S. L. SARAF, J. Two writ petitions (i) Writ Petition No. 19087 of 1990 and (ii) Writ Petition No. 291 of 1991, were filed by the petitioners against the respondents seeking relief for continuance of their ser vice. The first writ application was filed on 30-7-1990 seeking the following reliefs: (i) issue a suitable writ, order or direction to commanding respondents and restraining the respondents in making new appointment at every 6 month to the post of Assistant knowing typing in the Branch office at Kanpur considering previous (petitioners) employees which amount to unfair labour practice under the law. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respon dents not to discontinue or deny duty to the petitioners w. e. f. 1-8-90 till the regular appoint ment and the petitioner be considered for regular appointment to the post of "assistant knowing typing" if vacancy and post continues. " (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respon dents to pay the wages and other allowances and benefits admissible to other Regular Employees of the Assistant post. " The Court by an order dated llth September, 1990 was pleased to pass the following order: "issue notice. In the meantime, it is directed that the respondents shall not discontinue or deny the duties to the petitioners with effect from 1-7-1990 for the post of Assistant knowing Typing till as regular appointment is made for the said post or till services of the petitioners are dispensed with in accordance with law. " The said order passed by the Court virtually granted the relief of prayer (ii) of the petition. 2. There was no interim order passed on the second writ application by this Honble High Court. 3. The case in the petition was that the petitioners No. 1, 2 and 3 were ap pointed temporary staff for a period of six months in the office of the respondents on and from 1-2-1990. Copy of the letter of appointment has been annexed as An-nexure-1 to the writ petition which reads as follows: "unit TRUST OF INDIa Gulab Bhawan, (Rear Block) 2nd Floor, 6, Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi New Delhi. Ref. Copy of the letter of appointment has been annexed as An-nexure-1 to the writ petition which reads as follows: "unit TRUST OF INDIa Gulab Bhawan, (Rear Block) 2nd Floor, 6, Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi New Delhi. Ref. No. Ut/nd 89-90 9-2-90 OFFICE ORDER No. UT/nd 296/89-90 The undernoted candidates have been ap pointed in the service of the Trust as Assistant knowing Typing on purely temporary and ad hoc basis with effect from 1-2-90 and posted to departments as indicated against their names. SI. No. Name Posted to 1. Sh. Prabhat Agnihotri K. K. O. 2. Sh. Sandeepagarwal. " 3. Sh. Sunilprakashsachan " 4. Sh. Abhay Saxena " They will be eligible for remuneration of Rs. 1883. 28 per month on pro rata basis. Their appointment will be only upto close of business on 28-2-90 and unless extended or terminated earlier will be deemed to have come to an end on the expiry of the aforesaid period. They will not be eligible for any other facility admissible to the regular staff of the trust nor will this temporary and ad hoc appointment confer on them any right to be considered for any post in the Trust. Their appointment will be subject to termina tion at any time without notice or compensation in lieu of notice. " Sd/-Illegible. " Petitioner No. 4 was appointed on 1-3-1990 on the said post on the same terms and conditions. The aforesaid let ters of appointment were duly accepted by the petitioners. While the petitioners were in service five persons were appointed on the post of Assistant knowing Typing with effect from 2-7-1990. Services of the petitioners were terminated on the expiry of the period of six months. While in set-vice and apprehending the termination of service even before the period of six months, the petitioners moved the aforesaid first writ petition before this Honble Court on the ground that the respondents had not filled up the post by making regular appointment and the petitioners were entitled to continue in service unless regular selections of Assis tant knowing Typing are made by the respondents. Secondly, it is alleged that new incumbents have been appointed as Assistant knowing Typing on 2nd July, 1990. Thirdly, the respondents were in dulging in unfair labour practice and acted in violation of Sections 25- G, 25-H and 25-Tof the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. Secondly, it is alleged that new incumbents have been appointed as Assistant knowing Typing on 2nd July, 1990. Thirdly, the respondents were in dulging in unfair labour practice and acted in violation of Sections 25- G, 25-H and 25-Tof the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. The respondents have filed counter-affidavit in the aforesaid matter and have denied the allegations made by the petitioners. It is submitted that since disputed questions of fact were involved in the writ petition, the same was not main tainable and the petitioners should be directed to move the proper forum for adjudication. The respondents submitted that remedy lay in filing a suit in Civil Court. It was further contended that the right and obligation referred to in the writ petition was contractual in nature and the matter should be instituted before the Civil Court. Further, it was submitted that the petitioners were appointed purely on temporary and ad hoc basis. The respon dents annexed to the said counter- affidavit the applications made by the petitioners for appointment as Assistant knowing Typing on temporary basis. The respon dents have also annexed the copy of the order passed on 9th February, 1990 which has been set out hereinabove. 5. As per the said letter of appoint ment the petitioners were appointed only for stipulated period and unless extended the services of the petitioners were to be terminated on the expiry of the stipulated period. They were not eligible to any fac ility admissible to regular staff of the Trust. 