Judgment :- C.S. Rajan, J. The petitioner was appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant by the 5th respondent in his school The above appointment was approved was approved as per Ext. P1 form 2.1.1989. Later by Ext. P2 order the petitioner was appointed as H.S. A., for the period from 28.6.90 to 31.8.1990. The above appointment was also approved as per Ext. P2. The petitioner was again appointed as H.S.A. from 2.1.1995 to 30.3.1995. The above appointment was also approved as per Ext. P3. 2. The 6th respondent was appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant on 5.6.1995. At that time, she was working as a Clerk in the School. The above appointment of the 6th respondent as UPS A was approved. Thereafter the 5th respondent promoted the 6th respondent as H.S. A. in the leave vacancy on 10.7.1995. The above appointment was not approved by the 4th respondent as per Ext. P4. Against Ext. P4 the 5th respondent manager filed an appeal before the third respondent. The third respondent by Ext. P5 rejected the appeal upholding the petitioner's statutory claim for promotion as H.S. A. over the 6th respondent. 2A. The leave vacancy which was to expire on 31.5.1995 was extended till 3.7.1997. The 5th respondent allowed the 6th respondent to continue in the said leave vacancy. Another leave vacancy arose on 9.10.1995. In the above vacancy the 5th respondent promoted the petitioner. The above appointment was approved by the 4th respondent as per Ext. P6. The petitioner was revered as UPS A after the expiry of the above leave vacancy. A regular permanent vacancy of H.S.A. arose on 3.6.1996. Instead of promoting the petitioner, the 5th respondent appointed the 6th respondent in the above vacancy and promoted the petitioner in the leave vacancy in which the 6th respondent was functioning. The above appointment was approved* by the 4th respondent as per Ext. P7. Thereafter the petitioner submitted Ext. P8 representation before the 4th respondent pointing out the illegality in the appointment of the 6th respondent in the permanent vacancy. The petitioner further submitted a representation. to the third respondent evidenced by Ext. P9. Respondents 3 and 4 did not pass orders on these representations. The 4th respondent also did not approve the appointment of the 6th respondent. Therefore, the petitioner tiled O.P. No. 18166/96. The above Original Petition was disposed of by Ext. P12 judgment. In Ext. The petitioner further submitted a representation. to the third respondent evidenced by Ext. P9. Respondents 3 and 4 did not pass orders on these representations. The 4th respondent also did not approve the appointment of the 6th respondent. Therefore, the petitioner tiled O.P. No. 18166/96. The above Original Petition was disposed of by Ext. P12 judgment. In Ext. P12 judgment this Court directed respondents 3 and 4 to consider and pass orders on the representations filed by the petitioner in accordance with law. It was also observed that on the basis of the submission made by respondents 5 and 6 that the revision petitions filed by them before the Government and the Director of Public Instruction can be pursued by them in accordance with law. Thereafter, the second respondent issued notice to the petitioner and others regarding the personal hearing of the matter. The reference in Ext. P13 is the approval of appointment of the 6th respondent and also the revision petition filed by the 5th respondent. Thereafter by Ext. P17 the second respondent disposed of the matter. The reference in Ext. P17 is also the appeal petitions of the 6th respondent. The second respondent by Ext. P17 order cancelled the appointment of the petitioner, which was approved as per Ext. P1. The 4th respondent was directed to approve the appointment of the 6th respondent in the leave vacancy with effect from 10.7.1995. 3. The 6th respondent has filed a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit the 6th respondent has stated the details of her previous service. She was first appointed as H.S.A. on 7.8.78 and continued till 7.10.78. 'Thereafter she was appointed as UPS A from 6.6.79 to 14.7.80, from 15.7.80U) 22.8.80 and from 13.6.84 to 13.8.84. On 28.4.82 she was appointed as a Clerk for 4 months. Again she was appointed as a Clerk on 1.12.87, in which post she continued till 4.6.1995 when she was appointed as a UPSA. According to the petitioner, therefore, she had every right to claim the appointment in the vacancy to which the petitioner was appointed on 1.11.1989 as UPSA, The counter affidavit reveals the fact that the 6th respondent tiled a petition against the appointment of the petitioner which took place as early as in 1989, only on 5.2.96. The above representation was rejected by the 4th respondent by Ext. R6(a). The above representation was rejected by the 4th respondent by Ext. R6(a). Thereafter what the 5th respondent did was to forward the representation of the 6th respondent which was rejected, with a covering letter to respondents 1 and 2. It must be noted that the 6th respondent did not take up the matter before any higher authorities. The counter affidavit further reveals that the 6th respondent went abroad in 19 85 and remained there till 1987. According to her, when a vacancy arose in November 1986, she could not come back to join duty. But it was not averred whether the petitioner