G. P MATHUR, J. A learned Single Judge has referred the following question for decision by larger bench: "whether an order of remand could be subject-matter of a revision under Section 397/401,cr. P. C. or not?" 2. Sub-section (2) of Section 397, Cr. P. C. lays down that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any inter locutory order passed in any appeal, en quiry, trial or other proceeding. The ex pression "interlocutory order" has not been defined in the Code. It will, therefore, be useful to refer to its meaning as given in some of the dictionaries: THE NEW LEXCION WEBSTERs DICTIONARY: Interlocutory.-Pronounced and arising during legal procedure, not final. WEBSTERs THIRD NEW INTERNA TIONAL DICTIONARY : Not final or definitive, made or done during the progress of an action; WHARTONs LAW LEXICON : An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties e. g. , an order appointing a receiver or granting an injunction, and a motion for such an order is termed an interlocutory motion. BLACKs LAW DICTIONARy Provisional; temporary; not final. Some thing intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. 3. Ordinarily and generally the ex pression interlocutory order has been un derstood and taken to mean as a converse of the term final order. In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsburys Laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606:- ". . . . . . . a judgment on order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must, therefore, be considered separately in relation to the par ticular purpose for which it is required. " In para 1607 it is said: "in general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed "final". The meaning of the two words must, therefore, be considered separately in relation to the par ticular purpose for which it is required. " In para 1607 it is said: "in general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed "final". In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words: "an order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declara tions of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed "interlocutory". An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. " 4. In 5. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, AIR 1949 FC 1, the following principle laid down in Salomon v. Warner, (1891) 1 QB 734, was quoted with approval: "if their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory. " 5. The test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. 6. However, in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 , such an interpretation and the universal applica tion of the principle that what is hot a final order must be an interlocutory order was not accepted as this will render the revisional power conferred by Section 397 (1) nugatory. 6. However, in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 , such an interpretation and the universal applica tion of the principle that what is hot a final order must be an interlocutory order was not accepted as this will render the revisional power conferred by Section 397 (1) nugatory. After taking into con sideration the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the object of con ferring a power of revision on the Court of Sessions and the High Court, it was ob served as follows: "in such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably be converse of the words final order. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sence noticed in Kuppuswanis case, AIR 1949 FC 1 (supra), but, yet it may not be an inter locutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate order. " 7. Section 209, Cr. P. C. confers power upon a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody until the case has been committed to the Court of Sessions and also until the conclusion of the Trial. Section 309, Cr. P. C. confers power upon a Court to remand an accused to custody after taking cognizance of an offence or during com mencement of trial when if finds it neces sary to adjourn the enquiry or trial The order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings of the trial itself nor it can have any effect on the ultimate decision of the case. If an order or remand is found to be illegal it cannot result in acquittal of the accused. A remand order cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case (supra), it cannot be categorised even as an "intermediate order". The order is, therefore, a pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Sec tion 397, Cr. Therefore, applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case (supra), it cannot be categorised even as an "intermediate order". The order is, therefore, a pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Sec tion 397, Cr. P. C. a revision against the said order is not maintainable. 8. Learned Counsel for the applicant has referred to Rajesh Misra v. State of U. P, 1994 ACC 197 : 1994 JIC 305 (All), in support of his submission that a revision against an order of remand is main tainable. In the said case, the learned Single Judge entertained revision against an order of remand but did not at all con sider the question whether the revision was maintainable in view of the bar created by Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. Therefore, the authority cited by learned Counsel can be of no assistance to him. That a part in Rajesh Misra (supra) A. S. Tripathi, J. ob served as follows: ". . . . . . In my opinion, the amended provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. will remain in force only till the provisions of Section 309 of the Cr. P. C. are applicable and continued. But once the provisions of sub- section (2) of Section 309, Cr. P. C. begins to apply on adjournment or postponement of the trial, then a fresh remand is required if the accused is in custody. " 9. The aforesaid view is contrary to the plain language of Section 209 (b), Cr. P. C. which lays down that a Magistrate while committing the case to the Court of Sessions remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. This case has also been overruled by a Division Bench in Vimal Kumar Sharma v. State, 1995 AWC 424. 10. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Radhey Shyam v. State, 1994 ACC 645 : 1994 JIC 601 (All) wherein it has been held that an order granting remand is an interlocutory order. 11. Our answer to the question referred is as follows: "an order granting remand is a purely interlocutory order and no revision would lie against such an order in view of the bar created by sub-section (2)of Section 397, Cr. P. C. " 12. 11. Our answer to the question referred is as follows: "an order granting remand is a purely interlocutory order and no revision would lie against such an order in view of the bar created by sub-section (2)of Section 397, Cr. P. C. " 12. The revision may now be listed before the appropriate Bench for admis sion. Petition disposed of. .