6. The petitioners in their rejoinder-affidavit have denied the receipt of the appointment letters of 9th February, 1990 or 20th March, 1990. It is alleged that only their signatures were taken on the back of their name on 20-5-1990. The petitioners have challenged Annexures-CA-6 and CA-7 in their rejoinder- affidavit and al leged the same to be false and fabricated papers. It was stated that CA-I and CA-IA annexed to the counter-affidavit were not legal and just. It is further averred that continuation in service of the petitioners after the expiry of stipulated period con ferred entitlement to continue on the post and the petitioners became permanent. 7. It was stated that CA-I and CA-IA annexed to the counter-affidavit were not legal and just. It is further averred that continuation in service of the petitioners after the expiry of stipulated period con ferred entitlement to continue on the post and the petitioners became permanent. 7. On the aforesaid facts, the Counsel for the petitioners argued that Writ Peti tion No. 19087 of 1990 be made absolute and urged that the petitioners were en titled to the protection of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-T of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Mr. VK. S. Chaudhary, appearing for the petitioners submitted that Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act has no application in the present case for the following reasons ; Firstly, no extension letter has been filed whereby contract was renewed for the months of March to June, 1990 and CA-6 an extension letter, filed by the respondents only relates to the month of July, 1990 whereby, contract was purportedly renewed. The said Annexure- CA-6 does not bear the signatures of the petitioners and the petitioners have not signed the office order. Secondly, the con tract was a bilateral agreement and in ab sence of the signatures of the petitioners the extension would not become contrac tual, as such the provisions of Section 2 (oo) (bb) were not applicable. It was fur ther urged that Annexures CA-1 and CA-1a dated 9-2-1990 and 20-3- 1990 have been signed by the petitioners long after the contract which already had ceased. Since no documents containing extension for months of March to June, 1990 have been disclosed, the continuity is broken and for this reason clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) is not applicable. Further, the re quirement of 240 days of service has no application for getting the benefit under Sections 25-G & 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further urged that the respondents had indulged in unfair labour practice and violated Section 2 (ra) read with Item No. 5 (a) (b) of the Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was further urged by the petitioners that workman has been defined under Section 2 (s) and in cludes all sorts of workmen temporary, ad hoc, daily wage earners and the law does not distinguish between one type of workman and another. 8. In support of the contentions, petitioners learned Counsel Sri VK. It was further urged by the petitioners that workman has been defined under Section 2 (s) and in cludes all sorts of workmen temporary, ad hoc, daily wage earners and the law does not distinguish between one type of workman and another. 8. In support of the contentions, petitioners learned Counsel Sri VK. S. Chaudhary relied on a large number of decisions. He referred to a Supreme Court decision 1996 Labour Industrial Cases 914, State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar Lal Gohlot, wherein the Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . When the appointment is for afixed period, unless there is finding that power under clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) was misused or vitiated by its mala fide exercise, it cannot be held that the termination is illegal. " Mr. Chaudhary further relied upon a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court 1987 Lab I. C. 1607, wherein an employee of the Allahabad University working as daily wager on contract basis having nearly 5 years service, was reinstated and the Court was pleased to hold that the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement. The Court observed: ". . . . . . . Terminations which are included in it are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated period orrompletion of work whichever may be earlier, may be covered in this clause. But if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate the claim of employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on anvil of fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb ). Because if it is left to employer not to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstance than the protection afforded to a workman by treating every termination of service as retrenchment shall be rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post ceases to exist or job comes to end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide. It cannot be ex tended to such cases where the job continues and the employees work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That would be unfair labour practice (See H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, (1985) 51 Fac. L. R. 494 1985 Lab 1c 1733 (SC ). From various Annexures filed with affidavits it is clear that some of petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years. Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular employee and not be casual, daily or seasonal worker. " The other decisions cited by the petitioners on Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act are that passed in Writ Petition No. 7770 of 1992, Uptron India Ltd. \. Presiding Officer & Ors. ; Kurukshchetra Central Cor poration Bank v. State of Haryana, 1993 LLR (P&h) 67, Ram Krishna Sharma v. Samrat Ashok Technical, 1995 LLR 225 (MP) and Bhikharam v. Presiding Officer, 1996 LIR 295 (P&h ). Further it was sub mitted that in cases where Sections 25-G and 25-H are applicable and if the retrenched workman has offered for re-employment, the retrenched workman should have preference over other persons to join the service, learned Counsel for the petitioners had cited a decision of Al lahabad High Court in Ram Bilas v. State of UP, (1990) 60 FLR 567 . Further, it was submitted that the principle of "first come and last go" should have been followed. 