Sujata V. Munohar, J. ( 1 ) [appellant recommended appointment of 2 labour Asstt. Commissioners in 1979 to the labour court. Respondent Association challenged it, mainly on the ground that only a person, who is qualified to be appointed u/art 234, Constitution of India, can be appointed to this post. The question involved in the case was whether a Labour Tribunal is a Court or a judicial office within then meaning of that word in Arcticles 234 to 236 of the Constitution of India. Single Judge accepted W. P. The D. B. dismissed the appeal and state appealed to Supreme Court. ] After detailing above. Judgment is : ( 2 ) UNDER Section 6 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, the State Govl. is entitled to constitute one or more Labour. Courts and appoint persons having prescribed qualifications as judges of these courts. The proviso to S. 6 lays down that no person shall be appointed unless he possesses the qualifications other than the qualification of age, prescribed under Article 234 of the Constitution for being eligible to enter the judicial service in the State and is not more than 60 years of age. The provision remains unamended. However, in view of the amendments carried out in the Industrial Disputes Act and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the State Govt. felt that it was open to it to appoint Assistant Commissioners of Labour working under the State Govt. for a period of not less than five years and holding a law degree, to die office of tlie presiding officers of Labour Courts. The impugned Notification of 8. 3. 79 therefore, was issued appointing C/2 such persons at Labour Courts at Sholapur and Pune which has been challenged in these proceedings. According to the first respondent Association, appointment as presiding officers of Labour Courts are appointments to the judicial service of the State and are, therefore, governed by Article 234 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) THERE is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a court. According to the first respondent Association, appointment as presiding officers of Labour Courts are appointments to the judicial service of the State and are, therefore, governed by Article 234 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) THERE is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a court. The Labour Court adjudicates upon disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have been within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not be able to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts. The Labour Courts are, therefore, courts and decide disputes that are civil. ,in nature. ( 4 ) IN the case of the Bharat Bank V. Employees ( 1950 SCR 459 ), this Court considered whether an Industrial Tribunal was a court. It said that one cannot go by mere nomenclature. One has to examine the functions of a Tribunal and how it proceeds to discharge those functions. It held that an Industrial Tribunal had all the trappings of a court and performed functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. The Court referred to the Rules by which proceedings before the Tribunal were regulated. The Court dwelt on the fact that the powers vested in it are similar to those, exercised by civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit. It liad the power of ordering discovery, inspection etc. and forcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents and so on. It gave its decision on die basis of evidence and in accordance with law. Applying the test laid down in the case of Cooper V. Wilson [ (1937) 2 K. B. 309 at p. 340], this Court said that "a true judicial decision presupposes an existence of dispute between two or more parties: (2) ascertainment of facts by means of evidence adduced by the parties often with the assistance of argument; (3) if the dispute relates to a question of law, submission of legal arguments by the parties; AND (4) by decision which disposes of the whole matter by findings on fact and application of law to facts so found. Judged by the same tests, a Labour Court would undoubtedly be a court in the true sense of the term. Judged by the same tests, a Labour Court would undoubtedly be a court in the true sense of the term. The question, however, is whether such a court and the presiding officer of such a court can be said to hold a post in the Judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236 of the constitution. ( 5 ) PART VI, Chapter VI of the Constitution of India deals with courts subordinate to the High Court. Article 233 which is the first Article of this Chapter, deals with appointment of District Judges. Article 234 provides as follows : "234; Recruitment of persons other than district judges to the judicial service - Appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial services of a state shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising juridiction in relation to such State. " ( 6 ) ARTICLE 235 provides that the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judges shall be vested in the High Court. Article 236 (a) defines the expression "district judge" as including judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency sessions judge and assistant sessions judge. This is an extensive definition and does not cover every category of a district judge. While considering the definition of a "district Judge", one can also bear in mind a similar definition of "district Judge" in section 3 (17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 3 (1-5) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. It is: District Judges shall mean the judge of a principal civil court of original Jurisdiction but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. " ( 7 ) THE District Judge, therefore, covers a judge of any Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. It is: District Judges shall mean the judge of a principal civil court of original Jurisdiction but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. " ( 7 ) THE District Judge, therefore, covers a judge of any Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. With an increase in the number of specialised courts and tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds of civil litigation which would ( 8 ) RELIANCE has been placed upon this judgment as showing that judicial service is interpreted narrowly to cover only the hierarchy of civil courts headed by die District Judge. This Court, however, was not considering the position of the other civil courts, in the context of die extensive definition given to the term "district judge". This Court was concerned with preserving indepedence of die judiciary from die executive and making sure dial persons from