was offered any appointment in the above post. According to the 6th respondent, while considering the question of approval of her appointment, necessarily the legality of the initial appointment of the petitioner also had to be considered. According to the 6th respondent she has got a strong claim both under Rules 43 and 51-A of Chapter XIV A of the KER. 4. The 5th respondent has also filed a counter affidavit. The present manager, who has sworn to this counter affidavit, took charge in 1991. So, according to the present manager, the earlier manger appointed the petitioner in 1989 without noticing the rightful claims of the 6th respondent. Therefore, the present manager wanted to correct the above mistake and to render justice to the 6th respondent. According to the counter affidavit of the 5th respondent, the 6th respondent was working as Clerk in 1989 when the petitioner was appointed as UPSA and was qualified to be promoted as UPSA. Since the 6th respondent was promoted as UPSA and HSA, she had a claim under R.51A also. The erstwhile manager did not follow the procedure prescribed in R.51A Note 2 before appointing the petitioner. The petitioner's initial appointment itself was wrong and illegal and therefore she could not claim any right to be appointed in any future vacancy. 5. Now by the impugned order, the approval of appointment of the petitioner as per Ext. P1 was cancelled by the second respondent. The approval of appointment of the 6th respondent was also directed to be granted by the second respondent. The only provision under which the second respondent can cancel an approval of appointment of a teacher is under R.8A of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. The above rule reads as follows: "8A. P1 was cancelled by the second respondent. The approval of appointment of the 6th respondent was also directed to be granted by the second respondent. The only provision under which the second respondent can cancel an approval of appointment of a teacher is under R.8A of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. The above rule reads as follows: "8A. The Director may on his own motion or otherwise call for records of the orders relating to approval of appointments issued by the Subordinate Officers and revise the same: Provided that an order affecting the interest of a person shall not be passed under this Rule unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such orders". The second respondent is competent to issue an order under R.8-A either suo mote or otherwise. Thereafter, he must call for the records leading to the approval of appointment of the teacher whose appointment he seeks to cancel. Again he has to issue a notice to the affected party to show cause why his appointment should not be cancelled. These are the circumstances under which R.8-A can be invoked. 6. Ext. P17 shows that the records leading to the approval of appointment of the petitioner are not available with the 4th respondent because they had been destroyed. Therefore there was no question of calling for the records. Then the question is on what materials the second respondent came to the conclusion that the approval of appointment of the petitioner is illegal. In Ext. P17 it has been stated that the objection filed against the appointment of the petitioner in 1989 was not considered by the Manager or the Sub Officers. There is no averment either on the part of the 6th respondent or by the 5th respondent in their counter affidavits that the approval of appointment of the petitioner was objected. The 5th respondent cannot object to the approval of appointment of the petitioner because it was his own appointment. There is a vague statement in the counter affidavit of the 6th respondent that she had objected to the appointment of the petitioner in 1989 itself. There is no statement whether the 6th respondent has pursued the matter further. Therefore, I am not prepared to accept the statement of the 6th respondent that she objected to the approval of appointment of the petitioner. There is no statement whether the 6th respondent has pursued the matter further. Therefore, I am not prepared to accept the statement of the 6th respondent that she objected to the approval of appointment of the petitioner. Therefore I failed to understand how 7. The direction to approve the appointment of the 6th respondent in the leave vacancy which arose on 10.7.1995 is on the basis that the petitioner's appointment on 1.11.1989 is cancelled and therefore, she did not have any preferencial claim over the 6th respondent. In view of my finding that the cancellation of the approval of appointment of the petitioner is illegal and liable to be set aside, the further direction to approve the appointment of the 6th respondent is also liable to be interfered. 8. Before parting with this case, two other contentions pressed vehemently by the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 have to be considered. According to these respondents the power under R.8-A of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. is very wide and can be exercised at any point of time, irrespective of the fact whether any other person has acquired a vested right. To drive home the above point, the learned counsel has cited a decision of this Court reported in Hazil Ivy Padua v. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 474). Of course in that decision this Court has held that the absence of time limit in R.8-A is intentional and deliberate so as to enable the authorities to exercise the power of jurisdiction in appropriate cases. It must be noted that in the above case the petitioner therein wanted to revise an order of approval of appointment of another teacher who was appointed in 1987. The matter was brought to the notice of the authorities in 1989 itself. Considering the above facts in this Court held that it is always open to the revisional authorities to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction on the ground of laches or undue delay or on other similar grounds. On the facts of the above case, the learned judge came to the conclusion that there was no laches on the part of the 6th respondent therein in invoking the revisional jurisdiction under R.8-A. But in this case, the approval of appointment was in 1989. The revisional jurisdiction, if at all, was invoked only in 1996. On the facts of the above case, the learned judge came to the conclusion that there was no laches on the part of the 6th respondent therein in invoking the revisional jurisdiction under R.8-A. But in this case, the approval of appointment was in 1989. The revisional jurisdiction, if at all, was invoked only in 1996. The 6th respondent was working as a Clerk in the High School during the relevant time. Therefore, she cannot plead ignorance of the appointment of the petitioner and the approval granted by the authorities. No reasons or circumstances have been made out in the counter affidavits filed by the 6th respondent or by the 5th respondent why the revisional powers under R.8-A were not invoked within a reasonable time. The rule provides that the powers must be exercised only after calling for the records. In this case, the records were not available because they were destroyed in accordance with the rules. That itself would go to show that at least before the normal time for destruction of records, the power under R.8-A must be exercised. If the power under R.8-A is exercised by an authority to revise an order of approval of appointment at any time, then definitely it will lead to arbitrariness. Therefore, the authorities are expected to act only within a reasonable time. In this case I do not find any jurisdiction to interfere with the order of approval of appointment of the petitioner in 1997 which was made in 1989. 9. The learned counsel for the 6th respondent also made a fervent plea that this Court should not interfere with Ext. P17 order because the petitioner has got an effective and efficacious remedy by way of revision under R.92 of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. But a mere availability of a revisional jurisdiction to the petitioner against Ext. P17 is not a bar to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. When I am convinced that the second respondent has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in cancelling the order of approval of appointment of the petitioner after several years, it will be a miscarriage of justice to refuse to interfere with the order merely because the petitioner can very well avail himself of an alternative remedy. 10. When I am convinced that the second respondent has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in cancelling the order of approval of appointment of the petitioner after several years, it will be a miscarriage of justice to refuse to interfere with the order merely because the petitioner can very well avail himself of an alternative remedy. 10. It is also pertinent to point out that the second respondent had not issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why her appointment should not be cancelled. The second respondent was dealing with a petition filed by the 5th respondent and also another petition filed by the 6th respondent. The 6th respondent's petition is against the non-approval of her appointment in 1995. The so called petition filed by the 5th respondent was to cancel his own appointment order issued to the petitioner. I do not think that on these materials the second respondent can act under R.8-A of Chapter XIV-A of the Ker. 11. Moreover, the petitioner has acquired a vested right by virtue of the approval of her appointment in 1989. This Court has held that by virtue of an appointment, a teacher gets a vested right so as to claim a right to future appointment under R.51-A of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R. The above appointment also vests with the petitioner a right to claim promotion under R.43 of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R..Therefore, such vested rights cannot be divested by the second respondent without any authority of law. Under these circumstances I quash Ext. P17. Respondents 3 and 4 are directed to pass consequential orders directing the 5th respondent to implement the earlier orders passed by them. Orders in this respect must be passed within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 12. The 6th respondent has got a grievance that she was not paid the salary of UPSA. The 6th respondent is free to make any representation with regard to the above grievance before the appropriate authorities. That also must be considered by the respondents along with the other matter. The Original Petition is allowed of as above.