9. Mr. Further, it was submitted that the principle of "first come and last go" should have been followed. 9. Mr. S. N. Verma, appearing for the respondents has submitted that the letters of the respondent- department were duly accepted by the petitioners, which dis closed that the appointment of the petitioners was for a fixed period of one month only and their services were ex tended from time to time. Services of the petitioners No. 1 to 3 were extended upto 31-7-1990 whereas, petitioner No. 4 was granted extension uptill 31-8-1990. Mr. Verma has submitted that the respondents had at no time indulged in unfair labour practice. The petitioners were appointed on contractual basis, their appointments were for a stipulated period and at the end of the stipulated period their services came to an end. In that view of the matter, Section 2 (oo) (bb) is applicable and the petitioners cannot challenge the cessation of service as per the terms of the contract. The petitioners have alleged unfair labour practice against the respondents without furnishing any material. The only allega tion is that five new persons were ap pointed on temporary basis on 3-7-1990. The respondents nave alleged that provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act are only ap plicable in the case of termination of ser vices and not the cases falling under Sec tion 2 (oo) (bb ). Moreover, the principle of last come and first go can be made ap plicable if junior persons appointed in the capacity as temporary employee were al lowed to continue. No material had been disclosed by the petitioners required to be controverted by the respondents. Since the writ petition was filed by the petitioners while they were in service, there was no question of contravention of Section 25-G. Moreover, Sections 25-G and 25-H are also not applicable in the instant case, inasmuch as, no material on record has been placed to show that other persons were appointed in similar capacity without an opportunity to the petitioners. The respondents have further submitted that offers were made to the petitioners for appearing in interview and test for regular appointment twice during February and July, 1990 and though three of them made applications for appearing in the examina tion, they never appeared at the examina tion. Mr. The respondents have further submitted that offers were made to the petitioners for appearing in interview and test for regular appointment twice during February and July, 1990 and though three of them made applications for appearing in the examina tion, they never appeared at the examina tion. Mr. Verma has submitted that in the above facts, it cannot be considered that the respondents had indulged either in unfair labour practice or had violated the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. Mr. Verma argued that the respo ndents had appointed the petitioners on contractual basis and on the expiry of the contract, the services of the petitioners stood terminated. The petitioners were only ad hoc and temporary employees. Their employment having been extended from month to month and such employ ment was accepted by the petitioners themselves, it will be contrary to and in consistent with the provisions of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, if such cessation of service arising out of contract, would be construed as retrench ment of service, requiring the applicability of Sections 25-E 25-G and 25-H of the Act. Contractual services of the petitioners do not fall within the protection granted under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H. Mr. Verma submitted that no materials or par ticulars have been disclosed in the writ petition to show that the respondents at any stage had indulged in unfair labour practice. The burden lay on the petitioners to prove the unfair labour practice and this is a question of fact which the petitioners have miserably failed to prove. In any view of the matter, there should be a finding of fact by the proper forum making an en quiry of facts. The same was not allowed to be done by the petitioners. The petitioners should have gone either to the Civil Court or at last to the Industrial Tribunal which alone could have decided on various materials, whether there was any unfair labour practice. Since the petitioners have chosen the writ Court, this Court shall not entertain the disputed questions of fact and the writ petition should be dismissed on that ground alone. Since the petitioners have chosen the writ Court, this Court shall not entertain the disputed questions of fact and the writ petition should be dismissed on that ground alone. It was urged by Sri Verma that the allegation of the petitio ners that along with the affidavits filed by the respondents, certain documents had been filed which were false and fabricated, can only be tried and investigated into by the fact finding body and not by this Court sitting in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. It was urged by Mr. Verma that there is an equally efficacious and ade quate alternative remedy available to the petitioners that he could have moved the forum under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court. Instead of doing the same the petitioners have chosen to come to Writ Court where the disputed ques tions of fact were being asked to be decided. On the point of alternative remedy, Mr. Verma has cited the following decisions: 12. Mr. Verma has also relied on the Supreme Court decision (1994)2 SCC 323 , M. Venu gopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machi-lipatnama. P, wherein it has been held: ". . . . . . Any such termination, even if the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable in the case of the appellant, shall not be deemed to be "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2 (oo), having been covered by exception (bb ). Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2 (oo) there were only three exceptions so far as termination of the service of the workman was concerned, which had been excluded from the ambit of retrench ment- (a) voluntary retirement; (b) retirement on reaching the age of superannuation ; and (c) on ground of continued ill-health. This Court, from time to time, held that the definition of "retrenchment" being very wide and com prehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of "retrenchment". (State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala ). The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of "retrenchment". (State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala ). Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2 (oo) under clause (bb) the legislature has excluded from the purview of "retrenchment" (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry; (ii) such con tract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employ ment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo ). In the present case, the termination of service of the appellant is as a result of the contract of employment having been terminated under the stipulations specifically provided under Regula tion 14 and the order of the appointment of the appellant. In this background, non-compliance of the requirement of Section 25-F shall not vitiate or nullify the order of termination of the appellant. " 13. A Division Bench decision of this Court was cited by Mr. Varma, 1993 Lab. I. C. 836, Zakir Hussain v. Engineer-in-Chief Irrigation Department & Ors. , wherein it has been held that a person who is appointed on daily wages or on ad hoc basis, does not have right to post and his services can be terminated at any time. Mr. Verma further relied on a Supreme Court decision (1992) 4 SCC 33 , Director, In stitute of Management Development, U. P v. Pushpa Srivastava (SMT), where it was held that the appointment made on purely contractual and cd hoc basis on con solidated pay for fixed period can be ter minated without notice even if extended, from time to time. The employee had no right to continue in the post and to claim regularisation in service. It was further held that the appointment being contrac tual and ad hoc came to an end by efflux of time. Another decision of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Verma is (1992) 4 SCC 118 , State of Haryana & Ors. The employee had no right to continue in the post and to claim regularisation in service. It was further held that the appointment being contrac tual and ad hoc came to an end by efflux of time. Another decision of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Verma is (1992) 4 SCC 118 , State of Haryana & Ors. v. Piara Singh and others, where it was held that if an ad hoc and temporary employee continues for considerably long period, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his ap pointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. In J. & K. Public Service Commission & Ors. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan & Ors. , (1994) 2 SCC 630 , the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that process of selection for recruitment against existing or anticipated vacancies does not create a right to appointment. Such appointment has to be made on the basis of statutory Rules and the authorities have to follow the said Rules. In the in stant case, Mr. Verma submitted, the U. T. I, was a Selection Board which ap points regular employees of the Trust. The regular appointments are made on the basis of examination, tests and interview being held in accordance with the Rules framed. The workman who were employed on permanent basis, had appeared in the written test and interview and only on being selected they were appointed to the said post on regular basis. The petitioners knowingly did not appear in the examina tion to be appointed on regular basis and failed miserably when appeared pursuant to the orders of the Court. 14. I have considered the rival sub missions of Mr. V. K. S. Chaudhary and Mr. S. N. Verma carefully. I find that the letter of appointment issued by the respondent department was duly accepted by the petitioners show that the appointment was for a stipulated period of one month unless extended. This was a contract be tween the parties and on expiry of the contractual period the services of the petitioners stood terminated. It was made clear in the said letter that the petitioners shall not be eligible or entitled to other facilities available to regular staff. This was a contract be tween the parties and on expiry of the contractual period the services of the petitioners stood terminated. It was made clear in the said letter that the petitioners shall not be eligible or entitled to other facilities available to regular staff. Such period of service was extended from month to month till the month of July, 1990 and when the petitioners moved this Court asking their continuance of service till regular appointments were made, the Court was pleased to pass an order to that effect. In view of the aforesaid order of this Court the writ petition virtually succeeded at the interim stage and there was hardly any other relief to be granted. The matter has become infructuous as soon as regular appointments were made and services of the petitioners continued till the selection of regular staff and thereafter the same stood terminated. In my view of the mat ter, the petitioners have already succeeded in the writ application when the interim order dated 11-9-1990 was passed in Writ Petition No. 19087 of 1990. The said order was accepted by the petitioners as also the respondents, which continued to the benefit of the petitioners. 