non-judicial services, such as, die police, excise or revenue were not considered as eligible for appointment as District Judges. That is why the emphasis is on die tad that the judicial service should consist exclusively of judicial officers. This judgment should not be interpreted narrowly to exclude from judicial service new hierarchies of civil courts being set up which are headed by a judge who can be considered as a District Judge bearing in mind die extensive definition of that term in Article 236. ( 9 ) THE High Court has, therefore, correctly interpreted the observations of this Court in Chandra Mohan s case (supra) as giving paramount importance to the enforcement of the constitutional scheme providing for independence of the judiciary. The concern of the court was to see that this independence was not destroyed by an indirect method. ( 10 ) FOR the same reason of maintaining independence of the jusdiciary, in the case of Statesman V. H. R. Deb [ air 1968 SC 1495 ], this Court observed dial die intention of the Legislature in framing section 7 (prior to amendment) of the Industrial Disputes Act was that men who could be described as independent and widi sufficient judicial experience must be selected as Labour Court judges. The Court was considering die unamended S. 7. The Court was considering die unamended S. 7. In fact, in the case of die unamended Bombay Industrial Relations Act and die Unfair Labour Practices Act, die qualifications of a presiding officer of die Labour court were in terms of Article 234 until the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was amended. In die case of Maharashtra Unfair Labour Practices Act, the qualifications still remain as before. ( 11 ) WE need not refer at length to various other judgments which have dealt with the question whether a Tribunal set up under different Acts which were before the court in each case was judicial body or a court, and whedier it was a court subordinate to die High Court. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. , Vs. Shyam Sunder [air 1961 SC 1669], die central Govt. exercising appellate powers u/s 111 of the Companies Act was held to be acting as a judicial body and not as an administrative body. In the case of Shripatrao V. The State [air 1977 Bombay 384], die term "courts" was held to cover all tribunals which were basically courts performing judicial functions giving judgments which were binding and exercising sovereign judicial power transferred to diem by the State. It was held that High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 over such tribunals. A Full Bench of Gujarat in Shaikh Mohanunedhikhan V. Chandrahhanu Cinema [1986 Lab. I. C. 1749] held the Labour Courts and Industrial Courts were courts for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act and were also courts subordinate to the High Court. ( 12 ) THE Allahabad High Court in M/s. Poyshn Industrial Co. V. State [1985 Lab. I. C. 1983] has, however, held that the presiding officer of a Labour Court does not belong to the judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236. The Allahabad High Court s judgment has relied upon the decision of this Court in Chandra Mohan s case (supra) for the purpose of holding that it is only the hierarchy of ordinary civil courts in the narrow sense headed by a District Judge which comes under die term "judicial service" under Article 236. The view taken by die Allahabad High Court appears to be too narrow a view of the term "judicial service". The view taken by die Allahabad High Court appears to be too narrow a view of the term "judicial service". In Chandra Mohan s case (supra), this Court was primarily concerned with excluding from judicial service ( 13 ) RELIANCE has been placed upon this judgment as showing that judicial service is interpreted narrowly to cover only the hierarchy of civil courts headed by the District Judge. This Court, however, was not considering the position of the other civil courts, in the context of the extensive definition given to the term "district judge". This Court was concerned with preserving indepedence of the judiciary from the executive and making sure that persons from non- judicial services, such as, the police, excise or revenue were not considered as eligible for appointment as District Judges. That is why the emphasis is on the fad that the judicial service should consist exclusively of judicial officers. This judgment should not be interpreted narrowly to exclude from judicial service new hierarchies of civil courts being set up which are headed by a judge who can be considered as a District Judge bearing in mind the extensive definition of that term in Article 236. ( 14 ) THE High Court has, therefore, correctly interpreted the observations of this Court in Chandra Mohan s case (supra) as giving paramount importance to the enforcement of the constitutional scheme providing for independence of die judiciary. The concern of the court was to see that this independence was not destroyed by an indirect method. ( 15 ) FOR the same reason of maintaining independence of the jusdiciary, in the case of Statesman V. H. R. Deb [ air 1968 SC 1495 ], this Court observed thal the intention of die Legislature in framing section 7 (prior to amendment) of the Industrial Disputes Act was that men who could be described as independent and with sufficient judicial experience must be selected as Labour Court judges. The Court was considering the unamended S. 7. In fact, in the case of the unamended Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Unfair Labour Practices Act, die qualitications of a presiding officer of the Labour court were in terms of Article 234 until the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was amended. In the case of Maharashtra Unfair Labour Practices Act, the qualifications still remain as before. In fact, in the case of the unamended Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Unfair Labour Practices Act, die qualitications of a presiding officer of the Labour court were in terms of Article 234 until the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was amended. In the case of Maharashtra Unfair Labour Practices Act, the qualifications still remain as before. ( 16 ) WE need not refer at length to various other judgments which have dealt with the question whether a Tribunal set up under different Acts which were before die court in each case was judicial body or a court, and whedier it was a court subordinate to die High Court. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. , Vs. Shyam Sunder [air 1961 SC 1669], the central Govt. exercising appellate powers u/s 111 of the Companies Act was held to be acting as a judicial body and not as an administrative body. In die case of Shripatrao V. The State [air 1977 Bombay 384], die term "courts" was held to cover all tribunals which were basically courts performing judicial functions giving judgments which were binding and exercising sovereign judicial power transferred to mem by the State. It was held that High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 over such tribunals. A Full Bench of Gujarat in Shaikh Mohammedhikhan V. Chandrahhanu Cinema [1986 Lab. I. C. 1749] held the Labour Courts and Industrial Courts were courts for die purpose of Contempt of Courts Act and were also courts subordinate to the High Court. ( 17 ) THE Allahabad High Court in M/s. Poysha Industrial Co. V. State [1985 Lab. I. C. 1983] has, however, held that the presiding officer of a Labour Court does not belong to the judicial service of die State as defined in Article 236. The Allahabad High Court s judgment has relied upon the decision of tills Court in Chandra Mohan s case (supra) for the purpose of holding that it is only the hierarchy of ordinary civil courts in the narrow sense headed by a District Judge which comes under the term "judicial service" under Article 236. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court appears to be too narrow a view of the term "judicial service". The view taken by the Allahabad High Court appears to be too narrow a view of the term "judicial service". In Chandra Mohan s case (supra), this Court was primarily concerned with excluding from judicial servicepersons who held posts in services which were not exclusively judicial service from that term under Article 236. The High Court in the present case is justified in rejecting the narrow view taken in that judgment. ( 18 ) IN Shri Kumar Padma Prasad V. Union of India | (1992) 2 SCC 428 , (his Court had to consider qualifications for the purpose of appointment as a Judge of the High Court under Article 217 of the Constitution. While interpreting the expression "judicial office" under Article 217 (2) (a), this Court held thal the expression "judicial office" must be interpreted in consonance with the scheme of Chapters V and VI of part VI of the Constitution, so defined under Article 236 (b ). Therefore, in order to quality for appointment as a judge of a High Court, a person must hold a judicial office which must be a part of the judicial service of State. After referring to the cases of Chandra Mohan (supra) and Statesman (supra), this Court said that the term "judicial office" in its generic sense may include a wide variety of offices which are connected with the administration of justice in one way or the other. Officers holding various posts under the executive are often vested with magisterial power to meet a particular situation. The Court said, "did the frainers of the Constitution have this type of offices in mind when they provided a source of appointment to the high office of a judge of the High Court from amongst tlie holders of a "judicial office" ? The answer has to be in the negative. We are of tlie view that holder of judicial office under Article 217 (2) (a) means the person who exercises only judicial junctions, determines causes inter-parties and renders decision in a judicial capacity. He must belong to the judicial service which as a class is free from executive control and is disciplined to uphold the dignity, integrity and independence of the judiciary. "going by these tests laid down as to what constitutes judicial service under Article 236 of the Constitution, the Labour Court judges of the Industrial Court can be held to belong to judicial service. "going by these tests laid down as to what constitutes judicial service under Article 236 of the Constitution, the Labour Court judges of the Industrial Court can be held to belong to judicial service. The hierarchy contemplated in tlie case of Labour Court judges is tlie hierarchy of Labour Court judges and Industrial judges with tlie Industrial Court judges holding tlie superior position of District Judges. Tlie Labour Courts have also been held as subject to the High Court s power of superintendence under Article 227. ( 19 ) THE decision in Uie case osrajasthan State Road Transport Corp. V. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 ] is also REFERRED TO before us. It deals inter alia, with tlie inter-relationship of jurisdiction of Labour and Industrial Courts as dispute resolving forums with the jurisdiction of civil courts. It is not directly concerned with the question which is before us, ( 20 ) THE constitutional scheme under Chapter V of Part VI dealing with the High Courts and Chapter VI of Part VI dealing the subordinate courts shows a clear anxiety on the part of the trainers of the Constitution to preserve and promote independence of the judiciary from the executive. Thus Article 233 which deals with appointment of District Judges requires that such appointments shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court. Article 233 (2) has been interpreted as prescribing that "a person in the service of the Union or the State" can refer only to a person in tlie judicial service of the Union or tlie State. Article 234 which deals with recruitment of persons other than District Judge to the judicial service requires that their appointments can be made only in accordance with the Rules framed by the Governor of the State after consultation with State Public Service Commission and with the High Court. Article 235 provides that the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto shall be vested in tlie High Court; and Article 236 defines the expression "district Judge" extensively as covering judges of a city civil court etc. as earlier set out, and tlie expression "judicial service" as meaning a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to till tlie post of the District Judge and other civil judicial posts interior to the post of District Judge. as earlier set out, and tlie expression "judicial service" as meaning a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to till tlie post of the District Judge and other civil judicial posts interior to the post of District Judge. therefore, bearing in mind the principle of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, judicial service contemplates a service exclusively of judicial posts in which there will he a hierarchy headed by a District Judge. The High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the persons presiding over Industrial and Labour Courts would constitute a judicial service so defined. Therefore, the recruitment of Labour Court judges is required to be made in accordance with Article 234 of the Constitution. ( 21 ) IN the premises, the appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. -