 12. In the United Planters Association of Southern India v. K. G. Sangameswaran and another (1997-I-LLJ-1104), the Apex Court has held that the appellate authority has jurisdiction to take evidence or record evidence even in cases where no domestic enquiry was held. In the instant case, Respondent No. 1 has interfered with the order of termination on the ground that part of the cause of action arose at Madras without taking into consideration the place of working at the time of determination. After noticing the fact that no domestic enquiry was held, still it did not decide the validity or otherwise of the termination after recording the evidence. Thus, Respondent No. 1 committed grave error in clutching the jurisdiction and in setting aside the order of termination without evidence. The learned single Judge has failed to notice these aspects in his order. 13. Therefore, the order of the learned single Judge and that of the Respondent No. 1 passed in T.S.E. No. 56/84 are set aside and the matter is remitted to Respondent No. 1 to decide the appeal after recording the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the basis of the evidence recorded by it, irrespective of its earlier finding recorded regarding jurisdiction, after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties, in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. The parties to bear their own costs.