15. The other prayer regarding the declaration sought for by the petitioners in respect of unfair labour practice, in my opinion, is no more available to the petitioners, inasmuch as, they have ac cepted the order of the Court and con tinued to enjoy the benefit there under. In any view of the matter, this Court cannot entertain such plea unless the petitioners or the workman on introduction of facts and evidence before the appropriate forum or trial Court sufficiently proves that the respondents were indulging in un fair labour practice. The petitioners have chosen not to approach the forum under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court and this Court was not shown any evidence or material to show that the respondents were indulging in unfair labour practice. No material or sufficient material had been disclosed by the petitioners by introducing the same, which would show that the respondents indulged in unfair labour practice. However, if the petitioners have to succeed on prayer (i) of the writ petition, they must seek alterna tive remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court and this Court would not go into the disputed questions of fact. However, if the petitioners have to succeed on prayer (i) of the writ petition, they must seek alterna tive remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court and this Court would not go into the disputed questions of fact. Prayer No. (iii) is also refused by this Court inasmuch as, the terms of the appointment makes it abun dantly clear that such benefits will not be available to the petitioners who were not regular employees of the Unit Trust of India. In that view of the matter, the first petition fails. 16. Subject to the above, the first Writ Petition No. 19087/90 stands disposed of. 17. Second Writ Application No. 291 of 1990 has been filed after the petitioners services had come to an end on regular appointments having been made by the respondents in terms of the order dated 11- 9-1990. According to the petitioners new incumbents on me post of Assistant knowing Typing were recruited and ap pointed on and from 5th December, 1990. The Second petition was moved on the ground of unfair labour practice as also the violation of mandatory provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25- G, 25-H and 25-N of the Act. It was urged before this Court by Mr. VKS Chaudhary appearing for the petitioners that the petitioners had completed 240 days of service in the previous one year and were entitled to continue in service unless the services of the petitioners were retrenched in terms of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The second ground is of unfair labour practice and the prayer in the petition is that the order dated 5-12-1990, be quashed and the petitioners may be treated in ser vice and the respondents be directed to pay salary and other benefits admissible to the post with effect from 5-4-1990. 18. The respondents Counsel has relied upon a dated 5-12-1990 of the respondents wherein it was specifically said that the services of the petitioners came to an end on and from 6-12-1990 in terms of the order of the Court passed on llth September, 1990. The petitioners cannot be considered to be continuing in service within the definition of Section 25-B of the Act. They cannot take the advantage of the Courts order and count the 240 days on the basis of the extended service under the orders of the Court. Mr. The petitioners cannot be considered to be continuing in service within the definition of Section 25-B of the Act. They cannot take the advantage of the Courts order and count the 240 days on the basis of the extended service under the orders of the Court. Mr. Verma cited Broom as stated the maxim "actus curaie neminem gravabit" an Act of Court shall prejudice no man. Mr. Verma also cited the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (i) (1997) 5 SCC 112 -Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. &anr. v. U. P. S. E. B. & Ors. (ii) (1992) 3 SCC-1-Shree Chamundi Modes Ltd. v. Church of South India. It was submitted by Mr. Verma that contention of unfair labour practice on termination of petitioners services as per the orders of the Honble High Court, does not arise and is also not available to the petitioners in the instant case. The services of the petitioners stood ter minated in terms of the order of the High Court. In that view of the matter, it was urged, there was no unfair labour practice nor the same could be agitated before this Court. The said allegation could only be decided by the fact finding body. The petitioners having not approached the In dustrial Tribunal or Civil Court, such plea should not be allowed by this Honble Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents that the ser vices of the petitioners stood terminated in terms of the order of this Court passed on llth September, 1990 and the ground of unfair labour practice alleged by the petitioners, is not available to the petiti oners in the second writ petition. Further, I also agree that it is not a case of retrench ment u/s. 25-F inasmuch as, the petitio ners cannot be considered to have con tinued in service for more than 240 days in a year. In my view, the continuance of service of the petitioners on the strength of the order of this Court cannot be taken into consideration while computing the statutory requirement of 240 days in terms of Section 25-B of the Act. The Court cannot saddle the respondents and confer benefits on the petitioners by an interim order. In my view, the continuance of service of the petitioners on the strength of the order of this Court cannot be taken into consideration while computing the statutory requirement of 240 days in terms of Section 25-B of the Act. The Court cannot saddle the respondents and confer benefits on the petitioners by an interim order. It cannot prejudice a litigant and put him in the worst position at the inter im stage. In that view of the matter, the period for which the petitioners had worked under the orders of the High Court, has to be excluded for the purposes of computing 240 days under Section 25-B of the Act. If the period worked under the orders of the Court is excluded, it appears that the petitioners had not worked for 240 days. As such, in my view, there was no violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the workman/petitioners had not worked in continuous service for a year. As such, no notice under Section 25-F was necessary. Similarly, Section 25-G is also not applicable in the instant case, inasmuch as no facts have been disclosed to show that any new employee of the same category continued working with the respondents after the services of the petitioners stood terminated by efflux of time. The provisions of Section 25-H is also not available to the petitioners as there is no factual basis for the same. In any event, in my view, none of the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G or 25-H is applicable in cases of contractual empl oyment inasmuch as, the same is not within the scope of Industrial Disputes Act and the same cannot be agitated under the machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. Such a dispute could be agitated only before the Civil Court. 20. On consideration of above facts, the second petition No. 291 of 1991 also stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. To sum up- (1) Allegations of unfair labour practice is a question of fact and the same can be resolved only before the fact finding authority, i. e. , a Civil Court in a case of contractual employment and before an Industrial Tribunal. If it is a case of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. To sum up- (1) Allegations of unfair labour practice is a question of fact and the same can be resolved only before the fact finding authority, i. e. , a Civil Court in a case of contractual employment and before an Industrial Tribunal. If it is a case of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. (2) Contractual employment is beyond the authority of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same cannot be agitated utilising the machinery provided under the said Act. (3) Dispute arising out of cases falling under Section 2 (oo) but are contractual in na ture, cannot be agitated under the Industrial Disputes Act. (4) The protection under Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H cannot be availed of by a workman whose services fall under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the said Act. (5) The allegations of fraud, false and fabricated documents should be tried before a Civil Court or by an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be. (6) A person appointed under a contract or stipulation, may be absorbed by the employer as workman temporary, regular or permanent but it has to be proved on factual basis by adduc ing proper evidence before an appropriate forum. In the present case, such evidence is totally lacking. (7) The present case is full of disputed questions of fact and the same cannot be decided by the writ Court. The petitioners should have moved the appropriate Court or forum before coming to this Court. 21. However, taking a sympathetic view of the matter, I directed the respon dents to give the petitioners one more chance to sit at the examination and inter view and if they succeeded they might be absorbed in the organisation. The respon dents accordingly held the examination but the petitioners failed to pass the same by obtaining very low marks. At that stage, the petitioners Counsel submitted that the papers set were not meant for Assis tant Knowing Typing but for Officers Class and they disclosed a magazine, namely, "pratiyogita Darpan" and on the basis of the said magazine, the petitioners sub mitted that the question papers were not meant for the post of Assistant knowing Typing. At that stage, the petitioners Counsel submitted that the papers set were not meant for Assis tant Knowing Typing but for Officers Class and they disclosed a magazine, namely, "pratiyogita Darpan" and on the basis of the said magazine, the petitioners sub mitted that the question papers were not meant for the post of Assistant knowing Typing. The respondents, however, filed affidavit to show that similar papers were set for Assistant knowing Typing in the previous years as well and the present papers were also of the similar nature and the publication in Fratiyogita Darpan was not correct. At that stage, Mr. Chaudhary wanted the assistance of the Court for summoning the Editor of the said magazine. The Court pursuant to the prayer of the petitioners, issued summons to the Editor but he failed to appear before the Court. In that view of the matter, there was nothing before the Court to hold that the question papers set were not correct and the allegations of the petitioners have to be ignored. 22. Though I find no merit in the case of the petitioners and the writ petitions are dismissed accordingly. However, taking a sympathetic and lenient view and considering the facts that the dispute be tween the parties would take considerable time to be resolved to the detriment of both the parties, it will beproper and ap propriate that a sum of Rs. 50, 000 (Rs. Fifty thousand) be paid by the respondents to each of the petitioners as ex-gratia pay ment. The order is being made so that instead of fighting and spending unneces sary money, the petitioners can set up their own small business and be free from self- imposed torture. Such money shall be paid to the petitioners only on the petitioners agreeing to accept the same towards full and final settlement of all their claims and disputes, otherwise, the respondents shall not be liable to pay any amount, what soever, to the petitioners. If the payment made by the respondents is accepted by the petitioners, all litigations will come to an end between the parties and the petitioners shall not be entitled to agitate the issue any further. W. petitions dismissed. .